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  1. Marshall David Abrams (2002). Probabilistic Foundations of Teleology and Content. Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content in terms of functions, where the latter are in turn based in part on facts concerning past natural selection. While I support basing content on functions which are constituted by facts about the past, I argue that it is a mistake to base content on selection. This dissertation works out an alternative concept of function which is a more appropriate basis for a theory of mental content. In (...)
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  2. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (1997). Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. Analysis 57 (4):273 - 281.
  3. Stephen Barker (2015). Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-Existent Without Meinongian Metaphysics. Erkenntnis 80 (S2):215-234.
    Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to the Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what our relationship as (...)
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  4. Andreas Bartels (2006). Defending the Structural Concept of Representation. Theoria 21 (55):7-19.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomorphisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, theobjection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by reserving the relation.
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  5. Mark H. Bickhard (2004). The Dynamic Emergence of Representation. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier 71--90.
    A final version of this paper is in press as: Bickhard, M. H.. The Dynamic Emergence of Representation. In H. Clapin, P. Staines, P. Slezak Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Praeger.
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  6. Mark H. Bickhard (2001). Function, Anticipation, Representation. AIP Conference Proceedings 573:459-469.
    Function emerges in certain kinds of far-from-equilibrium systems. One important kind of function is that of interactive anticipation, an adaptedness to temporal complexity. Interactive anticipation is the locus of the emergence of normative representational content, and, thus, of representation in general: interactive anticipation is the naturalistic core of the evolution of cognition. Higher forms of such anticipation are involved in the subsequent macro-evolutionary sequence of learning, emotions, and reflexive consciousness.
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  7. Jonathan Birch (2014). Propositional Content in Signalling Systems. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):493-512.
    Skyrms, building on the work of Dretske, has recently developed a novel information-theoretic account of propositional content in simple signalling systems. Information-theoretic accounts of content traditionally struggle to accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation, and I show that Skyrms’s account is no exception. I proceed to argue, however, that a modified version of Skyrms’s account can overcome this problem. On my proposed account, the propositional content of a signal is determined not by the information that it actually carries, but by the (...)
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  8. Maria Brincker (2014). Navigating Beyond “Here & Now” Affordances—on Sensorimotor Maturation and “False Belief” Performance. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as (...)
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  9. Marc Champagne (2016). Diagrams of the Past: How Timelines Can Aid the Growth of Historical Knowledge. Cognitive Semiotics 9 (1):11-44.
    Historians occasionally use timelines, but many seem to regard such signs merely as ways of visually summarizing results that are presumably better expressed in prose. Challenging this language-centered view, I suggest that timelines might assist the generation of novel historical insights. To show this, I begin by looking at studies confirming the cognitive benefits of diagrams like timelines. I then try to survey the remarkable diversity of timelines by analyzing actual examples. Finally, having conveyed this (mostly untapped) potential, I argue (...)
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  10. Marc Champagne (2009). Some Semiotic Constraints on Metarepresentational Accounts of Consciousness. In John N. Deely & Leonard G. Sbrocchi (eds.), Semiotics. Legas Press 557-564.
    "Representation" is one of those Janus-faced terms that seems blatantly obvious when used in a casual or pre-theoretic manner, but which reveals itself far more slippery when attentively studied. Any allusion to "metarepresentation", it would then seem, only compounds these difficulties. Taking the metarepresentationalist framework in its roughest outline as our point of departure, we thus articulate four key "structural" features that appear binding for any such theory.
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  11. John Dilworth (2005). A Double Content Theory of Artistic Representation. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (3):249–260.
    The representational content or subject matter of a picture is normally distinguished from various non-representational components of meaning involved in artworks, such as expressive, stylistic or intentional factors. However, I show how such non subject matter components may themselves be analyzed in content terms, if two different categories of representation are recognized--aspect indication for stylistic etc. factors, and normal representation for subject matter content. On the account given, the relevant kinds of content are hierarchically structured, with relatively unconceptualized lower level (...)
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  12. Fred Dretske (1994). If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
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  13. Shimon Edelman (1998). Representation is Representation of Similarities. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):449-467.
    Intelligent systems are faced with the problem of securing a principled (ideally, veridical) relationship between the world and its internal representation. I propose a unified approach to visual representation, addressing both the needs of superordinate and basic-level categorization and of identification of specific instances of familiar categories. According to the proposed theory, a shape is represented by its similarity to a number of reference shapes, measured in a high-dimensional space of elementary features. This amounts to embedding the stimulus in a (...)
