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  1. Arrovian Aggregation of Generalised Expected-Utility Preferences: Possibility Results by Means of Model Theory.Frederik Herzberg - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (5):947-967.
    Cerreia-Vioglio et al. :341–375, 2011) have proposed a very general axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity, viz. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preference orderings. This paper investigates the problem of Arrovian aggregation of such preferences—and proves dictatorial impossibility results for both finite and infinite populations. Applications for the special case of aggregating expected-utility preferences are given. A novel proof methodology for special aggregation problems, based on model theory, is employed.
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  2. A Minimal Extension of Bayesian Decision Theory.Ken Binmore - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (3):341-362.
  3. Egalitarian–Utilitarian Bounds in Nash’s Bargaining Problem.Shiran Rachmilevitch - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (3):427-442.
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  4. Maxmin Weighted Expected Utility: A Simpler Characterization.Joseph Y. Halpern & Samantha Leung - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (4):581-610.
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  5. Lexicographic Expected Utility Without Completeness.D. Borie - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):167-176.
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  6. Veto Players and Equilibrium Uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn Model.Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (1):33-52.
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  7. ‘Divide-and-Choose’ in List-Based Decision Problems.Dinko Dimitrov, Saptarshi Mukherjee & Nozomu Muto - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (1):17-31.
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  8. Consistent Inconsistencies? Evidence From Decision Under Risk.Guillaume Hollard, Hela Maafi & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (4):623-648.
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  9. Nash Was a First to Axiomatize Expected Utility.Han Bleichrodt, Chen Li, Ivan Moscati & Peter P. Wakker - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (3):309-312.
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  10. Actual Utility, the Mismatch Problem, and the Move to Expected Utility.Robert Gruber - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3097-3108.
    The mismatch problem for consequentialism arises whenever the theory delivers mismatched verdicts between a group act and the individual acts that compose it. A natural thought is that moving to expected utility versions of consequentialism will solve this problem. I explain why the move to expected utility is not successful.
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  11. Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being.Hilary Greaves & Harvey Lederman - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:636-667.
    An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that these theories cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi () attempts to respond to this objection by appeal to so-called extended preferences: very roughly, preferences over situations whose description includes agents’ preferences. This paper examines the prospects for defending the preference-satisfaction theory via this extended preferences program. We argue that making conceptual sense of extended preferences is less problematic than others have supposed, but (...)
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  12. Aggregating Extended Preferences.Hilary Greaves & Harvey Lederman - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1163-1190.
    An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi :434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules that violate Arrow’s Independence of (...)
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  13. Towards a Theory of Rationality.John Kekes - 1973 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (4):275-288.
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  14. Communicative Action and Rational Choice. [REVIEW]William Rehg - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (3):622-623.
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  15. Decision Rules, Social Norms and the Expression of Disagreement: The Case of Qualified-Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union.S. Novak - 2010 - Social Science Information 49 (1):83-97.
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  16. Heuristic Coordination Games: Rational Action Equilibrium and Objective Social Constraints in a Linguistic Conception of Rationality.R. A. McCain - 1992 - Social Science Information 31 (4):711-734.
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  17. Decision Mechanisms: Educational Choices in Italy.D. Gambetta - 1984 - Social Science Information 23 (2):275-323.
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  18. Causal Comparability, Causal Generalizations, and Epistemic Homogeneity.Rosa W. Runhardt - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3):183-208.
    The issue of causal comparability in the social sciences underlies matters of both generalization and extrapolation. After critiquing two existing interpretations of comparability, due to Hitchcock and Hausman, I propose a distinction between ontological and epistemic comparability. While the former refers to whether two cases are actually comparable, the latter respects that in cases of incomplete information, we need to rely on whatever evidence we have of comparability. I argue, using a political science case study, that in those cases of (...)
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  19. Divergent Mathematical Treatments in Utility Theory.Davide Rizza - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1287-1303.
    In this paper I study how divergent mathematical treatments affect mathematical modelling, with a special focus on utility theory. In particular I examine recent work on the ranking of information states and the discounting of future utilities, in order to show how, by replacing the standard analytical treatment of the models involved with one based on the framework of Nonstandard Analysis, diametrically opposite results are obtained. In both cases, the choice between the standard and nonstandard treatment amounts to a selection (...)
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  20. Capital, Interest, and Professor Kirzner.Roger W. Garrison - 2002 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 12 (2).
    Israel Kirzner is to be credited for clarifying and developing the theory of capital and interest set out by Ludwig von Mises and for articulating and defending the pure time preference theory of interest. A revisiting of Mises and his critics suggests that the pure time preference theory is best formulated in terms of economic actions and then applied to the anticipated consequences of those actions. Differences between the Misesian and Knightian reckonings of time preference are to be understood in (...)
