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Summary Theories of free will focus on two basic questions: its possibility and its nature. The possibility question is almost always concerned principally with whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism, as well as with closely related (putative) threats like God's foreknowledge. Philosophers may be either compatibilists or incompatibilists with regard to the relation between freedom and determinism. Of course philosophers are particularly concerned with whether free will is actual. Questions of the nature of free will are usually addressed in conjunction with the compatibility question: philosophers develop accounts of free will in order to show that it is or is not compatible with causal determinism. The typology of these accounts appears under the sibling category "topics in free will".
Key works Contemporary theorists of free will divide into compatibilists, incompatibilists and impossibilists in the main. The most important contemporary compatibilist is probably John Martin Fischer (Fischer & Ravizza 1998) though real self views are increasingly influential (Arpaly 2002Scanlon 2008). Incompatibilists traditionally divide into hard determinists, who hold that free will is incompatible with determinism and determinism is true and libertarians. Libertarians, in turn, divide into agent-causal theorists (e.g. O'Connor 2000) and event-causal theorists (e.g. Kane 1996). Impossibilism has never been popular but seems to be growing slightly (see for instance Strawson 1994). Derk Pereboom's near-impossibilism is also influential (Pereboom 2001). 
Introductions O'Connor 2005;McKenna 2008; Clarke & Capes ms; Levy & McKenna 2009
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  1. Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. [REVIEW]B. M. A. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):374-375.
  2. Freedom of the Will. [REVIEW]C. P. A. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 11 (1):163-163.
  3. Possibilità E Libertà.Nicola Abbagnano - 1957 - Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):78-80.
  4. Free-Will and Moral Responsibility in the Works of Charles Arthur Campbell.Natalie Abrams - 1972 - Dissertation, Columbia University
  5. The American Commonsense Philosophers on Determinism and Agent Causality.Todd Llewellyn Adams - 1986 - Dissertation, University of Kentucky
    The focus of this dissertation is on the American commonsense philosophers in the first half of the nineteenth century. The primary issue dealt with is the agency theory of these philosophers and how that related to the debate concerning freedom and determinism. The essential Americans in this debate are Alexander Campbell, Asa Mahan, Henry Tappan, and Thomas Upham. Each one was committed to the fundamental principles of the commonsense philosophy, and so supported the view that man acts freely. They were (...)
  6. Die Letzte Revolution.Christian Adelt - 1970 - F. Schöningh.
  7. Ii Blasco Disputatio: Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities? Blasco Disputatio is a Yearly Workshop Designed to Promote the Discussion on Topics in Epistemology, Metaphysics, the Philosophy of Mind and the Philosophy of Language. Each Edition of This Workshop Focuses on a Particular Issue to Be Disputed by Two Invited Speakers That Will Defend Divergent, If Not Opposing, Views. A Call for Papers Will Be Made for Contributions That Will Explore Further Aspects of the Topic. The 2016 Edition of the Blasco Disputatio Will Be Mainly Focused on the Question of Whether Free Will Requires Alternative Possibilities and on the Role of Causation in a Proper Understanding of Freedom, but It is Open to Discussing Any Related Issues in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Action. The Invited Papers, Together with a Selection of the Submitted Papers, Will Appear on a Special Issue in the Journal Disputatio. [REVIEW] Admin - 2015 - Disputatio.
  8. Now Published: Vol. VI, No. 38, May 2014. Includes the LanCog Lectures in Metaphysics 2013 by Peter van Inwagen. Admin - 2014 - Disputatio.
  9. Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen.John Christopher Adorno (ed.) - forthcoming
  10. Freedom and Responsibility of Science.Evandro Agazzi - 1983 - Epistemologia 6:5.
  11. The Ethics of Free Soloing.Marcus Agnafors - 2010 - In Stephen E. Schmid (ed.), Climbing - Philosophy for Everyone: Because It's There. Wiley-Blackwell.
  12. Nature's Capacities.Charlotte Alderwick - 2016 - Angelaki 21 (4):59-76.
    This paper draws a number of parallels between Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and contemporary work in the metaphysics of powers. This concept is being applied to a range of debates, however a distinct lack of work exists focusing on extending this concept to ontology as a whole. I argue that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie provides insight into what this kind of system would look like. I begin with a brief outline of the characterisation and use of powers in the contemporary literature to show the (...)
  13. Kuno Fischer: An Estimate of His Life and Work.Archibald B. D. Alexander - 1908 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (3):57-64.
  14. More About the Paradigm-Case Argument.H. G. Alexander - 1957 - Analysis 18 (5):117 - 120.
  15. An Examination of the Problem of Physical Determinism.John Gerald Alexander - 1970 - Dissertation, University of Oregon
  16. Responsibility, Manipulation, and Resentment.David Alm - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (2):253-274.
    The paper presents a compatibilist explanation of why manipulated agents are not responsible for the actions that result from the manipulation. I first show that an agent’s having reason to resent being manipulated into action is a sufficient condition for his not being responsible for that action, and so an adequate explanation of the latter fact in standard cases in which the agent does have reason to resent. I then consider some cases in which, apparently, manipulation is not cause for (...)
  17. Free and Equal: A Philosophical Examination of Political Values By Richard Norman Oxford University Press, 1987 178 Pp., £6.95. [REVIEW]Brenda Almond - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (244):276-.
