This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

20 found
Order:
  1. Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism and Degrees of Rightness.Vuko Andrić & Attila Tanyi - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):711-731.
    In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multidimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multidimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis—he calls it DEGREE—that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Multidimensional Consequentialism and Risk.Vuko Andric & Attila Tanyi - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):49-57.
    In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson proposes a version of multi-dimensional consequentialism according to which risk is one among several dimensions. We argue that Peterson’s treatment of risk is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we want to show that all problems of one-dimensional (objective or subjective) consequentialism are also problems for Peterson’s proposal, although it may fall prey to them less often. In ending our paper, we address the objection that our discussion overlooks the fact that Peterson’s proposal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Self Torture and Group Beneficence.Frank Arntzenius & David McCarthy - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (1):129-144.
    Moral puzzles about actions which bring about very small or what are said to be imperceptible harms or benefits for each of a large number of people are well known. Less well known is an argument by Warren Quinn that standard theories of rationality can lead an agent to end up torturing himself or herself in a completely foreseeable way, and that this shows that standard theories of rationality need to be revised. We show where Quinn's argument goes wrong, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  4. Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology.Selim Berker - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):145-153.
    I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
    When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  6. Don’T Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting.Yishai Cohen - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):245-261.
    Suppose you can save only one of two groups of people from harm, with one person in one group, and five persons in the other group. Are you obligated to save the greater number? While common sense seems to say ‘yes’, the numbers skeptic says ‘no’. Numbers Skepticism has been partly motivated by the anti-consequentialist thought that the goods, harms and well-being of individual people do not aggregate in any morally significant way. However, even many non-consequentialists think that Numbers Skepticism (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Playing Dice with Morality: Weighted Lotteries and the Number Problem.Mathieu Doucet - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):161-181.
    In this article I criticize the non-consequentialist Weighted Lottery (WL) solution to the choice between saving a smaller or a larger group of people. WL aims to avoid what non-consequentialists see as consequentialism's unfair aggregation by giving equal consideration to each individual's claim to be rescued. In so doing, I argue, WL runs into another common objection to consequentialism: it is excessively demanding. WL links the right action with the outcome of a fairly weighted lottery, which means that an agent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Does Participation Matter? An Inconsistency in Parfit's Moral Mathematics: Ben Eggleston.Ben Eggleston - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (1):92-105.
    Consequentialists typically think that the moral quality of one's conduct depends on the difference one makes. But consequentialists may also think that even if one is not making a difference, the moral quality of one's conduct can still be affected by whether one is participating in an endeavour that does make a difference. Derek Parfit discusses this issue – the moral significance of what I call ‘participation’ – in the chapter of Reasons and Persons that he devotes to what he (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Should Consequentialists Make Parfit's Second Mistake? A Refutation of Jackson.Ben Eggleston - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):1–15.
    Frank Jackson claims that consequentialists should hold the view that Derek Parfit labels the second ‘mistake in moral mathematics’, which is the view that “If some act is right or wrong because of . . . effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act.” But each of the three arguments that Jackson offers is unsound. The root of the problem is that in order to argue for the conclusion Jackson aims to establish (that consequentialists should not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Is the Right Prior to the Good?Julian Fink - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):143-149.
    One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situa- tions, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action's rightness. This indicates that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Global Consequentialism and the Morality and Laws of War.Hilary Greaves - forthcoming - In McDermott and Roser Kuosmanen (ed.), Human rights and 21st century challenges. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Rights-based approaches and consequentialist approaches to ethics are often seen as being diametrically opposed to one another. In one sense, they are. In another sense, however, they can be reconciled: a ‘global’ form of consequentialism might supply consequentialist foundations for a derivative morality that is non-consequentialist, and perhaps rights-based, in content. By way of case study to illustrate how this might work, I survey what a global consequentialist should think about a recent dispute between Jeff McMahan and Henry Shue on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Review of Jeffrey A. Schaler (Ed.), Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics. [REVIEW]Daniel Groll - 2010 - Teaching Philosophy 33 (4):418-421.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing.Thomas Hurka (ed.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    These ten new essays by leading contemporary philosophers constitute the first collective study of a group of British moral philosophers active between the ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Coercion and Integrity.Elinor Mason - 2012 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 2. Oxford University Press.
    Williams argues that impartial moral theories undermine agents’ integrity by making them responsible for allowings as well as doings. I argue that in some cases of allowings, where there is an intervening agent, the agent has been coerced, and so is not fully responsible. -/- I provide an analysis of coercion. Whether an agent is coerced depends on various things (the coercer must provide strong reasons, and the coercer must have a mens rea), and crucially, the coercee’s action is rendered (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. The Confinement Problem: How to Terminate Your Mom with Her Trust.Paul McNamara - 1955 - Analysis 55 (4):310 - 313.
    Cliff Landesman provides a vivid description of a case where we have no best outcome available to us. He poses this as a problem for utilitarians who advise us to do the best we can. This does indeed make such advice impractical. I begin by contrasting older versions of utilitarianism with newer ones that have appeared in deontic logic and that were designed precisely to accommodate Landesman's sort of scenario. (I cast matters in terms of the Limit Assumption and world-theoretic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  16. Utilitarian Eschatology.Mark T. Nelson - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):339-47.
    Traditional utilitarianism, when applied, implies a surprising prediction about the future, viz., that all experience of pleasure and pain must end once and for all, or infinitely dwindle. Not only is this implication surprising, it should render utilitarianism unacceptable to persons who hold any of the following theses: that evaluative propositions may not imply descriptive, factual propositions; that evaluative propositions may not imply contingent factual propositions about the future; that there will always exist beings who experience pleasure or pain.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  17. Measuring the Consequences of Rules.Holly Smith - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):413-433.
    Rule utilitarianism has recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest triggered by Brad Hooker’s sophisticated treatment in Ideal Code, Real World.1 An intriguing new debate has now broken out about how best to formulate rule utilitarianism – whether to evaluate candidate moral codes in terms of the value of their consequences at a fixed rate (such as 90%) of social acceptance (as Hooker contends), or to evaluate codes in terms of the value of their consequences throughout the entire range of possible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  18. The Prospective View of Obligation.Holly M. Smith - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
  19. The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection.David Sobel - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7 (8):1-17.
    Consequentialism, many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, the theory's severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. My thesis is that as we come to better understand this objection, we see that, even if it signals or tracks the existence of a real problem for Consequentialism, it cannot itself be a fundamental problem with the view. The objection cannot itself provide good reason to break with Consequentialism, because it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  20. On Katherine Dimitriou's “Drowning Man”.Joseph Ulatowski - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):25-28.
    Ms. Dimitriou's motivist view has a simple upshot: for at least some cases, our moral assessment of an action should depend on the motives behind it (Dimitriou, passim). This may be contrasted with the antimotivist position, the view that argues motives should not figure into our moral assessment of an action. She presents two provocative cases where an agent’s motive “infects” the concomitant action. One example involves racist thinking and the other a form of sexual self-gratification. Given that we would (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography