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112 found
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1 — 50 / 112
  1. added 2018-09-21
    The Non-Conservativeness of Legal Definitions.Marc Andree Weber - 2016 - In Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher (eds.), Vagueness and Law. Philosophical and Legal Perspectives . Oxford, UK: pp. 189–203.
    What philosophers have in mind when they think about vagueness are sorites cases. Unlike vague scientific or artificial expressions, however, vague natural language expressions do not display the kind of vagueness that we associate with the sorites; they rather display what I call cluster vagueness. A non-trivial consequence of this is that those legal definitions that state precisifications of natural language concepts not only add aspects of meaning to existing expressions but also effectively change the meanings of these expressions. From (...)
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  2. added 2018-06-15
    Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions.Sergi Oms - 2010 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 25 (2):137-147.
    Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden'sview with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I (...)
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  3. added 2018-04-13
    Plurivaluationism, Supersententialism and the Problem of the Many Languages.Rohan Sud - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    According to the plurivaluationist, our vague discourse doesn’t have a single meaning. Instead, it has many meanings, each of which is precise—and it is this plurality of meanings that is the source of vagueness. I believe plurivaluationist positions are underdeveloped and for this reason unpopular. This paper attempts to correct this situation by offering a particular development of plurivaluationism that I call supersententialism. The supersententialist leverages lessons from another area of research—the Problem of the Many—in service of the plurivaluationist position. (...)
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  4. added 2018-02-19
    Nonprobabilistic Chance?Seamus Bradley - unknown
    "Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas. It is often assumed -- without argument -- that chances are probabilities. I explore the extent to which this assumption is really sanctioned by what we understand by the concept of chance.
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  5. added 2018-02-16
    Transvaluationism, Common Sense and Indirect Correspondence.Matjaž Potrč - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (2):101-119.
    The problem of reconciling the philosophical denial of ontological vagueness with common-sense beliefs positing vague objects, properties and relations is addressed. This project arises for any view denying ontological vagueness but is especially pressing for transvaluationism, which claims that ontological vagueness is impossible. The idea that truth, for vague discourse and vague thought-content, is an indirect form of language-thought correspondence is invoked and applied. It is pointed out that supervaluationism provides one way, but not necessarily the only way, of implementing (...)
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  6. added 2017-11-09
    Quantum Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Claudio Calosi & Jessica Wilson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-29.
    On many currently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of value definiteness, according to which the properties of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether either metaphysical supervaluationist or determinable-based approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can accommodate quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI). We start by discussing the standard theoretical indicator of QMI, and distinguishing three seemingly different sources of QMI (S1). We then show that previous arguments for the conclusion that metaphysical supervaluationism (...)
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  7. added 2017-05-05
    Tolerant, Classical, Strict.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):347-385.
    In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, (...)
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  8. added 2017-03-13
    Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.
    I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate ‘phenomenally conscious’: for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature is phenomenally conscious at that time. I first defend the Positive Characterization Thesis, which says that for any borderline case of any predicate there is a positive characterization of that case that can show any sufficiently competent speaker what makes it a borderline case. I then appeal to (...)
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  9. added 2017-02-08
    Nyu.David Barnett - unknown
    Stephen Schiffer claims (in the present collection) that vagueness is essentially a psychological phenomenon. According to him, vagueness should not be explicated in terms of absent truth values or incurable ignorance—that is, as a semantic or an epistemic phenomenon—but rather in terms of a peculiar new type of propositional attitude. Schiffer introduces the notion of a vagueness-related partial belief and bases upon it both a novel analysis of the notion of a borderline case and a novel solution to the sorites (...)
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  10. added 2017-02-02
    Vagueness.Jeff Pelletier - unknown
    Vagueness: an expression is vague if and only if it is possible that it give rise to a “borderline case.” A borderline case is a situation in which the application of a particular expression to a (name of) a particular object does not generate an expression with a definite TRUTH-VALUE. That is, the piece of language in question neither applies to the object nor fails to apply.
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  11. added 2017-01-28
    Burns, Linda Claire: Vagueness. An Investigation Into Natural Languages And The Sorites Paradox, Dordrecht/Boston/London, KluwerAcademic Publishers, Colecção Reason And Argument Volume 4, 1991,202 Págs. + Xii. [REVIEW]Edmundo Balsetnão - 1992 - Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 1 (2):401-406.
