Transparency

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. added 2020-04-06
    Acquiring a Concept of Visual Experience.Austin Andrews - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):223-245.
    The transparency of visual experience is a widely held and important thesis in the philosophy of perception. Critical discussion of transparency has focused on visual experiences, such as the experience of visual blur that are taken to be counter examples to transparency. Here, I consider a novel objection to transparency that does not depend on intuitions about examples. The objection is that if transparency is true then we cannot explain our ability to think about our visual experiences as such. In (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-08
    Cognitive Self-Management Requires the Phenomenal Registration of Intrinsic State Properties.Frederic Peters - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1113-1135.
    Cognition is not, and could not possibly be, entirely representational in character. There is also a phenomenal form of cognitive expression that registers the intrinsic properties of mental states themselves. Arguments against the reality of this intrinsic phenomenal dimension to mental experience have focused either on its supposed impossibility, or secondly, the non-appearance of any such qualities to introspection. This paper argues to the contrary, that the registration of cognitive state properties does take place independently of representational content; and necessarily (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-04
    Harman on Mental Paint and the Transparency of Experience.Erhan Demircioglu - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (1):56-81.
    Harman famously argues that a particular class of antifunctionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties (...)
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  4. added 2019-12-11
    The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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  5. added 2019-12-11
    Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.
    In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which (...)
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  6. added 2019-08-22
    The Transparency of Experience and the Neuroscience of Attention.Assaf Weksler, Hilla Jacobson & Zohar Z. Bronfman - forthcoming - Synthese.
    According to the thesis of transparency, subjects can attend only to the representational content of perceptual experience, never to the intrinsic properties of experience that carry this representational content, i.e., to “mental paint.” So far, arguments for and against transparency were conducted from the armchair, relying mainly on introspective observations. In this paper, we argue in favor of transparency, relying on the cognitive neuroscience of attention. We present a trilemma to those who hold that attention can be directed to mental (...)
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  7. added 2019-07-09
    The Argument From Pain: A New Argument for Indirect Realism.Dirk Franken - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 93 (1):106 - 129.
    The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions are (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Frey on Experiendal Transparency and Its Rational Role.Anil Gupta - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):717-720.
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing.Joseph Levine - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
    In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: physicalism about the non‐mental world, consistency with what is known from color science, and transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral reflectance, subjectivism, dispositionalism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet all three constraints. By (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Presence and Transparency: A Reading of Levertov's Sands of the Well.Edward Zlotkowski - 1997 - Renascence 50 (1/2):135-151.
  11. added 2019-06-05
    Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some other (...)
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  12. added 2019-04-12
    A Puzzle About Colors.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):321-336.
    I propose a description of one aspect of the philosophical problem about the ontology of colors by formulating and motivating six plausible premises that seem to be hard to deny in isolation but that are jointly incoherent. I briefly sketch a solution and comment on the views presented in this volume from the perspective of the puzzle.
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  13. added 2019-03-27
    Two Theories of Transparency.Edward W. Averill & Joseph Gottlieb - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience itself. This is a (purported) introspective fact. It is also often said that we can infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details for these two (...)
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  14. added 2019-03-23
    Sensuous Experience, Phenomenal Presence, and Perceptual Availability.Christopher Frey - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2):237-254.
    I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to (...)
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  15. added 2019-03-23
    Phenomenal Presence.Christopher Frey - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. pp. 71-92.
    I argue that the most common interpretation of experiential transparency’s significance is laden with substantive and ultimately extraneous metaphysical commitments. I divest this inflated interpretation of its unwarranted encumbrances and consolidate the precipitate into a position I call core transparency. Core Transparency is a thesis about experience’s presentational character. The objects of perceptual experience are there, present to us, in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. According to core transparency, it is in the disclosure (...)
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  16. added 2019-03-22
    Perceiving External Things and the Time‐Lag Argument.Sean Enda Power - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):94-117.
    We seem to directly perceive external things. But can we? According to the time‐lag argument, we cannot. What we directly perceive happens now. There is a time‐lag between our perceptions and the external things we seem to directly perceive; these external things happen in the past; thus, what we directly perceive must be something else, for example, sense‐data, and we can only at best indirectly perceive other things. This paper examines the time‐lag argument given contemporary metaphysics. I argue that this (...)
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  17. added 2019-02-22
    Quine’s Poor Tom.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (1):5-16.
    Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.
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  18. added 2019-01-16
    What has Transparency to Do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:221-242.
    This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
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  19. added 2018-09-16
    Nihilismus der Transparenz. Grenzen der Medienphilosophie Jean Baudrillards.Gregor Schiemann - 2013 - In Jan-Hendrik Möller (ed.), Paradoxalität des Medialen. Fink Verlag. pp. 237-254.