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  21. The Knightian Firm: Uncertainty, Entrepreneurial Judgement and Coordination.Tony Fu-Lai Yu - 2002 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 12 (4).
    This paper interprets Knight’s views of the firm from the standpoint of his theory of human agency. Focusing on the coordination perspective, this paper argues that Knightian firms are institutions which deal with intersubjective uncertainty. The fundamental principle underlying an organized activity is the reduction of the uncertainty inherent in judgements and decisions by grouping the decisions of a particular individual and estimating the proportion of successes and failures. Coordinating activities by the use of the firm, shift focus and interest (...)
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  22. Cardinal Utility: History, Empirical Findings, and Applications an Overview.Maurice Allais - 1990 - Journal de Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 1 (2):3-40.
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  23. What is Alertness?Roger Koppl - 2002 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 12 (1).
    Israel Kirzner’s concept of “alertness” is recast in the language of phenomenological psychology. Our ideas about things are either openended ideas posing no particular problem of choice, “open possibilities”, or alternatives to choose between, “problematic possibilities”. Choice is the process of formulating problematic possibilities; it is the process of reinterpreting one’s situation. The fully formed reinterpretation generates the chosen outcome as a necessary consequence of preferences and perceived constraints. Reinterpretation precedes choice, both logically and temporally. This understanding of alertness helps (...)
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  24. The Bounded Rationality Theory, the Rational Choice Theory or the Methodological Individualism.Raymond Boudon - 2004 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 14 (1).
    The bounded rationality theory has been perceived by social scientists as a more flexible version of the rational choice theory, also called expected utility theory. The former has the avantage of taking into consideration the fact that information is generally costly. It corrects the RCT on an important point. For the social sciences, the RCT is very useful, but far from representing a general theory which could explain the various kinds of behaviour the social sciences are confronted to, even in (...)
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  25. IDEAS in AGORA: Decision-Making Risk: The Difference Between Risk And Uncertainity In Economic Activities.Gabriela Munteanu & Nicoleta Vasilcovschi - 2014 - Human and Social Studies 3 (2):34-46.
    Economic activities are always supposed to carry with them the risk of market. Our area of research is concerned with what is known as the model of risk decisions at the level of economic activity; a model that can be valuable at any point of economic development. In our research, we present important aspects of risk in taking decisions in the previous and current dynamics of the market. The conditions of taking decisions with potential risks provide decision-makers with the possibility (...)
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  26. Rationality and Coordination - Cristina Bicchieri.Philippe Maître - 1995 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 6 (4).
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  27. Game Theory: A Critical Introduction.Caroline Gauthier - 1996 - Journal de Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 7 (2-3):453-462.
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  28. Before and After “Cost and Choice”.Giuseppe Eusepi - 1991 - Journal de Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 2 (1):135-150.
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  29. An Interactive Multimedia Business Game.Linda Hardman & Guido van Rossum - 1995 - Journal of Intelligent Systems 5 (2-4):139-150.
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  30. Rationality and Coordination Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory.Cristina Bicchieri - 1993
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  31. An Association Between Inequity-Averse Moral Preference and Risk Aversion in Decision-Making.C. J. Palmer, B. Paton, T. T. Ngo, R. H. Thomson, J. Hohwy & S. M. Miller - unknown
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  32. Transformative Experience and the Limits of Revelation.Eli Shupe - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3119-3132.
    In her recent book, L. A. Paul presses a serious problem for normative decision theory. Normative decision theory seems to be inapplicable when the values of potential outcomes are unknown, or when our preferences may change as a result of our choice. Paul then offers a framework for overcoming these problems, known as therevelation approach. I argue that, contrary to what Paul suggests, this approach is unhelpful in the large class of cases where the decision at hand centrally concerns persons (...)
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  33. Sen’s Criticism of Revealed Preference Theory and its ‘Neo-Samuelsonian Critique’: A Methodological and Theoretical Assessment.Cyril Hédoin - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (4):349-373.
    This paper evaluates how Amartya Sen’s critique of revealed preference theory stands against the latter’s contemporary, ‘neo-Samuelsonian’ version. Neo- Samuelsonians have argued that Sen’s arguments against RPT are innocuous, in particular once it is acknowledged that RPT does not assume away the existence of motivations or other latent psychological or cognitive processes. Sen’s claims that preferences and choices need to be distinguished and that external factors need to be taken into account to analyze the act of choice then appear to (...)
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  34. Morals by Agreement.David Copp & David Gauthier - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):411.
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  35. Morality and Utility. [REVIEW]Thomas E. Hill - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (4):547.