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  12. added 2016-12-12
    What Vagueness Consists In.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.
    The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is (...)
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  13. added 2016-12-12
    Vagueness.Loretta Torrago & Timothy Williamson - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):637.
    Consider an object or property a and the predicate F. Then a is vague if there are questions of the form: Is a F? that have no yes-or-no answers. In brief, vague properties and kinds have borderline instances and composite objects have borderline constituents. I'll use the expression "borderline cases" as a covering term for both. ;Having borderline cases is compatible with precision so long as every case is either borderline F, determinately F or determinately not F. Thus, in addition (...)
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  14. added 2016-12-08
    Recent Work on Vagueness.M. Eklund - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):352-363.
    Vagueness, as discussed in the philosophical literature, is the phenomenon that paradigmatically rears its head in the sorites paradox, one prominent version of which is: One grain of sand does not make a heap. For any n, if n grains of sand do not make a heap, then n + 1 grains of sand do not make a heap. So, ten billion grains of sand do not make a heap. It is common ground that the different versions of the sorites (...)
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  15. added 2016-12-08
    Theories of Vagueness.D. Raffman & S. Shapiro - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):259-262.
  16. added 2016-12-08
    Bertrand Russell on Vagueness.Marvin Kohl - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):31-41.
    Bertrand russell, In his paper on "vagueness," claims that all language is vague. His first argument is that language is vague because all words-Physical-Object words, Logical words, Proper names, Etc.-Are vague. Or, To state the argument more fully: a word is vague if it is a word the extent of whose application is essentially doubtful; all words have an extent of application that is essentially doubtful; hence all words are vague. There are several difficulties, Most of which result from russell's (...)
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  17. added 2016-10-20
    Vagueness and Modality.Jon Erling Litland & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):1-39.
    How does vagueness interact with metaphysical modality and with restrictions of it, such as nomological modality? In particular, how do definiteness, necessity (understood as restricted in some way or not), and actuality interact? This paper proposes a model-theoretic framework for investigating the logic and semantics of that interaction. The framework is put forward in an ecumenical spirit: it is intended to be applicable to all theories of vagueness that express vagueness using a definiteness (or: determinacy) operator. We will show how (...)
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  18. added 2016-10-08
    Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox.Patrick Greenough - forthcoming - In Ali Abasnezhad & Otavio Bueno (eds.), Synthese Special Edition. Springer.
    Neutralism is the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. The broad goal here is to articulate a distinct, specific kind of sorites paradox (The Observational Sorites Paradox) and show that it can be effectively treated via Neutralism.
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  19. added 2016-09-28
    Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.
    There is a trade-off between specificity and accuracy in existing models of belief. Descriptions of agents in the tripartite model, which recognizes only three doxastic attitudes—belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment—are typically accurate, but not sufficiently specific. The orthodox Bayesian model, which requires real-valued credences, is perfectly specific, but often inaccurate: we often lack precise credences. I argue, first, that a popular attempt to fix the Bayesian model by using sets of functions is also inaccurate, since it requires us to (...)
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  20. added 2016-05-11
    Déstabiliser le sens.François Recanati - 2001 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2 (217):197-208.
    Contribution au numéro spécial de la Revue Internationale de Philosophie sur John Searle.
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  21. added 2016-05-02
    A New Semantics for Vagueness.Joshua D. K. Brown & James W. Garson - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):65-85.
    Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative (...)
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  22. added 2016-03-01
    Vagueness.Hans Kamp & Galit W. Sassoon - forthcoming - In Paul Dekker Maria Aloni (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 389-441.
    Vagueness is an ultimate challenge. An enormous diversity of literature on the topic has accumulated over the years, with no hint of a consensus emerging. In this light, Section 1 presents the main aspects of the challenge vagueness poses, focusing on the category of adjectives, and then gives some brief illustrations of the pervasive manifestations of vagueness in grammar.Section 2 deals with theSorites paradox, which for many philosophers is the hallmark of vagueness: By assigning avague predicate step by apparently inescapable (...)
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  23. added 2016-02-29
    Tolerating Vagueness.R. M. Sainsbury - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:33 - 48.
