Tropes

Edited by Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)
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  1. Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation.Peter Alward - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (01):53-.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  2. Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes.Peter Alward - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (1):53-64.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  3. Properties.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Four Disputes About Properties.David M. Armstrong - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  5. Research on Tropes. [REVIEW]Charles Atkinson - 1985 - Speculum 60 (3):684-685.
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  6. Review: If Tropes. [REVIEW]J. Bacon - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):459-462.
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  7. A Single Primitive Trope Relation.John Bacon - 1989 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (2):141 - 154.
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  8. Tropes or Universals: How (Not) to Make One's Choice.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):69-86.
    This article discusses a familiar version of trope theory as opposed to a familiar version of the theory of universals, examining how these two rivals address the problem of “attribute agreement”—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place. The article shows that there is not much of a difference between the ways these two theories handle the problem, and in a more general way it argues that there is (...)
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  9. Tropes or Universals: How to Make One's Choice.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):69-86.
    This article discusses a familiar version of trope theory as opposed to a familiar version of the theory of universals, examining how these two rivals address the problem of “attribute agreement”—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place. The article shows that there is not much of a difference between the ways these two theories handle the problem, and in a more general way it argues that there is (...)
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  10. New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism.Jiri Benovsky - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227.
    In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more (...)
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  11. Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars.Hilan Bensusan & Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163.
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that (...)
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  12. Tropes With a Kantian Flavor.Florian Boge - 2014 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 41 (99-100).
    This paper discusses one of the major problems for resemblance nominalism, posed by Bertrand Russell in 1911–12, and often referred to as Russell’s regress. It is the problem that resemblance must either be a universal, thus refuting a thorough nominalism, or must itself resemble other resemblances to count as a resemblance, which ultimately leads to an infinite regress of resemblances. I am going to discuss two solutions that have been proposed to this problem. I will then attempt to show in (...)
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  13. Abstract Particulars in a Four-Dimensional Frame.Montse Bordes - 1998 - Dialectica 52:3-12.
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  14. Why I Am Not a Tropist.Andrea Borghini - 2008 - In M. Okada & B. Smith (eds.), Proceedings of the First Interdisciplinary Ontology Meeting (InterOntology 2008). Keio University Press. pp. 93-98.
    A major division among ontologists has always been the one between those who believe that all entities are particular, and those who believe that at least some entities are universal. I find myself with the latter, and in this paper I offer part of the reasons why this is so. More precisely, I offer a reason why we ought to reject tropism, due to the failure of this view to account for the similarities we experience among entities. In the paper, (...)
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  15. El regreso de Bradley y el problema de la unidad-compleja: ¿tropos al rescate?Sebastián Briceño - 2016 - Critica 48 (143):47-75.
    It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a trope ontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already (...)
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  16. Tropes de I'ordinaire de la Messe: Tropes du Sanctus. [REVIEW]Lance Brunner - 1993 - Speculum 68 (4):1143-1144.
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  17. Tropes de l'Ordinaire de la Messe: Tropes du Sanctus.Gunilla Iversen.Lance W. Brunner - 1993 - Speculum 68 (4):1143-1144.
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  18. Dal nominalismo al platonismo. Il problema degli universali nella filosofia contemporanea.Francesco F. Calemi - 2012 - Mimesis.
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  19. Tropes, Necessary Connections, and Non-Transferability.Ross Cameron - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):99–113.
    In this paper I examine whether the Humean denial of necessary connections between wholly distinct contingent existents poses problems for a theory of tropes. In section one I consider the substance-attribute theory of tropes. I distinguish first between three versions of the non-transferability of a trope from the substratum in which it inheres and then between two versions of the denial of necessary connections. I show that the most plausible combination of these views is consistent. In section two I consider (...)
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  20. Review of Simone Gozzano, Francesco Orilia (Eds.), Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology[REVIEW]Keith Campbell - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (8).
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  21. Abstract Particulars.Keith Campbell - 1990 - Blackwell.
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  22. The Universe As We Find It, by John Heil. [REVIEW]Chad Carmichael - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.
    In this ambitious work, John Heil presents a fundamental ontology (chapters 1-8) consisting of finitely many substances and their properties (which he thinks of as particular, trope-like things), together with an account of causation, truthmaking, and a chapter on relations generally. He then applies this ontology (chapters 9-12) to a number of outstanding problems about reductionism, kinds, essences, emergence, consciousness, cognition, and much else. A final chapter reprises the main points about fundamental ontology from the first chapters.
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  23. Enduring States.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2008 - In Christian Kanzian (ed.), Persistence. Ontos.
    The problem of how a concrete individual survives changes of its properties has long divided the philosophical community into ‘enduratists’ and ‘perduratists’. Enduratists take the idea of a surviving individual ontologi-cally seriously. They claim that many objects we encounter in our every-day (and for that matter also scientific) life endure in time, which means that these entities are wholly present at any time at which they exist. For those who are in principle happy with the conceptual framework of our ‘everyday’ (...)
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  24. Two Concepts of Trope.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):137-155.
    The concept of a trope (understood as an individual property and not as a figure of speech) plays an important role in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It is, however, often far from clear what the logic of this concept really is. Indeed, there are two equally important intuitions underlying the concept of trope, two intuitions that generate two quite different conceptual frameworks. According to the first intuition, a trope is a particularised property – a property taken as an individual aspect of (...)
