Thomas Aquinas

Heresies are intrinsically intertwined with the evolution and inner growth of the very religions that denounce them. They serve as theological junctures, challenging and thus refining the orthodoxy of religious beliefs. The Pelagian heresy touches on one of the central tenets of Christian theology: the question of salvation. Pelagianism posits that human beings retain freedom of the will and, more specifically, the capacity to earn salvation through their own merits rather than relying solely on the grace of God in Christ. (...) This stands in contrast to the predominant Christian view that Original Sin fundamentally impaired man’s will and intellect. A central tenet of Christianity is that through His suffering and death on the Cross, Christ atoned for humanity’s Original Sin and paved the way for our redemption. But what exactly made this redemption possible through the suffering and death on the Cross? Unlike many of the answers offered, Abelard’s explanation, also referred to as exemplarism, resonates with modern sensibilities: Christ set an example to imitate, and through this imitation, man learns humility and love. However, this stance faced criticism and was condemned by Bernard of Clairvaux as having Pelagian tendencies because it suggests that Christ’s redemptive work might not inherently require Christ’s divine nature. This study will attempt to defend the exemplaristic approach while ensuring Christ’s essential role and addressing criticisms against the Pelagian heresy. This discussion is further enriched by an examination of the Eucharist, illuminating the theological tension between symbolic and realistic interpretations of religious rites. (shrink)

First, we shall examine theoretical similarities and differences between two ethics: that of a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as commented upon by Aquinas and Augustine and that of a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Joseph Fletcher in his Situation Ethics. The deep similarity is that both ethics find that the highest virtue is that of love. The key difference is that for a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics developed by Aquinas and Augustine there are some actions and feelings that are evil in themselves and which (...) have no Golden Mean whereas for a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Fletcher there are no actions which are evil in themselves. This question of whether there are actions evil in themselves is the primary reason for writing this paper. Second, we shall examine (a) the positive practice of the virtues, arguing that there is little to no practical difference between a Christian-Aristotelian ethics as developed by Aquinas and Augustine and a Christian-Aristotelian situation ethics as developed by Fletcher in the positive practice of the virtues; and we shall examine (b) the practical differences between these two ethics in deciding whether there are some actions that are evil in themselves by reflecting upon the four conditions of the principle of the double effect. The paper will conclude by favoring a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Aquinas and Augustine. Keywords: Christian-Aristotelian Ethics, Aquinas, Augustine, Joseph Fletcher. (shrink)

This work sought to carry out a comparative analysis of in vitro fertilization (IVF) vis-à-vis St. Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory. Both of them emanated from problem of infertility. IVF makes use of artificial insemination for fertilization which is quite contrary to the natural process of sexual reproduction. This work makes use of analytic method to analyse comparatively in vitro fertilization and St. Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory. Thus, this work conceives that IVF is one of the assisted reproductive technologies (...) in the scientific exploration of genetic engineering and bio-technology which emanated to tackle the problem of genetic inheritance outside marriage. It contravenes the coital or natural reproduction which conforms to St. Thomas Aquinas’ second precept of natural law. Again, IVF is artificial as such it is pruned to many complications. There is no adequate information given by the medical practitioners or providers of this service on the health hazards or risks involve in IVF. In addition, in vitro fertilization makes provision for donor gamete and surrogate motherhood which may have many negative implications both for the couples, off-spring, gestation mother, and society at large. (shrink)

The article presents an overview of medieval approaches to understanding the phenomenon of intentionality. First, the author outlines the approach of Thomas Aquinas, according to which the process of cognition consists in assimilating the intellect to the object of cognition. This theory insists that there is no difference between the form of a real object, thanks to which it exists, and the form of this object in the mind of the cognizing subject. Duns Scotus makes this picture more sophisticated when (...) he begins to distinguish in the mind the sensory image of the cognized thing (phantasma) and the intelligible representation (species) of this thing. William of Ockham, on the other hand, refuses to introduce any additional entities between the object of knowledge and the mind of the knower. This rejection, together with the nominalism, led to the emergence of the concept of mental language, in which there is no place for signs connecting thought and object, instead, a direct connection between the spoken word and the corresponding mental words is postulated. In conclusion, the author considers the problem of the justification and legitimacy of the discovery of proto-phenomenological concepts in medieval philosophy. (shrink)

A brief account of Ledesma's ideas on taxes in his treatise of moral (1603). Ledesma was a teacher in the University of Salamanca and one of the last members of the Salamanca School. He follows Salamancans' tradition on taxes but he also comes closer to later developments of this doctrine.

