Topics in Environmental Ethics, Misc

Are bacteriophage T4 and the long-nosed elephant fish valuable in their own right? Nicholas Agar defends an affirmative answer to this question by arguing that anything living is intrinsically valuable. This claim challenges received ethical wisdom according to which only human beings are valuable in themselves. The resulting biocentric or life-centered morality forms the platform for an ethic of the environment. -/- Agar builds a bridge between the biological sciences and what he calls "folk" morality to arrive at a workable (...) environmental ethic and a new spectrum--a new hierarchy--of living organisms. The book overturns common-sense moral belief as well as centuries of philosophical speculation on the exclusive moral significance of humans. Spanning several fields, including philosophy of psychology, philosophy of science, and other areas of contemporary analytic philosophy, Agar analyzes and speaks to a wide array of historic and contemporary views, from Aristotle and Kant, to E. O. Wilson, Holmes Rolston II, and Baird Callicot. The result is a challenge to prevailing definitions of value and a call for a scientifically-informed appreciation of nature. (shrink)

Uncertainty, insufficient information or information of poor quality, limited cognitive capacity and time, along with value conflicts and ethical considerations, are all aspects thatmake risk managementand riskcommunication difficult. This paper provides a review of different risk concepts and describes how these influence risk management, communication and planning in relation to forest ecosystem services. Based on the review and results of empirical studies, we suggest that personal assessment of risk is decisive in the management of forest ecosystem services. The results are (...) used together with a reviewof different principles of the distribution of risk to propose an approach to risk communication that is effective aswell as ethically sound. Knowledge of heuristics and mutual information on both beliefs and desires are important in the proposed risk communication approach. Such knowledge provides an opportunity for relevant information exchange, so that gaps in personal knowledge maps can be filled in and effective risk communication can be promoted. (shrink)

£ British Society of Aesthetics 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comThis unique and sprawling collection of sixteen essays explores a wide range of perspectives on the human body and how it is embodied, lived, viewed, perceived, and constructed by ourselves and by others in both positive and harmful ways. The book’s contributors include philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, and artists, as well as scholars who focus on (...) law, culture, and on Africana, race, gender, sexuality, and disability studies. In addition, the authors represent a diverse group of scholars whose personal and societal experiences are also part of the discussion. Centred in philosophical aesthetics, this book moves into and explores fields of everyday and somatic experience, evolutionary psychology, art, ethics, personal identity, and socio-political status and treatment. It shows how bodies are... (shrink)

The most popular and convincing arguments for the claim that vegetarianism is morally obligatory focus on the extensive, unnecessary harm done to animals and to the environment by raising animals industrially in confinement conditions (factory farming). I outline the strongest versions of these arguments. I grant that it follows from their central premises that purchasing and consuming factoryfarmed meat is immoral. The arguments fail, however, to establish that strict vegetarianism is obligatory because they falsely assume that eating vegetables is the (...) only alternative to eating factory-farmed meat that avoids the harms of factory farming. I show that these arguments not only fail to establish that strict vegetarianism is morally obligatory, but that the very premises of the arguments imply that eating some (non-factory-farmed) meat rather than only vegetables is morally obligatory. Therefore, if the central premises of these usual arguments are true, then strict vegetarianism is immoral. (shrink)

By arguing that current theories of ontology and intrinsic value in environmental ethics are inadequate in informing a truly ecological ethic, I show that new theories need to be developed if environmental philosophers are going to be able to address environmental policy issues. I offer an ecologically-informed ontology that fulfills the need for an adequate ontology by identifying the various beings that should be considered by an environmental ethic. This ontology includes various ecological entities, e.g., ecosystems, bioregions and populations, as (...) well as genealogical entities, e.g., demes, lineages, families and species. Then, I develop a basis for intrinsic value of non-human nature--intrinsic value as degree of organic unity. The aesthetic notion of organic unity, I argue, provides an adequate grounds for intrinsic value in environmental ethic. When this ontology and theory of value are combined, they provide direction for public policy issues concerning the environment. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Steglich-Petersen claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.

