This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

1169 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 1169
Material to categorize
  1. El valor de los dilemas morales para la teoría de las decisiones.Fabio Morandín-Ahuerma - 2020 - Praxis Filosófica 50:187-206.
    En este artículo se analiza la teoría para la toma de decisiones y se contrasta la valía de los dilemas morales para explicar los mecanismos deliberativos. Se sostiene que una estrategia de decisión exitosa es aquella que es capaz de realizar los movimientos racionales, adaptativos y necesarios para llegar a un fin programado. Una aspiración de las éticas normativas y descriptivas es elaborar una teoría de la decisión práctica, sin importar los análisis racionales del modo en que se llegue al (...)
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Precautionary Principles.Tanja Rechnitzer - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Precautionary Principles The basic idea underlying a precautionary principle is often summarized as “better safe than sorry.” Even if it is uncertain whether an activity will lead to harm, for example, to the environment or to human health, measures should be taken to prevent harm. This demand is partly motivated by the consequences of regulatory practices of the past. Often, chances of harm were disregarded because there was no scientific proof of a causal connection between an activity or substance and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Problem of State-Dependent Utility: A Reappraisal.Jean Baccelli - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz024.
    State-dependent utility is a problem for the behavioural branch of decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This article gives grounds to reject these two views. The various models of beliefs can be shown to be unequally exposed to the problem of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Temptation and Preference-Based Instrumental Rationality.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - In Jose Luis Bermudez (ed.), Self-control, decision theory and rationality. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
    In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. The Relation Between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - forthcoming - In Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox.
    Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (“credences”) and also binary beliefs (“beliefs simpliciter”). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the “lottery paradox”: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Risk Aversion and the Long Run.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):230-253.
    This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the face (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. What Independent Random Utility Representations Are Equivalent to the IIA Assumption?John K. Dagsvik - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (3):495-499.
    This paper discusses random utility representations of the Luce model. Earlier works, such as McFadden, Yellott, and Strauss have discussed random utility representations under the assumption that utilities are additively separable in a deterministic and a random part. Under various conditions, they have established that a separable and independent random utility representation exists if and only if the random terms are type III extreme value distributed. This paper analyzes independent random utility representations without the separability condition and with an infinite (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Richter–Peleg Multi-Utility Representations of Preorders.José Carlos R. Alcantud, Gianni Bosi & Magalì Zuanon - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (3):443-450.
    The existence of a Richter–Peleg multi-utility representation of a preorder by means of upper semicontinuous or continuous functions is discussed in connection with the existence of a Richter–Peleg utility representation. We give several applications that include the analysis of countable Richter–Peleg multi-utility representations.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Choquet Expected Utility with Affine Capacities.Pascal Toquebeuf - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):177-187.
    This paper studies decisions under ambiguity when attention is paid to extreme outcomes. In a purely subjective framework, we propose an axiomatic characterization of affine capacities, which are Choquet capacities consisting in an affine transformation of a subjective probability. Our main axiom restricts the well-known Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle to a change in a common intermediate outcome. The representation result is then an affine combination of the expected utility of the valued act and its maximal and minimal utilities.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Subjunctive Conditional Probability.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):47-66.
    There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. Do Bets Reveal Beliefs?Jean Baccelli - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3393-3419.
    This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Stochastic Choice and Consistency in Decision Making Under Risk: An Experimental Study.Barry Sopher & J. Mattison Narramore - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (4):323-349.
    This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to uncover the stochastic structure of individual preferences over lotteries. Unlike previous experiments, which have presented subjects with pair-wise choices between lotteries, our design allowed subjects to choose between two lotteries or (virtually) any convex combination of the two lotteries. We interpret the mixtures of lotteries chosen by subjects as a measure of the stochastic structure of choice. We test between two alternative interpretations of stochastic choice: the random utility interpretation and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Two Envelope Problems.Gary Malinas - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:153-158.
    When decision makers have more to gain than to lose by changing their minds, and that is the only relevant fact, they thereby have a reason to change their minds. While this is sage advice, it is silent on when one stands more to gain than to lose. The two envelope paradox provides a case where the appearance of advantage in changing your mind is resilient despite being a chimera. Setups that are unproblematically modeled by decision tables that are used (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Rationality And Coordination.Philippe Maître - 1995 - Journal de Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 6 (4):703-710.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. A Parametric Model of Utility for Two-Person Distributions.Stephen Lurie - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (1):42-60.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Pollock on Rational Choice and Trying.Peter K. Mcinerney - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):253-261.
