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  1. S. C. A. (1971). An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):352-352.
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  2. Ali E. Abbas (2011). Risk-Adjusted Martingales and the Design of “Indifference” Gambles. Theory and Decision 71 (4):643-668.
    In the probability literature, a martingale is often referred to as a “fair game.” A martingale investment is a stochastic sequence of wealth levels, whose expected value at any future stage is equal to the investor’s current wealth. In decision theory, a risk neutral investor would therefore be indifferent between holding on to a martingale investment, and receiving its payoff at any future stage, or giving it up and maintaining his current wealth. But a risk-averse decision maker would not be (...)
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  3. Mohammed Abdellaoui, Olivier L'Haridon & Corina Paraschiv (2013). Individual Vs. Couple Behavior: An Experimental Investigation of Risk Preferences. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 75 (2):175-191.
    In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the individual level and at the couple level. Our main results are twofold. First, risk attitude for couples is compatible with PT and incorporates deviations from expected utility similar to those found in individual decision making. Second, couples’ attitudes towards risk (...)
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  4. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Peter P. Wakker (2005). The Likelihood Method for Decision Under Uncertainty. Theory and Decision 58 (1):3-76.
    This paper introduces the likelihood method for decision under uncertainty. The method allows the quantitative determination of subjective beliefs or decision weights without invoking additional separability conditions, and generalizes the Savage–de Finetti betting method. It is applied to a number of popular models for decision under uncertainty. In each case, preference foundations result from the requirement that no inconsistencies are to be revealed by the version of the likelihood method appropriate for the model considered. A unified treatment of subjective decision (...)
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  5. T. P. Abeles (1994). The Economics of Collective Choice, by Joe B. Stevens. Agriculture and Human Values 11:57-57.
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  6. Robert J. Ackermann (1967). Conflict and Decision. Philosophy of Science 34 (2):188-193.
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  7. Daniel Acuna & Paul Schrater (2008). Bayesian Modeling of Human Sequential Decision-Making on the Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 100--200.
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  8. Ernest Adams (1962). Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 59 (7):177-182.
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  9. Matthew D. Adler (forthcoming). Aggregating Moral Preferences. Economics and Philosophy:1-39.
    Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. “Ideal-advisor” accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, (...)
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  10. Matthew D. Adler, Aggregating Moral Preferences.
    Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. “Ideal-advisor” accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, (...)
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  11. Matthew D. Adler (2014). Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons: A New Account. Economics and Philosophy 30 (2):123-162.
  12. Matthew D. Adler, Harsanyi 2.0.
    How should we make interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences? One branch of welfare economics eschews such comparisons, which are seen as impossible or unknowable; normative evaluation is based upon criteria such as Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency that require no interpersonal comparability. A different branch of welfare economics, for example optimal tax theory, uses “social welfare functions” to compare social states and governmental policies. Interpersonally comparable utility numbers provide the input for SWFs. But this scholarly tradition has never adequately (...)
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  13. Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein & Peter Huang, Introduction to, Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Legal Implications.
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  14. Marlies Ahlert & Hartmut Kliemt (2006). Binmore, Boundedly Rational. Analyse & Kritik 28 (1):104-110.
    It is argued that a truly Humean approach to social interaction and to normative reflection on how we should interact needs to get even closer to the facts than the Binmore program suggests. In view of the facts Binmore’s normative conclusions on bargaining as well as on the nature of the equilibria of the game of life both seem precarious.
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  15. Alpaslan Akay, Peter Martinsson, Haileselassie Medhin & Stefan T. Trautmann (2012). Attitudes Toward Uncertainty Among the Poor: An Experiment in Rural Ethiopia. Theory and Decision 73 (3):453-464.
    We investigate risk and ambiguity attitudes among Ethiopian farmers in one of the poorest regions of the world. Strong risk aversion and ambiguity aversion were found with the Ethiopian farmers. We compared their attitudes to those of a Western university student sample elicited by the same decision task. Ambiguity aversion was similar for farmers and students, but farmers were more risk averse. Our results show that ambiguity aversion is not restricted to Western student populations, and that studies of agricultural decisions (...)
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  16. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luciano Pomatto (2016). Choice Under Aggregate Uncertainty. Theory and Decision 80 (2):187-209.
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  17. José C. R. Alcantud & Ritxar Arlegi (2008). Ranking Sets Additively in Decisional Contexts: An Axiomatic Characterization. Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):147-171.
    Ranking finite subsets of a given set X of elements is the formal object of analysis in this article. This problem has found a wide range of economic interpretations in the literature. The focus of the article is on the family of rankings that are additively representable. Existing characterizations are too complex and hard to grasp in decisional contexts. Furthermore, Fishburn (1996), Journal of Mathematical Psychology 40, 64–77 showed that the number of sufficient and necessary conditions that are needed to (...)
