Theories of Mathematics, Misc

Gives two pared-down versions of the argument from design, which may prove more persuasive as to a Creator, discusses briefly the mathematics underpinning disbelief and nonbelief and its misuse and some proper uses, moves to why the full argument is needed anyway, viz., to demonstrate Providence, offers a theory as to how miracles (open and hidden) occur, viz. the replacement of any particular mathematics underlying a natural law (save logic) by its most appropriate nonstandard variant. -/- Note: This is an (...) extended abstract; there are no present plans to complete it. (shrink)

Hilbert's axiomatic approach was an optimistic take over on the side of the logical foundations. It was also a response to various restrictive views of mathematics supposedly bounded by the reaches of epistemic elements in mathematics. A complete axiomatization should be able to exclude epistemic or ontic elements from mathematical theorizing, according to Hilbert. This exclusion is not necessarily a logicism in similar form to Frege's or Dedekind's projects. That is, intuition can still have a role in mathematical reasoning. Nevertheless, (...) this role is to be given a structural orientation with the help of explications of the underlying logic of axiomatization. (shrink)

The paper presents a proof of the consistency of Peano Arithmetic (PA) that does not lie in deducing its consistency as a theorem in an axiomatic system. PA’s consistency cannot be proved in PA, and to deduce its consistency in some stronger system PA+ is self-defeating, since the stronger system may itself be inconsistent. Instead, a semantic proof is constructed which demonstrates consistency not relative to the consistency of some other system but in an absolute sense.

This paper argues that, insofar as we doubt the bivalence of the Continuum Hypothesis or the truth of the Axiom of Choice, we should also doubt the consistency of third-order arithmetic, both the classical and intuitionistic versions. -/- Underlying this argument is the following philosophical view. Mathematical belief springs from certain intuitions, each of which can be either accepted or doubted in its entirety, but not half-accepted. Therefore, our beliefs about reality, bivalence, choice and consistency should all be aligned.

The article reconstructs Jean Cavaillès’s polemical engagement with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy of mathematics. I argue that Cavaillès’s encounter with Husserl clarifies the scope and ambition of Cavaillès’s philosophy of the concept by identifying three interrelated epistemological problems in Husserl’s phenomenological method: (1) Cavaillès claims that Husserl denies a proper content to mathematics by reducing mathematics to logic. (2) This reduction obliges Husserl, in turn, to mischaracterize the significance of the history of mathematics for the philosophy of mathematics. (3) Finally, (...) Husserl’s phenomenology distorts the nature of mathematical experience. Accordingly, Cavaillès’s philosophy of mathematics is premised on a threefold affirmation designed to overcome these inadequacies. Cavaillès claims that mathematics is an autonomous field of conceptual production that cannot be reduced to logical, psychological, or phenomenological descriptions of conceptual genesis. Two important corollaries follow: the history of mathematics must guide the philosophy of mathematics, and mathematical experience itself must be described according to the mechanisms of a novel theory of mathematical abstraction. In what follows, I demonstrate that Cavaillès’s encounter with Husserl does not merely describe a polemical engagement with a rival philosophical position; it allows us to reconstruct Cavaillès’s own highly original contributions to the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

A proof of Fermat’s last theorem is demonstrated. It is very brief, simple, elementary, and absolutely arithmetical. The necessary premises for the proof are only: the three definitive properties of the relation of equality (identity, symmetry, and transitivity), modus tollens, axiom of induction, the proof of Fermat’s last theorem in the case of.