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  36. Shogi: Japan's Game of Strategy.K. K. I. & Trevor Leggett - 1967 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 87 (2):212.
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  37. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Veil.Mona Simion - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):557-572.
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  38. The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach.Joseph Greenberg - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book, first published in 1991, offers an integrative approach to the study of formal models in the social and behavioural sciences. The theory presented here unifies both the representation of the social environment and the equilibrium concept. The theory requires that all alternatives that are available to the players be specified in an explicit and detailed manner, and this specification is defined as a social 'situation'. A situation, therefore, not only consists of the alternatives currently available to the players, (...)
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  39. Norms and the Law.John N. Drobak (ed.) - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book contains perspectives of world-renowned scholars from the fields of law, economics, and political science about the relationship between law and norms. The authors take different approaches by using a wide variety of perspectives from law, legal history, neoclassical economics, new institutional economics, game theory, political science, cognitive science, and philosophy. The essays examine the relationship between norms and the law in four different contexts. Part One consists of essays that use the perspectives of cognitive science and behavioral economics (...)
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  40. Bargaining Theory with Applications.Abhinay Muthoo - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    The first unified and systematic treatment of the modern theory of bargaining, presented together with many examples of how that theory is applied in a variety of bargaining situations. Abhinay Muthoo provides a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results and insights obtained from the wide-ranging and diverse bargaining theory literature. Furthermore, he develops new analyses and results, especially on the relative impacts of two or more forces on the bargaining outcome. Many topics - such as inside options, commitment tactics and (...)
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  41. Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations.John C. Harsanyi - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a (...)
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  42. Essays on Economic Decisions Under Uncertainty.Jacques Drèze - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    Professor Dreze is a highly respected mathematical economist and econometrician. This book brings together some of his major contributions to the economic theory of decision making under uncertainty, and also several essays. These include an important essay on 'Decision theory under moral hazard and state dependent preferences' that significantly extends modern theory, and which provides rigorous foundations for subsequent chapters. Topics covered within the theory include decision theory, market allocation and prices, consumer decisions, theory of the firm, labour contracts, and (...)
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  43. Social Choice: A Framework for Collective Decisions and Individual Judgements.John Craven (ed.) - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
    This textbook provides a survey of the literature of social choice. It integrates the ethical aspects of the subject, with positive aspects of decision mechanisms that centre on the revelation of true preferences. The literature on the subject presently consists of a great many papers. This book draws them together in common notation and points out interpretations which are often missing in specialist papers. Applications in economics, electoral politics, and ethics are discussed. The book will be used by senior undergraduate (...)
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  44. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory.Wulf Gaertner - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K. J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this (...)
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  45. Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium: Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games.Douglas Gale - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is (...)
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  46. Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms.Cristina Bicchieri - 2017 - Oxford University Press USA.
    In Norms in the Wild, distinguished philosopher Cristina Bicchieri argues that when it comes to human behavior, social scientists place too much stress on rational deliberation. In fact, she says, many choices occur without much deliberation at all. Two people passing in a corridor automatically negotiate their shared space; cars at an intersection obey traffic signals; we choose clothing based on our instincts for what is considered appropriate. Bicchieri's theory of social norms accounts for these automatic components of coordination, where (...)
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  47. Making Ado Without Expectations.Mark Colyvan & Alan Hájek - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):829-857.
    This paper is a response to Paul Bartha’s ‘Making Do Without Expectations’. We provide an assessment of the strengths and limitations of two notable extensions of standard decision theory: relative expectation theory and Paul Bartha’s relative utility theory. These extensions are designed to provide intuitive answers to some well-known problems in decision theory involving gaps in expectations. We argue that both RET and RUT go some way towards providing solutions to the problems in question but neither extension solves all the (...)
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  48. Saliency From the Decision Perspective.Michael Zehetleitner - unknown
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  49. Patrick Suppes and Game Theory.Ken Binmore - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (3):241-251.
    This article is a contribution to a symposium celebrating the life of Patrick Suppes. It describes the context in which he made contributions relevant to two extremes of the game theory spectrum. At one extreme, he made an experimental study of whether laboratory subjects learn to use Von Neumann’s minimax theory in games of pure conflict. At the other extreme, he invented a theory of empathetic identification that lies at the root of an approach to making interpersonal comparisons needed for (...)
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  50. Freedom and Choice in Economics.Adolfo García de la Sienra - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (3):316-332.
    Even though Patrick Suppes made important contributions to utility theory, his final views on economic choice are quite critical of the expected-utility theories of rational choice. The aim of the present paper is to expose in a unified way his final views on economic choice and freedom. These views are part of his conception of causality and rationality.
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