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  1. Indexicals and Reference‐Shifting: Towards a Pragmatic Approach.Jonas Åkerman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):117-152.
    I propose a pragmatic approach to the kind of reference-shifting occurring in indexicals as used in e.g. written notes and answering machine messages. I proceed in two steps. First, I prepare the ground by showing that the arguments against such a pragmatic approach raised in the recent literature fail. Second, I take a first few steps towards implementing this approach, by sketching a pragmatic theory of reference-shifting, and showing how it can handle cases of the relevant kind. While the immediate (...)
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  2. Peirce's Final Account of Signs and the Philosophy of Language.Albert Atkin - 2008 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (1):pp. 63-85.
    In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the puzzles highlights (...)
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  3. Atención, referencia e inescrutabilidad.Ignacio Avila - 2014 - Estudios de Filosofía 50:31-51.
    Resumen: En este ensayo discuto la crítica de John Campbell a la tesis de la inescrutabilidad de la referencia de Quine. Primero defiendo que los argumentos de Campbell no dan en el blanco, pues él pasa por alto la conexión que Quine traza entre referencia, cuantificación, y ontología. Luego discuto otra línea de argumentación contra la inescrutabilidad que invoca la concepción relacional de la atención de Campbell. Finalmente, sugiero que esta línea –aunque insuficiente y necesitada de complemento– pone de manifiesto (...)
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  4. Self-Reference, Phenomenology, and Philosophy of Science.Steven James Bartlett - 1980 - Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology 13 (3):143-167.
    The paper begins by acknowledging that weakened systematic precision in phenomenology has made its application in philosophy of science obscure and ineffective. The defining aspirations of early transcendental phenomenology are, however, believed to be important ones. A path is therefore explored that attempts to show how certain recent developments in the logic of self-reference fulfill in a clear and more rigorous fashion in the context of philosophy of science certain of the early hopes of phenomenologists. The resulting dual approach is (...)
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  5. The Idea of a Metalogic of Reference.Steven James Bartlett - 1976 - Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology 9 (3):85-92.
    This paper sought to state in a concise and comparatively informal, unsystematic, and more accessible form the more technical approach the author developed during a research fellowship in 1974-75 at the Max-Planck-Institut in Starnberg, Germany. The ideas presented in this paper are more fully developed in later publications by the author which are listed in the two-page addendum to this paper.
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  6. Self-Reference: Reflections on Reflexivity.Steven James Bartlett & Peter Suber (eds.) - 1987 - Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
    From the Editor’s Introduction: -/- THE INTERNAL LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING -/- We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation. -/- (...)
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  7. Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations.Barwise Jon & Perry John - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):387-404.
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  8. Gebaute Zeichen. Zu den Bedeutungsweisen von Bauwerken.Christoph Baumberger - 2014 - In Jörg H. Gleiter (ed.), Symptom Design. Vom Zeigen und Sich-Zeigen der Dinge. Transkript. pp. 93-113.
    Architekturkritiker und -historiker verwenden eine Vielzahl von Ausdrücken, um anzugeben, was Bauwerke bedeuten. Es ist beispielsweise die Rede davon, dass sie etwas ausdrücken, repräsentieren, zitieren, manifestieren, darstellen oder aussagen; man kann von Gebäuden lesen, die mehrdeutig sind, als Metaphern fungieren oder auf etwas anspielen. In diesem Aufsatz frage ich, wie Bauwerke bedeuten können, um die Grundzüge einer Theorie der Bedeutungsweisen von Bauwerken und ihren Teilen vorzustellen, die als Rahmen für Einzelanalysen und historische Untersuchungen verwendet werden kann. Anstatt die meist unklaren (...)
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  9. Individual and Cross-Cultural Differences in Semantic Intuitions: New Experimental Findings.James R. Beebe - 2016 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 16 (3-4):322-357.
    In 2004 Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich published what has become one of the most widely discussed papers in experimental philosophy, in which they reported that East Asian and Western participants had different intuitions about the semantic reference of proper names. A flurry of criticisms of their work has emerged, and although various replications have been performed, many critics remain unconvinced. We review the current debate over Machery et al.’s (2004) results and take note of which (...)
