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  1. LA INTUICIÓN EN JACQUES MARITAIN.Miguel Acosta - 2012 - In Manuel Oriol (ed.), Inteligencia y Filosofía. Madrid, Spain: Marova. pp. 383-400.
    La intuición es un tipo de conocimiento que consiste en captar de modo inmediato la esencia de las cosas y comprenderlas de forma directa sin llevar a cabo un proceso discursivo. Algunas filosofías rechazan este modo de conocer por ser falible, otros la enmarcan dentro de los fenómenos extrasensoriales e incluso paranormales. En este trabajo se considera la intuición en Jacques Maritain, no en su aspecto de fenómeno sobrenatural, sino como una vía de aprehensión de la realidad adquirida por métodos (...)
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  2. A Machine That Knows Its Own Code.Samuel A. Alexander - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (3):567-576.
    We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
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  3. The Benefits of Prototypes: The Case of Medical Concepts.Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto - 2017 - Reti, Saperi E Linguaggi, The Italian Journal of Cognitive Sciences, 2017 3.
    In the present paper, we shall discuss the notion of prototype and show its benefits. First, we shall argue that the prototypes of common-sense concepts are necessary for making prompt and reliable categorisations and inferences. However, the features constituting the prototype of a particular concept are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for determining category membership; in this sense, the prototype might lead to conclusions regarded as wrong from a theoretical perspective. That being said, the prototype remains essential to handling most (...)
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  4. Elaborating Aquinas' Epistemology: From Being to Knowledge.Nicholas Chukwudike Anakwue - 2017 - Philosophy Pathways 216:1-12.
    Amidst the broad divergence in opinion of philosophers and scientists at understanding reality that has lent character to the historical epochs of the Philosophical enterprise, the crucial realization has always been, of the necessity of Epistemology in our entire program of making inquiry into ‘What Is’. This realization seems born out of the erstwhile problem of knowing. Epistemology, which investigates the nature, sources, limitations and validating of knowledge, offers a striking challenge here. Since we have no direct access to our (...)
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  5. A Little Idealism Is Idealism Enough.Luis M. Augusto - 2006 - Idealistic Studies 36 (1):61-73.
    Given the evidence available today, we know that the later Middle Ages knew strong forms of idealism. However, Plato alone will not do to explain some of its features. Aristotle was the most important philosophical authority in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but until now no one dared explore in his thought the roots of this idealism because of the dogma of realism surrounding him. I challenge this dogma, showing that the Stagirite contained in his thought the roots of idealist (...)
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  6. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. By John Greco. (Cambridge UP, 2010. Pp. X + 205. Price £17.99/US$29.99.). [REVIEW]Guy Axtell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):208-211.
    A Review of John Greco's book Acheiving Knowledge. The critical points I make involve three claims Greco makes that represent common ground between the reliabilists (including agent reliabilists like himself) and the character epistemologists (which would include myself): I. Such virtues are often needed to make our cognitive abilities reliable (to turn mere faculties into excellences); II. Such virtues might be essentially involved in goods other than knowledge; III. Such virtues might be valuable in themselves.
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  7. Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses?Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.
    The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. (...)
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  8. Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief.Nathan Ballantyne - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  9. The Role of Reflexivity in Understanding Human Understanding.Steven James Bartlett - 1992 - In Steven J. Bartlett (ed.), Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co.. pp. 3--18.
    The Introduction to the collection of papers, _Reflexivity: A Source-book in Self-reference_. The Introduction studies the limits of our understanding that we carry unavoidably with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and (...)
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  10. Safety, Virtue, Scepticism: Remarks on Sosa.Peter Baumann - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (45):295-306.
    Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to a wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some of his core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start with a discussion of the safety account of knowledge – a view he has championed and further developed over the years. I continue with some questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistemic virtue for our understanding of knowledge. Safety and virtue (...)
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  11. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. [REVIEW]Peter Baumann - 2000 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54 (2).
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  12. Epistemology Modalized.Kelly Becker - 2007 - Routledge.
