Edited by Shannon Spaulding (Oklahoma State University)
|Summary||Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology describe our capacity to understand and interact with other agents. One important way we make sense of other agents' behavior is by attributing various mental states to them and explaining and predicting their behavior on the basis of these attributed mental states.This is called mindreading. The main debates at issue in this area are (i) the general nature of our ability to understand and interact with other agents, (ii) theories of how we attribute mental states, e.g., Theory Theory or Simulation Theory, (iii) the ontogenetic development of our folk psychological and mindreading skills, (iv) the nature of the mental state concepts we employ in folk psychology, and (v) skepticism about the propositional attitudes folk psychology attributes to agents.|
|Key works||Two books that have served as pillars of the debate about theory of mind and folk psychology are Davies & Stone 1995 and Davies & Stone 1995. These two volumes contain essays that defined the relevant debates and gave shape to the field. More contemporary works that have had a significant impact on the field are Nichols & Stich 2003:Mindreading and I. Goldman 2006:Simulating Minds. These two books present different accounts of the nature of our folk psychological practices, how we attribute mental states, the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of folk psychology, introspection, and a host of other issues. These works have had an enormous impact on both general and specific theories of theory of mind and folk psychology.|
Material to categorize
The Nature of Folk Psychology
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