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  10. Moral Valence and Semantic Intuitions.James R. Beebe & Ryan J. Undercoffer - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):445-466.
    Despite the swirling tide of controversy surrounding the work of Machery et al. , the cross-cultural differences they observed in semantic intuitions about the reference of proper names have proven to be robust. In the present article, we report cross-cultural and individual differences in semantic intuitions obtained using new experimental materials. In light of the pervasiveness of the Knobe effect and the fact that Machery et al.’s original materials incorporated elements of wrongdoing but did not control for their influence, we (...)
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  11. Knowing Who.Steven Boër & William Lycan - 1986 - MIT Press.
  12. Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism Versus Millianism.João Branquinho - 2014 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 26 (39):465-486.
    This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular (...)
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  13. What Can Neuroscience Tell Us About Reference?Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Barbara Abbott & Jeanette Gundel (eds.), Handbook on Reference. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational?Ray Buchanan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.
    In a number of influential papers, Hartry Field has advanced an account of truth and reference that we might dub quasi-disquotationalism. According to quasi-disquotationalism, truth and reference are to be explained in terms of disputation and facts about what constitute a good translation into our language. Field suggeststhat we might view quasi-disquotationalism as either (a) an analysis of our ordinary truth-theoretic concepts of reference and truth, or (b) an account of certain other concepts that improve upon our ordinary concepts. In (...)
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  15. Self-Reference and Translation.Tyler Burge - 1978 - In Guenther-Reutte & Guenther (eds.), Translation and Meaning. Duckworth.
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  16. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term.J. Campbell - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):89-104.
  17. Brandom, Peirce, and the Overlooked Friction of Contrapiction.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2561–2576.
    Robert Brandom holds that what we mean is best understood in terms of what inferences we are prepared to defend, and that such a defence is best understood in terms of rule-governed social interactions. This manages to explain quite a lot. However, for those who think that there is more to making correct/incorrect inferences than obeying/breaking accepted rules, Brandom’s account fails to adequately capture what it means to reason properly. Thus, in an effort to sketch an alternative that does not (...)
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  18. Aristotle on Predication.Phil Corkum - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):793-813.
    A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the (...)
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  19. Reference and Singular Referring Terms.C. Daniels - 1972 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1):86 - 102.
  20. Review of E. Runggaldier: Signifier and Signified. Linguistico-Philosophical Enquiries Into the Problem of Reference. [REVIEW]Marian A. David - 1988 - Philosophy and History 21 (1):31-34.
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  21. Gareth Evans on Proper Names.Erhan Demircioglu - 2014 - Felsefe Tartismalari 50:1-9.
    The central aim of this paper is to argue against Evans’ hybrid theory of reference. I will show that Evans’ theory makes false predictions in the case of some thought-experiments. The paper has two sections. After providing a short presentation of Evans’ theory in the first section, I will move on to criticize it in the second section.
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  22. Whither Experimental Semantics?Michael Devitt - 2012 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (1):5-36.
    The main goal of the paper is to propose a methodology for the theory of reference in which experiments feature prominently. These experiments should primarily test linguistic usage rather than the folk’s referential intuitions. The proposed methodology urges the use of: (A) philosophers’ referential intuitions, both informally and, occasionally, scientifically gathered; (B) the corpus, both informally and scientifically gathered; (C) elicited production; and, occasionally, (D) folk’s referential intuitions. The most novel part of this is (C) and that is where most (...)
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  23. Fixing Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles, the first of which connects aboutness and truth, and the second of which connects truth and justification. These principles (...)
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  24. How Proper Names Refer.Imogen Dickie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.
    This paper develops a new account of reference-fixing for proper names. The account is built around an intuitive claim about reference fixing: the claim that I am a participant in a practice of using α to refer to o only if my uses of α are constrained by the representationally relevant ways it is possible for o to behave. §I raises examples that suggest that a right account of how proper names refer should incorporate this claim. §II provides such an (...)
