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Summary Theories of personal identity are, most often, theories of what makes X, a person, at one time numerically identical to Y at another time.  Such theories fall into two very general categories.  On reductionist views, the facts about identity across time simply consist in facts about brains, bodies, or interrelated physical or mental events.  On nonreductionist views, the facts about identity do not consist simply in such facts, but also consist in facts about, e.g., souls or Cartesian egos.  Among reductionist theories, there are two general approaches: psychological and biological.  On psychological approaches, what makes X and Y identical is typically continuity of some subset of psychological features.  On biological approaches, what makes X and Y identical is typically continuity of the person's biological (animal) organism.
Key works Derek Parfit offers and explains the distinction between nonreductionist and reductionist views of personal identity in Parfit 1984 (a distinction he originally labeled as between "simple" and "complex" views in Parfit 1973).  For the original statement of a psychological criterion of identity, see John Locke's "persistence of consciousness" view in Locke & Nidditch 1979.  For nonreductionist rejoinders, see Thomas Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man and Butler 1736.  For contemporary advocacy of a psychological criterion, see, in addition to Parfit, Harold Noonan's Personal Identity and Sydney Shoemaker's contribution in Shoemaker & Swinburne 1984 (and for contemporary nonreductionism about identity, see Swinburne's contribution).  For contemporary advocacy of a biological criterion, see Olson 1997.
Introductions Good introductions include Perry 1978, Perry 1975, and Olson 2002.
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  1. Personal Identity and Reidentification.Adeleke Segun Adeofe - 1991 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    My focus is on the metaphysical issue of what identity consists in. That is, what it is that supposedly makes a person the same persisting entity. I start by considering whether this issue is one to specially care about. I bring in the views of Thomas Reid and Saul Kripke. I argue that if the focus is on identity simpliciter, then personal identity is not significantly different from identity of numbers, say. I do, however, argue that this does not, and (...)
  2. The Stars Down to Earth and Other Essays on the Irrational in Culture.Adorno Theodor & Crook Stephen - 1996 - The Personalist Forum 12 (2):183-186.
  3. Adrenergic Receptors: A Personal and Practical View.Raymond P. Ahlquist - 1973 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 17 (1):119-122.
  4. The Self, Supervenience, and Personal Identity.Ronald G. Alexander - 1997
    In this study, I address the problem of personal identity by examining the possibility that a person is ascribed identity on the basis of having a supervenient self. Using the methods of non-eidetic phenomenology and analytic ontology, I argue that the self is supervenient on the physical and psychological properties of the human being. Understood in this manner, the self is not a static entity, but reflects the temporal nature of the person. Instead of trying to find the ground of (...)
  5. Personal Identity and Self-Constitution.Ronald G. Alexander - 1992 - The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):83-89.
  6. Human Destiny, Reincarnation, and Personal Identity in Yoruba Metaphysics.S. Ali - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1).
    In African metaphysics, with special reference to Yoruba thought, human destiny, reincarnation, and personal identity constitute some of the major philosophical concerns. Given that man is trimorphously considered a composite of body , soul and inner-head , the last is the metaphysical symbol of human destiny which externally is represented by the physical head. The three elements are classifiable into physical and metaphysical entities with êmi and ori taken to be immortal. Do these metaphysical entities reincarnate and in what way? (...)
  7. Personal Identity: An Epistemological Assessment and a Metaphysical Theory.Karen Allen - 1983 - Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
    The philosophical problem of personal identity seems especially complex since the metaphysical and epistemological issues have been conflated in the standard literature and there is a general tendency to equate the ways the identities of persons are constituted with ways they can be verified. Thus, in an attempt to dispel this sort of confusion and to clarify the fundamental difficulties about personal identity, this dissertation attempts to answer two separate theoretical questions: What makes someone the same person through time? and (...)
  8. Raymond Tallis and the Alleged Necessity of a Body for Personal Identity.R. Allen - 2009 - Appraisal 7.
  9. The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science.Gordon W. Allport - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (3):367-369.
  10. Shoemaker, S., "Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays". [REVIEW]J. J. Altham - 1988 - Mind 97:285.