In a number of texts throughout his career, Thomas Aquinas identifies different senses of the term ‘esse’. Most notably, he notes that according to one sense, the term signifies the act of existence (actus essendi), which he famously holds is really distinct from essence in all beings other than God. Perhaps surprisingly, he also notes on a number of occasions that according to another sense, the term ‘esse’ can signify that very principle that he says is distinct from the act (...) of existence, namely, essence. In light of Aquinas's semantic theory, this paper investigates how he coherently holds within his metaphysical system that this term ‘esse’ can signify in different ways both essence and the act of existence. More broadly, what it shows is how, for Aquinas, the metaphysician can look to the modes of signification (modi significandi) of terms and as well as their modes of predication (modi praedicandi) to draw careful conclusions about the modes of existence (modi essendi) of real beings. These considerations reveal that in Aquinas's view, although the grammarian and logician in their way are also concerned with these semantic modes, it is not their job to employ them to discern the various senses of the term ‘being’ or the fundamental modes of being. In the end, this is a task for the metaphysician. (shrink)

Aquinas's views about the morality of lying are well known and often discussed by commentators. But his views about the nature of lying have yet to receive the attention they deserve. In this article, I take some of the first steps necessary to correct this state of affairs by clarifying and offering a limited defense of the account of lying that Aquinas presents in in his Summa Theologiae—more specifically, in that portion of it known as the treatise on truth (Part (...) 2-2, Questions 109–113). (shrink)

Many questions have been raised concerning the logical validity of Aquinas's Fourth Way. Some commentators judge the Fourth Way to be problematic while others find it delightful. In this paper, the Fourth Way is understood as a reflection on what it is to attribute to things around us scalar predicates. Does the Fourth Way not resemble what Wittgenstein observes when speaking about ‘the standard meter’? If so, is the Fourth Way significantly different from what might be called a ‘mystical’ line (...) of thinking? If not, it would be this mystical meaning that is used in the Way with respect to ‘God exists’. How should we understand this mystical meaning? By noting that beauty appears as a response-dependent property and by stressing that in order to attribute it to something we must possess certain virtues. Beauty would then be relative to virtues which are linked to the mystical meaning of ‘God’. Why could such a use, concerning the predicate ‘beautiful’ (even if that is not mentioned in the Fourth Way) not constitute an explanation of ‘what we call God’? This is a question to which the reading of the Fourth Way might lead. (shrink)

Aquinas holds that after death, the human soul can no longer change its basic orientation either toward God or away from him. He takes this to be knowable not only from divine revelation but by purely philosophical reasoning. The heart of his position is that the basic orientation of an angelic will is fixed immediately after its creation, and that the human soul after death is relevantly like an angel. This article expounds and defends Aquinas's position, paying special attention to (...) the action theory underlying it. (shrink)

The topic of wisdom attracted much less attention in modern thought than in ancient and medieval times. However, there has been a renewal of interest in it in recent psychology and philosophy, and a variety of questions has emerged from this current work. Aquinas has a detailed and elaborate account of the wisdom which pervades his oeuvre. This paper explores that and seeks to answer some of these contemporary questions from Aquinas's perspective.

Gradually, the multiverse hypothesis has been gaining popularity, not only in the scientific and academic sphere, but also in popular culture. This hypothesis, however, is not recent; Thomas Aquinas himself had to respond to a version of it. Although the problem is broad and must be approached in an interdisciplinary dialogue, the Thomistic approach is very interesting, since he accepts the plurality of worlds as something possible but denies that it is a possibility made real. His answer, which is the (...) subject of this article, is an opportunity to think about our representation of God and his causal activity. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas holds that the actual content of our thought is not accessible for any creature, and that free will cannot be superseded. These theses are founded on the spiritual condition of our intelligence and will, which makes them directly invulnerable to any intervention on our body. On the other hand, he enthrones the will as the keeper of interiority: it precludes a full transparency that would make our free decision to communicate superfluous, and it exert an inalienable control over (...) the action through which we direct ourselves to the good. In this sense, Aquinas departs from reductionist accounts, which either refuse the existence of free will, suppressing the reason to protect its expression, or face the difficulty of explaining the meaning and justification of the rights that are claimed for free will. However, Thomas Aquinas admits the possibility of indirectly accessing our minds through the knowledge of brain states and of influencing our will through passions by means of alterations of our organisms. Although this possibility was not within the reach of the human being in his time, he considered it was within the reach of separated substances. The consideration of the limits of their perspicacity and control sheds light on the possibilities that neurotechnology can allow in the future. The existence of an unassailable stronghold that guarantees our interiority and free will legitimates our right to be respected but does not make their protection superfluous. (shrink)

