This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

296 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 296
Material to categorize
  1. Comments on Plato's Causal Explanation.D. Z. Andriopoulos - 2008 - Philosophical Inquiry 30 (3-4):115-143.
  2. Understanding Science: Why Causes Are Not Enough.Ruth Berger - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (2):306-332.
    This paper is an empirical critique of causal accounts of scientific explanation. Drawing on explanations which rely on nonlinear dynamical modeling, I argue that the requirement of causal relevance is both too strong and too weak to be constitutive of scientific explanation. In addition, causal accounts obscure how the process of mathematical modeling produces explanatory information. I advance three arguments for the inadequacy of causal accounts. First, I argue that explanatorily relevant information is not always information about causes, even in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3. Two Kinds of Causal Explanation.George Botterill - 2010 - Theoria 76 (4):287-313.
    To give a causal explanation is to give information about causal history. But a vast amount of causal history lies behind anything that happens, far too much to be included in any intelligible explanation. This is the Problem of Limitation for explanatory information. To cope with this problem, explanations must select for what is relevant to and adequate for answering particular inquiries. In the present paper this idea is used in order to distinguish two kinds of causal explanation, on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Evolutionary Developmental Biology and the Limits of Philosophical Accounts of Mechanistic Explanation.Ingo Brigandt - 2015 - In P.-A. Braillard & C. Malaterre (eds.), Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences. Springer. pp. 135–173.
    Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) is considered a ‘mechanistic science,’ in that it causally explains morphological evolution in terms of changes in developmental mechanisms. Evo-devo is also an interdisciplinary and integrative approach, as its explanations use contributions from many fields and pertain to different levels of organismal organization. Philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation are currently highly prominent, and have been particularly able to capture the integrative nature of multifield and multilevel explanations. However, I argue that evo-devo demonstrates the need for a (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  5. Towards an Aristotelean Theory of Scientific Explanation.B. A. Brody - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (1):20-31.
    In this paper, I consider a variety of objections against the covering-law model of scientific explanation, show that Aristotle was already aware of them and had solutions for them, and argue that these solutions are correct. These solutions involve the notions of nonHumean causality and of essential properties. There are a great many familiar objections, both methodological and epistemological, to introducing these concepts into the methodology of science, but I show that these objections are based upon misunderstandings of these concepts.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  6. Does IBE Require a "Model" of Explanation?Frank Cabrera - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    In this paper, I consider an important challenge to the popular theory of scientific inference commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE), one which has received scant attention. The problem is that there exists a wide array of rival models of explanation, thus leaving IBE objectionably indeterminate. First, I briefly introduce IBE. Then, I motivate the problem and offer three potential solutions, the most plausible of which is to adopt a kind of pluralism about the rival models of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Explanations Are Like Salted Peanuts. Why You Can't Cut the Route Toward Further Reduction.Daniel Cohnitz - unknown
    This paper is a defense of an elaborated ideal explanatory text conception against criticism as put forward by Bob Batterman. It is argued that Batterman's critique of "philosophical" accounts of scientific explanation is inadequate.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Train to Pyongyang: Imagination, Utopia, and Korean Unification.Samuel Gerald Collins - 2013 - Utopian Studies 24 (1):119-143.
    This article originated in a “cultural futures” course I taught in Seoul in 2007.1 As part of their semester project, students interviewed friends and family to identify futures that were likely to precipitate profound cultural shifts in their lives. Not surprisingly, “Korean unification” was at the top of students’ lists. After all, then-president Roh Moo-hyun had in many ways continued the “Sunshine” policies of his predecessor, President Kim Dae-jung, culminating in a largely symbolic train journey from the South to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. What is Philosophy? A Causal Explanation.Christopher Dicarlo - unknown - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Some Problems of Causal Explanation.Haskell Fain - 1963 - Mind 72 (288):519-532.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Errors of Measurement and Explanation-as-Unification.John Forge - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):41-61.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. The Structure of Physical Explanation.John Forge - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):203-226.
    Some features of physical science relevant for a discussion of physical explanation are mentioned. The D-N account of physical explanation is discussed, and it is seen to restrict the scope of explanation in physical science because it imposes the requirement that the explanandum must be deducible from the explanans. Analysis shows that an alternative view of scientific explanation, called the instance view, allows a wider range of physical explanations. The view is seen to be free from a certain class of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  13. The Relationship of Scientific Explanation to Models of Rationality.Eugenie Gatens-Robinson - 1983 - Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
    This work contrasts the formalist approach to defining explanation in science, exemplified in the Deductive-Nomenological Model of Carl G. Hempel, with the contextualist approach of Thomas Kuhn. It is argued that both of these attempts to define the explanatory processes of science are inadequate. A connection is made between the view of rationality upon which each view is based and the way that it defines explanation. It is argued that a process of thought, which scientific explanation represents, is considered rational (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Why Unification is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Explanation.Victor Gijsbers - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):481-500.
