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  1. Vagueness and Goodness Simpliciter.Henrik Andersson - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):378-394.
    Recently a lot has been written on the topic of value incomparability. While there is disagreement on how we are to understand incomparability, most seem to accept Ruth Chang's claim that all comparisons must proceed in some specific respect. Call this the Requirement for Specification. Interestingly, even though most seem to accept this requirement, next to nothing has been written on it. In this paper I focus on the requirement and discuss two different but related topics. First, an important observation (...)
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  2. Justice, Contestability, and Conceptions of the Good.I. Barry'S. Argument - 1996 - Utilitas 8 (3).
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  3. The Problem of Semantic Incomparability.Johannes Bechert - 1991 - In Dietmar Zaefferer (ed.), Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics. Foris Publications. pp. 12--60.
  4. Value, Interest, and Well-Being.Jeremy Bentham - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (4).
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  5. Transitivity and the Patterns of Adult Preferences.H. Bradbury & T. M. Nelson - 1973 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 1 (5):337-339.
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  6. Moral Dimensions of Moral Hazards.Will Braynen - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (1):34-50.
    ‘Moral hazard’ is an economic term which commonly refers to situations in which people have a tendency to increase their exposure to risk when the costs of their actions, should they get unlucky, befall someone else. Once insured, for example, a person might have little reason, financially speaking, to be careful if he will get fully reimbursed for his losses should things go wrong, especially if he does not risk an increase in his insurance premium fees. In this article, I (...)
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  7. John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), Pp. 286.Krister Bykvist - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):497-500.
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  8. Incommensurability (and Incomparability).Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell. pp. 2591-2604.
    This encyclopedia entry urges what it takes to be correctives to common (mis)understandings concerning the phenomenon of incommensurability and incomparability and briefly outlines some of their philosophical upshots.
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  9. Adaptive Preferences and Autonomy.B. Colburn - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1).
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  10. Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences.Ben Colburn - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):52-71.
    Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster's explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are characterized by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily unaware), and covert influence undermines our (...)
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  11. Degrees of Fairness and Proportional Chances.Adam Cureton - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2):217-221.
    Suppose the following: Two groups of people require our aid but we can help only one group; there are more people in the first group than the second group; every person in both groups has an equal claim on our aid; and we have a duty to help and no other special obligations or duties. I argue that there exists at least one fairness function, which is a function that measures the goodness of degrees of fairness, that implies that we (...)
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  12. Darwall on Welfare as Rational Care.Subject Darwall’S. - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (4).
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  13. Conflicting Violations of Transitivity and Where They May Lead Us.Brett Day & Graham Loomes - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):233-242.
    The literature contains evidence from some studies of asymmetric patterns of choice cycles in the direction consistent with regret theory, and evidence from other studies of asymmetries in the opposite direction. This article reports an experiment showing that both patterns occur within the same sample of respondents operating in the same experimental environment. We discuss the implications for modelling behaviour in such environments.
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  14. Andrew Mason (Ed.), Ideals on Equality.J. de Wispelaere - 2000 - Utilitas 12 (2):243-247.
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  15. Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.
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  16. Formal Axiology and its Critics.Rem B. Edwards (ed.) - 1995 - Rodopi.
    Formal Axiology and Its Critics consists of two parts, both of which present criticisms of the formal theory of values developed by Robert S. Hartman, replies to these criticisms, plus a short introduction to formal axiology.Part I consists of articles published or made public during the lifetime of Hartman to which he personally replied. It contains previously published replies to Hector Neri Castañeda, William Eckhardt, and Robert S. Brumbaugh, and previously unpublished replies to Charles Hartshorne, Rem B. Edwards, Robert E. (...)
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  17. Distributive Justice and Freedom: Cohen on Money and Labour.Cécile Fabre - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):393-412.
    In his recent Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen mounts a sustained critique of coerced labour, against the background of a radical egalitarian conception of distributive justice. In this article, I argue that Cohenian egalitarians are committed to holding the talented under a moral duty to choose socially useful work for the sake of the less fortunate. As I also show, Cohen's arguments against coerced labour fail, particularly in the light of his commitment to coercive taxation. In the course (...)
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  18. Is the Body Special? Review of Cecile Fabre, Whose Body is It Anyway? Justice and the Integrity of the Person.Cécile Fabre - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2).
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  19. A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence.Guy Fletcher - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):417-420.
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  20. Toward A New Axiology.Federico Gay - 1973 - Southwest Philosophical Studies.
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  21. Comments on Cahn's "the Happy Immoralist".Bernard Gert - 2004 - Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (1):18–19.
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  22. Delving Into the Ethical Dimension Of.Nicolito Gianan - 2011 - Cultura 8 (1):63-82.
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  23. Evil and a Worthwhile Life.Zachary J. Goldberg - 2017 - In Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility: Essays in Honor of Peter A. French. Springer. pp. 145-163.
    The concept of evil plays a central role in many of Peter French’s publications. He defines evil as “a human action that jeopardizes another person’s (or group’s) aspirations to live a worthwhile life (or lives) by the willful infliction of undeserved harm on that person(s)” (French 2011, 61, 95). Inspired by Harry Frankfurt’s work on the importance of what we care about, French argues that “the life a person leads is worthwhile if what he or she really gives a damn (...)
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  24. The Impotence of the Value Pump.John Halstead - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (2):195-216.
    Many philosophers have argued that agents must be irrational to lose out in a or . A number of different conclusions have been drawn from this claim. The has been one of the main arguments offered for the axioms of expected utility theory; it has been used to show that options cannot be incomparable or on a par; and it has been used to show that our past choices have normative significance for our subsequent choices. In this article, I argue (...)
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  25. Choice Structures and Preference Relations.Bengt Hansson - 1968 - Synthese 18 (4):443 - 458.
  26. Meeting Need.Nicole Hassoun - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):250-275.
    This paper considers the question ‘How should institutions enable people to meet their needs in situations where there is no guarantee that all needs can be met?’ After considering and rejecting several simple principles for meeting needs, it suggests a new effectiveness principle that 1) gives greater weight to the needs of the less well off and 2) gives weight to enabling a greater number of people to meet their needs. The effectiveness principle has some advantage over the main competitors (...)
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  27. Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Pp. Ix + 357. [REVIEW]Jennifer Hawkins - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (2):237-241.
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  28. From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries.Tim Henning - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):169-206.
    Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction account, the procedural account, and the ideal consent account, and argues that none of these (...)
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  29. Agency Without Autonomy: Valuational Agency.Ranjoo Seodu Herr - 2010 - Journal of Global Ethics 6 (3):239-254.
    National minority women’s defense of nonliberal minority cultures that encompass sexist customs and rules has greatly perplexed liberal theorists. Many attempted to resolve this puzzle by attributing constrained agency to such women and dismissing their defense as unreasonable. This article argues that this liberal assessment of minority women’s position is philosophically indefensible and that the failure of mainstream liberalism to make sense of these women’s response indicates not that these women’s agency is compromised but rather that the liberal conception of (...)
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  30. Fairness and Fair Shares.Keith Horton - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):88.
    Some moral principles require agents to do more than their fair share of a common task, if others won’t do their fair share – each agent’s fair share being what they would be required to do if all contributed as they should. This seems to provide a strong basis for objecting to such principles. For it seems unfair to require agents who have already done their fair share to do more, just because other agents won’t do their fair share. The (...)
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  31. Chapter 1: AXIOLOGY-Formal Axiology of Henryk Elzenberg.Leslaw Hostynski - 2009 - Dialogue and Universalism 19 (8):19.
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  32. Is Incomparability A Problem For Anyone?N. Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.
    The incomparability of alternatives is thought to pose a problem for justified choice, particularly for proponents of comparativism – the view that comparative facts about alternatives determine what one rationally ought to choose. As a solution, it has been argued that alternatives judged incomparable by one of the three standard comparative relations, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally good,” are comparable by some fourth relation, such as “roughly equal” or “on a par.” This solution, however, comes at what many would (...)
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  33. Pairwise Comparison and Numbers Skepticism.Nien-hê Hsieh, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (4):487-504.
