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  1. Felicia Ackerman (1994). Roots and Consequences of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 8:129-136.
  2. Parveen Adams (1994). The Bald Truth. Diacritics 24 (2-3):184-189.
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  3. Jonas Åkerman (2014). Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201403.
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  4. Ken Akiba (2000). Vagueness as a Modality. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):359-370.
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  5. Ken Akiba (2000). Vagueness as a Modality. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):359-370.
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  6. William P. Alston (1967). Vagueness. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 7--218.
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  7. Ayda Arruda & Elias Alves (1979). Some Remarks on the Logic of Vagueness. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 8 (3):133-138.
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  8. Edmundo Balsetnão (1992). Burns, Linda Claire: Vagueness. An Investigation Into Natural Languages And The Sorites Paradox, Dordrecht/Boston/London, KluwerAcademic Publishers, Colecção Reason And Argument Volume 4, 1991,202 Págs. + Xii. [REVIEW] Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 1 (2):401-406.
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  9. David Barnett, Nyu.
    Stephen Schiffer claims (in the present collection) that vagueness is essentially a psychological phenomenon. According to him, vagueness should not be explicated in terms of absent truth values or incurable ignorance—that is, as a semantic or an epistemic phenomenon—but rather in terms of a peculiar new type of propositional attitude. Schiffer introduces the notion of a vagueness-related partial belief and bases upon it both a novel analysis of the notion of a borderline case and a novel solution to the sorites (...)
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  10. David Barnett, Vagueness and Rationality.
    The two standard theories of vagueness—vagueness-as-ignorance and vagueness-asindeterminacy—agree on the following principle: if you are certain that it is clearly vague whether p, then you clearly should not believe p and you clearly should not believe not-p. I argue against the principle, and thus against the two standard theories. I offer an explanation of the initial appeal of the principle. And I show how a rival principle helps to better explain a recalcitrant trio of widely accepted data.
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  11. David Barnett (2013). Vague Entailment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):325 - 335.
    On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then all the specific facts about the distribution of hair on Harry's head, together with all the facts about Harry's comparison class, together with all the facts about our community-wide use of the word ?bald?, fail to settle whether Harry is bald. On the dominant view, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then nothing settles whether Harry is bald?it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but (...)
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  12. David Brian Barnett (2003). On the Possibility of Indeterminacy. Dissertation, New York University
    Intuitively, a question is indeterminate just in case it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically. We ordinarily ascribe indeterminacy by saying that there is no fact of the matter. We say for instance that there is no fact of the matter how many clouds exist. The distribution of water droplets in the sky would appear to settle that there are some clouds, but not how many. ;On the one hand, it seems obvious that certain questions are indeterminate. On the (...)
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  13. A. Cornelius Benjamin (1939). Science and Vagueness. Philosophy of Science 6 (4):422-431.
  14. Arthur F. Bentley (1945). On a Certain Vagueness in Logic. I. Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):6-27.
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  15. Arthur F. Bentley (1945). On a Certain Vagueness in Logic. II. Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):39-51.
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  16. Istvan Berkeley, Vagueness, Natural Language and Logic. Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 9.
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  17. Thomas Bittner & Barry Smith (2003). Granular Partitions and Vagueness. In Chris Welty & Barry Smith (eds.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS). New York, USA: ACM Press. pp. 309-320.
    There are some who defend a view of vagueness according to which there are intrinsically vague objects or attributes in reality. Here, in contrast, we defend a view of vagueness as a semantic property of names and predicates. All entities are crisp, on this view, but there are, for each vague name, multiple portions of reality that are equally good candidates for being its referent, and, for each vague predicate, multiple classes of objects that are equally good candidates for being (...)
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  18. Thomas Bittner & Barry Smith (2003). Vague Reference and Approximating Judgements. Spatial Cognition and Computation 3 (2):137–156.
    We propose a new account of vagueness and approximation in terms of the theory of granular partitions. We distinguish different kinds of crisp and non-crisp granular partitions and we describe the relations between them, concentrating especially on spatial examples. We describe the practice whereby subjects use regular grid-like reference partitions as a means for tempering the vagueness of their judgments, and we demonstrate how the theory of reference partitions can yield a natural account of this practice, which is referred to (...)
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  19. Ulrich Blau (1983). Three-Valued Analysis of Precise, Vague, and Presupposing Quantifiers'. In Thomas T. Ballmer & Manfred Pinkal (eds.), Approaching Vagueness. Elsevier. pp. 79--129.
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  20. James Charles Bohan (1970). Vagueness: A Critical Examination of Some Traditional Analyses. Dissertation, University of Washington
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  21. Chris Boyne (1972). Vagueness and Colour Predicates. Mind 81 (324):576-577.
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  22. Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan (2012). Just What is Vagueness? Ratio 25 (1):19-33.
    We argue that standard definitions of ‘vagueness’ prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of ‘vagueness’ in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of ‘vagueness’ should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over (...)
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  23. J. A. Burgess (1990). The Sorites Paradox and Higher-Order Vagueness. Synthese 85 (3):417-474.
    One thousand stones, suitably arranged, might form a heap. If we remove a single stone from a heap of stones we still have a heap; at no point will the removal of just one stone make sufficient difference to transform a heap into something which is not a heap. But, if this is so, we still have a heap, even when we have removed the last stone composing our original structure. So runs the Sorites paradox. Similar paradoxes can be constructed (...)
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  24. John Burgess (1981). Vagueness and the Theory of Meaning.
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  25. Arthur W. Burks (1946). Empiricism and Vagueness. Journal of Philosophy 43 (18):477-486.
