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  1. An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice. [REVIEW]S. C. A. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):352-352.
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  2. Risk-Adjusted Martingales and the Design of “Indifference” Gambles.Ali E. Abbas - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):643-668.
    In the probability literature, a martingale is often referred to as a “fair game.” A martingale investment is a stochastic sequence of wealth levels, whose expected value at any future stage is equal to the investor’s current wealth. In decision theory, a risk neutral investor would therefore be indifferent between holding on to a martingale investment, and receiving its payoff at any future stage, or giving it up and maintaining his current wealth. But a risk-averse decision maker would not be (...)
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  3. Editorial Statement.Mohammed Abdellaoui - 2005 - Theory and Decision 58 (1):1-2.
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  4. Risk Aversion Elicitation: Reconciling Tractability and Bias Minimization. [REVIEW]Mohammed Abdellaoui, Ahmed Driouchi & Olivier L'Haridon - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (1):63-80.
    Risk attitude is known to be a key determinant of various economic and financial choices. Behavioral studies that aim to evaluate the role of risk attitudes in contexts of this type, therefore, require tools for measuring individual risk tolerance. Recent developments in decision theory provide such tools. However, the methods available can be time consuming. As a result, some practitioners might have an incentive to prefer “fast and frugal” methods to clean but more costly methods. In this article, we focus (...)
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  5. Individual Vs. Couple Behavior: An Experimental Investigation of Risk Preferences. [REVIEW]Mohammed Abdellaoui, Olivier L'Haridon & Corina Paraschiv - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (2):175-191.
    In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the individual level and at the couple level. Our main results are twofold. First, risk attitude for couples is compatible with PT and incorporates deviations from expected utility similar to those found in individual decision making. Second, couples’ attitudes towards risk (...)
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  6. The Likelihood Method for Decision Under Uncertainty.Mohammed Abdellaoui & Peter P. Wakker - 2005 - Theory and Decision 58 (1):3-76.
    This paper introduces the likelihood method for decision under uncertainty. The method allows the quantitative determination of subjective beliefs or decision weights without invoking additional separability conditions, and generalizes the Savage–de Finetti betting method. It is applied to a number of popular models for decision under uncertainty. In each case, preference foundations result from the requirement that no inconsistencies are to be revealed by the version of the likelihood method appropriate for the model considered. A unified treatment of subjective decision (...)
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  7. The Economics of Collective Choice, by Joe B. Stevens.T. P. Abeles - 1994 - Agriculture and Human Values 11:57-57.
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  8. Conflict and Decision.Robert J. Ackermann - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (2):188-193.
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  9. Bayesian Modeling of Human Sequential Decision-Making on the Multi-Armed Bandit Problem.Daniel Acuna & Paul Schrater - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 100--200.
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  10. When Time is Money.Barbara Adam - 2003 - Theoria 50 (102):94-125.
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  11. Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. [REVIEW]Ernest Adams - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (7):177-182.
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  12. Aggregating Moral Preferences.Matthew D. Adler - unknown
    Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. “Ideal-advisor” accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, (...)
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  13. Aggregating Moral Preferences.Matthew D. Adler - unknown
    Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. “Ideal-advisor” accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, (...)
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  14. Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons: A New Account.Matthew D. Adler - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (2):123-162.
  15. Harsanyi 2.0.Matthew D. Adler - unknown
    How should we make interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences? One branch of welfare economics eschews such comparisons, which are seen as impossible or unknowable; normative evaluation is based upon criteria such as Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency that require no interpersonal comparability. A different branch of welfare economics, for example optimal tax theory, uses “social welfare functions” to compare social states and governmental policies. Interpersonally comparable utility numbers provide the input for SWFs. But this scholarly tradition has never adequately (...)
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  16. Introduction to, Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Legal Implications.Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein & Peter Huang - unknown
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  17. Preference for Gradual Resolution of Uncertainty.Martin Ahlbrecht & Martin Weber - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (2):167-185.