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  18. Jonathan Aldred (2007). Intransitivity and Vague Preferences. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):377-403.
    This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none (...)
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  19. J. McKenzie Alexander (2012). Why the Angels Cannot Choose. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):619 - 640.
    Decision theory faces a number of problematic gambles which challenge it to say what value an ideal rational agent should assign to the gamble, and why. Yet little attention has been devoted to the question of what an ideal rational agent is, and in what sense decision theory may be said to apply to one. I show that, given one arguably natural set of constraints on the preferences of an idealized rational agent, such an agent is forced to be indifferent (...)
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  20. Jason Mckenzie Alexander (2000). The Evolution of Distributive Justice. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    Traditional contractarian theories based upon the theory of rational choice suffer from a number of well-known problems. For example, in positing the initial choice problem, the outcome selected by rational agents depends upon the specification of the choice situation, the range of alternatives the agents may choose from, and the nature of the rational agents themselves. Modifying any one of these three parameters likely alters the choice outcome, creating difficulties for social contract theorists who attempt to base a theory of (...)
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  21. Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms (1999). Bargaining With Neighbors. Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588-598.
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  22. E. Algaba, J. M. Bilbao, J. R. Fernández & A. Jiménez (2004). The Lovász Extension of Market Games. Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):229-238.
    The multilinear extension of a cooperative game was introduced by Owen in 1972. In this contribution we study the Lovász extension for cooperative games by using the marginal worth vectors and the dividends. First, we prove a formula for the marginal worth vectors with respect to compatible orderings. Next, we consider the direct market generated by a game. This model of utility function, proposed by Shapley and Shubik in 1969, is the concave biconjugate extension of the game. Then we obtain (...)
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  23. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull (2008). Family Ties, Incentives and Development: A Model of Coerced Altruism. In Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development. Oxford University Press.
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  24. Syed Mubashir Ali (1989). Does Son Preference Matter? Journal of Biosocial Science 21 (4):399-408.
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  25. Maurice Allais (1990). Cardinal Utility: History, Empirical Findings, and Applications an Overview. Journal de Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 1 (2):3-40.
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  26. Michael Allingham (2002). Choice Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press UK.
    We make choices all the time - about trivial matters, about how to spend our money, about how to spend our time, about what to do with our lives. And we are also constantly judging the decisions other people make as rational or irrational. But what kind of criteria are we applying when we say that a choice is rational? What guides our own choices, especially in cases where we don't have complete information about the outcomes? What strategies should be (...)
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  27. S. M. Amadae & Daniel Lempert (2015). The Long-Term Viability of Team Reasoning. Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (4):462-478.
    Team reasoning gives a simple, coherent, and rational explanation for human cooperative behavior. This paper investigates the robustness of team reasoning as an explanation for cooperative behavior, by assessing its long-run viability. We consider an evolutionary game theoretic model in which the population consists of team reasoners and ‘conventional’ individual reasoners. We find that changes in the ludic environment can affect evolutionary outcomes, and that in many circumstances, team reasoning may thrive, even under conditions that, at first glance, may seem (...)
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  28. Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos (2001). On Rational Choice of Final Ends. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):117-133.
    This paper is a non-technical paper on the kinematics of rational decision-making. lt focuses upon Williams’s Regret argument. The Argument is directed against injunction implicit in standard decision theory and formulated by Rawls: a rational agent is always ready to act so that she need never blame herself “no matter how things finally transpire”. The purpose of this paper is to offer new insights into theweaknesses of the Argument, introducing new considerations regarding coherence of the self of the would-be repentant. (...)
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  29. Rafael Amer & José Miguel Giménez (2003). Modification of Semivalues for Games with Coalition Structures. Theory and Decision 54 (3):185-205.
    Consideration of reference systems for semivalues leads us to a global representation of the action of a semivalue on a game. Using this representation, we show how to modify semivalues to take account of coalition structures on the player set. The players' allocations according to a semivalue, including a modified semivalue, can be computed by means of products of matrices obtained from the multilinear extension of the game.
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  30. Paul Anand (1987). Are the Preference Axioms Really Rational? Theory and Decision 23 (2):189-214.
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  31. Christopher M. Anderson (2012). Ambiguity Aversion in Multi-Armed Bandit Problems. Theory and Decision 72 (1):15-33.
    In multi-armed bandit problems, information acquired from experimentation is valuable because it tells the agent whether to select a particular option again in the future. This article tests whether people undervalue this information because they are ambiguity averse, or have a distaste for uncertainty about the average quality of each alternative. It is shown that ambiguity averse agents have lower than optimal Gittins indexes, appearing to undervalue information from experimentation, but are willing to pay more than ambiguity neutral agents to (...)
