Thomas Hobbes

A relação entre os termos do contratualismo e da justiça é uma questão relevante a ser discutida no âmbito do projeto filosófico e político de Hobbes. Trata-se, portanto, de uma relação que subjaz a lógica interna do seu projeto contratualista, enquanto uma relação entre promessas de cumprimento e uma ação contrária capaz de desfazer o princípio de qualquer acordo efetivamente expresso. Nesse sentido, há, portanto, duas ações no núcleo do acordo consensual proposto por Hobbes, uma ação injusta e outra justa, (...) ou seja, uma de “quebra” do acordo, outra do cumprimento da promessa. Essas ações são os elementos conceituais mais relevantes para refletir o sentido do ato justo e injusto no âmbito do contratualismo hobbesiano. O justo compreende o cumprimento do acordo e, por outro, o seu descumprimento é uma ação injusta. Não obstante, deve-se indagar: o que determina o cumprimento e o descumprimento do acordo? Em que sentido uma “vida virtuosa” depende de cumprir promessas, acordos e pactos? O propósito desse artigo consiste em evidenciar o cerne da temática da justiça em Hobbes considerando, sobretudo, a sua intrínseca relação com o seu argumento contratualista. Nessa relação, analisam-se o caráter dúbio das atribuições das palavras justo e injusto, assim como as de justiça e da injustiça. Diante disso, o direcionamento do debate proposto será de examinar a natureza da concepção de justiça, utilizando-se do modo como Hobbes concebe as determinações de uma verdadeira ação justa, ao passo que mediante tais esclarecimento seja possível conceber um homem justo e, consequentemente, um homem virtuoso e a pratica de uma vida virtuosa. (shrink)

In the 1733 edition of An Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue, Archibald Campbell added two lengthy discussions of Thomas Hobbes’s views on human nature and sociability. Taken together, these constitute what is probably the most detailed engagement with Hobbes’s thought in the early decades of the eighteenth century, at least amongst British moral philosophers. This article reconstructs and analyses Campbell’s criticisms of Hobbes. In particular, it shows how Campbell responds to the opening chapter of De Cive – where (...) Hobbes had famously denied “that Man is an Animal born fit for Society” – by maintaining that the desire of esteem, or honour, is in fact evidence that humans are naturally sociable creatures. In examining Hobbes’s account of human conflict, Campbell further argues that what Hobbes took to be features of our natural condition arise only once our desire of esteem is corrupted within civil societies. (shrink)

volume 1. Editorial introduction -- volume 2. The English and Latin texts (i) -- volume 3. The English and Latin texts (ii).

This edition of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan is intended to update Hobbes's style and language from early modern English to more contemporary, 21st Century English and to clarify some important elements of the work that are problematic to beginning and casual readers of Hobbes.

It is well known that Thomas Hobbes wrote his political theory multiple times. 'This little MS. treatise [The Elements of Law: Natural & Politic] grew to be his Booke De Cive, and at last grew there to be the so formidable LEVIATHAN.' The first work circulated in manuscript in 1640; the second, Latin version was published in 1642 and in a second edition in 1647; Leviathan came out four years later, with a Latin edition following in 1668. In composing De (...) Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes drew on the earlier text(s), re-using, expanding, re-organizing, and adding to material that had appeared previously. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Hobbes makes a new interpretation about politics backgrounded in full materialistic conception. His materialistic ontology denies the separate essences from the traditional metaphysics and denies the Aristotelian idea of politics as essential nature of humanity. Unlike this view, Hobbes shows that the politics is created by human beings from the power fight and power is a way of satisfying the human desires by synthetized objects and relations. In this way, politics aims to satisfy concrete human needs and the power itself, (...) before being political, is an expression from human activity. Besides, politics exists only while it can keep effective protection for citizens, because its existence depends on its material effectivity. (shrink)

El artículo examina la teoría de la representación por medio de la cual el filósofo inglés Thomas Hobbes construye la más madura y elaborada versión de su doctrina política. La demostración del Leviatán innova y resuelve ciertas ambigüedades de los trabajos anteriores por el uso de la teoría de la representación, apoyo del poder supremo del soberano; abre la ciencia política a la modernidad. Con esta ficción, el razonamiento adquiere una coherencia que aún no había alcanzado ni en Elements of (...) Law ni en De Cive. Para Hobbes, la representación desempeña un papel decisivo en la estructuración del mundo jurídico en que consiste el Estado. A partir del pensamiento del filósofo inglés, la noción de representación alcanza por primera vez un sentido político, inaugurando una nueva forma de comprender el vínculo social y político, así como la institución y perpetuación de la comunidad política con su conceptualización como principio de existencia de la comunidad. (shrink)