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  25. Lewis and His Critics on Putnam´s Paradox.Daniel Dohrn - unknown
    The model-theoretic argument known as Putnam´s paradox threatens our notion of truth with triviality: Almost any world can satisfy almost any theory. Formal argument and intuition are at odds. David Lewis devised a solution according to which the very stucture of the world fixes how it is to be divided into elite classes which determine the reference of any true theory. Three claims are defended: Firstly, Lewis´ proposal must be completed by an account of successful referential intentions. Secondly, contrary to (...)
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  26. Explaining Reference: A Plea for Semantic Psychologism.Santiago Echeverri - 2014 - In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. University of Geneva. pp. 550-580.
    ‘Modest’ and ‘full-blooded’ conceptions of meaning disagree on whether we should try to provide explanations of reference. In this paper, I defend a psychological brand of the full-blooded program. As I understand it, there are good reasons to provide a psychological explanation of referential abilities. This explanation is to be framed at an intermediary level of description between the personal level and the explanations provided by neuroscience. My defense of this program has two parts: First, I display the explanatory insufficiency (...)
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  27. The Realpolitik of Reference.Brian Epstein - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):1–20.
    What are the conditions for fixing the reference of a proper name? Debate on this point has recently been rekindled by Scott Soames, Robin Jeshion, and others. In this paper, I sketch a new pragmatic approach to the justification of reference-fixing procedures, in opposition to accounts that insist on an invariant set of conditions for fixing reference across environments and linguistic communities. Comparing reference to other relations whose instances are introduced through "initiation" procedures, I outline a picture in which the (...)
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  28. Essentially Contested Concepts and Semantic Externalism.Simon J. Evnine - 2014 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 8 (1):118-140.
    In 1956, W.B. Gallie introduced his idea of essentially contested concepts. In my paper, I offer a novel interpretation of his theory and argue that his theory, thus interpreted, is correct. The key to my interpretation lies in a condition Gallie places on essentially contested concepts that other interpreters downplay or dismiss: that the use of an essentially contested concept must be derived “from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept.” This reveals (...)
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  29. Kant and Natural Kind Terms.Luca Forgione - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (1):55-72.
    As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects of Kan’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting (...)
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  30. The Four Puzzles of Reference.Bryan Frances - manuscript
  31. Singular Terms, Predicates and the Spurious ‘Is’ of Identity.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):325-343.
    Contemporary orthodoxy affirms that singular terms cannot be predicates and that, therefore, ‘is’ is ambiguous as between predication and identity. Recent attempts to treat names as predicates do not challenge this orthodoxy. The orthodoxy was built into the structure of modern formal logic by Frege. It is defended by arguments which I show to be unsound. I provide a semantical account of atomic sentences which draws upon Mill's account of predication, connotation and denotation. I show that singular terms may be (...)
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  32. Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition.Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.) - 2014 - Springer.
    Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology. -/- Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference held at the University of Aarhus in June 2012, the book addresses such questions as: If the (...)
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  33. Homophonic Prejudices.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 40 (120):67-84.
    I critically discuss some aspects of Mark Sainsbury's Reference without Referents, from an otherwise sympathetic viewpoint. My objections focus on the adequacy of the truth-conditional framework that Sainsbury presupposes. I argue that, as semantic theories, truth-conditional accounts are both too ambitious, and too austere to be fully explanatory, and that both problems have consequences for an account of reference. The latter problem has to do with the difficulties to capture in a truth-conditional framework the descriptive contribution of indexicals and, in (...)
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  34. How Wittgenstein Escapes the Slingshot.A. C. Genova - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:1-22.
    The paper attempts to do the following: (1) provide a reconstruction of a valid argument for Frege’s thesis that a truth-apt sentence refers to its truth value---an argument that is the implicit argument of Frege’s original text, based on premises explicitly stated or clearly implied in “On Sense and Reference”; (2) examine a standard version (essentially Davidson’s) of the recent counterpart of the Fregean Argument (the so-called Slingshot) designed to refute, quite generally, fact-based correspondence theories of truth; and (3) show (...)
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  35. Communication and Mental Events.Irwin Goldstein - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (October):331-338.