    Analyses of preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution usually assumes all uncertainty to resolve in one point in time. More realistically, uncertainty should be modelled to resolve gradually over time. Kreps and Porteus (1978) have introduced an axiomatically based model of time preference which can explain preferences for gradual uncertainty resolution. This paper presents an experimental test of the Kreps-Porteus model. We derive implications of the model relating preferences for gradual and one-time resolving lotteries. Our data do not support (...)
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  18. Aspiration Balancing Agreements: A New Axiomatic Approach to Bounded Rationality in Negotiations.Marlies Ahlert - 2007 - Analyse & Kritik 29 (2):121-138.
    A wealth of experimental findings on how real actors do in fact bargain exists. However, as long as there is no systematic general account of the several experiments bargaining theory remains dominated by axiomatic approaches based on normative requirements or on assumptions of full rather than bounded rationality. Contrary to that, the new axiomatic account of aspiration level balancing in negotiations of boundedly rational actors presented in this paper incorporates experimental findings systematically into economic bargaining theory. It thereby forms a (...)
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  19. Binmore, Boundedly Rational.Marlies Ahlert & Hartmut Kliemt - 2006 - Analyse & Kritik 28 (1):104-110.
    It is argued that a truly Humean approach to social interaction and to normative reflection on how we should interact needs to get even closer to the facts than the Binmore program suggests. In view of the facts Binmore’s normative conclusions on bargaining as well as on the nature of the equilibria of the game of life both seem precarious.
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  20. Attitudes Toward Uncertainty Among the Poor: An Experiment in Rural Ethiopia.Alpaslan Akay, Peter Martinsson, Haileselassie Medhin & Stefan T. Trautmann - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (3):453-464.
    We investigate risk and ambiguity attitudes among Ethiopian farmers in one of the poorest regions of the world. Strong risk aversion and ambiguity aversion were found with the Ethiopian farmers. We compared their attitudes to those of a Western university student sample elicited by the same decision task. Ambiguity aversion was similar for farmers and students, but farmers were more risk averse. Our results show that ambiguity aversion is not restricted to Western student populations, and that studies of agricultural decisions (...)
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  21. Choice Under Aggregate Uncertainty.Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luciano Pomatto - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (2):187-209.
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  22. The Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment.Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):249-284.
    We provide a critical assessment of the ambiguity aversion literature, which we characterize in terms of the view that Ellsberg choices are rational responses to ambiguity, to be explained by relaxing Savage's Sure-Thing principle and adding an ambiguity-aversion postulate. First, admitting Ellsberg choices as rational leads to behaviour, such as sensitivity to irrelevant sunk cost, or aversion to information, which most economists would consider absurd or irrational. Second, we argue that the mathematical objects referred to as in the ambiguity aversion (...)
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  23. Ranking Sets Additively in Decisional Contexts: An Axiomatic Characterization.José C. R. Alcantud & Ritxar Arlegi - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):147-171.
    Ranking finite subsets of a given set X of elements is the formal object of analysis in this article. This problem has found a wide range of economic interpretations in the literature. The focus of the article is on the family of rankings that are additively representable. Existing characterizations are too complex and hard to grasp in decisional contexts. Furthermore, Fishburn (1996), Journal of Mathematical Psychology 40, 64–77 showed that the number of sufficient and necessary conditions that are needed to (...)
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  24. Intransitivity and Vague Preferences.Jonathan Aldred - 2007 - Journal of Ethics 11 (4):377-403.
    This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none (...)
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  25. Book Review:Collective Decision Making: Applications From Public Choice Theory. Clifford S. Russell. [REVIEW]John Aldrich - 1981 - Ethics 92 (1):164-.
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  26. Why the Angels Cannot Choose.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):619 - 640.
    Decision theory faces a number of problematic gambles which challenge it to say what value an ideal rational agent should assign to the gamble, and why. Yet little attention has been devoted to the question of what an ideal rational agent is, and in what sense decision theory may be said to apply to one. I show that, given one arguably natural set of constraints on the preferences of an idealized rational agent, such an agent is forced to be indifferent (...)