The hard problem of consciousness is explicating how moving matter becomes thinking matter. Harder yet is the problem of spelling out the mutual determinations of individual experiences and the experiencing self. Determining how the collective social consciousness influences and is influenced by the individual selves constituting the society is the hardest problem. Drawing parallels between individual cognition and the collective knowing of mathematical science, here we present a conceptualization of the cognitive dimension of the self. Our abstraction of the relations (...) between the physical world, biological brain, mind, intuition, consciousness, cognitive self, and the society can facilitate the construction of the conceptual repertoire required for an explicit science of the self within human society. (shrink)

In a fragment entitled Elementa Nova Matheseos Universalis Leibniz writes “the mathesis [...] shall deliver the method through which things that are conceivable can be exactly determined”; in another fragment he takes the mathesis to be “the science of all things that are conceivable.” Leibniz considers all mathematical disciplines as branches of the mathesis and conceives the mathesis as a general science of forms applicable not only to magnitudes but to every object that exists in our imagination, i.e. that is (...) possible at least in principle. As a general science of forms the mathesis investigates possible relations between “arbitrary objects”. It is an abstract theory of combinations and relations among objects whatsoever. In 1810 the mathematician and philosopher Bernard Bolzano published a booklet entitled Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics. There is, according to him, a certain objective connection among the truths that are germane to a certain homogeneous field of objects: some truths are the “reasons” of others, and the latter are “consequences” of the former. The reason-consequence relation seems to be the counterpart of causality at the level of a relation between true propositions. Arigorous proof is characterized in this context as a proof that shows the reason of the proposition that is to be proven. Requirements imposed on rigorous proofs seem to anticipate normalization results in current proof theory. The contributors of Mathesis Universalis, Computability and Proof, leading experts in the fields of computer science, mathematics, logic and philosophy, show the evolution of these and related ideas exploring topics in proof theory, computability theory, intuitionistic logic, constructivism and reverse mathematics, delving deeply into a contextual examination of the relationship between mathematical rigor and demands for simplification. (shrink)

It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is (...) empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality. (shrink)

This paper considers non-standard analysis and a recently introduced computational methodology based on the notion of ①. The latter approach was developed with the intention to allow one to work with infinities and infinitesimals numerically in a unique computational framework and in all the situations requiring these notions. Non-standard analysis is a classical purely symbolic technique that works with ultrafilters, external and internal sets, standard and non-standard numbers, etc. In its turn, the ①-based methodology does not use any of these (...) notions and proposes a more physical treatment of mathematical objects separating the objects from tools used to study them. It both offers a possibility to create new numerical methods using infinities and infinitesimals in floating-point computations and allows one to study certain mathematical objects dealing with infinity more accurately than it is done traditionally. In these notes, we explain that even though both methodologies deal with infinities and infinitesimals, they are independent and represent two different philosophies of Mathematics that are not in a conflict. It is proved that texts :539–555, 2017; Gutman and Kutateladze in Sib Math J 49:835–841, 2008; Kutateladze in J Appl Ind Math 5:73–75, 2011) asserting that the ①-based methodology is a part of non-standard analysis unfortunately contain several logical fallacies. Their attempt to show that the ①-based methodology can be formalized within non-standard analysis is similar to trying to show that constructivism can be reduced to the traditional Mathematics. (shrink)

En ' Godel’s Way ', tres eminentes científicos discuten temas como la indecisión, la incompleta, la aleatoriedad, la computabilidad y la paracoherencia. Me acerco a estas cuestiones desde el punto de vista de Wittgensteinian de que hay dos cuestiones básicas que tienen soluciones completamente diferentes. Existen las cuestiones científicas o empíricas, que son hechos sobre el mundo que necesitan ser investigados Observacionalmente y cuestiones filosóficas en cuanto a cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar inteligiblemente (que incluyen ciertas preguntas en matemáticas (...) y lógica), que necesitan decidirse por unt cómo realmente usar palabras en contextos concretos. Cuando tenemos claro sobre qué juego de idiomas estamos jugando, estos temas son vistos como preguntas científicas y matemáticas ordinarias como cualquier otra. Las percepciones de Wittgenstein rara vez se han igualado y nunca superado y son tan pertinentes hoy como lo fueron hace 80 años cuando dictó los libros azul y marrón. A pesar de sus fallas — realmente una serie de notas en lugar de un libro terminado —, esta es una fuente única de la obra de estos tres eruditos famosos que han estado trabajando en los bordes sangrantes de la física, las matemáticas y la filosofía durante más de medio siglo. Da Costa y Doria son citados por Wolpert (ver abajo o mis artículos sobre Wolpert y mi reseña de ' los límites de la razón ' de Yanofsky) desde que escribieron en el cómputo universal, y entre sus muchos logros, da Costa es pionera en paraconsistencia. -/- Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punta da vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2a ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y Delirios utópicos suicidas en el siglo 21 4a Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