    Introduction: externalism and modalism -- Externalism -- Modalism -- What should the theory do? -- What's missing? -- Process reliabilism -- Goldman's causal theory -- Goldman's discrimination requirement and relevant alternatives -- Process reliabilism and why it is not enough -- Implications for skepticism -- Sensitivity -- Nozick's subjunctive conditional theory of knowledge -- Methods : an important refinement -- Objections to nozicks theory -- Safety -- Motivating safety -- Weak and strong safety : luck and induction -- Is safety (...)
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  13. Knowledge Without Belief.Carolyn Black - 1971 - Analysis 31 (5):152-158.
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  14. Getting Off the Wheel.Patrick Bondy & Dustin Olson - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):620-637.
    Roderick Chisholm argues that in giving an account of knowledge, we must either begin with an account of what knowledge is, and proceed on that basis to identify the particular things that we know, or else start with instances of knowledge, and proceed on that basis to formulate a definition of knowledge. Either approach begs the question against the other. This is the epistemic wheel. This article responds to Chisholm's challenge. It begins with cases of knowledge attribution and builds its (...)
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  15. A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75 - 81.
    This is a reply to John N. Williams’ paper “Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge'” (2015). That paper argues that Peter Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. Klein himself answered a version of this objection in his (1971). Williams’ paper adds a new twist to the 1971 objection. I argue that Williams’ objection misses its target because of this new twist.
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  16. In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman.Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2987–3001.
    According to proper functionalist theories of warrant, a belief is warranted only if it is formed by cognitive faculties that are properly functioning according to a good, truth-aimed design plan, one that is often thought to be specified either by intentional design or by natural selection. A formidable challenge to proper functionalist theories is the Swampman objection, according to which there are scenarios involving creatures who have warranted beliefs but whose cognitive faculties are not properly functioning, or are poorly designed, (...)
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  17. Introduction: Knowledge Ascriptions - Their Semantics, Cognitive Bases and Social Functions.Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-30.
  18. An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims.Joel Buenting - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (2):99-104.
    Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation “S knows p rather than q”. I argue that “S knows p rather than q” is often equivalent to “S knows p rather than not-p” and hence equivalent to “S knows p”. The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.
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  19. Why Should the Logic of Discovery Be Revived?Carlo Cellucci - 2014 - In E. Ippoliti (ed.), Heuristic Reasoning. Springer. pp. 11-27.
    Three decades ago Laudan posed the challenge: Why should the logic of discovery be revived? This paper tries to answer this question arguing that the logic of discovery should be revived, on the one hand, because, by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, mathematical logic fails to be the logic of justification, and only reviving the logic of discovery logic may continue to have an important role. On the other hand, scientists use heuristic tools in their work, and it may be useful (...)
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  20. Accidentally True Belief and Warrant.Andrew Chignell - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
    The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by (...)
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  21. The Normative Evaluation of Belief and the Aspectual Classification of Belief and Knowledge Attributions'.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (10):588–612.
    It is a piece of philosophical commonsense that belief and knowledge are states. Some epistemologists reject this claim in hope of answering certain difficult questions about the normative evaluation of belief. I shall argue, however, that this move offends not only against philosophical commonsense but also against ordinary common sense, at least as far as this is manifested in the semantic content of the words we use to talk about belief and knowledge. I think it is relatively easily to show (...)
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  22. What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
    The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does know. I (...)
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  23. Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception.Christian Coseru - 2009 - Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  24. Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application.Ron de Weijze - manuscript
    Finding truth is an art that was learned and unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for independent confirmation of our beliefs, by reality. This methodology is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. A completely different social order is implied and the one keeps running the other into the ground like a tectonic plate. Philosophical Modernism showed us how dualism works, before Post-Modernism challenged it, regressing (...)
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  25. Knowledge Generation as Natural Computation.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2008 - Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics 6 (2).
    Knowledge generation can be naturalized by adopting computational model of cognition and evolutionary approach. In this framework knowledge is seen as a result of the structuring of input data (data → information → knowledge) by an interactive computational process going on in the agent during the adaptive interplay with the environment, which clearly presents developmental advantage by increasing agent’s ability to cope with the situation dynamics. This paper addresses the mechanism of knowledge generation, a process that may be modeled as (...)
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  26. An Introduction to Connective Knowledge.Stephen Downes - 2008 - In Theo Hug (ed.), Media, Knowledge & Education - Exploring new Spaces, Relations and Dynamics in Digital Media Ecologies. Innsbruck University Press.