  11. Bootstrapping the Afterlife.Roman Altshuler - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Samuel Scheffler defends “The Afterlife Conjecture”: the view that the continued existence of humanity after our deaths—“the afterlife”—lies in the background of our valuing; were we to lose confidence in it, many of the projects we engage in would lose their meaning. The Afterlife Conjecture, in his view, also brings out the limits of our egoism, showing that we care more about yet unborn strangers than about personal survival. But why does the afterlife itself matter to us? Examination of Scheffler’s (...)
  12. Criteria of Personal Identity.Karl Ameriks - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47 - 69.
    I defend the claim that bodily continuity is the primary criterion of personal identity by arguing there is an important sense in which it (unlike rival criteria) is a necessary condition of such identity. This claim is shown to be misunderstood in recent discussions because of a confusion of it with the claim that bodily continuity is a sufficient condition of personal identity. In the course of my argument, I criticize williams, Shoemaker, Puccetti, Quinton, Miri, And others.
  13. Coconsciousness and Numerical Identity of the Person.Susan L. Anderson - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (July):1-10.
    The phenomenon of multiple personality--Like the "split-Brain" phenomenon--Involves a disintegration of the normally unified self to the point where one must question whether there is one, Or more than one, Person associated with the body even at a single moment in time. Besides the traditional problem of determining identity over time, There is now a new problem of personal identity--Determining identity at a single moment in time. We need the conceptual apparatus to talk about this new problem and a test, (...)
  14. Criteria of Identity and Procedures of Individuation.Adam Andrzejewski - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (4):23.
  15. In Search of the Person: Philosophical Explorations in Cognitive Science.Michael A. Arbib - 1987 - The Personalist Forum 3 (1):78-80.
  16. SHOEMAKER, S.: "Identity, Cause, and Mind".D. M. Armstrong - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:236.
  17. Thinking Animals.S. T. Árnadóttir - unknown
    Many personal identity theorists claim that persons are distinct from the animals that constitute them, but when combined with the plausible assumption that animals share the thoughts of the persons they constitute, this denial results in an excess of thinkers and a host of related problems. I consider a number of non-animalist solutions to these problems and argue that they fail. I argue further that satisfactory non-animalist solutions are not forthcoming and that in order to avoid these problems we ought (...)
  18. The Primacy of Space in Heidegger and Taylor: Towards a Unified Account of Personal Identity.Ignacio Arriagada - 2009 - Appraisal 7.
  19. Personal Identity: Historical and Analytical Considerations.Lawrence Raymond Ashley - 1973 - Dissertation, Duke University
  20. Philosophy Outdoors : First Person Physical.John Michael Atherton - 2007 - In M. J. McNamee (ed.), Philosophy, Risk, and Adventure Sports. London ;Routledge.
  21. Editor’s Introduction.E. Auxier Randall - 1999 - The Personalist Forum 15 (2):204-204.
  22. Lynn Rudder Baker, "Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism". [REVIEW]Anita Avramides - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (4):693.
  23. Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Lynne Rudder Baker Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. 190. $19.95 (U.S.), $9.95 (U.S.) Paper. [REVIEW]Anita Avramides - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (04):693-.
  24. Locke on Personal Identity: The Form of the Self.S. Azeri - 2011 - Filozofia 66:222-239.
    In line with the empiricist project, Locke tries to describe how unconscious encounters with environment yield to the emergence of consciousness. For Locke the self is identical with consciousness and consciousness is accessible empirically. As far as the identity of human is concerned, identity of the self depends on the consciousness of the person. The person is identical to himself to the extent that he is aware of his own perceptions and thinking. The range of the person’s memory sets the (...)
  25. Person-Stages.Harriet Erica Baber - 1980 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
    In the later chapters of this essay, I attempt to set up the machinery for a reconstructed person-stage theory incorporating the suggestion that person-stage identity is a sortal-relative identity relation. To understand this relation we have to define the class of predicates for which it is an indiscernibility relation. I suggest that this class is to be defined in terms of Perry's notion of a 'basic property,' which, though intuitive, turns out to be highly problematic upon closer examination. Relative identity (...)
  26. Psychology in the 1950s: A Personal View.Alan Baddeley - 2008 - In Pat Rabbitt (ed.), Inside Psychology: A Science Over 50 Years. Oxford University Press.
  27. Personal Ethics.Archie Bahm - 1979 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 4.
  28. Persons, Animals, Ourselves, by Paul F. Snowdon. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):411-414.
  29. Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...)