Whether churches should be demolished, rebuilt, restored or preserved is a contentious issue. Some hold that the needs of a present worshipping community should take precedence over antiquarian or aesthetic interest, others that we owe a debt to the ages. Arguments mirror those between developers and environmentalists. It is argued here that it is not abstract rights that matter, but a sense of history, and of the sacred. Church buildings and landscapes are to be maintained not as museum pieces but (...) as living elements of a humane piety. (shrink)

The twentieth century saw the rise of hermeneutics, the philosophical interpretation of texts, and eventually the application of its insights to metaphorical “texts” such as individual and group identities. It also saw the rise of modern environmentalism, which evolved through various stages in which it came to realize that many of its key concerns—“wilderness” and “nature” among them—are contested territory that are viewed differently by different people. Understanding nature requires science and ecology to be sure, but it also requires a (...) sensitivity to history, culture, and narrative. Thus, understanding nature is a fundamentally hermeneutic task. Interpreting Nature brings together leading voices at the intersection of these two increasingly important philosophical discussions: philosophical hermeneutics and environmental philosophy. The resulting field, environmental hermeneutics, provides the center of gravity for a collection of essays that grapple with one of the most compelling issues of our time: how do humans relate to nature? Adopting a broad and inclusive view of “the environment, Interpreting Nature takes up restoration and preservation, natural and built environments, the social construction of nature and nature as it imposes itself beyond our categories, and much more. The rich diversity of contributions illustrates the remarkable fecundity of hermeneutic resources applied to environmental issues. Taken together, the various contributions to this collection mark the arrival of environmental hermeneutics as a distinct field of study. (shrink)

Today it is widely recognized that we face urgent and serious environmental problems and we know much about them, yet we do very little. What explains this lack of motivation and change? Why is it so hard to change our lives? This book addresses this question by means of a philosophical inquiry into the conditions of possibility for environmental change. It discusses how we can become more motivated to do environmental good and what kind of knowledge we need for this, (...) and explores the relations between motivation, knowledge, and modernity. After reviewing a broad range of possible philosophical and psychological responses to environmental apathy and inertia, the author argues for moving away from a modern focus on either detached reason and control or the natural, the sentiments, and the authentic , both of which make possible disengaging and alienating modes of relating to our environment. Instead he develops the notion of environmental skill: a concept that bridges the gap between knowledge and action, re-interprets environmental virtue, and suggests an environmental ethics centered on experience, know-how and skillful engagement with our environment. The author then explores the implications of this ethics for our lives: it changes the way we think about , and deal with, health, food, animals, energy, climate change, politics, and technology. (shrink)

In the voluminous literature on the subject of bovine growth hormone (bGH) we have yet to find an attempt to frame the issue in specifically moral terms or to address systematically its ethical implications. I argue that there are two moral objections to the technology: its treatment of animals, and its dislocating effects on farmers. There are agricultural biotechnologies that deserve funding and support. bGH is not one of them.

In recent decades there has been increasing development of environmental rights at both the national and international level, with increased adjudication of such rights in both national (constitutional) courts and international human rights courts. This raises a question as to whether it is better to develop and adjudicate environmental rights at the national or international level. This article considers a case recently made by James May and Erin Daly on behalf of developing environmental rights at the national constitutional level and (...) adjudicating such rights in domestic courts. I consider the limitations of this case by showing that international environmental human rights can play a role that systematically benefits environmental protection, with adjudication in international human rights courts a key part of that process. This involves drawing on an argument Allen Buchanan offers to justify a system of international legal human rights, which appeals to a number of benefits that such a system can provide. The argument is developed and applied to adjudication of environmental human rights in international human rights courts. First, it is shown how the benefits are realized in the area of environmental human rights. Second, it is shown how adjudication can enhance the benefits, both by providing a mechanism for their realization and by facilitating a mutually supportive relationship among them. On the basis of these enhanced benefits, and the value that they add, it is concluded that there is strong justification for developing and adjudicating environmental human rights at the international level. (shrink)