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  14. Christopher Gauker (1995). Thinking Out Loud: An Essay on the Relation Between Thought and Language. Princeton University Press.
    An Essay on the Relation Between Thought and Language Christopher Gauker. things possible? How, having once perceived the herds by the lake, does the agent remember this for later use? My answer is that one way he may do it is ...
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  15. Mikkel Gerken (2014). A Puzzle About Mental Self-Representation and Causation. Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):890-906.
    The paper articulates a puzzle that consists in the prima facie incompatibility between three widely accepted theses. The first thesis is, roughly, that there are intrinsically selfrepresentational thoughts. The second thesis is, roughly, that there is a particular causal constraint on mental representation. The third thesis is, roughly, that nothing causes itself. In this paper, the theses are articulated in a less rough manner with the occurrence of the puzzle as a result. Finally, a number of solution strategies are considered, (...)
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  16. Liran Shia Gordon (2015). Reconstructing Aquinas's Process of Abstraction. Heythrop Journal 57 (4).
    Aquinas’s process of abstraction of the particular thing into a universal concept is of pivotal importance for grounding his philosophy and theology in a natural framework. Much has been said and written regarding Aquinas’s doctrine of abstraction, yet recent studies still consider it to be ‘nothing more than a kind of magic.’ This problematic claim is not without foundation, for in trying to understand exactly how this process works, we are constantly faced with an unbridgeable abyss and the repeated vague (...)
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  17. Paweł Gładziejewski (forthcoming). Predictive Coding and Representationalism. Synthese:1-24.
    According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...)
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  18. Paweł Gładziejewski (2015). Action Guidance is Not Enough, Representations Need Correspondence Too: A Plea for a Two-Factor Theory of Representation. New Ideas in Psychology:doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015..
    The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is constitutive (...)
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  19. Robert Hopkins (2006). The Speaking Image: Visual Communication and the Nature of Depiction. In Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Blackwell Pub. 135--159.
    This paper summarises the main claims I have made in a series of publications on depiction. Having described six features of depiction that any account should explain, I sketch an account that does this. The account understands depiction in terms of the experience to which it gives rise, and construes that experience as one of resemblance. The property in respect of which resemblance is experienced was identified by Thomas Reid, in his account of ‘visible figure’. I defend the account against (...)
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  20. Robert Hopkins (1994). Resemblance and Misrepresentation. Mind 103 (412):421-438.
    One problem faced by resemblance views of depiction is posed by the misrepresentation. Another is to specify the respect in which pictures resemble their objects. To isolate the first, I discuss resemblance in the context of sculpture, where the solution to the second is, prima facie, obvious. The point of appealing to resemblance is to explain how the representation has the content it does. In the case of misrepresenting sculptures, this means appealing to resemblance, not between the sculpture and the (...)
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  21. Anthony Jaffey, Consciousness: A Quasi-Identity Approach.
    Abstract: The article considers how the relationship between consciousness and neural events in the brain should be viewed. The approach is that conscious experiences – perceptions, feelings and mental images – are the subjective versions of the neural events. It is the conscious experiences that are the essence of intentionality and meaning; the neural events do the causative work. From this viewpoint there are discussions of the neural representations that figure in thinking and their corresponding subjective experiences – in what (...)
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  22. Benjamin Jarvis (2015). Representing as Adapting. Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.
    In this paper, I recommend a creature-level theory of representing. On this theory, a creature represents some entity just in case the creature adapts its behavior to that entity. Adapting is analyzed in terms of establishing new patterns of behavior. The theory of representing as adapting is contrasted with traditional causal and informational theories of mental representation. Moreover, I examine the theory in light of Putnam-Burge style externalism; I show that Putnam-Burge style externalism follows from and is explained by it. (...)
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  23. Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don't Guide. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
    More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these (...)
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  24. David Kirsh (2010). Thinking With External Representations. AI and Society 25 (4):441-454.
    Why do people create extra representations to help them make sense of situations, diagrams, illustrations, instructions and problems? The obvious explanation— external representations save internal memory and com- putation—is only part of the story. I discuss seven ways external representations enhance cognitive power: they change the cost structure of the inferential landscape; they provide a structure that can serve as a shareable object of thought; they create persistent referents; they facilitate re- representation; they are often a more natural representation of (...)
