Transparency

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Causation, Transparency, and Emphasis.Peter Achinstein - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):1 - 23.
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  2. Transparency and Teaching.G. Allen - 2006 - Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3):568-570.
  3. Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present (...)
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  4. Natural Decompositions of Perceived Transparency: Reply to Albert.Barton L. Anderson, Manish Singh & Judit O'Vari - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (4):1144-1151.
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  5. Postscript: Qualifying and Quantifying Constraints on Perceived Transparency.Barton L. Anderson, Manish Singh & Judit O'Vari - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (4):1151-1153.
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  6. On the Transparency of Begin: Some Uses of Semantic Theory.Tommy R. Anderson - 1968 - Foundations of Language 4 (4):394-421.
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  7. Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - manuscript
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the Transparency Datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some (...)
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  8. Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
    Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.
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  9. Transparency, Olfaction and Aesthetics.Thomas Baker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):121-130.
    Many have suggested that, unlike the so-called higher-senses, the lower-senses are not capable of providing aesthetic experience. Supporting this is, what I will call, the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument, which says that a necessary feature for aesthetic experience is lacking in the case of the lower-senses, namely transparency/exteroceptivity. I argue, contrary to the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument, that olfaction can provide transparent access to the properties of particular external objects. I argue that the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument relies on a misleading visuocentric and unimodal view of (...)
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  10. Transparency and the Particular.Zenon Bankowski - 1999 - Cultural Values 3 (4):427-444.
  11. Scents and Sensibilia.Clare Batty - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):103-118.
    This paper considers what olfactory experience can tell us about the controversy over qualia and, in particular, the debate that focuses on the alleged transparency of experience. The appeal to transparency is supposed to show that there are no qualia—intrinsic, non-intentional and directly accessible properties of experience that determine phenomenal character. It is most commonly used to motivate intentionalism—namely, the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its representational content. Although some philosophers claim that transparency holds (...)
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  12. The Perception of Transparency and X-Junctions.J. Beck & R. Ivry - 1986 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (5):328-329.
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  13. Morpholexical Transparency and the Argument Structure of Verbs of Cutting and Breaking.Jürgen Bohnemeyer - 2007 - Cognitive Linguistics 18 (2).
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  14. Is There Introspective Evidence for Phenomenal Intentionality?Davide Bordini - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1105-1126.
    The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers of mind and has traditionally been used to motivate Representationalism, i.e., the view that phenomenal character is in some strong way dependent on intentionality. However, more recently, others have appealed to TE to go the opposite way and support the phenomenal intentionality view (...)
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  15. The Transparencies and the Opacities of Experience. Intentionalism, Phenomenal Character, and Moods.Davide Bordini - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Milan
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  16. Are Alien Thoughts Beliefs?Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):134-148.
    Thought insertion is a common delusion in schizophrenia. People affected by it report that there are thoughts in their heads that have been inserted by a third party. These thoughts are self-generated but subjec-tively experienced as alien (hereafter, we shall call them alien thoughts for convenience). In chapter 5 of Transparent Minds, Jordi Fernández convincingly argues that the phenomenon of thought insertion can be accounted for as a pathology of self-knowledge. In particular, he argues that the application of the bypass (...)
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  17. The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance.Joke Brouwer, Lars Spuybroek & Sjoerd van Tuinen (eds.) - 2016 - V2_Publishing.
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  18. Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.
    Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have (...)
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  19. Transparency? What Transparency?John Chapman - 1995 - Business Ethics 4 (3):139–142.
  20. Transparency? What Transparency?John Chapman - 1995 - Business Ethics: A European Review 4 (3):139-142.
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  21. Introspection, Intentionality, and the Transparency of Experience.Tim Crane - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):49-67.
    Some philosophers have argued recently that introspective evidence provides direct support for an intentionalist theory of visual experience. An intentionalist theory of visual experience treats experience as an intentional state, a state with an intentional content. (I shall use the word ’state’ in a general way, for any kind of mental phenomenon, and here I shall not distinguish states proper from events, though the distinction is important.) Intentionalist theories characteristically say that the phenomenal character of an experience, what it is (...)
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  22. Seeing Through Transparency: Performativity, Vision and Intent1.Anne M. Cronin - 1999 - Cultural Values 3 (1):54-72.
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  23. Existe-t-il des phénomènes mentaux?Arnaud Dewalque & Denis Seron - 2015 - Philosophie (124):105-126.
    Nous nous attribuons naturellement une vie mentale, au sens minimal où il nous semble intuitivement que quelque chose se passe dans notre esprit. Mais que veut dire « quelque chose se passe dans notre esprit »?La formule est singulièrement obscure, et les philosophes y consacrent depuis toujours de patientes recherches. Au sens le plus naturel et immédiat, elle semble signifier quelque chose de ce...
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  24. Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  25. Transparency Gained, Morality Lost.Wim Dubbink - 2007 - Business and Society Review 112 (2):287-313.