The 70th anniversary of Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac (1949) approaches. For philosophers—environmental ethicists in particular—this text has been highly influential, especially the ‘Land Ethic’ essay contained therein. Given philosophers’ acumen for identifying and critiquing arguments, one might reasonably think a firm grasp of Leopold’s ideas to have emerged from such attention. I argue that this is not the case. Specifically, Leopold’s main interpreter and systematiser, philosopher J. Baird Callicott, has shoehorned Aldo Leopold’s ideas into differing monistic moral theories (...) that ill-serve a proper understanding. Against Callicott, my paper argues that Aldo Leopold embraces a robust moral pluralism, one that goes beyond mere pragmatics, and he does so while seeking a consistency maximisation of values. A new, improved understanding of Leopold’s ideas thus emerges. (shrink)

I argue that a reasonable understanding of Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’ is one that identifies possession of health as being a sufficient condition for moral consideration. With this, Leopold extends morality not only to biotic wholes, but to individual organisms, as both can have their health undermined. My argument centers on explaining why Leopold thinks it reasonable to analogize ecosystems both to an organism and to a community: both have a health. My conclusions undermine J. Baird Callicott’s rhetorical dismissal of the (...) organism analogy’s importance, a dismissal crucially serving his thesis that Leopoldians should hold community membership necessary for moral standing. (shrink)

How does an engagement with religious traditions (broadly construed) illuminate and complicate the task of thinking through the ethics of eating? In this introduction, we survey some of the many food ethical issues that arise within various religious traditions and also consider some ethical positions that such traditions take on food. To say the least, we do not attempt to address all the ethical issues concerning food that arise in religious contexts, nor do we attempt to cover every tradition’s take (...) on food. We look at just a few traditions and a few interesting writings on food ethics and religion: What do they say about the ethics of eating? Why do they say these things? Here we use the terms “food ethics” and “religion” ecumenically as big tents under which many importantly different sorts of things may be grouped. Among the wide range of food ethical issues we consider in this chapter, for example, are religious views about the ethics of keeping, hurting, and killing animals, killing plants, dominion over creation, wastefulness, purity, blessing, atonement, and the connection between food and character. We realize, moreover, that it might be a stretch to label some of the views engaged by selected readings in this chapter as “religious” on a stringent understanding of that term; Lisa Kemmerer’s “Indigenous Traditions,” for instance, addresses some views that are recognizably spiritual but perhaps not religious in a strict sense. We hope that our ecumenical usage of the term can bring these important traditions to bear on the discussion without reducing them to something they are not. (shrink)

This paper examines potential responses to emerging ‘climate refugee’ justice issues. ‘Climate refugee’ describes migrants forced to flee their homeland due to losses and damages brought about by events linked to global climate change. These include losses and damages due to extreme weather events, severe droughts and floods, sea-level rise, and an array of pollutant contamination issues. A paradigm case if climate refugeedom is seen in the influx of Peruvian immigrants into various North American cities; seeking asylum after losing access (...) to water and agricultural resources after heavy metals were released through rapid glacial melting and contaminated these necessities in recent years. -/- The main discussion begins with a sketch of the scientific picture of the causal genesis of the apparently worsening “climate refugee crisis” and a concise discussion of new climate science research methods, Probabilistic Event Attribution studies (PEAs), that many agree can be used to determine the liability of certain countries for particular extreme events due to climate change (§1). Against that background, and after providing clarifications regarding the distinction between ‘climate refugee’ and ‘environmental refugee’ (§2), I then discuss key ethical and political issues that are unique to climate refugee cases (§3). Subsequently, I critically assess options for helping climate refugees through existing institutions (§4). I endorse pursuing responses to the most pressing climate refugee problems through the provisions for addressing climate change “losses and damages” in the 2016 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Paris Agreement”; which outlines “risk sharing” protocol that I contend can be used to help climate refugees who are not currently subject to existing UN policies designed to help other types of refugees (e.g. those fleeing from persecution or war). I conclude by outlining a number of ways that PEAs may aid in effectively implementing those losses and damages provisions. (shrink)