The aim of the present thesis is twofold. First we propose a constructive solution to Frege's puzzle using an approach based on homotopy type theory, a newly proposed foundation of mathematics that possesses a higher-dimensional treatment of equality. We claim that, from the viewpoint of constructivism, Frege's solution is unable to explain the so-called ‘cognitive significance' of equality statements, since, as we shall argue, not only statements of the form 'a = b', but also 'a = a' may contribute to (...) an extension of knowledge. Second, we study this higher-dimensional account of equality from a constructive (computational) standpoint and, based on these considerations, we offer a new perspective to the project proposed by Peter Aczel of developing conventions and notations for an informal style of doing mathematics in type theory. To that end, we adopt the cubical type theory of Angiuli, Favonia and Harper, a framework that can be seen as constructive refinement of the ideas of homotopy type theory. (shrink)

Dialetheism is the view that there exists a true contradiction. This paper ventures to suggest that Priest’s argument for Dialetheism from Gödel’s theorem is unconvincing as the lesson of Gödel’s proof (or Rosser’s proof) is that any sufficiently strong theories of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent. In addition, a contradiction is derivable in Priest’s inconsistent and complete arithmetic. An alternative argument for Dialetheism is given by applying Gödel sentence to the inconsistent and complete theory of arithmetic. We argue, (...) however, that the alternative argument raises a circularity problem. In sum, Gödel’s and its related theorem merely show the relation between a complete and a consistent theory. A contradiction derived by the application of Gödel sentence has the value of true sentences, i.e. the both-value, only under the inconsistent models for arithmetic. Without having the assumption of inconsistency or completeness, a true contradiction is not derivable from the application of Gödel sentence. Hence, Gödel’s and its related theorem never can be a ground for Dialetheism. (shrink)

Gideon Rosen and Robert Schwartzkopff have independently suggested (variants of) the following claim, which is a varian of Hume's Principle: -/- When the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs, this fact is grounded by the fact that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs. -/- My paper is a detailed critique of the proposal. I don't find any decisive refutation of the proposal. At the same time, it has some consequences which many will (...) find objectionable. (shrink)

Abstract -/- Mathematics for Piyush is a Passion from his childhood he was so passionate about Mathematics used to play with Numbers draw figures and try to get sides distance one day I draw a AP SERIES Right Angle Triangle (thinking that the distance between the point of intersection of median & altitude at the base must be sum of rest sides that was in My Mind). And at last Piyush Succeed. This new Theorem proved with Four Proof (Trigonometry/Co-ordinates Geometry/Acute (...) Theorem/Obtuse Theorem). (shrink)

This book tries to present math to the millions and does a pretty good job. It is simple and sometimes witty but often the literary allusions intrude and the text bogs down in pages of relentless math--lovely if you like it and horrid if you don´t. If you already know alot of math you will still probably find the discussions of general math, geometry, projective geometry, and infinite series to be a nice refresher. If you don´t know any and don´t (...) have a natural talent for it, you will find it very dense or impossible. Being somewhere in the middle I skimmed thru most of it and slowed down when it got interesting. If you have only a little time I would suggest the last chapter ´The Abyss` about Georg Cantor and transfinite arithmetic. -/- At points they wax philosophical and ask the perennial question: is math is out there in the world or in here in our heads. Why not ask this about art or music or literature or computer programs or philosophy itself? In a very general way math must come from the same place that words and ideas and images come from---our brain evolved to make them and they must in many ways (every way?) reflect the structure of our brains, which reside in our DNA, which was shaped by natural selection, which was shaped by the geology of the earth and the structure of our universe, which comes from particle physics which comes from the laws of nature which are just there. -/- I have written extensively on the nature of math and language and mind and how they are all one in my many other reviews so please see them if these topics interest you. Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX -/- . (shrink)