  30. Concerning Theories of Personal Identity.Patrick Bailey - unknown
    The purpose of this thesis is to provide a brief examination of the historical accounts of philosophical theories of personal identity and show the influence that each has had on the development of contemporary theories. In doing so, the thesis explores the problems associated with these theories, attempting to establish a meta-theory of personal identity. What is demonstrated is that the fundamental problems of personal identity arise from issues related to the use of language, as well as assumptions involving the (...)
  31. Olson, ET-The Human Animal.J. Baillie - 1998 - Philosophical Books 39:58-60.
  32. Identity, Consciousness and Value.James Baillie - 1992 - Philosophical Books 33 (1):42-44.
  33. What Am I?Baker Lynne Rudder - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:185-193.
    Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable—namely, that I was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously (...)
  34. Replies to Reviews of 'Persons and Bodies'.LR Baker - unknown
  35. Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.
    Theories of the human person differ greatly in their ability to underwrite a metaphysics of resurrection. This paper compares and contrasts a number of such views in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection. In a Christian framework, resurrection requires that the same person who exists on earth also exists in an afterlife, that a postmortem person be embodied, and that the existence of a postmortem person is brought about by a miracle. According to my view of persons (the Constitution (...)
  36. David Braine, The Human Person: Animal and Spirit Reviewed By.Steven Baldner - 1994 - Philosophy in Review 14 (6):381-383.
  37. David Braine, The Human Person: Animal and Spirit. [REVIEW]Steven Baldner - 1994 - Philosophy in Review 14:381-383.
  38. Personal Identity.James Mark Baley - 1976 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
  39. Personal Identity and Bodily Identity.Victor Chaim Balowitz - 1969 - Dissertation, Columbia University
  40. Got to Have Soul.Joseph A. Baltimore - 2006 - Religious Studies 42 (4):417-430.
    Kevin Corcoran offers an account of how one can be a physicalist about human persons, deny temporal gaps in the existence of persons, and hold that there is an afterlife. I argue that Corcoran's account both violates the necessity of metaphysical identity and implausibly makes an individual's existence dependent on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Corcoran's defence is considered, as well as Stephen Davis's suggestions on how an account like Corcoran's can defend itself against these concerns. It is shown, (...)
  41. Who Do You Think You Are? Relations, Subjectivity, and the Identity of Persons.David Banach - 1992 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 66:109-121.
  42. Life-Extension and Personal Identity.G. Barazetti & M. Reichlin - 2011 - In Guy Kahane, Julian Savulescu & Ruud Ter Meulen (eds.), Enhancing Human Capacities.
  43. Books on Personal Identity Since 1970.Kenneth F. Barber, Jorge Je Gracia, York Press, Andrew Brennan, Caroline Walker Bynum, Michael Carrithers, Roderick M. Chisholm, I. L. La Salle & Frederick C. Doepke - 2003 - In Raymond Martin & John Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity. Blackwell.
  44. Chapter 7 Community, Persons, and the Case of Faked Identity.Michał Bardel - 2011 - In Cheikh Mbacke Gueye (ed.), Ethical Personalism. De Gruyter. pp. 99-116.
  45. Personal Identity and Concrete Values.Evelyn M. Barker - 1990 - Analecta Husserliana 31:115.
  46. Hartshorne and Brightman on God, Process, and Persons: The Correspondence 1922-1945. [REVIEW]Joe Barnhart - 1999 - The Personalist Forum 15 (2):424-426.
  47. The Truth and Identity of a Person and of a People.Mary Rose Barral - 1990 - Analecta Husserliana 31:93.
  48. On Becoming a Person.John Barresi - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
    How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through (...)
  49. Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century.John Barresi & Raymond Martin - 1999 - Routledge.
    _Naturalization of the Soul_ charts the development of the concepts of soul and self in Western thought, from Plato to the present. It fills an important gap in intellectual history by being the first book to emphasize the enormous intellectual transformation in the eighteenth century, when the religious 'soul' was replaced first by a philosophical 'self' and then by a scientific 'mind'. The authors show that many supposedly contemporary theories of the self were actually discussed in the eighteenth century, and (...)
  50. Inner Self Located.Bradley Bartholomew - 1991 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 18 (4):549.
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