    This paper provides an overview of connective knowledge. It is intended to be an introduction, expressed as non-technically as possible.
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  27. On Bolzano’s Alleged Explicativism.Jacques Dubucs & Sandra Lapointe - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):229-246.
    Bolzano was the first to establish an explicit distinction between the deductive methods that allow us to recognise the certainty of a given truth and those that provide its objective ground. His conception of the relation between what we, in this paper, call "subjective consequence", i.e., the relation from epistemic reason to consequence and "objective consequence", i.e., grounding however allows for an interpretation according to which Bolzano advocates an "explicativist" conception of proof: proofs par excellence are those that reflect the (...)
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  28. Qu’est-ce que la connaissance?Julien Dutant - 2010 - Vrin.
    Dans cet ouvrage, l’auteur discute d’abord un un ensemble d’idées de sens commun qui permettent de mieux cerner la notion de connaissance : nous savons beaucoup de choses, ce que nous savons ne vient pas toujours des sciences, tout ce que nous savons est vrai, la connaissance est le but de l’enquête, on ne doit croire et affirmer que ce que l’on sait, on ne doit agir que sur la base de ce que l’on sait, la connaissance a de la (...)
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  29. History of Epistemology.Chad Engelland - 2013 - In R. L. Fastiggi (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia 2012-2013: Ethics and Philosophy. Gale (2013).
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  30. Hegels Theorie der Intelligenz Als Grundlegung der Unmöglichkeit des Unvernünftigen.Hector Ferreiro - 2015 - In Christoph Asmuth & Simon Gabriel Neuffer (eds.), Irrationalität. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. pp. 71-81.
    Hegel definiert „Vernunft” als die Einheit der Objektivität und der Subjektivität. Diese Definition bedeutet nicht, dass für Hegel nur das Subjekt existiert, welches sich das Objekt dementsprechend nur in seinem Inneren vorstellt; eine solche Definition bedeutet nämlich nicht, dass es für Hegel keine Außenwelt gibt, sondern eigentlich, dass es für ihn nichts gibt, was als solches unvernünftig ist. Als Einheit des Subjekts, das erkennt, und des Objekts, das erkannt wird, umfasst die Vernunft für Hegel alles, was es gibt und geben (...)
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  31. La Relación Entre Lenguaje y Pensamiento En El Sistema Hegeliano.Hector Ferreiro - 2010 - In Carlos Oliva Mendoza (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, experiencia y fenomenología. México, D.F.: Ediciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. pp. 21-33.
    Además de la percepción sensible y del conocimiento por medio de conceptos abstractos, Hegel distingue una tercera forma específica de conocer de la inteligencia humana, a saber: el “pensar”. Hegel define el pensar como la unidad del objeto y el sujeto. Ahora bien, ¿no es el objeto exterior dado a la percepción sensible después de todo siempre diferente del contenido de la representación abstracta del sujeto? Si con la categoría “pensar” Hegel no se refiere en realidad a una forma más (...)
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  32. Ernest Sosa's epistemology and other theories of knowledge.Pris Francois-Igor - 2017 - Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology 1:36-44.
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  33. Epistemology and Information.Dretske Fred - 2008 - In Pieter Adriaans & Johan Van Benthem (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 8. Philosophy of Information. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier-North Holland. pp. 29-47.
  34. Gettier’s Classic Irrelevance.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    Edmund Gettier’s three-page article is generally regarded as a classic of epistemology. I argue that Gettier cases depend upon three false assumptions and are irrelevant to the theory of knowledge. I suggest that we follow Karl Popper in abandoning subject-centred epistemologies in favour of theories of objective knowledge.
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  35. Against Knowledge-First Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - In Gordon and Jarvis Carter (ed.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
    I begin by criticizing reductionist knowledge-first epistemology according to which knowledge can be used to reductively analyze other epistemic phenomena. My central concern is that proponents of such an approach commit a similar mistake to the one that they charge their opponents with. This is the mistake of seeking to reductively analyze basic epistemic phenomena in terms of other allegedly more fundamental phenomena. I then turn to non-reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology. Specifically, I consider the knowledge norms of assertion and (...)
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  36. ¿Una creencia verdadera justificada es conocimiento? [Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?].Edmund L. Gettier & Paulo Vélez León - 2013 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 2 (3):185-193.