  24. added 2016-02-18
    Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language.Diana Raffman - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    In Unruly Words, Diana Raffman advances a new theory of vagueness which, unlike previous accounts, is genuinely semantic while preserving bivalence. According to this new approach, called the multiple range theory, vagueness consists essentially in a term's being applicable in multiple arbitrarily different, but equally competent, ways, even when contextual factors are fixed.
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  25. added 2015-10-09
    Vagueness: Why Do We Believe in Tolerance?Paul Égré - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-17.
    The tolerance principle, the idea that vague predicates are insensitive to sufficiently small changes, remains the main bone of contention between theories of vagueness. In this paper I examine three sources behind our ordinary belief in the tolerance principle, to establish whether any of them might give us a good reason to revise classical logic. First, I compare our understanding of tolerance in the case of precise predicates and in the case of vague predicates. While tolerance in the case of (...)
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  26. added 2015-09-01
    Vagueza.Ricardo Santos - 2015 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    Most words in natural language are vague, that is to say, they lack sharp boundaries and, hence, they have (actual or potential) borderline cases, where the word in question neither definitely applies nor definitely fails to apply. Vagueness gives rise to paradoxes, the best known of which is the sorites (concerned with how many grains of sand are needed to make a heap). Besides offering a solution to such paradoxes, a theory of vagueness should systematically describe how the truth conditions (...)
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  27. added 2015-07-04
    Como Explicar o Fenómeno da Vagueza?Domingos Faria - 2013 - Investigação Filosófica 1.
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  28. added 2015-06-04
    Review of Elijah Millgram's Hard Truths. [REVIEW]Cory Wright - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1218-1221.
  29. added 2014-11-21
    Introduction: Philosophical Issues in Geography.Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - Topoi 20 (2):119-130.
    An outline of the wealth of philosophical material that hides behind the flat world of geographic maps, with special reference to (i) the centrality of the boundary concept, (ii) the problem of vagueness, and (iii) the metaphysical question (if such there be) of the identity and persistence conditions of geographic entities. Serves as an introduction to the special issue of "Topoi" (20:2, 2001) on the Philosophy of Geography.
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  30. added 2014-11-08
    Higher-Order Vagueness and Numbers of Distinct Modalities.Susanne Bobzien - 2014 - Disputatio (39):131-137.
    This paper shows that the following common assumption is false: that in modal-logical representations of higher-order vagueness, for there to be borderline cases to borderline cases ad infinitum, the number of possible distinct modalities in a modal system must be infinite. (Open access journal).
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  31. added 2014-10-10
    Vaghezza e ontologia.Achille C. Varzi - 2008 - In Maurizio Ferraris (ed.), Storia dell’ontologia. Bompiani. pp. 672–698.
    On the opposition between de re and de dicto conceptions of vagueness, with special reference to their bearing on the tasks of ontology.
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  32. added 2014-10-10
    I confini del Cervino.Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - In Vincenzo Fano, Gino Tarozzi & Massimo Stanzione (eds.), Prospettive della logica e della filosofia della scienza. Atti del convegno triennale della Società Italiana di Logica e Filosofia delle Scienze. Rubbettino Editore. pp. 431–445.
    Some philosophers have argued that the vagueness exhibited by names and descriptions such as ‘Mount Everest’, ‘Downtown Manhattan’, or ‘that cloud in the sky’ is ultimately ontological: they are vague because they refer to vague objects, objects with fuzzy boundaries. I take the opposite stand and argue for the view that all vagueness is semantic. There is no such thing as a vague mountain. Rather, there are many things where we conceive the mountain to be, each with its precise boundary, (...)
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  33. added 2014-10-10
    Unsharpenable Vagueness.John D. Collins & Achille C. Varzi - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):1-10.
    A plausible thought about vagueness is that it involves semantic incompleteness. To say that a predicate is vague is to say (at the very least) that its extension is incompletely specified. Where there is incomplete specification of extension there is indeterminacy, an indeterminacy between various ways in which the specification of the predicate might be completed or sharpened. In this paper we show that this idea is bound to founder by presenting an argument to the effect that there are vague (...)
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  34. added 2014-10-10
    Vagueness, Indiscernibility, and Pragmatics: Comments on Burns.Achille C. Varzi - 1994 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):49-49.