This article offers an explanation of perhaps Wittgenstein’s strangest and least intuitive thesis – the semantical mutation thesis – according to which one can never answer a mathematical conjecture because the new proof alters the very meanings of the terms involved in the original question. Instead of basing our justification on the distinction between mere calculation and proofs of isolated propositions, characteristic of Wittgenstein’s intermediary period, we generalize it to include conjectures involving effective procedures as well.

We compute that the index set of PAC-learnable concept classes is m-complete Σ30\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Sigma^{0}_{3}}$$\end{document} within the set of indices for all concept classes of a reasonable form. All concept classes considered are computable enumerations of computable Π10\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi^{0}_{1}}$$\end{document} classes, in a sense made precise here. This family of concept classes is sufficient to cover all standard examples, and also has the property that PAC learnability (...) is equivalent to finite VC dimension. (shrink)

Hermann Grassmann’s 1861 work [2] was probably the first attempt at an axiomatic approach to arithmetic. The historical significance of this work is enormous, even though the set of axioms has proven to be incomplete. Basing on the interpretation of Grassmann’s theory provided by Hao Wang in [4], I present its detailed discussion, define the class of models of Grassmann’s arithmetic and discuss a certain axiom system for integers, modeled on Grassmann’s theory. At the end I propose to modify the (...) set of axioms of Grassmann’s arithmetic, which consists in adding an elementary sentence and removing a non-elementary one. I prove that after this modification the only model of the theory up to isomorphism is the standard model. (shrink)

Quantity is the first category that Aristotle lists after substance. It has extraordinary epistemological clarity: "2+2=4" is the model of a self-evident and universally known truth. Continuous quantities such as the ratio of circumference to diameter of a circle are as clearly known as discrete ones. The theory that mathematics was "the science of quantity" was once the leading philosophy of mathematics. The article looks at puzzles in the classification and epistemology of quantity.

This volume contains six new and fifteen previously published essays -- plus a new introduction -- by Storrs McCall. Some of the essays were written in collaboration with E. J. Lowe of Durham University. The essays discuss controversial topics in logic, action theory, determinism and indeterminism, and the nature of human choice and decision. Some construct a modern up-to-date version of Aristotle's bouleusis, practical deliberation. This process of practical deliberation is shown to be indeterministic but highly controlled and the antithesis (...) of chance. Others deal with the concept of branching four-dimensional space-time, explain non-local influences in quantum mechanics, or reconcile God's omniscience with human free will. The eponymous first essay contains the proof of a fact that in 1931 Kurt Gödel had claimed to be unprovable, namely that the set of arithmetic truths forms a consistent system. (shrink)

I contend that mathematical domains are freestanding institutional entities that, at least typically, are introduced to serve representational functions. In this paper, I outline an account of institutional reality and a supporting metaontological perspective that clarify the content of this thesis. I also argue that a philosophy of mathematics that has this thesis as its central tenet can account for the objectivity, necessity, and atemporality of mathematics.

Hilary Putnam first published the consistency objection against Ludwig Wittgenstein’s account of mathematics in 1979. In 1983, Putnam and Benacerraf raised this objection against all conventionalist accounts of mathematics. I discuss the 1979 version and the scenario argument, which supports the key premise of the objection. The wide applicability of this objection is not apparent; I thus raise it against an imaginary axiomatic theory T similar to Peano arithmetic in all relevant aspects. I argue that a conventionalist can explain the (...) consistency of T and suggest that an analogous explanation can be provided for the consistency of Peano arithmetic. (shrink)