  26. James Cargile (1990). SAINSBURY, R. M. Paradoxes. [REVIEW] Philosophy 65:106.
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  27. Matthew Carmody (2005). Vagueness, Boundarylessness and Communication. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
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  28. Roberto Casati (1993). Colour Predicates and Vagueness. Acta Analytica 10 (10):129-134.
  29. Mark Changizi (2004). Vagueness, Rationality And Undecidability: A Theory Of Why There Is Vagueness. Synthese 120 (3):345-374.
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  30. James Kennedy Chase (forthcoming). Voting and Vagueness. Synthese:1-16.
    How to handle vagueness? One way is to introduce the machinery of acceptable sharpenings, and reinterpret truth as truth-in-all-sharpenings or truth-in-some-sharpenings. A major selling point has been the conservativism of the resulting systems with respect to classical theoremhood and inference. Supervaluationism and subvaluationism possess interesting formal symmetries, a fact that has been used to argue for the subvaluationist approach. However, the philosophical motivation behind each is a different matter. Subvaluationism comes with a standard story that is difficult to sign up (...)
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  31. Petr Cintula, Christian Fermuller, Lluis Godo & Petr Hajek (eds.) (forthcoming). Reasoning Under Vagueness. College Publications.
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  32. Timothy Cleveland (1997). On the Very Idea of Degrees of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):218 – 221.
    In his book _Paradoxes, Mark Sainsbury suggests that degrees of truth can be justified and explained by analogy with degrees of belief. Considerations of vagueness place theoretical limitations on degrees of belief which require degrees of truth. This paper argues that considerations of vagueness and degrees of belief do nothing to illuminate degrees of truth. An account of vagueness need not postulate degrees of truth.
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  33. Murray Code (1995). Myths of Reason: Vagueness, Rationality, and the Lure of Logic. Humanities Press.
  34. Mary Elizabeth Cohen (1987). Vagueness, Logic and Truth. Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    Hilary Putnam has suggested that logic and metaphysics are intimately connected so that logic is dependent upon metaphysics. According to Putnam, the validity of classical logic depends upon the truth of metaphysical realism, whereas the truth of metaphysical anti-realism will justify only some alternative to classical logic. Moreover, if Putnam's suggestion is correct, then even an attempt to defend one semantics of vagueness over another must include a defense of some metaphysical view. ;My project began as an attempt to find (...)
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  35. Vincent Colapietro (1995). The Virtues of Vagueness and the Vagaries of Precision: Re-Interpreting James and Re-Orienting Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 26 (3):300-312.
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  36. Roy T. Cook (2011). Vagueness and Meaning. In Giuseppina Ronzitti (ed.), Vagueness: A Guide. Springer Verlag. pp. 83--106.
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  37. B. J. Copeland (1994). Vagueness and Bivalence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:193-200.
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  38. G. Watts Cunningham (1949). On the Meaningfulness of Vague Language. Philosophical Review 58 (6):541-562.
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  39. Steven G. Daniel (2003). Logic, Vagueness, and the Use Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):259 - 283.
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  40. de Sa Dan López (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...)
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  41. Wayne Richard Dewitt (1988). Vagueness, Logic and the Computational View of Mind. Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    The current project is to assess the implication of vague predicates for metaphysics, logic and the philosophy of mind. In the area of metaphysics, it is argued that vagueness shows certain types of metaphysical realism to be untenable. With respect to what constitutes the best logic of vagueness, the favored approach is argued to be a form of supervaluation semantics. Finally, it is argued that vague predicates prove problematic for certain stances in the philosophy of mind, most notably, the stance (...)
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  42. Lewis A. Dexter & A. Cornelius Benjamin (1940). Science and Vagueness. Philosophy of Science 7 (1):129-131.
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  43. Giuseppina Scotto di Carlo (2013). Vagueness in Progress: A Linguistic and Legal Comparative Analysis Between UN and U.S. Official Documents and Drafts Relating to the Second Gulf War. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 26 (2):487-507.
    This paper is based on a doctoral thesis which aimed at investigating on whether the use of strategic vagueness in Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq has contributed to the breakout of the 2002–2003s Gulf war instead of a diplomatic solution of the controversies. This work contains a linguistic and legal comparative analysis between UN and U.S. documents and their drafts in order to demonstrate how vagueness was deliberately added to the final versions of the documents before being passed, and (...)
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  44. Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.) (2009). Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press UK.
    Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is - a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? May even relations like identity or parthood be affected by vagueness? Sorites arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for (...)
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  45. Gary Ebbs (2004). Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions. Synthese 127 (3):303-323.
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  46. Paul Égré (forthcoming). Vague Judgment: A Probabilistic Account. Synthese:1-29.
    This paper explores the idea that vague predicates like “tall”, “loud” or “expensive” are applied based on a process of analog magnitude representation, whereby magnitudes are represented with noise. I present a probabilistic account of vague judgment, inspired by early remarks from E. Borel on vagueness, and use it to model judgments about borderline cases. The model involves two main components: probabilistic magnitude representation on the one hand, and a notion of subjective criterion. The framework is used to represent judgments (...)
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  47. Matti Eklund (2007). Characterizing Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):896–909.
    Philosophy Compass 2: 896-909. (Link to Philosophy Compass.).
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  48. Theodore J. Everett (2000). A Simple Logic for Comparisons and Vagueness. Synthese 123 (2):263-278.
    This article provide an intuitive semantic account of a new logic for comparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both a classical truth-value and a “how much” value or extension in the range [0, 1]. The truth-value of each comparison is determined by the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value of each atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separate standard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically. CL is less radical than Casari’s comparative logics, in (...)
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  49. Kit Fine (forthcoming). The Possibility of Vagueness. Synthese.
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  50. Pete Fischer (2000). Sorites Paradox and Vague Geographies. Fuzzy Sets and Systems 113 (1):7--18.
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