    In ‘Something to Do with Vagueness ...’, Linda Burns defends an analogy between the informational and the borderline-case variety of vagueness. She argues that the latter is in fact less extraordinary and less disastrous than people in the tradition of Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright have told us. However, her account involves presuppositions that cannot be taken for granted. Here is to take a closer look at some of these presuppositions and argue hat they may—when left unguarded—undermine much of Burns’ (...)
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  35. added 2014-10-09
    Event Location and Vagueness.Andrea Borghini & Achille C. Varzi - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):313-336.
    Most event-referring expressions are vague; it is utterly difficult, if not impossible, to specify the exact spatiotemporal location of an event from the words that we use to refer to it. We argue that in spite of certain prima facie obstacles, such vagueness can be given a purely semantic (broadly supervaluational) account.
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  36. added 2014-04-02
    Vague Objects with Sharp Boundaries.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):29-39.
    In this article I shall consider two seemingly contradictory claims: first, the claim that everybody who thinks that there are ordinary objects has to accept that they are vague, and second, the claim that everybody has to accept the existence of sharp boundaries to ordinary objects. The purpose of this article is of course not to defend a contradiction. Indeed, there is no contradiction because the two claims do not concern the same ‘everybody’. The first claim, that all ordinary objects (...)
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  37. added 2014-04-02
    Some Remarks on Vagueness and a Dynamic Conception of Language.Jamie Tappenden - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):193-201.
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  38. added 2014-04-02
    Something to Do With Vagueness.Linda Burns - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):23-47.
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  39. added 2014-04-02
    Transvaluationism: Comments on Horgan.Diana Raffman - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):127-132.
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  40. added 2014-04-02
    Vagueness, Indiscernibility, and Pragmatics: Comments on Burns.Achille C. Varzi - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):49-62.
    In ‘Something to Do with Vagueness ...’, Linda Burns defends an analogy between the informational and the borderline-case variety of vagueness. She argues that the latter is in fact less extraordinary and less disastrous than people in the tradition of Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright have told us. However, her account involves presuppositions that cannot be taken for granted. Here is to take a closer look at some of these presuppositions and argue hat they may--when left unguarded--undermine much of Burns’ (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-31
    From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts.D. Hyde - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):641-660.
    One of the few points of agreement to be found in mainstream responses to the logical and semantic problems generated by vagueness is the view that if any modification of classical logic and semantics is required at all then it will only be such as to admit underdetermined reference and truth-value gaps. Logics of vagueness including many valued logics, fuzzy logics, and supervaluation logics all provide responses in accord with this view. The thought that an adequate response might require the (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-28
    Vagueness and Language Use.Paul Égré & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This volume brings together twelve papers by linguists and philosophers contributing novel empirical and formal considerations to theorizing about vagueness. Three main issues are addressed: gradable expressions and comparison, the semantics of degree adverbs and intensifiers (such as 'clearly'), and ways of evading the sorites paradox.
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  43. added 2014-03-28
    Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic.Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is -- a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? May even relations like identity or parthood be affected by vagueness? Sorites arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-28
    Where Demonstratives Meet Vagueness: Possible Languages.Adam Morton - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):1–18.
    I argue that both demonstratives and vague predicates are instances of some more general linguistic phenomena, which could take quite different forms. My argument consists in constructing three natural-like langauges, and using their intelligibility to argue for conclusions about languages such as English.
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  45. added 2014-03-27
    Vagueness and Partial Belief.Stephen Schiffer - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):220 - 257.
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  46. added 2014-03-27
    Stephen Schiffer's Theory of Vagueness.Paul Horwich - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):271 - 281.
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  47. added 2014-03-27
    An Intensional Parametric Semantics for Vague Quantifiers.Shalom Lappin - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (6):599-620.
  48. added 2014-03-26
    Varieties of Vagueness.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
    According to one account, vagueness is "metaphysical." The friend of metaphysical vagueness believes that, for some object and some property, there can be no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property. A second account maintains that vagueness is due only to ignorance. According to the epistemic account, vagueness is explained completely by and is nothing over and above our not knowing some relevant fact or facts. These are the minority views. The dominant position maintains that there (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-25
    Keefe, Rosanna and Peter Smith (Eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. [REVIEW]André Fuhrmann - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (1):133-136.
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  50. added 2014-03-24
    The Dynamics of Vagueness.Chris Barker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-36.
1 — 50 / 112