Value claims about ecological entities, their functionality, and properties take center stage in so-called “ecological” ethical and aesthetic theories. For example, the claim that the biodiversity in an old-growth forest imbues it with “value in and for itself” is an explicit value claim about an ecological property. And the claim that one can study “the aesthetics of nature, including natural objects...such as ecosystems” presupposes that natural instances of a type of ecological entity exist and can be regarded as more or (...) less aesthetically valuable. My discussion below will bear wide implications for how claims like... (shrink)

In “Why Not NIMBY?” Derek Turner and Simon Feldman fail to address that many NIMBY protesters are not just concerned with concrete decision making, but also introduce a ‘metaphysical’ issue that liberal-democracy considers an inappropriate subject for the political debate. The type of rationality dominating political discourse requires one to reason in terms of 'common good' or personal preferences that can be weighted against other preferences. NIMBY’s do neither; rather they reframe the debate, starting from a radically different approach to (...) the meaning of place that questions the very notion that particular places can be compared. (shrink)

Milieufilosofisch Nederland wordt momenteel verdeeld door een controverse naar aanleiding vanrecente publicaties van de Wageningse filosofen Keulartz en Korthals. In dit artikel wil ik - aande hand van een analyse van het gebruik van het natuurbegrip bij Wim Zweers - laten zien dat Keulartz op een tot nu toe onderbelicht probleem wijst: het probleem van de veelheid vannatuurbeelden. Tegelijkertijd wil ik echter aantonen dat Keulartz' eigen, 'post-naturalistische' positie op een tegenspraak berust. Tenslotte geef ik aan hoe deze controverses zijn terug (...) tevoeren op een onvermijdelijke spanning in onze morele omgang met de natuur, en zoek ik naar een manier waarop deze spanning binnen de milieu-ethiek vruchtbaar kan worden gemaakt. (shrink)

Environmental ethics has mostly been practiced separately from philosophy of technology, with few exceptions. However, forward thinking suggests that environmental ethics must become more interdisciplinary when we consider that almost everything affects the environment. Most notably,technology has had a huge impact on the natural realm. In the following discussion, the notions of synthesising philosophy of technology and environmental ethics are explored with a focus on research, development, and policy.

This collection gathers a set of central papers from the emerging area of ethics and climate change.

The contemporary industrialized global food system has sustained an onslaught of criticism from diverse parties—academic and popular, scientists and social justice advocates, activists and intellectuals—criticism that has only intensified in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Feminist voices have made substantial contributions to these critiques, calling attention to the cultural politics of food and health ; to the impact of the corporatization of agriculture on food quality, the environment, and the people of the Global South, especially women ; and (...) to the complicated relationship among cooking, eating, and gender, including how food.. (shrink)

This essay reexamines Holmes Rolston’s evocative notion of “storied residence” and evaluates it for its fitness for environmental virtue ethics. Environmental virtue ethics (or EVE) continues to garner attention among environmental philosophers, and recently Brian Treanor has argued for the indispensability of narrative approaches as part of that discourse. In this paper, I endorse this indispensability thesis generally, but I argue that narrative environmental virtue ethics must be supplemented either by “storied residence” or a similar environmentally, scientifically, culturally, and historically (...) rich concept of narrative. Rolston himself has criticized environmental virtue ethics for being too agent-centered. Fortunately, an adequate sense of storied-residence is precisely what is needed to avoid triggering the vicious anthropocentrism that concerns Rolston. More concretely, storied-residence makes place(s) central to environmental virtue ethics by giving expression to features of the more-than-human world that often become secondary considerations to agency in accounts of environmental virtue. (shrink)