Increased abstraction of modern mathematical theories has revived interest in traditional philosophical and methodological problem of internally consistent system of axioms where the contradicting each other statements can’t be deduced. If we are talking about axioms describing a well-known area of mathematical objects from the standpoint of local consistency this problem does not appear to be as relevant. But these problems are associated with the various attempts of formalists to explain the mathematical existence through consistency. But, for example, with regard (...) to the problem of establishing of consistency of mathematical analysis the solution of which would clarify the fate of Hilbert’s proof theory it has not solved yet so as the problem of the consistency of axiomatic set theory. Therefore it can be assumed that the criterion of consistency despite its essential role in axiomatic systems both formal and substantive nature is the same auxiliary logical criterion as well as mathematical provability. An adequate solution of the problem of consistency of mathematics can be achieved in the area of methodological and substantive arguments revealing the mechanism of appearance of contradictions in the mathematical theory. The paper shows that from a systemic point of view in the context of philosophical and methodological synthesis of various directions of justification of modern mathematics it can’t insist on only the rationale for consistency of mathematical theories. (shrink)

We seek to elucidate the philosophical context in which one of the most important conceptual transformations of modern mathematics took place, namely the so-called revolution in rigor in infinitesimal calculus and mathematical analysis. Some of the protagonists of the said revolution were Cauchy, Cantor, Dedekind,and Weierstrass. The dominant current of philosophy in Germany at the time was neo-Kantianism. Among its various currents, the Marburg school (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer, and others) was the one most interested in matters scientific and mathematical. Our (...) main thesis is that Marburg neo-Kantian philosophy formulated a sophisticated position towards the problems raised by the concepts of limits and infinitesimals. The Marburg school neither clung to the traditional approach of logically and metaphysically dubious infinitesimals, nor whiggishly subscribed to the new orthodoxy of the “great triumvirate” of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass that declared infinitesimals conceptus nongrati in mathematical discourse. Rather, following Cohen’s lead, the Marburg philosophers sought to clarify Leibniz’s principle of continuity, and to exploit it in making sense of infinitesimals and related concepts. (shrink)

We start from previous studies of G.N. Ord and A.S. Deakin showing that both the classical diffusion equation and Schrödinger equation of quantum mechanics have a common stump. Such result is obtained in rigorous terms since it is demonstrated that both diffusion and Schrödinger equations are manifestation of the same mathematical axiomatic set of the Clifford algebra. By using both such ( ) i A S and the i,±1 N algebra, it is evidenced, however, that possibly the two basic equations (...) of the physics cannot be reconciled. 1. (shrink)

For over thirty years I have argued that all branches of science and scholarship would have both their intellectual and humanitarian value enhanced if pursued in accordance with the edicts of wisdom-inquiry rather than knowledge-inquiry. I argue that this is true of mathematics. Viewed from the perspective of knowledge-inquiry, mathematics confronts us with two fundamental problems. (1) How can mathematics be held to be a branch of knowledge, in view of the difficulties that view engenders? What could mathematics be knowledge (...) about? (2) How do we distinguish significant from insignificant mathematics? This is a fundamental philosophical problem concerning the nature of mathematics. But it is also a practical problem concerning mathematics itself. In the absence of the solution to the problem, there is the danger that genuinely significant mathematics will be lost among the unchecked growth of a mass of insignificant mathematics. This second problem cannot, it would seem, be solved granted knowledge-inquiry. For, in order to solve the problem, mathematics needs to be related to values, but this is, it seems, prohibited by knowledge-inquiry because it could only lead to the subversion of mathematical rigour. Both problems are solved, however, when mathematics is viewed from the perspective of wisdom-inquiry. (1) Mathematics is not a branch of knowledge. It is a body of systematized, unified and inter-connected problem-solving methods, a body of problematic possibilities. (2) A piece of mathematics is significant if (a) it links up to the interconnected body of existing mathematics, ideally in such a way that some problems difficult to solve in other branches become much easier to solve when translated into the piece of mathematics in question; (b) it has fruitful applications for (other) worthwhile human endeavours. If ever the revolution from knowledge to wisdom occurs, I would hope wisdom mathematics would flourish, the nature of mathematics would become much more transparent, more pupils and students would come to appreciate the fascination of mathematics, and it would be easier to discern what is genuinely significant in mathematics (something that baffled even Einstein). As a result of clarifying what should count as significant, the pursuit of wisdom mathematics might even lead to the development of significant new mathematics. (shrink)