Aquinas famously held that only intellectual beings can grasp the natures or essences of things and cognize universals per se. Below these intellectual beings, however, were the non-human animals who shared many of the interior sense faculties in common with man; such animals’ highest sense was merely what is called the estimative power. Aquinas’s account of animal cognition has largely been ignored in contemporary biological research, although hopes for a resurgence have been emerging in the Thomistic world. In this paper (...) I seek to explicate Aquinas’s account of animal cognitive activities, particularly by explicating a more detailed account of animal cognitive action as found in the biological works of Aristotle known by Aquinas. I then turn to various contemporary biological findings to show that many purported modern discoveries (like dolphins rescuing a man or recognition of social hierarchies) shouldn’t be so surprising after all. Many such cognitive acts were already there in the texts of Aristotle read by Aquinas. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for the necessity of including what I call “categorical norms” in Thomas Aquinas’s account of the ground of obligation (normativity theory) by drawing on the value phenomenology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. A categorical norm is one conceptually irreducible to any non-normative concept and which obligates us irrespective of pre-existing aims, goals, or desires. I show that Thomistic normativity theory on any plausible reading of Aquinas lacks categorical norms and then raise two serious objections which constitute (...) master arguments against it. The upshot is that this theory requires reform. I end by proposing work remaining for such reform, namely, an expansion of the Thomistic metaphysic and anthropology. (shrink)

African Philosophy and St Thomas Aquinas have both been taught in African universities, but the engagement between the continent’s indigenous philosophical tradition and the Catholic intellectual tradition’s preeminent strand, has not been thorough. Presupposing that plural philosophical traditions contribute to the search to better understand, this research embarks upon a comparative analysis of the perspectives of the African ubuntu philosophy and Thomist philosophical conceptualisations of human becoming and being. Through analysis of dimensions of both traditions, it is contended that human (...) fulness arises through relationality. It is argued that in centring on the interpersonal encounter and the consequent recognition of another’s being through mutual engagement, these philosophical traditions open to each other. Further, both traditions contribute toward the ontology of personhood in ubuntu and the good of mutual indwelling, respectively. (shrink)

This paper raises an uncommon question: What can studying Thomas Aquinas and Critical Race Theory teach us about failures to promote mercy across the color-line? I answer this question in five stages. After locating Thomas’s teachings on mercy and its impediments within his masterwork, the Summa theologiae, I excavate Thomas’s account of mercy’s impediments. Next, I address the question “What is CRT?” Then I examine a foundational CRT text’s analysis of mercy’s impediments. Lastly, I offer a proposal for further Thomas-CRT (...) collaborations. (shrink)

This scientific article explores the notion of a Christian geopolitics and its compatibility with realpolitik and international relations. The analysis delves into the perspectives of Pope Francis, John Mearsheimer, and Catholic social thought principles to examine the moral implications of geopolitical strategies. Mearsheimer’s bait and bleed strategy in Ukraine is critiqued for its callousness and disregard for human life, while Francis’s emphasis on personal and social reform highlights the importance of ethics and the universal destination of goods. The article questions (...) whether Christians can engage in realpolitik strategies that perpetuate poverty and violate the principles of human dignity and mercy. It further considers the implications for Catholic leaders in government and military roles, particularly in the context of upcoming U.S. presidential contenders. The analysis ultimately challenges the notion that a Christian geopolitics is a category mistake, advocating for a higher moral road in international relations. (shrink)

I discuss Aquinas’s view of habit—the genus to which virtue belongs. The first article in both of Aquinas’s sustained treatments of the virtues in general (STh I.II.55-67 and QDV 1) asks whether virtues are habits. Thus, Aquinas’s pedagogical strategy is to elucidate the virtues in terms of their nature as habits. Following this strategy, I explore Aquinas’s discussion of habits in Questions 49-54 of the prima secundae by tracing three important topics: the essence of habits, the cause of habits, and (...) the increase of habits. By the end of this paper, the reader will have a strong grasp of the nature and types of habits and the different ways in which they can increase. (shrink)