The controversy over genetically modified [GM] organisms is often framed in terms of possible hazards for human health. Articles in a previous volume of this *Encyclopedia* give a general overview of GM crops [@Mulvaney2014] and specifically examine human health [@Nordgard2014] and labeling [@Bruton2014] issues surrounding GM organisms. This article explores several other aspects of the controversy: environmental concerns, political and legal disputes, and the aim of "feeding the world" and promoting food security. Rather than discussing abstract, hypothetical GM organisms, this (...) article explores the consequences of the GM organisms that have actually been deployed in the particular contexts that they have been deployed, on the belief that there is little point in discussing GM organisms in an idealized or context-independent way. (shrink)

Both consumers and producers of biotechnology products have insisted that communication between the two be improved. The former demand more democratic participation in the risk assessment process of biotechnology products. The latter seek to correct misinformation regarding alleged risks from these products. One way to resolve these concerns, I argue, is through the use of biotechnology labels. Such labeling fosters consumer autonomy and moves toward more participatory decisionmaking, in addition to ensuring that informed consent from consumers is maintained. Furthermore, although (...) voluntary biotech-free labeling in lieu of biotechlabels may uphold consumer sovereignty, the latter remains a more effective strategy for achieving ethical communication between consumers and producers of biotechnology products. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 241-243, June 2012.

Hans Jonas and Arne Næss have argued that philosophers need not be concerned with natural sciences even when they talk about enviromental issues like global warming (§1). However, believing sciences blindly is in itself unphilosophical. So we think, in this paper, the other way around: We consider the current view of global warming, which was reported by the IPCC, critically. The so-called AR4 is divided into two parts. One is about the industrial revolutions (§§5-9); the other is about the greenhouse (...) effect (§§11-20). Through this consideration, it will be revealed: the views of the Establishment are not at all absolute; there still remains room to reconsider them. (shrink)

Sehnsucht nach Natur ist in unserer Gesellschaft weit verbreitet. Wandern und Wildniscamps sind aktuelle Beispiele dafür. Die zahlreichen Naturfilme und Inszenierungen von Natur in der Werbung sind klare Indizien ihrer gesellschaftlichen Wertschätzung. Wie ist diese Wertschätzung von und Sehnsucht nach Natur zu erklären?

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the (...) Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness. (shrink)

The concepts dao and de in the Daodejing may be evoked to support a distinctive and plausible account of environmental holism. Dao refers to the totality of particulars, including the relations that hold between them, and the respective roles and functions of each within the whole. De refers to the distinctiveness of each particular, realized meaningfully only within the context of its interdependence with others, and its situatedness within the whole. Together, dao and de provide support for an ethical holism (...) that avoids sacrificing individuals for the sake of the whole. The integrity and stability of the whole are important not because the whole is an end-in-itself but because those conditions assist in preserving the well-being of the constituent parts. In other words, the ethical holism supported in the Daodejing does not present individuals and wholes in mutually exclusive terms, but sees them in symbiotic relation, allowing for events to be mutually beneficial, or mutually obstructive, to both. In addition, two other Daoist concepts, wuwei (non-action) and ziran (spontaneity), provide further support for this construction of holism. If the distinctiveness of particular individuals is valued, then unilateral or reductive norms which obliterate such individuality are inappropriate. In this regard, the methodology of wuwei allows for the idea of individuals developing spontaneously in relation to others. According to this view of holism,individuals manifest and realize their integrity in relation to others in the environmental context, achieving an outcome that is maximally co-possible within those limits, rather than one that is maximally beneficial only for particular individuals. (shrink)

The debate over the use of genetically-modified crops is one where the heat to light ratio is often quite low. Both proponents and opponents of GM crops often resort more to rhetoric than argument. This paper attempts to use Philip Kitcher’s idea of a “well-ordered science” to bring coherence to the debate. While I cannot, of course, here decide when and where, if at all, GM crops should be used I do show how Kitcher’s approach provides a useful framework in (...) which to evaluate the desirability of using GM crops. At the least Kitcher’s approach allows us to see that the current state of research in to, and use of, GM crops is very far from the ideal of a well-ordered science and gives us a goal to work towards if we wish to achieve a more well-ordered agricultural policy. (shrink)