This essay consists of two parts. In the first part, I focus my attention on the remarks that Frege makes on consistency when he sets about criticizing the method of creating new numbers through definition or abstraction. This gives me the opportunity to comment also a little on H. Hankel, J. Thomae—Frege’s main targets when he comes to criticize “formal theories of arithmetic” in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1903)—G. Cantor, L. E. (...) J. Brouwer and D. Hilbert (1899). Part 2 is mainly devoted to Hilbert’s proof theory of the 1920s (1922–1931). I begin with an account of his early attempt to prove directly, and thus not by reduction or by constructing a model, the consistency of (a fragment of) arithmetic. In subsequent sections, I give a kind of overview of Hilbert’s metamathematics of the 1920s and try to shed light on a number of difficulties to which it gives rise. One serious difficulty that I discuss is the fact, widely ignored in the pertinent literature on Hilbert’s programme, that his language of finitist metamathematics fails to supply the conceptual resources for formulating a consistency statement qua unbounded quantification. Along the way, I shall comment on W. W. Tait’s objection to an interpretation of Hilbert’s finitism by Niebergall and Schirn, on G. Gentzen’s allegedly finitist consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic as well as his ideas on the provability and unprovability of initial cases of transfinite induction in pure number theory. Another topic I deal with is what has come to be known as partial realizations of Hilbert’s programme, chiefly advocated by S. G. Simpson. Towards the end of this essay, I take a critical look at Wittgenstein’s views about (in)consistency and consistency proofs in the period 1929–1933. I argue that both his insouciant attitude towards the emergence of a contradiction in a calculus and his outright repudiation of metamathematical consistency proofs are unwarranted. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein falls short of making a convincing case against Hilbert’s programme. I conclude with some philosophical remarks on consistency proofs and soundness and raise a question concerning the consistency of analysis. (shrink)

The goal of this paper consists of developing a new (more physical and numerical in comparison with standard and non-standard analysis approaches) point of view on Calculus with functions assuming infinite and infinitesimal values. It uses recently introduced infinite and infinitesimal numbers being in accordance with the principle ‘The part is less than the whole’ observed in the physical world around us. These numbers have a strong practical advantage with respect to traditional approaches: they are representable at a new kind (...) of a computer – the Infinity Computer – able to work numerically with all of them. An introduction to the theory of physical and mathematical continuity and differentiation (including subdifferentials) for functions assuming finite, infinite, and infinitesimal values over finite, infinite, and infinitesimal domains is developed in the paper. This theory allows one to work with derivatives that can assume not only finite but infinite and infinitesimal values, as well. It is emphasized that the newly introduced notion of the physical continuity allows one to see the same mathematical object as a continuous or a discrete one, in dependence on the wish of the researcher, i.e., as it happens in the physical world where the same object can be viewed as a continuous or a discrete in dependence on the instrument of the observation used by the researcher. Connections between pure mathematical concepts and their computational realizations are continuously emphasized through the text. Numerous examples are given. (shrink)

Friedrich Waismann, a little-known mathematician and onetime student of Wittgenstein's, provides answers to problems that vexed Wittgenstein in his attempt to explicate the foundations of mathematics through an analysis of its practice. Waismann argues in favor of mathematical intuition and the reality of infinity with a Wittgensteinian twist. Waismann's arguments lead toward an approach to the foundation of mathematics that takes into consideration the language and practice of experts.

Gauss used quadratic forms in his second proof of quadratic reciprocity. In this paper we begin to develop a theory of binary quadratic forms over weak fragments of Peano Arithmetic, with a view to reproducing Gauss’ proof in this setting.