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  27. The Evolution of Distributive Justice.Jason Mckenzie Alexander - 2000 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    Traditional contractarian theories based upon the theory of rational choice suffer from a number of well-known problems. For example, in positing the initial choice problem, the outcome selected by rational agents depends upon the specification of the choice situation, the range of alternatives the agents may choose from, and the nature of the rational agents themselves. Modifying any one of these three parameters likely alters the choice outcome, creating difficulties for social contract theorists who attempt to base a theory of (...)
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  28. Bargaining With Neighbors.Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588-598.
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  29. The Lovász Extension of Market Games.E. Algaba, J. M. Bilbao, J. R. Fernández & A. Jiménez - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):229-238.
    The multilinear extension of a cooperative game was introduced by Owen in 1972. In this contribution we study the Lovász extension for cooperative games by using the marginal worth vectors and the dividends. First, we prove a formula for the marginal worth vectors with respect to compatible orderings. Next, we consider the direct market generated by a game. This model of utility function, proposed by Shapley and Shubik in 1969, is the concave biconjugate extension of the game. Then we obtain (...)
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  30. Family Ties, Incentives and Development: A Model of Coerced Altruism.Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull - 2008 - In Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development. Oxford University Press.
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  31. Does Son Preference Matter?Syed Mubashir Ali - 1989 - Journal of Biosocial Science 21 (4):399-408.
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  32. Cardinal Utility: History, Empirical Findings, and Applications an Overview.Maurice Allais - 1990 - Journal de Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 1 (2):3-40.
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  33. Choice Theory: A Very Short Introduction.Michael Allingham - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.
    We make choices all the time - about trivial matters, about how to spend our money, about how to spend our time, about what to do with our lives. And we are also constantly judging the decisions other people make as rational or irrational. But what kind of criteria are we applying when we say that a choice is rational? What guides our own choices, especially in cases where we don't have complete information about the outcomes? What strategies should be (...)
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  34. Activity and Convention.Richard Alterman - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):127-138.
    This paper develops Lewis’ notion of convention within a framework that mixes cognitive science with some more social theories of activity like distributed cognition and activity theory. The close examination of everyday situations of convention-based activity will produce some interesting issues for a cognitive theory of behavior. Uncertainty, dynamics, and the complexities of the performance of convention-based activities that are distributed over time and/or place, are driving factors in the analysis that is presented. How the actors reason and manage their (...)
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  35. Book ReviewsRichard Tuck,. Free Riding.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Pp. 223. $35.00. [REVIEW]S. M. Amadae - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):211-216.
    This review of Richard Tuck's Free Riding conveys Tuck's crucial distinction between the logic of collective action which fails due to the problem of causal negligibility, and free riding, which has been modeled as a Prisoner's Dilemma and involves casually impacting another actor in an adverse manner. Tuck also distinguishes the practice of voting which he argues neither fails due to the worry of causal negligibility or due to free riding; instead it represents a problem of achieving sufficiency of votes (...)
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  36. The Long-Term Viability of Team Reasoning.S. M. Amadae & Daniel Lempert - 2015 - Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (4):462-478.
    Team reasoning gives a simple, coherent, and rational explanation for human cooperative behavior. This paper investigates the robustness of team reasoning as an explanation for cooperative behavior, by assessing its long-run viability. We consider an evolutionary game theoretic model in which the population consists of team reasoners and ‘conventional’ individual reasoners. We find that changes in the ludic environment can affect evolutionary outcomes, and that in many circumstances, team reasoning may thrive, even under conditions that, at first glance, may seem (...)
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  37. On Rational Choice of Final Ends.Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos - 2001 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):117-133.
    This paper is a non-technical paper on the kinematics of rational decision-making. lt focuses upon Williams’s Regret argument. The Argument is directed against injunction implicit in standard decision theory and formulated by Rawls: a rational agent is always ready to act so that she need never blame herself “no matter how things finally transpire”. The purpose of this paper is to offer new insights into theweaknesses of the Argument, introducing new considerations regarding coherence of the self of the would-be repentant. (...)