This article evaluates the political implications of Thomas Hobbes’s extensive treatment of religion by taking up the motif of the Eucharist (and accompanying doctrine of transubstantiation) in Leviathan. Hobbes holds out transubstantiation as an exemplar of absurdity and an historical outgrowth of Christianity’s inauspicious meeting with pagan practices. At the same time, Leviathan contains allusions to eucharistic imagery in its narration of the generation of the “Mortal God,” the commonwealth, as the incorporation of a civil body. These conflicting sentiments are (...) illustrative of a wider tension running through Hobbes’s thought. Although Hobbes’s repudiation of superstition is well-known, it stands in stark contrast to Leviathan’s treatment of Christianity as an exemplar of “true” religion. The varied allusions to eucharistic doctrine illustrate how proper use might be made of a persistent “natural religiosity.” Both in its consonance with reason and its political logic, Christianity remains a politically constructive expression of “power invisible.”. (shrink)

This article presents a reading of Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, in recourse to lesser known works of his such as Dictatorship and On the Three Types of Juristic Thought and in light of a hypothesis developed while examining his comment to Concept, going back to the German re-edition of the latter in 1963. There, Schmitt offers an interpretative scheme he has himself named “Hobbes-Crystal”, encapsulating not only a suggestion of how to decipher Hobbes, but also Schmitt’s own approach (...) to politics as Political Theology. As I argue below, the relevant comment also hints at Schmitt’s opposing stance to Natural Law as a legal paradigm and philosophical tradition. I show how this is supported by the Concept’s main text and other works mentioned above, proceeding to claim the former functions on a double-level: Schmitt‘s nominalist inquiry in the concept, circular in itself (although favourably supported by a sup-posedly mere description of what is “the case”) sits on premises which not only have not been articulated openly, but also contradict the nominalist proceeding. Bringing both insights to-gether and fleshing them out by close reading, I show that Schmitt’s nominalism presupposes his adversary stance towards Natural Law. Examining the arguments for this position of his and endorsing Oliver Marchart’s work in history of political theory, I read the nominalist façade of the Concept as a case of postfundamentalist criticism of Natural Law, which Schmitt’s Hobbes studies were formative to. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars have delved deeper into the intricate connections between Thomas Hobbes’s political and religious doctrines. It is now widely recognized that religion plays a central role...

This article examines Thomas Hobbes’s notorious claim that “fear and liberty are consistent” and therefore that agreements coerced by threat of violence are binding. This view is to a surprising extent inherited from Aristotle, but its political implications became especially striking in the wake of the English Civil War, and Hobbes recast his theory in far-reaching ways between his early works and Leviathan to accommodate it. I argue that Hobbes’s account of coercion is both philosophically safe from the most common (...) objections to it and politically superior to the seemingly commonsensical alternatives that we have inherited from Hobbes’s critics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx by David JamesMeghan RobisonDavid James. Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 256. Hardback, $70.00.In his newest monograph, David James offers an elaborate, well-wrought reflection on human freedom and its limits by considering five canonical modern philosophers: Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Judging from the table of contents, the book (...) appears to be a work in the history of philosophy: each of the chronologically organized chapters examines a different aspect of necessity, history, and freedom in one of the five philosophers just mentioned. By focusing on those thinkers, James tracks a progression in the modern reflection on the nature of freedom and its relation to constraint. Specifically, he argues that such a progression culminates, with Marx, in finally getting the right understanding of the relation between freedom and two kinds of necessity—one practical, the other historical. This is an extremely ambitious book, and its scope is extensive: by its end, James has considered more than thirty philosophical works spanning nearly two hundred years. Yet, even though it makes several contributions to various longstanding scholarly debates, Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History is not a work of intellectual history. Its main seven chapters—each of which offers a richly complex interpretative analysis that is sure to challenge any reader, even a specialist—are preceded by an introduction that explains that the book's aim is to contribute to a vision of society where necessity and freedom are reconciled. This aim is not a mere framing device but structures the book's contents as well its interpretive method.On James's account, the project of reconciling freedom with necessity—which was initiated by Rousseau in the eighteenth century and then developed by each of the modern philosophers examined in this book (with the exception of Hobbes [9])—remains incomplete. James explains this incompleteness as in part due to the success of the "two-liberties" conception of freedom outlined by Isaiah Berlin which he understands as the "liberal" idea according to which liberty begins and ends where others are prohibited from interfering in one's freedom and the "neo-republican" idea according to which the mere threat of domination is a constraint on freedom. Both views of liberty are essentially negative, James argues, and also deficient because they entail an impoverished and incorrect idea of constraint. To get beyond this viewpoint, James proposes to augment the idea of constraint that such a viewpoint entails by including both additional forms of practical constraint and a positive idea of freedom as self-determination (1). James explains the importance of the concept of self-determination by stressing the role it played in "gaining control over social and historical conditions and forces that generate avoidable practical constraints on human agency that may or may not interfere in people's lives" (2). To this end, he locates a productive tension between freedom as self-determination and practical constraint: the former is limited by the latter which, at the same time, it seeks to abolish. The "two-liberties" view cannot grasp this tension, James argues, because, in tying agency back to a "clearly identifiable agent," it overlooks the plural nature of freedom (2). In short, freedom and necessity remain unreconciled because we have not understood the nature of constraint and its relation to freedom as self-determination.James seeks to fill this "knowledge gap" by returning to what Kant, Hegel, and Marx said on freedom and necessity (both practical and historical) when they reflected on the transition to a society in which freedom and necessity are eventually reconciled. Specifically, James tries to identify new possibilities implicit in those three thinkers' accounts and to "kick the tires," so to speak, by looking for holes in their understanding of practical necessity. In particular, he focuses on what Kant's, Hegel's, and Marx's understanding of freedom and necessity might entail about the role of suffering in the transition toward a society in which freedom and necessity are reconciled. In combing through those three thinkers' arguments for inconsistencies, contradictions, and pregnant loose threads, James strives to... (shrink)