Thomists typically emphasize and defend Aquinas’s “realist” approach to knowledge as an alternative to modern skepticism, but Aquinas is attuned to the common experience of uncertainty, and gives principled reasons for the limits of knowledge across various domains, including especially in the realm of human action. Virtue in general, and Thomistic practical wisdom specifically, can be understood as a habit for responsibly managing choice in the face of imperfect knowledge, unpredictable circumstances, and risk. Several modern specialized disciplines – especially economics, (...) psychology, and various applied social sciences – have highlighted interesting questions about uncertainty and its practical significance, especially in evaluating risk. Emphasizing the role of uncertainty in life is thus not only an invitation for Thomists to notice neglected aspects of Aquinas’s thought, but an opportunity to bring Aquinas’s writings into conversations in other disciplines. Catholic social teaching presents a particularly promising area to engage and learn from those other disciplines in the ongoing elaboration of Thomistic thought. (shrink)

In this article, I would like to present a brief overview of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. I try to express the cognitive processes that this model of the mind describes in more modern terminology (e.g., I interpret ‘an image’ [phantasm] as the binding effect of monomodal representations of a perceived object). Characteristic of this model is the postulation, in the case of the human mind, of intellectual abstraction leading to concepts, which requires assuming the existence of the intellect in its (...) active and passive aspects. In this context, a metaphysical conclusion can be drawn about the immortal nature of this intellect, according to Thomas. On the other hand, this model of the mind is not, to all appearances, a variant of Platonic-Cartesian dualism – Aquinas makes several arguments against dualism understood in this way, at least one of which was still raised by (non-Thomistic) critics of Descartes. In addition, Thomas points to the developmental aspect of the human mind and also attempts to describe the possible functioning of the intellect after death. (shrink)

In the paper I discuss Geach’s rejection of volitions (inner acts of the will) both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in systematic action theory – a rejection followed by some analytical commentators of Aquinas (like Davies and Kenny). I claim that Geach’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in terms of tendencies (treating the will as a special kind of tendency) enables – pace Geach – a sound defense of volitionism both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in the action (...) theory. In other words, I offer arguments in favour of volitions (inner acts of the will) starting from some insights to be found in Geach, and I response to some standard objections against volitionism. Moreover, I try to sketch a framework (based on an ontology of tendencies suggested by Geach) suitable to discuss some other volitionist claims. I proceed in four steps: first I introduce the definition of a volition or inner act of the will that may be ascribed to various camps in the volitionism debate; then I discuss three main arguments of Geach against volitionism – the argument from trying, the argument from voluntary omissions, and the argument from natural theology. I pay special attention to the issue of the timing of volitions. (shrink)

Narratives relate salient connected events across some time and many particular details of the agents involved in those events. Whether fictional or true, historical or current, personal or cultural, they seem to pervade human experience and, according to theorists across different philosophical traditions, can be of some help to elucidate concerns in the moral life. Thomas Aquinas himself acknowledges the existence of such things, or at least their near analogues, in various places in his corpus. But he does not offer (...) a sustained explanation of how narratives are understood in terms of his psychology. In this paper, I claim that such an account lies in his thought on the functioning of two interior senses in particular – the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) and the memorative power (vis memorativa) – which have been the subject of more sustained study only more recently. With this account of how humans generate and process such narratives, Thomistic scholars will be positioned to explain how narratives may function in human experience, especially the moral life, on Thomistic terms. (shrink)

In this paper, I tackle Aquinas’s notion of ‘natural inclinations’, specifically as it occurs in his seminal elaboration of the natural law in Summa Theologiae I-II. Question 94. Article 2. Maintaining that it constitutes a departure from Aristotle’s terminology, and is hence puzzling, I go on to investigate a raft of modern, mainly Anglophone, interpretations of the concept. Beginning with Jacques Maritain, I move through the broadly chronological sequence of John Finnis, Jean Porter, Steven Jensen, Justin Matchulat and Stephen Brock. (...) In each case, I argue that – despite these scholars’ philosophical ingenuity and textual facility – there are crucial problems with their respective approaches and construals. I end the paper by outlining my own construal of ‘natural inclinations’, which, even if not bolstered by heavy textual scholarship, is at least coherent and, moreover, avoids the philosophical pitfalls of the above interpretations. (shrink)

Does the fine-tuning of the universe for life continue in the afterlife? Aquinas would answer yes. In his view, the cosmic conditions post-apocalypse are set to support the resurrected body and the sensible knowledge of God’s majesty as reflected in the renewed material creature. The renewed universe is, thus, fine-tuned for immortal human life. In the first part, I present Aquinas’ version of fine-tuning, referring to earthly life and the afterlife. I distinguish between two modes of fine-tuning: organic and cognitive. (...) In the second part, I analyze the characteristics of the universe post-apocalypse in connection with the resurrected body in general and the qualities of the blessed body in particular. (shrink)