It is argued that the goal of Hilbert's program was to prove the model-theoretical consistency of different axiom systems. This Hilbert proposed to do by proving the deductive consistency of the relevant systems. In the extended independence-friendly logic there is a complete proof method for the contradictory negations of independence-friendly sentences, so the existence of a single proposition that is not disprovable from arithmetic axioms can be shown formally in the extended independence-friendly logic. It can also be proved by means (...) of independence-friendly logic that proof-theoretical consistency of a sentence S implies the existence of a model in which S is not false. Hence the consistency of the axioms of arithmetic in the sense of being not-false in a model can be proved. (shrink)

We approach the philosophy of mathematics via a discussion of the differences between classical mathematics and constructive mathematics, arguing that each is a valid activity within its own context.

A comprehensive historical overview of formalist ideas in the philosophy of mathematics.

I offer a critical review of several different conceptions of the activity of foundational research, from the time of Gauss to the present. These are (1) the traditional image, guiding Gauss, Dedekind, Frege and others, that sees in the search for more adequate basic systems a logical excavation of a priori structures, (2) the program to find sound formal systems for so-called classical mathematics that can be proved consistent, usually associated with the name of Hilbert, and (3) the historicist alternative, (...) guiding Riemann, Poincaré, Weyl and others, that seeks to perfect available conceptual systems with the aim to avoid conceptual limitations and expand the range of theoretical options. I shall contend that, at times, assumptions about the foundational enterprise emerge from certain dogmas that are frequently inherited from previous, outdated images. To round the discussion, I mention some traits of an alternative program that investigates the epistemology of mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

We apply G. Prasad’s volume formula for the arithmetic quotients of semi-simple groups and Bruhat-Tits theory to study the covolumes of arithmetic subgroups of $SO$. As a result we prove that for any even dimension $n$ there exists a unique compact arithmetic hyperbolic $n$-orbifold of the smallest volume. We give a formula for the Euler-Poincaré characteristic of the orbifolds and present an explicit description of their fundamental groups as the stabilizers of certain lattices in quadratic spaces. We also study hyperbolic (...) $4$-manifolds defined arithmetically and obtain a number theoretical characterization of the smallest compact arithmetic $4$-manifold. (shrink)

Bolzano fut le premier philosophe à établir une distinction explicite entre les procédés déductifs qui nous permettent de parvenir à la certitude d’une vérité et ceux qui fournissent son fondement objectif. La conception que Bolzano se fait du rapport entre ce que nous appelons ici, d’une part, « conséquence subjective », à savoir la relation de raison à conséquence épistémique et, d’autre part, la « conséquence objective », c’est-à-dire la fondation , suggère toutefois que Bolzano défendait une conception « explicativiste (...) » de la preuve : les preuves par excellence sont celles qui reflètent l’ordre de la fondation objective. Dans cet article nous faisons état des problèmes liés à une telle conception et argumentons en faveur d’une démarcation plus stricte entre la préoccupation ontologique et la préoccupation épistémologique dans l’élaboration d’une théorie de la preuve.Bolzano was the first to establish an explicit distinction between the deductive methods that allow us to recognise the certainty of a given truth and those that provide its objective ground. His conception of the relation between what we, in this paper, call “subjective consequence”, i.e. the relation from epistemic reason to consequence and “objective consequence”, i.e. grounding however suggests that Bolzano advocated an “explicativist” conception of proof : proofs par excellence are those that reflect the objective order of grounding. In this paper, we expose the problems involved by such a conception and argue in favour of a more rigorous demarcation between the ontological and the epistemological concern in the elaboration of a theory of proof. (shrink)

After sketching the main lines of Hilbert's program, certain well-known and influential interpretations of the program are critically evaluated, and an alternative interpretation is presented. Finally, some recent developments in logic related to Hilbert's program are reviewed.

The 1-consistency of arithmetic is shown to be equivalent to the existence of fixed points of a certain type of update procedure, which is implicit in the epsilon-substitution method.