Related categories

218 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 218
  1. Conceptions of Truth.Ken Akiba - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):525 – 527.
    Book Information Conceptions of Truth. Conceptions of Truth Wolfgang Künne , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2003 , xiii + 493 , £50.00 ( cloth ) By Wolfgang Künne. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xiii + 493. £50.00 (cloth:).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Truth in Philosophy.Barry Allen - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
    " Barry Allen shows what truth has come to mean in the philosophical tradition, what is wrong with many of the ways of conceiving truth, and why philosophers ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. The Value of Truth.John Altmann - manuscript
    The Value of Truth looks at the conditions that truths would have to meet to ascertain a value, as well as the different kinds of values a truth can possess.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. The Organicist Theory of Truth.Archie J. Bahm - 1975 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):197-201.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. The Generic Theory of Truth.Archie J. Bahm - 1947 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):370.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Variations on a Theme: The 1976 University Lecture.George Barany - 1976 - University of Denver.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Tarski’s 1944 Polemical Remarks and Naess’ “Experimental Philosophy”.Robert Barnard & Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):457-477.
    Many of Tarski’s better known papers are either about or include lengthy discussions of how to properly define various concepts: truth, logical consequence, semantic concepts, or definability. In general, these papers identify two primary conditions for successful definitions: formal correctness and material adequacy. Material adequacy requires that the concept expressed by the formal definition capture the intuitive content of truth. Our primary interest in this paper is to better understand Tarski’s thinking about material adequacy, and whether components of his view (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Thinking About the Liar, Fast and Slow.Robert Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski & Jonathan Weinberg - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-70.
    The liar paradox is widely conceived as a problem for logic and semantics. On the basis of empirical studies presented here, we suggest that there is an underappreciated psychological dimension to the liar paradox and related problems, conceived as a problem for human thinkers. Specific findings suggest that how one interprets the liar sentence and similar paradoxes can vary in relation to one’s capacity for logical and reflective thought, acceptance of certain logical principles, and degree of philosophical training, but also (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Asking Questions of Nature.Donald Mark Bauder - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    I begin with one way of making a distinction between something that can be called Realism, and its alternatives. It is a semantic distinction--about whether sentences of the relevant part of language have truth conditions, where truth is correctness of representation. This kind of truth is not warranted assertibility, and is not guaranteed by acceptance or agreement. The issue to be addressed comes from the combination of two things. The first is the naturalness of the view that sentences have truth (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Formulating Deflationism.Arvid Båve - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun?Arvid Båve - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14. Truth and the Absence of Fact.Jc Beall - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):437 – 439.
    Book Information Truth and the Absence of Fact. By Hartry Field. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xi + 401. Hardback, 45.00, US$65.00. Paperback, 16.99, $24.95.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. On the Identity Theory of Truth.JC Beall - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (1):127-130.
    According to the so-called identity theory of truth. A proposition is true if the given proposition is identical to some fact. But with which fact must a proposition be identical if it is to be true? This question, according to some philosophers (notably Stewart Candlish), raises serious problems for the identity theory of truth. The worry is that the identity must specify the "right fact" if it is to be an acceptable theory. The current paper aims to help the identity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Deflationism and Paradox.Jc Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth. Contributors (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Prosentential Theory of Truth.James R. Beebe - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Prosentential theorists claim that sentences such as “That’s true” are prosentences that function analogously to their better known cousins–pronouns. For example, just as we might use the pronoun ‘he’ in place of ‘James’ to transform “James went to the supermarket” into “He went to the supermarket,” so we might use the prosentenceforming operator ‘is true’ to transform “Snow is white” into “‘Snow is white’ is true.” According to the prosentential theory of truth, whenever a referring expression (for example, a definite (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
    Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  19. Truth: A Guide.Simon Blackburn - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    The author of the highly popular book Think, which Time magazine hailed as "the one book every smart person should read to understand, and even enjoy, the key questions of philosophy," Simon Blackburn is that rara avis--an eminent thinker who is able to explain philosophy to the general reader. Now Blackburn offers a tour de force exploration of what he calls "the most exciting and engaging issue in the whole of philosophy"--the age-old war over truth. The front lines of this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  20. Truth.Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favor 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given. The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they look at how the debates relate to further issues, such as the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  21. An Analysis of Certain Theories of Truth.George Boas - 1922 - Philosophical Review 31 (4):412-413.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22. Ockham'€™s Theory of Truth.Philotheus Boehner - 1958 - In Collected Articles on Ockham. Franciscan Institute.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Brentano on Truth.Johannes Brandl - forthcoming - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
    How to understand Brentano’s account of truth is a question of some controversy. A number of different views have been put forward as positions that Brentano held at some stage in his career. The received view has it that the early Brentano subscribed to a form of correspondence theory which he later rejected in favor of a definition of truth in terms of correct judging, where the correctness of a judgment is defined in terms of the notion of self-evidence (see (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used to argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  25. Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.
    Does a factive conception of knowability figure in ordinary use? There is some reason to think so. ‘Knowable’ and related terms such as ‘discoverable’, ‘observable’, and ‘verifiable’ all seem to operate factively in ordinary discourse. Consider the following example, a dialog between colleagues A and B: A: We could be discovered. B: Discovered doing what? A: Someone might discover that we're having an affair. B: But we are not having an affair! A: I didn’t say that we were. A’s remarks (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  26. Recognizing "Truth" in Chinese Philosophy.Lajos L. Brons - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):273-286.