Locke bases his moral and political philosophy on his doctrine of the ‘law of nature’. Scholars have debated the content and grounding of this law and its relationship to Christian theology. The ambiguities of the Lockean natural law’s content are traceable to an unclear grammatical construction in a crucial passage of the Treatises of Government, which can be resolved by following out a related set of arguments in that work. The ambiguities of the Lockean natural law’s grounding can then be (...) resolved by the hypothesis, strongly supported by textual evidence, that Locke relies tacitly on the reasoning of a parallel passage in Hobbes. Lockean natural law rests on neither atheistic nor specifically Christian premises but on a hypothetical natural theology. Locke’s conclusions from that natural theology represent an attempt to follow out Hobbesian logic while also tightening it up on one important point on which Hobbes himself appears to vacillate. (shrink)

In the early iterations of his political thought, The Elements of Law and De Cive, Hobbes proposed a new account of the nature of the people. In Section 2 I describe Pufendorf’s critical response. Pufendorf’s theory of the people is a neglected aspect of the political argument of the De Jure. Just as neglected is Locke’s theory of the people in Two Treatises of Government, though there is better reason for neglect in Locke’s case, in so far as he fails (...) in his major work of political philosophy to present anything resembling a theory of the people at all. In Section 3 I bring Locke’s thinking about the people into clearer focus. In the concluding Section 4 I explore some of the weaknesses of his position. (shrink)

My paper ‘Hobbes and the Motivations of Social Contract Theory’ was published in this journal in 1994. In this contribution I explain the background that led me to write that paper at an early stage of my career, relating the explanation to my education as a student at UCL, and, briefly, at Harvard and contrasting the methodological approaches I experienced in the two departments. The Hobbes paper itself offers a type of ‘rational reconstruction’ of Hobbes, drawing on the logic of (...) different social contract arguments, and while there is much in the paper I still agree with, it assumes an approach to Philosophy that I would not adopt now. (shrink)

Hobbes’s account of the individual’s right to resist sovereign authority is nuanced. His allowance for cases in which a sovereign’s command falls outside the terms of the social contract, despite recent reappraisals, cannot rescue him from the accusation that his system is contradictory. It has been suggested that some Hobbesian rights can be transferred whilst others are quarantined, or that it is the institution of law, rather than the particular commands of the sovereign, which Hobbes ultimately upholds. By reconsidering Hobbes’s (...) concept of sovereignty alongside his theory of natural law, I argue that his system remains in tension with itself. Hobbes’s prioritisation of sovereign judgement over that of the individual, when combined with the principles he retains from the natural law tradition, renders his theory of resistance irreconcilable with his position on sovereignty. (shrink)