    Jean Baudrillards Kulturphilosophie läßt sich durch die Behauptung charakterisieren, daß die Medien in der modernen Kultur vorherrschend geworden sind. Seine These, die Medien hätten jeden Bezug zu einer von ihnen unabhängigen Realität verloren, haben zahlreiche Autorinnen und Autoren nihilistisch genannt. Das Zutreffende dieser Kennzeichnung verdankt sich im Wesentlichen einem eingeschränkten, auf das 19. Jahrhundert zurückweisenden Begriff des Nihilismus. Allerdings nimmt Baudrillard auf Phänomene Bezug, die er historisch später verortet und die sich ihrer Struktur nach kategorial von den Funktionen der Medien (...)
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  20. added 2018-03-20
    The Whence and Whither of Experience.Nick Treanor - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1119-1138.
    Consider a toothache, or a feeling of intense pleasure, or the sensation you would have if you looked impassively at an expanse of colour. In each case, the experience can easily be thought to fill time by being present throughout a period. This way of thinking of conscious experience is natural enough, but it is in deep conflict with the view that physical processes are ultimately responsible for experience. The problem is that physical processes are related to durations in a (...)
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  21. added 2018-03-05
    Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence.Christoph Hoerl - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:127-151.
    Philosophers frequently comment on the intimate connection there is between something’s being present in perceptual experience and that thing’s being, or at least appearing to be, temporally present. Yet, there is relatively little existing work that goes beyond asserting such a connection and instead examines its specific nature. In this paper, I suggest that we can make progress on the latter by looking at two more specific debates that have hitherto been conducted largely isolation from each other: one about the (...)
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  22. added 2017-09-25
    Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.
    According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience. This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite (...)
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  23. added 2017-03-21
    An Analytic-Hermeneutic History of Consciousness.Benj Hellie - forthcoming - In Kelly Michael Becker & Iain Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Companion to History of Philosophy 1945-2015. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    The hermeneutic tradition divides /physical/ discourse, which takes an 'exterior' point of view in /describing/ its subject-matter, from /mental/ discourse, which takes an 'interior' point of view in /expressing/ its subject-matter: a 'metapsychological dualist' or 'metadualist' approach. The analytic tradition, in its attachment to truth-logic and consequently the 'unity of science', is 'metamonist', and thinks all discourse takes the 'exterior' viewpoint: the 'bump in the rug' moves to the disunification of mind into the functional and (big-'C') Consciousness. Assuming the hermeneuts (...)
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  24. added 2017-02-13
    The Transparencies and the Opacities of Experience. Intentionalism, Phenomenal Character, and Moods.Davide Bordini - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Milan
  25. added 2017-02-13
    Information, Feedback, and Transparency.Robert Van Gulick - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (1):27-29.
  26. added 2017-02-12
    The Effect of Transparency on Recognition of Overlapping Objects.Anne P. Hillstrom, Hannah Wakefield & Helen Scholey - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 19 (2):158.
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  27. added 2017-02-12
    Magnetic Appeal: MRI and the Myth of Transparency.Amit Prasad - 2010 - Annals of Science 67 (4):577-578.
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  28. added 2017-01-28
    Reply to Livet: Meta-Abeyance?Thomas Metzinger - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Let me begin by pointing out a number of potential misunderstandings in Pierre Livet’s densely written commentary. In the first paragraph, Pierre Livet writes, “phenomenal transparency involves an implication of the existence of the entities represented” . This is what I call the “extensionality equivocation” . As explained at length in BNO, “phenomenal transparency” has been a technical term in philosophy at least since G. E. Moore’s paper The Refutation of Idealism. In BNO, I offered a refined notion of the (...)
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  29. added 2017-01-28
    "Transparency" of Nature in Selected Literary Texts.Mathew K. V. Punchayil - 1992 - Dissertation, St. John's University (New York)
    Among the varied attitudes and responses to Nature, a consistent stream of responses centered round Nature's "transparency," over the centuries and across the continents, is discernible, as it finds expression in the literatures of the world. Based on this basic presupposition, this study of The Bhagavad Gita, Nature , and Hopkins' poetry aims at the discovery, in spite of their many differences, of their common vision of Nature's "transparency." ;"Transparency" of Nature, at its highest level, is not susceptible to the (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-27
    The Transparency of Mind.Sarah K. Paul - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):295-303.
    In philosophical inquiry into the mind, the metaphor of ‘transparency’ has been attractive to many who are otherwise in deep disagreement. It has thereby come to have a variety of different and mutually incompatible connotations. The mind is said to be transparent to itself, our perceptual experiences are said to be transparent to the world, and our beliefs are said to be transparent to – a great many different things. The first goal of this essay is to sort out the (...)
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  31. added 2017-01-27
    The Perception of Transparency and X-Junctions.J. Beck & R. Ivry - 1986 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (5):328-329.