The 20th Century was a rich period for Thomism. Many commentaries to the First Way were written. One of the many points of disagreement between Thomists was the actual meaning of “motion.” In this paper, I try to argue that one should take for “motion” the broad meaning of “motus” (as equivalent to “mutatio”). I do so by reviewing the position of various prominent Thomists of the last century, many of which have disagreed with this position. I make the case (...) that Aristotle is not the best interpreter of the First Way, and similarly that other works by Aquinas should only be used when the Summa Theologiae itself is not clear enough—which is not the case. (shrink)

According to both Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, Aquinas’ third way to demonstrate that God exists presupposes the acceptance of the principle of plenitude, i.e., of the claim that all possibilities are realized at some time. Aquinas, however, maintained elsewhere that not all possibilities are always realized, and the coherence of his philosophical project may be called into question if one were to accept Hintikka’s and Knuuttila’s reading of the third way. In this paper, I argue that it is difficult (...) to present the third way without invoking the principle of plenitude in Hintikka’s formulation. The corollary of this claim is that third way cannot be a demonstration within the philosophical system outlined by Aquinas, despite his claim to the contrary. Against the backdrop of this exegetical discussion, it is possible to rephrase Aquinas’ third way as a probabilistic argument that shows that God’s existence is highly likely, although not necessarily proven. (shrink)

In the broadest sense of the term, “Thomism” refers to a set of ideas and principles, both in philosophy and theology that can be considered as derivations or representations of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. However, Thomism should not be considered as a mere conceptual body. It also represents a certain view and way of doing philosophy and theology. Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, argues that the Thomistic approach provides a coherent and skillful point (...) of view for dealing creatively and critically with opposing views, contrasting this approach with the encyclopedic and the genealogical approaches. The former imposes a single worldview, enclosing knowledge and “truth” in a monolithic structure of “progress,” while the latter, following Nietzsche, devalues and relativizes knowledge, reducing it to a multiplicity of perspectives, each with its own claims to truth, leading to incommensurability and the consequent subjugation of “truth” to the law of the strongest. On the other hand, Thomists have adopted, from the end of the thirteenth century to the present day, different styles and ways of thinking while maintaining dialogue with their “predecessors” and at the same time with their contemporaries, that is, Thomists are capable of what MacIntyre called the “rationality of tradition”. (shrink)

English translation of Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms, Psalm 54.

English translation of Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms, Psalm 53.

English translation of Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms, Psalm 52.

English translation of Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms, Psalm 51.

English translation of Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms, Psalm 35.

English translation of Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms, Psalm 11.

English translation of Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms, Psalm 9.

Since the Congregatio de Auxiliis, the Thomist and Molinist positions on divine foreknowledge have been portrayed as antithetical. Nowhere has this ostensible incompatibility been more vividly played out than the theories’ applicability as a solution to the problem of theological fatalism, the claim that if God has infallible knowledge of future contingent propositions, then human free will is impossible. The thesis argues that while both theories are satisfactory solutions to the problem, there are deficiencies within each that can be addressed (...) by blending the two views. This novel contribution to the scholarship outlines such a synthesis of the Thomist and Molinist positions to resolve the challenge of fatalism and outline a coherent and plausible theory of divine foreknowledge. Through a rigorous exposition of the key concepts of fatalism and freedom, the challenge to the classical theistic concept of articulated, but it is demonstrated that the fatalist position lacks fangs and that a Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) conception of creaturely freedom can be preserved. A critical exegetical approach is used to assess a range of theories of divine providence, with careful analysis of the merits of Aquinas and Molina’s work in particular. In recognition that Aquinas and Molina’s work relies on a coherent Boethian account of divine timelessness, a firm distinction between God’s eternality and creation’s temporality is defended with an appeal to Special Relativity, Perfect Being theology, and the phenomenological experience of tense. Having demonstrated conclusively the crucial premise of both views, Thomas’ emphasis on the divine vision is integrated with Molina’s recognition of the role of counterfactual middle knowledge to produce a view that overcomes the objections raised against Thomism and Molinism individually. This highly original synthesis based on what I have termed ‘meta-vision’ not merely rebuts serious objections; it opens up major theological debates on prayer, sin, and much more. (shrink)

English translation of Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms, Psalm 8.

Includes the whole of the First Part of the Summa Theologica. Pegis's revision and correction of the English Dominican Translation renders Aquinas' technical terminology consistently as it conveys the directness and simplicity of Aquinas' writing; the Introduction, notes, and index aim at giving the text its proper historical setting, and the reader the means of studying St. Thomas within that setting.