    In everyday life people frequently recognize that a person at a time may be more or less strongly motivated to carry out an intentional action and that “trying harder” frequently affects the successful completion of an intentional action. In “Rational Choice and Action Omnipotence,” John Pollock provides an original account of rational choice in which “trying to do an action” is a basic factor. This paper argues that Pollock’s “expected-utility optimality prescription” is deficient because it lacks a parameter for intensity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties – Discussion.J. Dreier - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):199-219.
  18. Preference-Based Choice Functions: A Generalized Approach.Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):257-269.
    Although choice and preference are distinct categories, it may in some contexts be a useful idealization to treat choices as fully determined by preferences. In order to construct a general model of such preference-based choice, a method to derive choices from preferences is needed that yields reasonable outcomes for all preference relations, even those that are incomplete and contain cycles. A generalized choice function is introduced for this purpose. It is axiomatically characterized and is shown to compare favourably with alternative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Cicero's Paradoxes and His Idea of Utility.Walter Nicgorski - 1984 - Political Theory 12 (4):557-578.
  20. Representing Utility Functions Via Weighted Goals.Joel Uckelman, Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss & Jérôme Lang - 2009 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4):341-361.
    We analyze the expressivity, succinctness, and complexity of a family of languages based on weighted propositional formulas for the representation of utility functions. The central idea underlying this form of preference modeling is to associate numerical weights with goals specified in terms of propositional formulas, and to compute the utility value of an alternative as the sum of the weights of the goals it satisfies. We define a large number of representation languages based on this idea, each characterized by a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. What's the Use of Utility?Elijah Millgram - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2):113-136.
  22. An Axiomatization of Choquet Expected Utility with Cominimum Independence.Takao Asano & Hiroyuki Kojima - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (1):117-139.
    This paper proposes a class of independence axioms for simple acts. By introducing the E\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {E}}$$\end{document}-cominimum independence axiom that is stronger than the comonotonic independence axiom but weaker than the independence axiom, we provide a new axiomatization theorem of simple acts within the framework of Choquet expected utility. Furthermore, in order to provide the axiomatization of simple acts, we generalize Kajii et al. into an infinite state space. Our axiomatization theorem relates (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. A Note on Equivalent Comparisons of Information Channels.Luís Fernando Brands Barbosa & Gil Riella - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (1):33-44.
    Nakata (Theory Decis 71:559–574, 2011) presents a model of acquisition of information where the agent does not know what pieces of information she is missing. In this note, we point out some technical problems in a few of Nakata’s results and show how to correct them.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Sodium Pump and Its Rivals: An Example of Conflict Resolution in Science.Joseph D. Robinson - 1982 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 25 (3):486-495.
  25. Utility and Discipline.N. E. Henry - 1912 - Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 6:159.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. The Utility Function and the Emotional Well-Being Function.Jose Daza - 2004 - Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies 9 (2):22-29.
    Behind the utility function, which is the basis for economic and finance theory, is a philosophical and ethical approach based essentially on the Utilitarian and Hedonistic schools. Once qualitative, the utility function’s approach shifted to a quantitative one based on the work of the mathematician, D. Bernoulli. This quantitative approach is normative and based on a maximizing agent. In this paper, the “emotional well-being” function is developed which mixes the ethics of a rational economic individual with those of a more (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. “Classicist Culture”: The Utility And Limits Of An Ideal Type.Thomas J. McPartland - 2010 - Method 1 (1):1-16.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Do Dynamic-Choice "Exploitation" Arguments Justify the Standard Rationality Axioms of Decision Theory?Miroslaw Janusz - 2000 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    In a static decision problem the decision-maker faces just one up-front choice, while in a dynamic one there are some choices to be made after other choices or after the resolution of some uncertain events. The standard axioms for static decision-making require that choices under certainty or uncertainty be based on a weak order preference relation, and conform to the variously formulated independence condition for uncertainty; these axioms permit a derivation of the principle of maximizing expected utility. ;In a dynamic-choice (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. New Inconsistencies in Infinite Utilitarianism: Is Every World Good, Bad or Neutral?D. J. Fishkind, B. Hamkins & Montero - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):178.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Utility From Work and Priority Target Setting Behaviour.S. A. Drakopoulos & I. Theodossiou - 1992 - University of Aberdeen, Department of Economics.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. A Theory of Rationality.Michael James Webster - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    A choice function is rational if it describes the maximization of a preference relation. There are a variety of conditions that a preference relation can satisfy. We focus on orders, a complete and transitive relation. While alpha and beta characterize choice functions normalized by an order, they do not characterize all choice functions that describe the maximization of an order. We show that lambda and mu characterize choice functions that are representable by an order. The difference between a normal and (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Statistics: Its Utility, Its Risks.John Y. Wu - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):445-450.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  34. Decision Theory Without Representation Theorems.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Naive versions of decision theory take probabilities and utilities as primitive and use expected value to give norms on rational decision. However, standard decision theory takes rational preference as primitive and uses it to construct probability and utility. This paper shows how to justify a version of the naive theory, by taking dominance as the most basic normatively required preference relation, and then extending it by various conditions under which agents should be indifferent between acts. The resulting theory can make (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  35. Sequential Decision Making Without Independence: A New Conceptual Approach. [REVIEW]A. Nebout - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (1):85-110.