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  32. added 2017-01-26
    Transparency and Teaching.G. Allen - 2006 - Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3):568-570.
  33. added 2017-01-26
    User Controlled Transparency Model.Leif Engström & Per-Eric Häll - 2005 - In Alan F. Blackwell & David MacKay (eds.), Power. Cambridge University Press. pp. 17.
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  34. added 2017-01-26
    Effects of Phenomenal Transparency in Visual Search.M. Ikeda & A. Ishiguchi - 2004 - In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell. pp. 148-148.
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  35. added 2017-01-26
    Seeing Through Transparency: Performativity, Vision and Intent1.Anne M. Cronin - 1999 - Cultural Values 3 (1):54-72.
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  36. added 2017-01-26
    Transparency and the Particular.Zenon Bankowski - 1999 - Cultural Values 3 (4):427-444.
  37. added 2017-01-26
    Chromatic Scission in Perceptual Transparency.F. Faul - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 105-105.
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  38. added 2017-01-26
    Stereoscopic Transparency and Segregation in Depth.M. J. M. Lankheet & M. Palmen - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 71-71.
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  39. added 2017-01-26
    On the Transparency of Begin: Some Uses of Semantic Theory.Tommy R. Anderson - 1968 - Foundations of Language 4 (4):394-421.
  40. added 2017-01-25
    Visual Transparency.Jeff Engelhardt - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):5-20.
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  41. added 2017-01-24
    The Broad Perception Model and the Transparency of Qualia.Renée Smith - 2011 - Behavior and Philosophy 39:69-81.
    The transparency of qualia to introspection has been given as reason for favoring a representationalist view of phenomenal character. Qualia realists, notably Block (1996, 2000), A.D. Smith (2008), and Kind (2003, 2008), have denied that qualia are transparent. What is clear is that the phenomenology of introspection alone cannot decide the case, but a theory of introspection could. If the qualia realist could show that our introspective access to mental properties is akin to the perceptual access we have to perceived (...)
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  42. added 2017-01-23
    The Transparency of Experience Argument.Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  43. added 2017-01-22
    Expanding Mediation Theory.Peter-Paul Verbeek - 2012 - Foundations of Science 17 (4):391-395.
    In his article In Between Us, Yoni van den Eede expands existing theories of mediation into the realm of the social and the political, focusing on the notions of opacity and transparency. His approach is rich and promising, but two pitfalls should be avoided. First, his concept of ‘in-between’ runs the risk to conceptualize mediation as a process ‘between’ pre-given entities. On the basis of current work in postphenomenology and actor-network theory, though, mediation should rather be seen as the origin (...)
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  44. added 2017-01-22
    What Does the 'Transparency of Experience' Show About the Relationship Between the Phenomenality and the Intentionality of Experience?Yasushi Ogusa - 2011 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (1):17-33.
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  45. added 2017-01-22
    Causation, Transparency, and Emphasis.Peter Achinstein - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):1 - 23.
    It is often said that singular causal statements express a relationship between one event and another or between a fact and an event. This is a very strong view, which has the following simple corollary: singular causal statements whose cause-term purports to refer to an event and whose effect-term purports to refer to an event express a relationship between an event and an event.Thus, both Davidson and Kim would claim that the singular causal Statement Socrates’ drinking hemlock at dusk caused (...)
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  46. added 2017-01-21
    On the 'Hyperinsulation' and 'Transparency' of Imaginery Situations.Jérome Pelletier - 2007 - In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    I make a few comments concerning the way Recanati analyses imaginary situations in two realms : : the realm of the fictional and the realm of the ascription of beliefs.
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  47. added 2017-01-17
    The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance.Joke Brouwer, Lars Spuybroek & Sjoerd van Tuinen (eds.) - 2016 - V2_Publishing.
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  48. added 2017-01-16
    Transparency, Olfaction and Aesthetics.Thomas Baker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):121-130.
    Many have suggested that, unlike the so-called higher-senses, the lower-senses are not capable of providing aesthetic experience. Supporting this is, what I will call, the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument, which says that a necessary feature for aesthetic experience is lacking in the case of the lower-senses, namely transparency/exteroceptivity. I argue, contrary to the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument, that olfaction can provide transparent access to the properties of particular external objects. I argue that the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument relies on a misleading visuocentric and unimodal view of (...)
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  49. added 2017-01-16
    Postscript: Qualifying and Quantifying Constraints on Perceived Transparency.Barton L. Anderson, Manish Singh & Judit O'Vari - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (4):1151-1153.
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  50. added 2017-01-16
    Natural Decompositions of Perceived Transparency: Reply to Albert.Barton L. Anderson, Manish Singh & Judit O'Vari - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (4):1144-1151.
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