Includes substantial selections from the Second Part of the Summa Theologica and the Summa Contra Gentiles. Pegis's revision and correction of the English Dominican Translation renders Aquinas' technical terminology consistently as it conveys the directness and simplicity of Aquinas' writing; the Introduction, notes, and index aim at giving the text its proper historical setting, and the reader the means of studying St. Thomas within that setting.

In the article, the author undertakes the problem of whether the world, which in the light of the philosophical theory of creation ex nihilo was introduced into being as indestructible in some of its elements, can be annihilated by God and turned into non-being again. The divine power, which is the principle that sustains the world in existence, is subjected to metaphysical analysis. In the first part, the considerations concern the order of potentia Dei absoluta and focus on whether the (...) annihilation of creation is within the scope of God’s power and what such an action may consist in. In the second part, the subject of consideration is the ordered power of God (potentia Dei ordinata), which is related to the search for an answer to the question of whether God, from whom the effect in the form of creation comes, not only can but actually wants to deprive the world of existence? Since the annihilation of the world is related to the issue of God’s decision to stop the creative activity that has been initiated, in addition to the principle of power, God’s will is also taken into account in the last part of the analysis. (shrink)

This study locates Aquinas's theory of infused and acquired virtue in his foundational understanding of nature and grace. Aquinas holds that all the virtues are bestowed on humans by God along with the gift of sanctifying grace. Since he also holds, with Aristotle, that we can create virtuous dispositions in ourselves through our own repeated good acts, a question arises: How are we to understand the relationship between the virtues God infuses at the moment of grace and virtues that are (...) gradually acquired over time? In this important book, Angela McKay Knobel provides a detailed examination of Aquinas's theory of infused moral virtue, with special attention to the question of how the infused and acquired moral virtues are related. Part 1 examines Aquinas's own explicit remarks about the infused and acquired virtues and considers whether and to what extent a coherent "theory" of the relationship between the infused and acquired virtues can be found in Aquinas. Knobel argues that while Aquinas says almost nothing about how the infused and acquired virtues are related, he clearly does believe that the "structure" of the infused virtues mirrors that of the acquired in important ways. Part 2 uses that structure to evaluate existing interpretations of Aquinas and argues that no existing account adequately captures Aquinas's most fundamental commitments. Knobel ultimately argues that the correct account lies somewhere between the two most commonly advocated theories. Written primarily for students and scholars of moral philosophy and theology, the book will also appeal to readers interested in understanding Aquinas's theory of virtue. (shrink)

Obraz jako pojęcie filozoficzne ma długą i złożoną historię, która ma swój początek już w starożytności. Uczeni chrześcijańscy włączyli je do swoich badań filozoficznych w postaci imago Dei. W niniejszej pracy autor dokonał analizy dzieł św. Tomasza z Akwinu w celu ustalenia, jakie konsekwencje antropologiczne wynikają z idei stworzenia człowieka na obraz Boży. W pierwszej kolejności ustalono, że człowiek jako istota stworzona na obraz Boga uczestniczy poprzez swój intelekt w naturze Bożej. Dodatkowo przedstawione zostały trzy etapy uczestnictwa człowieka w Bogu. (...) Następnie autor bronił klasycznej teorii Akwinaty przeciwko współczesnym reinterpretacjom jego myśli. Argumentowano, iż Akwinata słusznie utrzymuje, że jedynie intelektualna część duszy ludzkiej jest, ściśle rzecz biorąc, stworzona na Obraz Boży, natomiast ciało ludzkie (i inne stworzenia irracjonalne) upodabnia się do Boga na podobieństwo śladu. (shrink)

This essay is dedicated to exploring the experience of multiple, perhaps conflicting, emotions occurring at the same time. Though this experience is part of our common language, such as when we speak of feeling conflicted or torn, philosophical accounts of the emotions and the research on these accounts tends to approach emotion sequentially, as a process of one emotion after another. This essay thus offers an account of simultaneous emotions in the work of two thinkers, Thomas Aquinas and Zhuangzi 莊子, (...) focused on the coincidence of grief and joy as found in exemplary persons. I argue that both Aquinas and Zhuangzi offer accounts which acknowledge the reality of simultaneous emotions, and both offer different explanations of how this is possible, as well as how these emotions are moderated or forgotten. (shrink)

Review of Stump, E., & White, T. J. (Eds.). (2022). The New Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.