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  1. Metaethics After Moore (2008). The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Utilitas 20 (4).
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  2. S. Ahmed (1999). ''`She 'Ll Wake Up One of These Days and Find She's Turned Into a Nigger': Passing Through Hybridity. Theory, Culture and Society 16 (2):87-106.
    In this article, I examine racial narratives of passing and their relationship to discourses of hybridity. Rather than defining passing as inherently transgressive, or as one side of identity politics or the other, I suggest that passing must be understood in relationship to forms of social antagonism. I ask the following questions: how are differences that threaten the system recuperated? How do ambiguous or hybrid bodies get read in a way which further supports the enunciative power of those who are (...)
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  3. Andrew Altman (2003). Review of Joseph Raz's Value, Respect and Attachment. Utilitas 15 (3):376-378.
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  4. Antony Archer (1975). The Passing of The?Simple Faithful? New Blackfriars 56 (660):196-204.
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  5. Charles M. Bakewell (1904). Professor Strong on the Passing Thought. Philosophical Review 13 (5):552-559.
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  6. Matt Bedke (2011). Passing the Deontic Buck. Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6 6:128.
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  7. Kathleen Boscawen (1916). The Passing on of Life.
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  8. Borden Parker Bowne (1923). The Passing of Educational Fiatism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (2):77.
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  9. Robert Bracey (1924). The Passing of Talleyrand. New Blackfriars 4 (48):1450-1456.
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  10. Johan Brännmark (2008). Excellence and Means: On the Limits of Buck-Passing. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):301-315.
    The article explores the limits of buck-passing analysis in evaluating value or goodness. It talks about the inability of back-passers to account for two important types of value or goodness, which include excellence and means. The use of delimiting strategy in buck-passing analysis in order to be in possession of goodness is discussed.
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  11. W. J. Brown (1903). The Passing of Conviction. Hibbert Journal 2:553.
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  12. Brenda Brueggemann (2006). Interlude 1: On (Almost) Passing. In Lennard J. Davis (ed.), The Disability Studies Reader. Psychology Press. pp. 321--330.
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  13. K. Bykvist (2009). No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails. Mind 118 (469):1-30.
    Understanding value in terms of fitting attitudes is all the rage these days. According to this fitting attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis for short) what is good is what it is fitting to favour in some sense. Many aspects of the FA-analysis have been discussed. In particular, a lot of discussion has been concerned with the wrong-reason objection: it can be fitting to have an attitude towards something for reasons that have nothing to do with the value the thing has (...)
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  14. Charles Upson Clark (1930). S. Ambrosii de Helia Et IeiunioMary Joseph Aloysius Buck. Speculum 5 (2):224-225.
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  15. R. Crisp (2005). Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck. Analysis 65 (1):80-85.
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  16. Roger Crisp (1992). Thomas Baldwin, G. E. Moore, London, Routledge, 1990, Pp. 337. Utilitas 4 (1):169.
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  17. Jonathan Dancy (2005). Should We Pass the Buck? In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 33--44.
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  18. Julia Driver (2011). Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Pp. 178. Utilitas 23 (2):235-237.
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  19. Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.
    So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...)
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  20. William Leighton Grane (1912). The Passing of War.
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  21. Jeremy R. Gray (2002). Does a Prosocial-Selfish Distinction Help Explain the Biological Affects? Comment on Buck. Psychological Review 109 (4):729-738.
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  22. Adolf Grunbaum (1963). Comments on Professor Roger Buck's Paper "Reflexive Predictions.". Philosophy of Science 30 (4):370 - 372.
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  23. Pamela Hieronymi, Research Overview.
    In this document I survey my work to date (i.e., to September 2010) and connect it to the larger themes that have been animating it.
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  24. Kent Hurtig, The Wrong Kind of Value.
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  25. Joyce L. Jenkins (2011). Dead and Gone. Utilitas 23 (2):228-234.
    I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives (...)
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  26. Mark Johnson (2014). Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding From the Perspective of Cognitive Science. University of Chicago Press.