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  32. Chrisoula Andreou (2002). Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 22 (1):41-43.
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  33. Chrisoula Andreou (2002). Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 22:41-43.
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  34. G. Arce M. Daniel (1997). Correlated Strategies as Institutions. Theory and Decision 42 (3):271-285.
    Two institutions that are often implicit or overlooked in noncooperative games are the assumption of Nash behavior to solve a game, and the ability to correlate strategies. We consider two behavioral paradoxes; one in which maximin behavior rules out all Nash equilibria (‘Chicken’), and another in which minimax supergame behavior leads to an ‘inefficient’ outcome in comparison to the unique stage game equilibrium (asymmetric ‘Deadlock’). Nash outcomes are achieved in both paradoxes by allowing for correlated strategies, even when individual behavior (...)
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  35. Amos Arieli & Ariel Rubinstein, Tracking Decision Makers Under Uncertainty.
    Eye tracking is used to investigate human choice procedures. We infer from eye movement patterns in choice problems where the deliberation process is clear to deliberations in problems of choice between two lotteries. The results indicate that participants tend to compare prizes and probabilities separately. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers use an expected utility type of calculation exclusively. This is particularly true when the calculations involved in comparing the lotteries are complicated.
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  36. C. Armand Maurer (1954). Comment on Paper of Fr. Peter Nash. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 28:75-77.
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  37. Roger A. Arnold (1982). Efficiency Vs. Ethics: Which Is the Proper Decision Criterion in Law Cases? Journal of Libertarian Studies 6 (1):49-57.
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  38. Christian Arnsperger (2000). Methodological Altruism as an Alternative Foundation for Individual Optimization. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (2):115-136.
    Can economics, which is based on the notion of individual optimization, really model individuals who have a sense of exteriority? This question, derived both from Marcel Mauss's sociological analysis of the social norm of gift-giving and from Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenological analysis of the idea of 'otherness,' leads to the problem of whether it is possible to model altruism with the tool of optimization. By investigating the ways in which economic theory can address this challenge, and by introducing a postulate of (...)
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  39. Kenneth Arrow (1951). Individual Values and Social Choice. Wiley: New York.
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  40. Kenneth J. Arrow (1966). Exposition of the Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty. Synthese 16 (3-4):253 - 269.
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  41. Richard C. Atkinson & Patrick Suppes (1958). An Analysis of Two-Person Game Situations in Terms of Statistical Learning Theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 55 (4):369.
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  42. Gilbert Atnip & David Hothersall (1973). The Preference of Albino Rats for Free or Response-Produced Food. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 2 (3):153-154.
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  43. Giuseppe Attanasi & Aldo Montesano (2012). The Price for Information About Probabilities and its Relation with Risk and Ambiguity. Theory and Decision 73 (1):125-160.
    In this article, ambiguity attitude is measured through the maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay to know the probability of an event. Two problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case, buying information implies playing a lottery, while, in the other case, buying information gives also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on the Choquet expected utility model, we study how the decision maker’s risk and (...)
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  44. R. J. Audley (1960). A Stochastic Model for Individual Choice Behavior. Psychological Review 67 (1):1-15.
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  45. Auer Ludwig Von (2004). Revealed Preferences in Intertemporal Decision Making. Theory and Decision 56 (3):269-290.
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  46. Robert U. Ayres & Manalur S. Sandilya (1986). Catastrophe Avoidance and Risk Aversion: Implications of Formal Utility Maximization. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 20 (1):63-78.
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  47. Bac Mehmet & Kanti Bag Parimal (2002). Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers. Theory and Decision 52 (3):267-286.
    A dichotomous decision-making context in committees is considered where potential partisan members with predetermined votes can generate inefficient decisions and buy neutral votes. The optimal voting rule minimizing the expected costs of inefficient decisions for the case of a three-member committee is analyzed. It is shown that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic with respect to side-transfers: in the symmetric case, majority voting is optimal under either zero, mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting may be optimal under (...)
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  48. Jean Baccelli & Philippe Mongin (2016). Choice-Based Cardinal Utility: A Tribute to Patrick Suppes. Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (3):268-288.
    We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes’ contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and distinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes’ doctrine with the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions as (...)
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  49. C. W. Bach, Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory.
    Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have (...)
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  50. Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann, Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction.
    We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that species setup, reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent connectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model. Agent connectedness measures the extent to which agents' choices are sequentially stable. Thus describing dynamic games allows to more fully understand strategic interaction over time. In particular, we provide suffcient conditions (...)
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