If humans may indeed legitimately intervene in conservation areas to let nature be and to protect the lives of all the diverse individual animals under their care, then the management of elephants must be legitimate as part of the conservation of natural world diversities. If this is so, to what extent are current management options ethically acceptable? In this article I address the ethics of the management options available once the judgement has been made that there are too many elephants (...) in a conservation area. I evaluate the ethical acceptability of four options, i.e., the simulation of nature, translocation, contraception, and culling. I furthermore ask whether the harsh blow of culling under very specific conditions can be softened by the taming and training of African elephants. I then examine the ethics of decision making about these issues. Before I do so, two issues must be discussed that decisively influence the management of elephants. The one is whether it is ethically justifiable to fence in elephants. The second is the ethical requirements of the scientific practice that informs management decisions. In the article I come to the conclusion that all four options are ethically flawed. All four require some violation of the important injunction to let nature be and to treat individual animals with respect. However, to do nothing and allow a loss of other species violates the important goal of conserving natural world diversity. (shrink)

We offer an overview of both the empirical literature on food waste and philosophical work on the concept of waste. We use this background to argue that an overemphasis on the reduction of individual food waste is misleading at best, and pernicious at worst, in combatting the substantial problems that global food waste creates. Rather, we argue that civic engagement and political activism aimed at institutional reform will be essential in addressing these problems.

The “land community” (or “biotic community”) that features centrally in Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic has typically been equated with the concept of “ecosystem.” Moreover, some have challenged this central Leopoldean concept given the multitude of meanings of the term “ecosystem” and the changes the term has undergone since Leopold’s time (see, e.g., Shrader-Frechette 1996). Even one of Leopold’s primary defenders, J. Baird Callicott, asserts that there are difficulties in identifying the boundaries of ecosystems and suggests that we recognize that their (...) boundaries are determined by scientific questions ecologists pose (Callicott 2013). I argue that we need to rethink Leopold’s concept of land community in the following ways. First, we should recognize that Leopold’s views are not identical to those of his contemporaries (e.g., Clements, Elton), although they resemble those of some subsequent ecologists, including some of our contemporaries (e.g., O’Neill 2001, Post et al. 2007, Hastings and Gross 2012). Second, the land community concept does not map cleanly onto the concept of “ecosystem”; it also incorporates elements of the “community” concept in community ecology by emphasizing the interactions between organisms and not just the matter/energy flow of the ecosystem concept. Third, the boundary question can be illuminated by considering some of the recent literature on the nature of biological individuals (in particular, Odenbaugh 2007; Hamilton, Smith, and Haber 2009; Millstein 2009), focusing on concentrations of causal relations as determinative of the boundaries of the land community qua individual. There are challenges to be worked out, particularly when the interactions of community members do not map cleanly onto matter/energy flows, but I argue that these challenges can be resolved. The result is a defensible land community concept that is ontologically robust enough to be a locus of moral obligation while being consistent with contemporary ecological theory and practice. (shrink)

Aldo Leopold's land ethic has been extremely influential among people working in conservation biology, environmental ethics, and related fields. Others have abandoned the land ethic for purportedly being outdated or ethically untenable. Yet, both acceptance of the land ethic and rejection of the land ethic are often based on misunderstandings of Leopold's original meaning – misunderstandings that have become so entrenched as to have the status of myths. This essay seeks to identify and then debunk six myths that have grown (...) up around the land ethic. These myths include misunderstandings about how we should understand key terms like “stability” and “biotic community” as well as the scope and main message of the land ethic. Properly understanding Leopold's original meaning, a meaning derived from ideas he developed after a lifetime of scientific theorizing and hands-on practical knowledge, prevents hasty rejection and provides a sounder basis for conservation policy. (shrink)

Book review of "Marion Hourdequin. Environmental Ethics: From Theory to Practice. London: Bloomsbury, 2015. 256 pp.".