    This paper presents a critical reflection on dynamic consistency as commonly used in economics and decision theory, and on the difficulty to test it experimentally. It distinguishes between the uses of the term dynamic consistency in order to characterize two different properties: the first accounts for the neutrality of individual preferences towards the timing of resolution of uncertainty whereas the second guarantees that a strategy chosen at the beginning of a sequential decision problem is immune to any reevaluation and will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Additive Representation of Separable Preferences Over Infinite Products.Marcus Pivato - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (1):31-83.
    Let X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal{X }$$\end{document} be a set of outcomes, and let I\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal{I }$$\end{document} be an infinite indexing set. This paper shows that any separable, permutation-invariant preference order \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document} on XI\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }$$\end{document} admits an additive representation. That is: there exists a linearly ordered abelian group R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  37. State-Dependent Utilities.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - unknown
    Several axiom systems for preference among acts lead to a unique probability and a state-independent utility such that acts are ranked according to their expected utilities. These axioms have been used as a foundation for Bayesian decision theory and subjective probability calculus. In this article we note that the uniqueness of the probability is relative to the choice of whatcounts as a constant outcome. Although it is sometimes clear what should be considered constant, in many cases there are several possible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  38. Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg: Decision Theory and Discontinuity at Infinity.Paul Bartha, John Barker & Alan Hájek - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):629-660.
    We examine a distinctive kind of problem for decision theory, involving what we call discontinuity at infinity. Roughly, it arises when an infinite sequence of choices, each apparently sanctioned by plausible principles, converges to a ‘limit choice’ whose utility is much lower than the limit approached by the utilities of the choices in the sequence. We give examples of this phenomenon, focusing on Arntzenius et al.’s Satan’s apple, and give a general characterization of it. In these examples, repeated dominance reasoning (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  39. What Does Subjective Decision Theory Tell Us?D. H. Mellor - 2005 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
  40. State-Dependent Utility.Edi Karni - 2009 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. Some Remarks on the Ranking of Infinite Utility Streams.Bhaskar Dutta - 2008 - In Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Review of Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish and Teddy Seidenfeld's Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics. [REVIEW]M. Hild - 2003 - Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):149-155.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Probabilities in Decision Rules.Paul Weirich - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 289--319.
    The theory of direct reference suggests revising probability theory so that a probability attaches to a proposition given a way of understanding the proposition. The revisions make probabilities relative but do not change their structure.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Utility and Rights.Lawrence Haworth - 1968 - In David Braybrooke (ed.), Studies in Moral Philosophy. Oxford, Published by Blackwell with the Cooperation of the University of Pittsburgh.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Representation Theorems of the de Finetti Type for (Partially) Symmetric Probability Measures.Godehard Link - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 2--207.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. Within-Subject Preference Reversals in Description-and Experience-Based Choice.Adrian R. Camilleri & Ben R. Newell - 2009 - In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. 449--454.
  47. Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision.Christoph Lumer - 1998 - In Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.), Preferences. De Gruyter. pp. 1998--33.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. 14 God's Utility Function.Richard Dawkins - 1999 - In Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 6--109.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Probability and Utility.John M. Vickers - 1993 - In J. Dubucs (ed.), Philosophy of Probability. Kluwer, Dordrecht. pp. 109--127.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Rank-Dependent Utility.Mohammed Abdellaoui - 2009 - In Paul Anand, Prastanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press, Usa.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1169