  18. Comments on Heidi Tiedke’s €Œis Knowledge Ever Constitutive of Freedom?€.Peter Alward - unknown
               According to Tiedke, in order for an act to be free it must satisfy two requirements: (PR) The agent must have been the source of the action. (PAP) It must have been possible for the agent to have done otherwise. Different accounts of freedom cash these conditions out in different ways. The Standard Compatibilist offers the following versions of these principles: (PRSC) The agent’s choice was a link in the (...)
  19. Rationality and Freedom.Elizabeth Anderson - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):253-271.
  20. Scientific Essentialism, Could've Done Otherwise, And the Possibility of Freedom.Erik Anderson - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:13-20.
    Philosophers concerned with the problem of freedom and determinism differ strikingly over the analysis of the concept of human freedom of the will. Compatibilists and incompatibilists, determinists and indeterminists populate the conceptual landscape with a dizzying array of theories differing in complex and subtle ways. Each of these analyses faces an under-appreciated potential challenge: the challenge from scientific essentialism. Might all traditional analyses of freedom of the will be radically ill-conceived because the concept—the nature of freedom itself—is something discoverable only (...)
  21. Freedom and the Environment: Reply to Critics.Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal - 1994 - Critical Review 8 (3):461-465.
  22. Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom Reviewed By.Chrisoula Andreou - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23 (3):217-220.
  23. Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom. [REVIEW]Chrisoula Andreou - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23:217-220.
  24. Matrix-Thoughts, is It a Compatibilist Solution to Transfer Cases?Silvia Andres Balsera - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):129-144.
  25. Were You a Zygote?G. E. M. Anscombe - 1984 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 18:111-115.
  26. Causality and Determinism.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1971 - Cambridge University Press.
    I IT is often declared or evidently assumed that causality is some kind of necessary connexion, or alternatively, that being caused is — non-trivially ...
  27. Three Philosophical Dialogues on Truth, on Freedom of Choice, on the Fall of the Devil.Thomas Anselm & Williams - 2002
  28. Determinism Versus Freedom in Freud.Jose Antonio Guerrero del Amo - 2009 - Pensamiento 65 (243):117-142.
  29. Jiyåujin No Kiseki Kindai No Bungaku to Shisåo.Shigeru åowada - 1993 - Musashino Shobåo.
  30. Freedom Not to Be Free.David Archard - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):453.
  31. God and Freedom in Human Experience, by Bernard Muscio. [REVIEW]C. F. D' Arcy - 1915 - Ethics 26:436.
  32. The Discourse of Freedom.Vilhjalmur Arnason - 1988 - Rechtstheorie 19 (4):491-501.
  33. Anagogical Vision and Comedic Form in Flannery O'Connor.Denise T. Askin - 2004 - Renascence 57 (1):47-62.
  34. Freedom and Determinism in Indian Thought.J. P. Atreya - 1974 - Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy 4:289-291.
  35. Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion.Robert N. Audi - 1974 - American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
    This paper sets out and defends an account of free action and explores the relation between free action and moral responsibility. Free action is analyzed as a certain kind of uncompelled action. The notion of compulsion is explicated in detail, And several forms of compulsion are distinguished and compared. It is argued that contrary to what is usually supposed, A person may be morally responsible for doing something even if he did not do it freely. On the basis of the (...)
  36. The Meaning of Life and Other Essays.A. J. Ayer - 1990
  37. The Road to Inner Freedom.J. E. B. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 11 (1):168-168.
  38. The Freedom to Read.L. K. B. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 11 (2):349-350.
  39. Liberty and Community.A. M. B. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 28 (2):359-360.
  40. La terminologie de M. Shadworth Hodgson.E. B. - 1879 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 7:477 - 479.
  41. Laws of Freedom.R. J. B. - 1965 - Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):152-153.
  42. Genetic Determinism, Neuronal Determinism, and Determinism Tout Court.Bernard Baertschi & Alexandre Mauron - 2011 - In Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 151.
    This article analyses neuronal determinism and mentions that at first sight it appears to be a type of qualified determinism. Neurodeterminism is better conceived as determinism tout court when it is applied to human beings. It differs importantly from genetic determinism, together the two views that are often regarded as similar in form if not in content. Moreover, the article examines the question of genetic determinism, because it is a paradigm of qualified determinism. It then explains the meaning of determinism (...)
  43. Conference Briefing 30 Free Will and Determinism Ron Wilburn Et Al.Julian Baggini - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 13.
  44. Free to Choose.Julian Baggini - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 11:37-40.
  45. The Bounds of Freedom About the Eastern and Western Approaches to Freedom.Oded Balaban & Anan Erev - 1995
  46. Replies to McKenna, Pereboom, and Kane.Mark Balaguer - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-22.
  47. Determinism: False and True.Frank Ballard - 1911
  48. Temporal Dynamics and Decomposition of Reciprocal Determinism: A Reply to Phillips and Orton.Albert Bandura - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (2):166-170.
  49. Implementing Revisionism: Assessing a Revisionist Theory of Moral Responsibility.Frédéric-Ismaël Banville - 2012 - Ithaque 10:115-135.
    The aim of this paper is to examine a particular substantive theory among others in the set of “revisionist” theories of moral responsibility, namely, Manuel Vargas’ version of the moral influence account of the justification of responsibility- specific practices. Moderate revisionism, which Vargas endorses, advocates a clear distinction between descriptive and normative questions, which enables a naturalistically plausible account of responsibility that does not jeopardize the normative aspect. However, while Vargas provides a useful framework for thinking about revisionism, I argue (...)
  50. A Modal Version of Free Logic.Juan L. Barba - 1989 - Topoi 8 (2):131-135.
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