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  38. Modification of Semivalues for Games with Coalition Structures.Rafael Amer & José Miguel Giménez - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (3):185-205.
    Consideration of reference systems for semivalues leads us to a global representation of the action of a semivalue on a game. Using this representation, we show how to modify semivalues to take account of coalition structures on the player set. The players' allocations according to a semivalue, including a modified semivalue, can be computed by means of products of matrices obtained from the multilinear extension of the game.
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  39. Are the Preference Axioms Really Rational?Paul Anand - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (2):189-214.
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  40. Handbook of Rational and Social Choice.Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume provides an overview of issues arising in work on the foundations of decision theory and social choice. The collection will be of particular value to researchers in economics with interests in utility or welfare, but also to any social scientist or philosopher interested in theories of rationality or group decision-making.
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  41. Simple Characterizations of the Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky Solutions.Nejat Anbarci - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):255-261.
    In this study we introduce two new properties, the Midpoint Outcome on a Linear Frontier (MOLF) and Balanced Focal Point (BFP) properties, to replace the Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Symmetry (SYM) and Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations (IEUR) properties in the axiomatic characterizations of the two most prominent solution concepts, namely the Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions, respectively.
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  42. Ambiguity Aversion in Multi-Armed Bandit Problems.Christopher M. Anderson - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (1):15-33.
    In multi-armed bandit problems, information acquired from experimentation is valuable because it tells the agent whether to select a particular option again in the future. This article tests whether people undervalue this information because they are ambiguity averse, or have a distaste for uncertainty about the average quality of each alternative. It is shown that ambiguity averse agents have lower than optimal Gittins indexes, appearing to undervalue information from experimentation, but are willing to pay more than ambiguity neutral agents to (...)
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  43. Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice Reviewed By.Chrisoula Andreou - 2002 - Philosophy in Review 22 (1):41-43.
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  44. Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice. [REVIEW]Chrisoula Andreou - 2002 - Philosophy in Review 22:41-43.
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  45. Correlated Strategies as Institutions.G. Arce M. Daniel - 1997 - Theory and Decision 42 (3):271-285.
    Two institutions that are often implicit or overlooked in noncooperative games are the assumption of Nash behavior to solve a game, and the ability to correlate strategies. We consider two behavioral paradoxes; one in which maximin behavior rules out all Nash equilibria (‘Chicken’), and another in which minimax supergame behavior leads to an ‘inefficient’ outcome in comparison to the unique stage game equilibrium (asymmetric ‘Deadlock’). Nash outcomes are achieved in both paradoxes by allowing for correlated strategies, even when individual behavior (...)
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  46. Tracking Decision Makers Under Uncertainty.Amos Arieli & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    Eye tracking is used to investigate human choice procedures. We infer from eye movement patterns in choice problems where the deliberation process is clear to deliberations in problems of choice between two lotteries. The results indicate that participants tend to compare prizes and probabilities separately. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers use an expected utility type of calculation exclusively. This is particularly true when the calculations involved in comparing the lotteries are complicated.
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  47. Comment on Paper of Fr. Peter Nash.C. Armand Maurer - 1954 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 28:75-77.
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  48. Efficiency Vs. Ethics: Which Is the Proper Decision Criterion in Law Cases?Roger A. Arnold - 1982 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 6 (1):49-57.
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  49. Methodological Altruism as an Alternative Foundation for Individual Optimization.Christian Arnsperger - 2000 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (2):115-136.
    Can economics, which is based on the notion of individual optimization, really model individuals who have a sense of exteriority? This question, derived both from Marcel Mauss's sociological analysis of the social norm of gift-giving and from Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenological analysis of the idea of 'otherness,' leads to the problem of whether it is possible to model altruism with the tool of optimization. By investigating the ways in which economic theory can address this challenge, and by introducing a postulate of (...)
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  50. Current Developments in the Theory of Social Choice.Kenneth Arrow - 1977 - Social Research 44.
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