    How do the young learn names for feelings? After criticizing Wittgensteinian explanations, I formulate and defend an explanation very different from Wittgensteinians embrace.
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  36. On the Error of Treating Functions as Objects.Karen Green - 2016 - Analysis and Metaphysics 15.
  37. Was Wittgenstein Frege's Heir?Karen Green - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):289-308.
    This paper argues that Dummett’s interpretation of the relationship between Frege’s anti-psychologism and Wittgenstein’s doctrine that meaning is use results in a misreading of Frege. It points out that anti-mentalism is a form of anti-psychologism, but that mentalism is not the only version of psycholgism. Thus, while Frege and Wittgenstein are united in their opposition to mentalism, they are not equally opposed to psychologism, and from Frege’s point of view, the doctrine that meaning is use could also imply a version (...)
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  38. Translation and Meaning. Guenther-Reutte & Guenther (eds.) - 1978 - Duckworth.
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  39. A. Bianchi (Ed.), On Reference. [REVIEW]Fredrik Haraldsen - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24 (1):121-127.
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  40. Shallow Versus Deep Response-Dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.
  41. The Philosophy of Curiosity.Ilhan Inan - 2011 - Routledge.
    In this book, Ilhan Inan questions the classical definition of curiosity as _a desire to know._ Working in an area where epistemology and philosophy of language overlap, Inan forges a link between our ability to become aware of our ignorance and our linguistic aptitude to construct terms referring to things unknown. The book introduces the notion of inostensible reference. Ilhan connects this notion to related concepts in philosophy of language: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the referential and the (...)
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  42. Inostensible Reference and Conceptual Curiosity.Ilhan Inan - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):21-41.
    A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...)
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  43. How Often Do We Use a Definite Description to Talk About its Semantic Referent?Ilhan Inan - 2009 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):7-12.
    In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon.
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  44. ‘The Referential’ and ‘the Attributive’: Two Distinctions for the Price of One.Ilhan Inan - 2006 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 12 (2):137-160.
    There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On the other hand there have been attempts (...)
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  45. Are “Attributive” Uses of Definite Descriptions Really Attributive?Ilhan Inan - 2006 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):7-13.
    In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...)
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  46. Discovery and Inostensible De Re Knowledge.Ilhan Inan - 2005 - In G. Irzık & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science.
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  47. Externalism, Metasemantic Contextualism, and Self-Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 228-247.
    This paper examines some of the interactions between holism, contextualism, and externalism, and will argue that an externalist metasemantics that grounds itself in certain plausible assumptions about self- knowledge will also be a contextualist metasemantics, and that such a contextualist metasemantics in turn resolves one of the best known problems externalist theories purportedly have with self-knowledge, namely the problem of how the possibility of various sorts of ‘switching’ cases can appear to undermine the ‘transparency’ of our thoughts (in particular, our (...)
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  48. With Reference to Touchie..Bernard S. Jackson - 1998 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 11 (1):79-93.
    This responds to the article by J.W.C. Touchie in this journal at 10 (1997) 317-335 commenting on my debate with Neil MacCormick regarding the linguistics of the normative syllogism, and in particular the notion of reference in the philosophy of language.
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  49. Why Definite Descriptions Really Are Referring Terms.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):45-79.
    According to Russell, '... the phi ...' means: 'exactly one object has phi and ... that object ...'. Strawson pointed out that, if somebody asked how many kings of France there were, it would be deeply inappropriate to respond by saying '... the king of France ...': the respondent appears to be presupposing the very thing that, under the circumstances, he ought to be asserting. But it would seem that if Russell's theory were correct, the respondent would be asserting exactly (...)
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  50. Partial Reference, Scientific Realism and Possible Worlds.Anders Landig - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:1-9.
    Theories of partial reference have been developed in order to retrospectively interpret rather stubborn past scientific theories like Newtonian dynamics and the phlogiston theory in a realist way, i.e., as approximately true. This is done by allowing for a term to refer to more than one entity at the same time and by providing semantic structures that determine the truth values of sentences containing partially referring terms. Two versions of theories of partial reference will be presented, a conjunctive (by Hartry (...)
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