    [ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963), de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, (1963) by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief».
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  37. Some Reflections on Gettier's Problem.Azam Golam - 2006 - The Dhaka University Studies,June 2006 (1):83-97.
  38. The Delude.Yoji K. Gondor (ed.) - 2013 - Sintesi Point Publishing.
    The amount of data to which a human is exposed has increased over time. The Delude is defined here as an individual that is overwhelmed by various incoherent and false assertions that data contains. This writing is a philosophical study that reflects on the epistemic conditions in which knowledge is accumulated. It is obvious that large amounts of falsehood, when regarded as truth, can induce heavy damage to anyone's intellect. -/- Frequently, a faulty mental state is induced by corrupt knowledge. (...)
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  39. Theaetetus Part II: A Dialogical Review.William M. Goodman - 2009 - In J. Tartaglia (ed.), Richard Rorty: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Routledge.
    After some years (or millennia) most works would no longer be considered eligible for "review." But an exception is called for, if the thrust of an older work is closely paralleled in a much more modern piece, as is the case between Plato's Theaetetus and Richard Rorty's acclaimed, and more recent volume, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. To fully understand and appreciate Rorty 's contribution to the subjects he raises, one must study his book in conjunction with Plato's Theaetetus-where (...)
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  40. The Lattice Milieu.Rowan Grigg - unknown
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  41. The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions.Michael Hannon - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
    Knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are a central area of research in philosophy. But why do humans think and talk about knowledge? What are knowledge ascriptions for? This article surveys a variety of proposals about the role of knowledge ascriptions and attempts to provide a unified account of these seemingly distinct views.
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  42. The Universal Core of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):769-786.
    Many epistemologists think we can derive important theoretical insights by investigating the English word ‘know’ or the concept it expresses. However, fewer than six percent of the world’s population are native English speakers, and some empirical evidence suggests that the concept of knowledge is culturally relative. So why should we think that facts about the word ‘know’ or the concept it expresses have important ramifications for epistemology? This paper argues that the concept of knowledge is universal: it is expressed by (...)
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  43. Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1119-1146.
    This paper defends the epistemological doctrine of fallibilism from recent objections. In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence BonJour argues that we should reject fallibilism for two main reasons: first, there is no adequate way to specify what level of justification is required for fallible knowledge; second, we cannot explain why any level of justification that is less than fully conclusive should have the significance that makes knowledge valuable. I will reply to these challenges in a way that allows me to (...)
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  44. Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information?Michael Hannon - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1069-1076.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is that (...)
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  45. Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.Donna Haraway - 1988 - Feminist Studies 14 (3):575-599.
  46. Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...)
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  47. Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge.Tristan Haze - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):309-311.
    I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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  48. A Sharp Eye for Kinds: Plato on Collection and Division.Devin Henry - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 41 (January):229-55.
    This paper focuses on two methodological questions that arise from Plato’s account of collection and division. First, what place does the method of collection and division occupy in Plato’s account of philosophical inquiry? Second, do collection and division in fact constitute a formal “method” (as most scholars assume) or are they simply informal techniques that the philosopher has in her toolkit for accomplishing different philosophical tasks? I argue that Plato sees collection and division as useful tools for achieving two distinct (...)
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  49. Klaus Hentschel and Dieter Hoffmann : Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker: Physics–Philosophy–Peace Research. [REVIEW]Kay Herrmann - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):405-409.
    Klaus Hentschel and Dieter Hoffmann Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker: Physics – Philosophy – Peace Research -/- Review by Kay Herrmann.
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  50. Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): Eine Philosophie der Exakten Wissenschaften.Kay Herrmann - 1994 - Tabula Rasa. Jenenser Zeitschrift Für Kritisches Denken (6).
    Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): A Philosophy of the Exact Sciences -/- Shortened version of the article of the same name in: Tabula Rasa. Jenenser magazine for critical thinking. 6th of November 1994 edition -/- 1. Biography -/- Jakob Friedrich Fries was born on the 23rd of August, 1773 in Barby on the Elbe. Because Fries' father had little time, on account of his journeying, he gave up both his sons, of whom Jakob Friedrich was the elder, to the Herrnhut Teaching (...)
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