    In this paper, I argue that unification is neither necessary nor sufficient for explanation. Focusing on the versions of the unificationist theory of explanation of Kitcher and of Schurz and Lambert, I establish three theses. First, Kitcher’s criterion of unification is vitiated by the fact that it entails that every proposition can be explained by itself, a flaw that it is unable to overcome. Second, because neither Kitcher’s theory nor that of Schurz and Lambert can solve the problems of asymmetry (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  15. Causal Explanation Provides Knowledge Why.Olav Gjelsvik - 2007 - In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer. pp. 69--92.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Free Press. pp. 504.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   367 citations  
  17. Theoretical Explanation and Unification.Anne L. Hiskes - 1994 - In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 147--157.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. The Mechanist and the Snail.Christopher Read Hitchcock - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (1):91 - 105.
    Introduction: One of the most influential theories of scientific explanation to have emerged in the past two decades is Salmon's causal/mechanical theory (Salmon 1984). According to this account, scientific explanations describe a network of causal processes and interactions. In this paper, I will use an example from evolutionary biology to argue that the causal nexus, as characterized by Salmon, is not rich enough to account for many causal explanations in the sciences.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19. The Objects of Acceptance: Competing Scientific Explanations.Ronald C. Hopson - 1972 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:349 - 363.
    Important revisions and additions to the contemporary objectives of acceptance rules result from construing a theory of warranted inductive inference to presuppose an account of adequate scientific explanations. We conceive the objects of acceptance rules to be the best of competing scientific explanations. Our primary interest is to show how to construct an analysis of competing explanations. Hence our specific investigation concerns the interrelations between the criteria of adequacy for scientific explanations and the definitions of the modes of competition between (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Theoretical Explanation.R. I. G. Hughes - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):132-153.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  21. Explanation Revisited.David Kaplan - 1961 - Philosophy of Science 28 (4):429-436.
    In 'Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation', (see preceding article) Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague criticize the analysis of explanation offered by Hempel and Oppenheim in their 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation'. These criticisms are shown to be related to the fact that Hempel and Oppenheim's analysis fails to satisfy simultaneously three newly proposed criteria of adequacy for any analysis of explanation. A new analysis is proposed which satisfies these criteria and thus is immune to the criticisms brought against the earlier (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22. The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.
    We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuro- science explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phe- nomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive fields are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   49 citations  
  23. Idealization and Structural Explanation in Physics.Martin King - manuscript
  24. What Should We Expect of a Theory of Explanation?Barbara V. E. Klein - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:319 - 328.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a meta-theoretic characterization of what ought to be expected of a general theory of explanation, a theory of scientific explanation, and a theory of a kind of explanation. The view presented, called "the logico-normative view", is taken to be implicit in the work of a number of influential writers on the subject, including Hempel. The paper falls into three parts. First, a number of pre-theoretic assumptions are articulated. Second, the two concerns of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. On Deductive Non-Nomological Explanation.Sheldon Krimsky - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (2):303-308.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Zur Verteidigung Einiger Hempelscher Thesen Gegen Kritiken Stegmüllers.Michael Küttner - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):475 - 484.
    The aim of this paper is to defend some of C. G. Hempel's basic theses concerning the logic of explanation and prediction against criticisms recently made by W. Stegmüller. It is argued (very concisely) thatthese is no need for essentially pragmatic conditions in DN-arguments;only the structural identity sub-thesis “Every adequate prediction is ... an adequate explanation” can be held instead of the one Hempel has in mind;the notion of the ambiguity of probabilistic explanations should be reformulated;there is no need for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Discussion:Rational Explanation and Covering Laws.Paul Langham - 1972 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):471-479.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Rational Explanation and Covering Laws.Paul Langham - 1972 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):471-479.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. The Nature of Scientific Explanation.Antoine Lavoisier - 2009 - In Timothy J. McGrew, Marc Alspector-Kelly & Fritz Allhoff (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 245.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. The Nature of Explanation.Michael Martin - 1987 - International Studies in Philosophy 19 (3):59-59.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Situational Logic and Covering Law Explanations in History.Michael Martin - 1968 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):388 – 399.