    In this article, we defend pairwise comparison as a method to resolve conflicting claims from different people that cannot be jointly satisfied because of a scarcity of resources. We consider Michael Otsuka's recent challenge that pairwise comparison leads to intransitive choices for the (someone who believes the numbers should not count in forced choices among lives) and Frances Kamm's responses to Otsuka's challenge. We argue that Kamm's responses do not succeed, but that the threat they are designed to meet is (...)
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  34. Against Equality and Priority.Michael Huemer - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (04):483-501.
    -/- I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y, then x is better than y; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that benefits given to the worse off contribute no more to (...)
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  35. The Moral Aspect of Nonmoral Goods and Evils.I. What Admirable Immorality & Nonadmirable Morality Are - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1).
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  36. Dead and Gone.Joyce L. Jenkins - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (2):228-234.
    I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives (...)
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  37. Equality, Priority, and Time.Klemens Kappel - 1997 - Utilitas 9 (2):203.
    The lifetime equality view has recently been met with the objection that it does not rule out simultaneous inequality: two persons may lead equally good lives on the whole and yet there may at any time be great differences in their level of well-being. And simultaneous inequality, it is held, ought to be a concern of egalitarians. The paper discusses this and related objections to the lifetime equality view. It is argued that rather than leading to a revision of the (...)
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  38. Broome's Theory of Fairness and the Problem of Quantifying the Strengths of Claims.James R. Kirkpatrick & Nick Eastwood - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (1):82-91.
    John Broome argues that fairness requires that claims are satisfied in proportion to their strength. Broome holds that, when distributing indivisible goods, fairness requires the use of weighted lotteries as a surrogate to satisfy proportionally each candidate's claims. In this article, we present two arguments against Broome's account of fairness. First, we argue that it is almost impossible to calculate the weights of the lotteries in accordance with the requirements of fairness. Second, we argue that Broome rules out those methods (...)
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  39. Axiology, and Science.Sigmund Koch - 1969 - In Marjorie Glicksman Grene (ed.), The Anatomy of Knowledge: Papers Presented to the Study Group on Foundations of Cultural Unity, Bowdoin College, 1965 and 1966. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 119.
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  40. Toward An Axiology Of Nature.Richard Leggett - 1975 - Southwest Philosophical Studies.
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  41. 'It's Good to Talk'?Sandra E. Marshall - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2):129–144.
    The idea that there are some things which we should not talk about is most commonly dealt with in the context of debates about rights to free speech, and other contexts in which the value of talking is typically understood in instrumental terms. This paper explores ways of grounding that idea which do not depend upon instrumental values, in particular in the context of self-revelatory and confessional talk.
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  42. James Griffin's Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs Is.Michele M. Moody-Adams - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1).
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  43. Some Difficult Intuitions for the Principle of Universality.G. E. Moore & W. D. Ross - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (4).
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  44. Art as an Axiology of Man.E. Moutsopoulos - 1987 - Filosofia 17:120-152.
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  45. The Mere Addition Paradox, Parity and Vagueness.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):129–151.
    Derek Parfit’s mere addition paradox has generated a large literature. This paper articulates one response to this paradox - which Parfit hirnself suggested - in terms of a formal account of the relation of parity. I term this response the ‘parity view’. It is consistent with transitivity of ‘at least as good as’, but implies incompleteness of this relation. The parity view is compatible with critical-band utilitarianism if this is adjusted to allow for vagueness. John Broome argues against accounts which (...)
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  46. Value Relations: Old Wine in New Barrels.Wlodek Rabinowicz - unknown
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, the (...)
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  47. Modeling Parity and Incomparability.Wlodek Rabinowicz - unknown
  48. Prioritarianism for Prospects.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):2-21.
    The Interpersonal Addition Theorem, due to John Broome, states that, given certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be represented as the sum of its individual utilities. Given ‘Bernoulli's hypothesis’ according to which individual utility coincides with individual welfare, this result appears to be incompatible with the Priority View. On that view, due to Derek Parfit, the benefits to the worse off should count for more, in the overall evaluation, than the comparable benefits to the (...)
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  49. Moral Aspirations and Ideals.Saul Smilansky - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3).
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  50. The Multiplication of Utility.Wp SWp, Wswp Swsw & Wswswp Swswsw - 1994 - Utilitas 6 (2).
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