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  26. Moore's Refutation of Idealism.C. J. Ducasse - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court. pp. 232-3.
  27. The Simple Theory of Colour and the Transparency of Sense Experience.J. Edwards - 1998 - In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the transparency of sense experience. The simple theory of colour (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 371.
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  28. Visual Transparency.Jeff Engelhardt - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):5-20.
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  29. User Controlled Transparency Model.Leif Engström & Per-Eric Häll - 2005 - In Alan F. Blackwell & David MacKay (eds.), Power. Cambridge University Press. pp. 17.
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  30. Independent Intentional Objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  31. Chromatic Scission in Perceptual Transparency.F. Faul - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 105-105.
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  32. Idiosyncratic Perception.Craig French - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv068.
    Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyncratic perception. I defend the relational view in response to this problem.
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  33. On the Rational Contribution of Experiential Transparency1.Christopher Frey - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):721-732.
  34. Transparency Tricks.Garsten Christina & Lindh de Montoya Monica - 2009 - In Christina Garsten & Tor Hernes (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas in Management. Routledge.
  35. Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.
    It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...)
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  36. Frey on Experiential Transparency and Its Rational Role.Anil Gupta - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):717-720.
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  37. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
  38. Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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  39. Perceptual Transparency.Larry Hardin - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):341-345.
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  40. Mind and Artifact: A Multidimensional Matrix for Exploring Cognition-Artifact Relations.Richard Heersmink - 2012 - In J. M. Bishop & Y. J. Erden (eds.), Proceedings of the 5th AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy (pp. 54-61).
    What are the possible varieties of cognition-artifact relations, and which dimensions are relevant for exploring these varieties? This question is answered in two steps. First, three levels of functional and informational integration between human agent and cognitive artifact are distinguished. These levels are based on the degree of interactivity and direction of information flow, and range from monocausal and bicausal relations to continuous reciprocal causation. In these levels there is a hierarchy of integrative processes in which there is an increasing (...)
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  41. An Analytic-Hermeneutic History of Consciousness.Benj Hellie - forthcoming - In Kelly Michael Becker & Iain Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Companion to History of Philosophy 1945-2015. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    The hermeneutic tradition divides /physical/ discourse, which takes an 'exterior' point of view in /describing/ its subject-matter, from /mental/ discourse, which takes an 'interior' point of view in /expressing/ its subject-matter: a 'metapsychological dualist' or 'metadualist' approach. The analytic tradition, in its attachment to truth-logic and consequently the 'unity of science', is 'metamonist', and thinks all discourse takes the 'exterior' viewpoint: the 'bump in the rug' moves to the disunification of mind into the functional and (big-'C') Consciousness. Assuming the hermeneuts (...)
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  42. An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
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  43. That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.
    I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going (...)
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  44. The Effect of Transparency on Recognition of Overlapping Objects.Anne P. Hillstrom, Hannah Wakefield & Helen Scholey - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 19 (2):158.
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  45. In Defense of Relational Direct Realism.Kenneth Hobson - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.
    According to proponents of relational direct realism, veridical perceptual experiences are irreducibly relational mental states that include as constituents perceived physical objects or intrinsic aspects of them. One consequence of the theory is the rejection of the causal theory of perception. This paper defends the relational theory against several objections recently developed by Paul Coates. He argues that the required experiential relation is incoherent and unmotivated. The argument that it is incoherent commits a fallacy. In reply to the argument that (...)
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  46. Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?Christopher Hood & David Heald - unknown - Proceedings of the British Academy 135.
    Christopher Hood: Transparency in Historical Perspective David Heald: Varieties of Transparency Patrick Birkinshaw: Transparency as a Human Right David Heald: Transparency as an Instrumental Value Onora O'Neill: Transparency and the Ethics of Communication Andrea Prat: The More Closely We Are Watched, the Better We Behave? Alasdair Roberts: Dashed Expectations: Governmental Adaptation to Transparency Rules Andrew McDonald: What Hope Freedom of Information in th UK James Savage: Member State Bedgetary Transparency in the Economic and Monetary Union David Stasavage: Does Transparency Make (...)
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  47. Effects of Phenomenal Transparency in Visual Search.M. Ikeda & A. Ishiguchi - 2004 - In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell. pp. 148-148.
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  48. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism.Frank Jackson - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 52--64.
  49. Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
    This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...)
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  50. Why the Extractive Industry Should Support Mandatory Transparency: A Shared Value Approach.Perrine Toledano Julien Topal - 2013 - Business and Society Review 118 (3):271-298.
    The Transparency Amendment, included in the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, can be an important tool in curtailing the resource curse that so heavily burdens resource‐rich developing countries by shedding light on opaque payments between the extractive sector and host countries. From the get‐go, however, extractive industry companies have fiercely opposed the new mandatory disclosure requirements as set out in this regulation. The corporate opposition is for the largest part motivated by the fear of a competitive disadvantage (...)
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