    The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize "truth" in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of /truth/, the concept of TRUTH, and the word *truth*. The property of /truth/ is what makes something true; the concept of TRUTH is our understanding of /truth/; and *truth*· is the word we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Frege on Truth.Tyler Burge - 1986 - In L. Haaparanta & J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized. D. Reidel Publishing Co.. pp. 97--154.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  28. If Truth is Dethroned, What Role is Left for It?John Campbell - manuscript
    in Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn (eds.), Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Michael Dummett.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. The Concept of Truth.Richard James Campbell - 2011 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Preface -- Introduction: Truth in Trouble -- The Linguistic Conception of Truth -- The Functions Truth Serves -- Truth in Action -- Acting Truly -- The Genesis of Representations -- Acts of Assertion -- The Truth of Statements -- The Challenge of Sceptical Relativism -- Truth as Faithfulness -- Bibliography -- Index.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. The Identity Theory of Truth.Stewart Candlish - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the truth, then we inevitably fail to capture (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  31. Rudolf Carnap's Analysis of `Truth': Reply.Rudolf Carnap - 1948 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (2):300-304.
  32. A Neglected Theory of Truth.Richard Cartwright - 1987 - In Philosophical Essays. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. Genus dicendi y verdad. A propósito de Ortega.Pedro José Chamizo Domínguez - 2009 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 34 (1):5-25.
    El objetivo de este artículo es el de explorar las principales características del ensayo como genus dicendi filosófico y cómo se cumplen en las obras de Ortega. En consecuencia, analizo en primer lugar las cuatro características principales del búsqueda de la verdad, valor cognitivo de las opiniones, rechazo del argumento de autoridad y tolerancia intelectual. Y, en segundo lugar, demuestro cómo se han tenido en cuenta en los escritos filosóficos de Ortega. ENGLISH: The aim of this paper is to explore (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Alternative Revision Theories of Truth.André Chapuis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399-423.
    The Revision Theory of Truth has been challenged in A. M. Yaqūb's recent book The Liar Speaks the Truth. Yaqūb suggests some non-trivial changes in the original theory - changing the limit rule - to avoid certain artifacts. In this paper it is shown that the proposed changes are not sufficient, i.e., Yaqūb's system also produces artifacts. An alternative solution is proposed and the relation between it and Yaqūb's solution is explored.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  35. Circularity, Definition, and Truth.André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.) - 2000 - Sole Distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
  36. Minimalism and the Generalisation Problem: On Horwich’s Second Solution.Cezary Cieśliński - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Disquotational theories of truth are often criticised for being too weak to prove interesting generalisations about truth. In this paper we will propose a certain formal theory to serve as a framework for a solution of the generalisation problem. In contrast with Horwich’s original proposal, our framework will eschew psychological notions altogether, replacing them with the epistemic notion of believability. The aim will be to explain why someone who accepts a given disquotational truth theory Th, should also accept various generalisations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. The Epistemic Lightness of Truth: Deflationism and its Logic.Cezary Cieśliński - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book analyses and defends the deflationist claim that there is nothing deep about our notion of truth. According to this view, truth is a 'light' and innocent concept, devoid of any essence which could be revealed by scientific inquiry. Cezary Cieśliński considers this claim in light of recent formal results on axiomatic truth theories, which are crucial for understanding and evaluating the philosophical thesis of the innocence of truth. Providing an up-to-date discussion and original perspectives on this central and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Deflationary Truth and Pathologies.Cezary Cieśliński - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):325-337.
    By a classical result of Kotlarski, Krajewski and Lachlan, pathological satisfaction classes can be constructed for countable, recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic. In this paper we consider the question of whether the pathology can be eliminated; we ask in effect what generalities involving the notion of truth can be obtained in a deflationary truth theory (a theory of truth which is conservative over its base). It is shown that the answer depends on the notion of pathology we adopt. It (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Hermenéutica: El Lógos de la Fenomenología.Andrés-Francisco Contreras - 2014 - Studia Heideggeriana 3:127-158.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Carnap's Theories of Truth.D. R. Cousin - 1950 - Mind 59 (233):1-22.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. The Nature and Criterion of Truth.J. E. Creighton - 1908 - Philosophical Review 17 (6):592-605.
  42. Truth as Identity and Truth as Corespondence.M. David - 2001 - In Michael P. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. MIT Press.
  43. Weak Necessity and Truth Theories.Martin K. Davies - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):415 - 439.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44. The Disunity of Truth.Josh Dever - unknown
    §§3-4 of the Begriffsschrift present Frege’s objections to a dominant if murky nineteenth-century semantic picture. I sketch a minimalist variant of the pre-Fregean picture which escapes Frege’s criticisms by positing a thin notion of semantic content which then interacts with a multiplicity of kinds of truth to account for phenomena such as modality. After exploring several ways in which we can understand the existence of multiple truth properties, I discuss the roles of pointwise and setwise truth properties in modal logic. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Realism and Truth.Michael Devitt - 1991 - Blackwell.
  46. McDowell and Identity Theories of Truth.Julian Dodd - 1955 - Analysis 55 (3):160 - 165.
    The main thesis of this paper is that John McDowell (in his Mind and World) tries to occupy a position that is not coherently statable; namely, that facts have objects and properties as constituents and are yet identical with true (Fregean) Thoughts. This position is contrasted with two other identity theories of truth: the robust theory, in which true propositions are identified with facts (which are understood to have objects and properties as constituents); and the modest theory, in which facts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  47. Truth and Error in Morality.Dale Dorsey - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 235--248.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  48. Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy.Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet distinct. One (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49. Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.) - 2014 - University of Geneva.
  50. Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth. [REVIEW]Kenny Easwaran - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):296-299.
1 — 50 / 218