Some types of solar radiation management (SRM) research are ethically problematic because they expose persons, animals, and ecosystems to significant risks. In our earlier work, we argued for ethical norms for SRM research based on norms for biomedical research. Biomedical researchers may not conduct research on persons without their consent, but universal consent is impractical for SRM research. We argue that instead of requiring universal consent, ethical norms for SRM research require only political legitimacy in decision-making about global SRM trials. (...) Using Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane's model of global political legitimacy, we examine several existing global institutions as possible analogues for a politically legitimate SRM decision-making body. (shrink)

Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac emphasizes values of receptivity and perceptivity that appear to be mutually reinforcing, critical to an ecological conscience, and cultivatable through concrete and embodied experience. His priorities bear striking similarities to elements of the ethics of care elaborated by feminist philosophers, especially Nel Noddings, who notably recommended receptivity, direct and personal experience, and even shared Leopold’s attentiveness to joy and play as sources of moral motivation. These commonalities are so fundamental that ecofeminists can and should (...) see Leopold as a philosophical ally. The three ecofeminist scholars who have devoted the most concerted attention to Leopold’s work argue that his Land Ethic is not, and does not provide a basis for, an ecofeminist ethic. I dispute the main criticisms of these scholars, and conclude that ecofeminists should attend more often to Leopold’s work, which extends possibilities for excellent praxis. (shrink)

Our attitudes toward human culpability for environmental problems have moral and emotional import, influencing our basic capacities for believing cooperative action and environmental repair are even possible. In this paper, I suggest that having the virtue of forgivingness as a response to environmental harm is generally good for moral character, preserving us from morally risky varieties of pessimism and despair. I define forgivingness as a forward-looking disposition based on Robin Dillon’s conception of preservative forgiveness, a preparation to be deeply and (...) abidingly accepting yet expecting human error. As with other virtues, however, preservative forgiveness is available to some of us more than others; in the second half of this paper, I consider the deep challenge posed by rational pessimism, especially on the part of those who have been given many reasons not to hope for the very moral improvements for which they strive. I conclude that for those of us with the power roles and personal resources especially conducive to environmental activism, preservative forgiveness inclines us to remain engaged in environmental activism with fellow flawed human beings, recognizing our own mutual depredations while committing us to cooperatively respond. (shrink)

The Origin and Development of Environmental Philosophy in the US according to John Muir, Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicot. The publication refers to environmental philosophy, which is also called ecological philosophy or ecophilosophy. It shows in what way philosophical reflection on the environment has been shaped in the American tradition. In this context, the views of the thinkers listed below have been presented, analysed and evaluated. John Muir, an astute observer of wild nature, has been presented as an enthusiast (...) and a prophet persuading a return to nature. Muir was a forester under the strong influence of the representatives of transcendentalism. As an activist, he founded national parks that served to preserve virgin areas, and as a writer he popularized the concept of the preservation of wild areas. For many representatives of ecophilosophy, the views of Aldo Leopold, as expressed in his well-known work, A Sand County Almanac, constituted a new pattern of thinking about wild nature. The book itself is almost generally regarded as a bible of environmental philosophy. Leopold, a forester interested in philosophy, created the fundamentals of holistic environmental philosophy, but the theory he developed is not without defects, to which some attention has been paid in this paper. The theory of J. Baird Callicot presents the attitude of an academic philosopher with regard to wild nature. His attitude is fully professional as regards the applied method, thus allowing the author to avoid committing a naturalistic fallacy. Callicot reinterprets the issues of facts and values, because he thinks that the discoveries of the dynamically developing ecology make possible the reformulation of the traditional approach to such issues by utilising a spirit of acceptance, and lead to a shift from is to ought to be. (shrink)