    Donagan has argued (a) that the covering law model of explanation does not apply in certain cases in historical explanations; (b) that situational logic explanations do apply, and (c) that situational logic explanations are fundamentally different from covering law explanations. It is argued that (b) is false as Donagan construes situational logic explanations. Once situational logic explanations are correctly construed they are similar to Hempel's rational explanations in covering law forms — hence (c) is false if situational logic explanations are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. The Nature of Explanation.Walter T. Marvin - 1907 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (5):113-118.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. 3. Instance Vs. Classic Ontology: Intensions and Unification.D. W. Mertz - 2016 - In On the Elements of Ontology: Attribute Instances and Structure. De Gruyter. pp. 126-166.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. On Omer's Model of Scientific Explanation.Seppo K. Miettinen - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (2):249-251.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. Tuomela on Deductive Explanation.Charles G. Morgan - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4):511 - 525.
    Almost every formal model of explanation thus far proposed has been demonstrated to be faulty. In this paper, a new model, proposed by Raimo Tuomela, is also demonstrated to be faulty. In particular, one condition of the model is shown to be too restrictive, and another condition of the model is shown to be too permissive.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. On Two Proposed Models of Explanation.Charles G. Morgan - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (1):74-81.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. Kim on Deductive Explanation.Charles G. Morgan - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (3):434-439.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38. How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be?Bernhard Nickel - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):305-328.
    Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Reply to Krimsky on D-N Explanation.Thomas Nickles - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (2):309-315.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. On Causal Explanation.Nunn T. Percy - 1906 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7:50 - 80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Causal Individualism and the Unification of Anthropology.J. Tim O'Meara - 1999 - In E. L. Cerroni-Long (ed.), Anthropological Theory in North America. Bergin & Garvey. pp. 105--42.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. On the D-N Model of Scientific Explanation.I. A. Omer - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (3):417-433.
    This paper discusses the D-N model of scientific explanation. It is suggested that explanation is a part of assertive discourse where certain principles must be observed. Then use is made of the relation between the informative content and logical content of a sentence (as shown, for instance, by Popper) to draw some of the conditions necessary for a sound model. It is claimed that the conditions of the model proposed in the present paper exhaust the insights of the papers in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  43. Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach.Judea Pearl - manuscript
    We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions and resolves major difficultiesn in the traditional account.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Explanatory Unification and Conceptualization.Stefan Petkov - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3695-3717.
    There are several important criticisms against the unificationist model of scientific explanation: Unification is a broad and heterogeneous notion and it is hard to see how a model of explanation based exclusively on unification can make a distinction between genuine explanatory unification from cases of ordering or classification. Unification alone cannot solve the asymmetry and irrelevance problems. Unification and explanation pull in different directions and should be decoupled, because for good scientific explanation extra ad explanandum information is often required. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Scientific Explanation.Nicholas Rescher - 1970 - New York: Free Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  46. Scientific Explanation: From Covering Law to Covering Theory.Fritz Rohrlich - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:69 - 77.
    A new model of scientific explanation is proposed: the covering theory model. Its goal is understanding. One chooses the appropriate scientific theory and a model within it. From these follows the functioning of the explanandum, i.e. the way in which the model portrays it on one particular cognitive level. It requires an ontology and knowledge of the causal processes, probabilities, or potentialities (propensities) according to which it functions. This knowledge yields understanding. Explanations across cognitive levels demand pluralistic ontologies. An explanation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Explanation.David-Hillel Ruben (ed.) - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
    The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading. This volume presents a selection of the most important (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  48. Explaining Explanation.David-Hillel Ruben - 1990 - Routledge.
    Getting our Bearings The series in which this book is appearing is called 'The Problems of Philosophy: Their Past and Present'; this volume, ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  49. Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation: Regularities, Counterfactuals, and Noncausal Explanations.Juha Saatsi & Mark Pexton - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):613-624.
    We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jettisoning the causal aspect as constitutive of explanatory power in connection with regularity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  50. A Defense of a Unificationist Theory of Explanation.Rebecca Schweder - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):421-435.
    This paper defends a unificationist theory of explanation. I first explore the notion of understanding entrenched by the unificationist. Then I present an overview of various kinds of causal statements and explanations. It is claimed that only genuine causal law statements have explanatory power. Finally, I attempt to fit causal explanations into the unificationist theory of explanation. In this way, I try to provide an account of how causal explanations provide understanding of the phenomena that they explain.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 296