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  25. Tomasz Kubalica (2011). Marburska krytyka poznania jako odbicia. Idea 23 (23).
  26. Luciano B. Mariano (1999). Content Naturalized. Philosophical Studies 96 (2):205-38.
  27. Christophe Menant (2008). From Meaningful Information to Representations, Enaction and Cognition (2008). Dissertation, Montpellier E-CAP08
    The notions of information, representation and enaction entertain historical and complex relations with cognition. Historical relations because representational structures belong to the central hypothesis of cognitive sciences. Complex relations because cognitive sciences apply the notion of representation to animals, humans and robots, and also because the enactive approach tends to disregard the GOFAI type of representations. In this wide horizon of relations, we propose to look at a systemic approach that could bring up a common denominator for information and representations (...)
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  28. Angela Mendelovici (2016). Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation. Disputatio 8 (42):57--92.
    Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the views. This paper clarifies and improves the argument (...)
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  29. Steven Nadler (1992). Intentionality in the Arnauld-Malebranche Debate. In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company
  30. Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2004). Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Elsevier 1--20.
    Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for (...)
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  31. Walter Ott (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.
    According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal (...)
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  32. Kenneth L. Pearce (2015). Port-Royal. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
    Port-Royal-des-Champes was an abbey in France, initially located near Versailles, but later moved to Paris. Its importance to the history of philosophy is due primarily to a group of Augustinian-Cartesian thinkers who developed an influential theory of mental and linguistic representation.
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  33. Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
    According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. And (...)
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  34. Dan Ryder, Models in the Brain (Book Summary).
    The central idea is that the cerebral cortex is a model building machine, where regularities in the world serve as templates for the models it builds. First it is shown how this idea can be naturalized, and how the representational contents of our internal models depend upon the evolutionarily endowed design principles of our model building machine. Current neuroscience suggests a powerful form that these design principles may take, allowing our brains to uncover deep structures of the world hidden behind (...)
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  35. Dennis Schulting (2016). In Defence of Reinhold’s Kantian Representationalism: Aspects of Idealism in Versuch Einer Neuen Theorie des Menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens. Kant Yearbook 8 (1):87-116.
    In this paper, I want to zero in on the Kantian idea that, whilst things in themselves must logically be presupposed as the ground underlying appearances and things are not reducible to their representations, (1) objects as appearances are not properties *of* things in themselves, and (2) things in themselves or the thing in itself cannot properly be represented or even thought. To do this, I turn to one of the earliest defenders and champions of the Kantian philosophy, Karl Leonhard (...)
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  36. Johanna Seibt (2009). Functions Between Reasons and Causes : On Picturing. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press
  37. Nicholas Shea, Peter Godfrey-Smith & Rosa Cao (forthcoming). Content in Simple Signalling Systems. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models of interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that is needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of content that is richer than bare informational content, especially in contexts where false content (...)
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  38. Michael R. Starks (2016). The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein & Searle.
    I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality(mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem (...)
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  39. Margot Strohminger (2016). Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and Their Contents. [REVIEW] British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (1):101-103.
  40. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1997). A Stimulus to the Imagination: A Review of Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition and Emotion in the Human Brain by Ralph D. Ellis. [REVIEW] Psyche 3 (4).
    Twentieth century philosophy and psychology have been peculiarly averse to mental images. Throughout nearly two and a half millennia of philosophical wrangling, from Aristotle to Hume to Bergson, images (perceptual and quasi-perceptual experiences), sometimes under the alias of "ideas", were almost universally considered to be both the prime contents of consciousness, and the vehicles of cognition. The founding fathers of experimental psychology saw no reason to dissent from this view, it was commonsensical, and true to the lived experience of conscious (...)
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  41. Preston J. Werner (2015). Character (Alone) Doesn't Count: Phenomenal Character and Narrow Intentional Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):261-272.
    Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. If this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. Using a twin-earth style case, I argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, I conclude by considering a few objections that help to (...)
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  42. Fred Wilson (1992). Association, Ideas, and Images in Hume. In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company
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  43. Guenter Zoeller (1992). The Austrian Way of Ideas: Contents and Objects of Presentation in the Brentano School. In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company