(Early) Modern social contract theories reject the idea that legal and political institutions are grounded in an alleged natural ordering or hierarchy of human beings, and instead argue that only government by a public (and not private) authority can fulfil the idea of justice as freedom and equality for all. To be authoritative and not just powerful, governing institutions must be shared as ours in this irreducible sense. I first outline how Kant’s ideal account of rightful freedom brilliantly transforms this (...) tradition as found in the works of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, before proposing a way to see Kant’s two-layered non-ideal theory—his accounts of human nature (“moral anthropology”) and historical societies (“the principle of politics”)—as complementing his ideal theory of rightful freedom. This enables us to envision a conception not only of rightful external freedom but of rightful human freedom in particular societies—with their histories—on planet Earth. With these arguments at hand, we can also better appreciate the importance of realizing that the four possible political conditions for Kant—anarchy, barbarism, despotism, and republic—are ideas of reason, which means that they are never perfectly realized. Hence, historical societies we are not either in the state of nature or in civil society. In addition, in historical societies founded on principles of freedom, there are pockets of injustice or pockets that are devoid of justice that can only be captured by means of one of the three political ideas that are not constitutive of the republican legal-political framework. Kant’s four ideas therefore give us more tools with which to capture the nature of different political forces and challenges facing us in our historical societies. (shrink)

Jeffrey Collins’ new book aims to presents Locke’s views on religious toleration in the light of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. At first blush, Hobbes seems an unusual choice as a point of co...

Locke refrained from engaging explicitly with Hobbes in any of his writings. Locke’s policy of non-engagement should be interpreted, we argue, neither as evidence of his lack of interest in (or ignorance of) Hobbes’s arguments, nor as an attempt to conceal from the uninitiated Locke’s covert Hobbesian commitments. Locke’s silence reveals rather than conceals. What it reveals is an absolute determination to “distinguish between the business of civil government and that of religion, and to mark the true bounds between them”. (...) Approached in this way, precisely because Locke’s account of the “business of civil government” says nothing about ecclesiastical government, the second of Two Treatises can be read, in its entirety, as a powerful critical response to Hobbes. To see why, it is necessary to grasp that Part iii of Leviathan (“Of a Christian Common-wealth”) is integral to Hobbes’s positive argumentative purposes in the work. (shrink)

An introduction to the special issue on Hobbes and Locke: Meaning, Method, Modernity.

Slavery and Race: Philosophical Debates in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries explores philosophical ideas, theories, and arguments that are central to early modern discussions of slavery. Jorati explores a topic that is widely neglected by historians of philosophy: debates about the morality of slavery in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century America and Europe. Slavery and Race: Philosophical Debates in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries explores philosophical ideas, theories, and arguments that are central to early modern discussions of slavery. It is a companion (...) volume to Jorati's Slavery and Race: Philosophy Debates in the Eighteenth Century (OUP 2023). (shrink)

This chapter considers the extent to which individual and common good are compatible within Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy. It explores Hobbes’s notion of “good”, and considers how he allows for the existence of “real” individual goods. Next, it examines Hobbes’s definition of common good as that which is “good for the commonwealth”. It is the sovereign who decides what is good for the commonwealth, but just as there are real individual goods, there are real common goods. Real goods for the commonwealth (...) are those things that preserve its existence. It is argued that, in Hobbes’s theory, real individual goods are compatible with real common goods; moreover, it is this compatibility that ensures the stability and prosperity of the commonwealth. However, a condition in which all laws are directed to the real common good, and citizens see where their own real good lies, is an ideal, not a realistic political scenario for Hobbes. Real politics requires defusing potential conflict between individual goods and the common good in a different way: namely, by encouraging citizens to accept the sovereign’s judgement of what is “good”. Nevertheless, there are limits to what subjects will accept. Tracing the theoretical compatibility between real goods for individuals and for commonwealths in Hobbes’s thought shows how the preservation of a Hobbesian political community relies not only on citizens accepting the sovereign’s judgement, but also on the ability of sovereigns to see the real common good. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’s radical tendency to view natural law as a means of individual self-preservation sparked critical responses among natural law theorists in England and continental Europe. This chapter compares how two of Hobbes’s immediate successors and critics – Richard Cumberland and Samuel Pufendorf – dealt with the potential conflict between self-interest and the requirements of natural law. The chapter shows how both intended to reply to Hobbes in their own distinctive ways by attempting to show that the ultimate aim of (...) natural law, imposed by God, obligated people to promote the common good of humankind as a whole rather than mainly function as the means for individual and social utility. They did not, however, consider self-interest to be merely destructive for social cooperation and natural law. Both argued in their distinct ways that self-interest is the most effective motivation for people to consider the advantage of others and it leads them to promote the common good. This chapter also points out notable differences between Cumberland’s and Pufendorf’s treatment of the relation between the private good and the common good. (shrink)