    What is the difference between right and wrong? This is no easy question to answer, yet we constantly try to make it so, frequently appealing to some hidden cache of cut-and-dried absolutes, whether drawn from God, universal reason, or societal authority. Combining cognitive science with a pragmatist philosophical framework in Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science, Mark Johnson argues that appealing solely to absolute principles and values is not only scientifically unsound but even morally suspect. (...)
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  27. D. McNaughton & P. Rawling (2003). Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck? Analysis 63 (4):328-331.
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  28. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (2003). Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck? Analysis 63 (4):328–331.
    Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness (...)
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  29. In J. Myung & Mark A. Pitt (2003). Model Fitting. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  30. Péter Nádas (2005). The Citizen of the World and the Buck Goat. Common Knowledge 11 (1):8-17.
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  31. Jonas Olson (2013). Buck‐Passing Accounts. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  32. C. S. Pande (1970). Dislocation Pile-Ups and Passing Stresses. Philosophical Magazine 21 (169):195-202.
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  33. Philip Pettit (2012). A Question for Tomorrow: The Robust Demands of the Good. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 7 (3):7-12.
  34. Engaging Reason (2006). Darwall on Rational Care. Utilitas 18 (4).
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  35. Kathryn Rummell (2007). Rewriting the Passing Novel: Danzy Senna's< Em> Caucasia. The Griot 26 (2).
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  36. Dave Salerno (2005). Versatile Buck-Boost Converter Offers High Efficiency in a Wide Variety of Applications. In Alan F. Blackwell & David MacKay (eds.), Power. Cambridge University Press. pp. 10--1.
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  37. Lars Samuelsson (2013). The Right Version of 'the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Utilitas 25 (3):383-404.
    In a recent article in Utilitas, Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so-called (WKR problem) for the buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang's suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the solution Lang opts for is of the wrong kind for solving the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang's suggestion for a solution (...)
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  38. Minot Judson Savage (1901). The Passing and the Permanent in Religion.
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  39. Fritz Senn (forthcoming). " In the Original": Buck Mulligan and Stephen Dedalus. Arion.
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  40. Michael Smith (2013). The Ideal of Orthonomous Action, or the How and Why of Buck-Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 50.
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  41. Michael Smith (2013). Why of Buck—Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 50.
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  42. Philip Stratton-Lake (2013). Dancy on Buck-Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press.
    I defend the buck-passing account of value from Dancy's critique.
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  43. Philip Stratton-Lake, Dancy on Buck Passing.
    I defend the buck-passing account of value from Dancy's critique.
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  44. Ryan Tanner (2008). Ouch, That Doesn't Fit There. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:419-426.
    According to the “fitting-attitudes” (FA) account of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. Value here is analyzed in terms of reasons for and against favoring, admiring, desiring, preferring, loving, etc. a thing. Whichever particular FA analysis you prefer, the basic idea is just that a thing’s value depends on extant reasons to be favorably (or disfavorably) disposed toward it. Of course, proponents of FA analyses deny that just any (...)
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  45. I. Terminology (2010). JS Mill's Conception of Utility. Utilitas 22 (1).
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  46. Cain Todd (2012). Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts. Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).
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  47. Tom Flynn (2003). No Passing. Free Inquiry 23 (3):26.
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  48. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Pp. IX + 231. Utilitas 21 (4):532-535.
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  49. James O. Young (2016). The Buck Passing Theory of Art. Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (4): 421-433.
    In Beyond Art (2014), Dominic Lopes proposed a new theory of art, the buck passing theory. Rather than attempting to define art in terms of exhibited or genetic featured shared by all artworks, Lopes passes the buck to theories of individual arts. He proposes that we seek theories of music, painting, poetry, and other arts. Once we have these theories, we know everything there is to know about the theory of art. This essay presents two challenges to the theory. First, (...)
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  50. Michaelj Zimmermann (2007). The Good and the Right. Utilitas 19 (3):326-353.
    T. M. Scanlon has revived a venerable tradition according to which something's being good consists in its being such that there is a reason to respond positively towards it. He has presented novel arguments for this thesis. In this article, I first develop some refinements of the thesis with a view to focusing on intrinsic value in particular, then discuss the relation between the thesis and consequentialism, then critically examine Scanlon's arguments for the thesis, and finally turn to the question (...)
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