La famille a longtemps t considre comme une unit sociale compose de trois relations simples : mari-femme, parent-enfant et matre-serviteur. Mais la fin du dix-huitime sicle, la dimension affective de la famille devient prpondrante, ce qui en exclut progressivement les serviteurs. Cette tude se penche sur le moment crucial de l'histoire des ides ou le paradigme familial est en train de changer, en s'intressant aux discours sur la famille d'une srie de penseurs issus de la tradition du droit naturel moderne (...) et des Lumires cossaises. Dans un effort constant de replacer chaque relation analyse dans le cadre de la famille, et la famille dans l'argument politique et philosophique plus gnral dfendu par ces auteurs, cette tude montre que la famille, loin d'tre une question subsidiaire, joue un role important dans la comprhension des rapports sociaux cette poque. (shrink)

The following essay aims to elaborate a comparative study between the political theories of Kant and Hobbes, based on the second part of the Kantian essay Theory and Practice. The first part of the essay studies the legitimizing sources suggested by Kant and Hobbes to explain the need for a civil state. The second part analyzes the three republican principles suggested by Kant and compares them with the Hobbesian proposal. The third part studies the direct critique of Kant to Hobbes; (...) it shows how Kant presents his critique in a way that highlights his principle of independence, absent in Hobbes. Finally, starting from an important point of convergence between the authors – the defense of an absolute duty of obedience –, other interpretative possibilities are explored in order to investigate the possibility of finding a recognition or a prudent openness to the question of disobedience. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This article discusses the effects of the political structures that emerged with the civilization process on human nature in Hobbes. Hobbes constructs the state of nature in an area where humans can live their nature completely freely. Although this situation creates a certain area of freedom for human nature, when it comes to social relations, this freedom endangers the lives of all people. As is known, Hobbes' solution on this issue is to build political structures such as states that will (...) benefit everyone, rather than people acting as in the state of nature. However, what I am trying to draw attention to here is whether human nature is dispensable with this transition. My main purpose in this article will be to show that even if there is a change in human position, his nature repositions itself as a fundamental determinant that in a sense manages and shapes all processes within political structures under different appearances, as in the state of nature. In the article handled for such a purpose, it is shown that human nature is no longer possible to remain in its pure form and has transformed into something that we can deal with through a political relationship. The basic view defended in this article is that with this new situation, which we can call the emergence of political nature, human nature emerges as a new force shaping the entire political field. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article argues that Thomas Hobbes' analysis of insult or ‘contumely’ prefigures recent developments in moral and political philosophy in striking ways. Specifically, Hobbes's concerns about the dignitary harms in hate speech went well beyond ‘fighting words’ to the essential role played by expressions of hatred and contempt in making and unmaking social hierarchies. Hobbes’s sensitivity to contumely’s subtle power to constitute social in/equalities recalls recent work in feminist and critical race theory. Yet his expansive solutions – both negative (...) and positive, legal and ethical – also shed light on the difficulties faced by aspirationally egalitarian societies in their efforts to eradicate contempt today. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to survey some of the most important developments in thinking about essence in the early modern period, highlighting ways in which thinkers in the period gradually depart from the medieval Aristotelian tradition. In this tradition, essence is thought of as selective, explanatory, and kind-determining. Whereas in the beginning of the early modern period some figures (such as René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, and Anne Conway) still adhere to this traditional view, later figures (including (...) Benedict de Spinoza, G.W. Leibniz, and John Locke) reject it. (shrink)

Las distinciones conceptuales propuestas por Thomas Hobbes reflejan el problema político de considerar lo múltiple en la unidad o la convergencia de innumerables cuerpos, deseos y pasiones en la consolidación de una voluntad soberana unitaria. Ejemplo de ello son las nociones de potentiae (potencias) y potestas (poder), junto a otras como multitud y pueblo o súbditos y soberano. Todas ellas reflejan el problema de la estabilidad del Estado y su legitimidad institucional: la necesidad de generar, de manera continua, un poder (...) común. Con la intención de formular una lectura democrática, el propósito de este artículo es relacionar una lectura iconográfica del frontispicio del Leviatán con la presencia/ausencia de un cuerpo indómito. El trabajo concluye que un rasgo esencial de la teoría política hobbesiana es el sentido de lo democrático fundamentado en la presencia ineludible de cuerpos colectivos que deben ser representados. (shrink)