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  25. Poliziano's Science of Tropes.Paul Colilli - 1989
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  26. Aristotle on Nonsubstantial Individuals.Phil Corkum - 2009 - Ancient Philosophy 29 (2):289-310.
    As a first stab, call a property recurrent if it can be possessed by more than one object, and nonrecurrent if it can be possessed by at most one object. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively and ongoing debate among commentators over the last forty-five years. One source of textual evidence in the Categories, drawn on in this debate, is Aristotle’s claim that certain properties are inseparable from what they are in. Here (...)
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  27. Relations, Universals, and the Abuse of Tropes.Richard Cross - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):53–72.
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  28. II–Richard Cross: Relations, Universals, and The Abuse Of Tropes.Richard Cross - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):53-72.
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  29. Tropes.Chris Daly - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:253 - 261.
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  30. Tropes.Christopher Daly - 1997 - In D. H. Mellor & A. Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press. pp. 140-59.
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  31. Des accidents aux tropes.Alain de Libera - 2002 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):479-500.
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  32. On the Compresence of Tropes.Arda Denkel - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):599-606.
    Once we assume that objects are bundles of tropes, we want to know how the latter cohere. Are they held together by a substratum, are they linked by external relations or do they cling to one another by internal relations? This paper begins by exploring the reasons for eliminating the first two suggestions. Defending that the third option can be made plausible, it advances the following thesis: Maintaining that tropes are held in a compresence by appropriately qualified internal relations avoids (...)
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  33. The New Ontology of the Mental Causation Debate.S. C. Gibb E. J. Lowe & R. D. Ingthorsson (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  34. Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation.Douglas Ehring - 2014 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Properties and objects are everywhere. We cannot take a step without walking into them; we cannot construct a theory in science without referring to them. Given their ubiquitous character, one might think that there would be a standard metaphysical account of properties and objects, but they remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring presents a defense of tropes—properties and relations understood as particulars—and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, and advocates a specific brand of trope (...)
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  35. Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation.Douglas Ehring - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.
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  36. Property Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism.Douglas Ehring - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):443 – 463.
    'Natural class' trope nominalism makes a trope's being of a certain sort--its nature--a matter of its membership in a certain natural class of actual tropes. It has been objected that on this theory had even a single member of the class of red tropes not existed, for example, then the type 'being red' would not have been instantiated and nothing would have been red. I argue that natural class trope nominalism can avoid this implication by way of counterpart theory as (...)
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  37. The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism.Douglas Ehring - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):179 - 190.
    In this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.
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  38. Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics and Momentary Tropes.Douglas Ehring - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):254–258.
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  39. Donald C. Williams’s Defence of Real Metaphysics.A. R. J. Fisher - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-24.
    In the middle of last century metaphysics was widely criticized, ridiculed, and committed to the flames. During this period a handful of philosophers, against several anti-metaphysical trends, defended metaphysics and articulated novel metaphysical doctrines. Donald C. Williams was one of these philosophers. But while his contributions to metaphysics are well known his defence of metaphysics is not and yet it played a key part in the development and revival of metaphysics. In this paper I present his defence of metaphysics in (...)
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  40. David Lewis, Donald C. Williams, and the History of Metaphysics in the Twentieth Century.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):3--22.
    The revival of analytic metaphysics in the latter half of the twentieth century is typically understood as a consequence of the critiques of logical positivism, Quine’s naturalization of ontology, Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, clarifications of modal notions in logic, and the theoretical exploitation of possible worlds. However, this explanation overlooks the work of metaphysicians at the height of positivism and linguisticism that affected metaphysics of the late twentieth century. Donald C. Williams is one such philosopher. In this paper I explain (...)
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  41. The Other Basic Aspect of Reality.Simon Floth - unknown
    It is argued that physical (and not inherently psychical) properties are insufficient to constitute all else. Specifically they cannot constitute an instance (K1) of our knowledge that the number of existing things is at least one. This employs a new version of entry by entailment: Every fact as to the presence of a constituted trope is entailed by facts about the presence of the ontologically basic, where a property is ontologically basic if and only if the fact of its presence (...)
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  42. Thinking About Different Nonexistents of the Same Kind: Reid's Account of the Imagination and its Nonexistent Objects.Marina Folescu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):627-649.
    How is it that, as fiction readers, we are nonplussed by J. K. Rowling's prescription to imagine Ronan, Bane, and Magorian, three different centaurs of the Forbidden Forrest at Hogwarts? It is usually held in the philosophical literature on fictional discourse that singular imaginings of fictional objects are impossible, given the blatant nonexistence of such objects. In this paper, I have a dual purpose: on the one hand, to show that, without being committed to Meinongeanism, we can explain the phenomenon (...)
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  43. Sets As Mereological Tropes.Peter Forrest - 2002 - Metaphysica 3 (1).
    Either from concrete examples such as tomatoes on a plate, an egg carton full of eggs and so on, or simply because of the braces notation, we come to have some intuitions about the sorts of things sets might be. (See Maddy 1990.) First we tend to think of a set of particulars as itself a particular thing.. Second, even after the distinction between settheory and mereology has been carefully explained we tend to think of the members of a set (...)
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  44. Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology.Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.) - 2008 - Ontos Verlag.
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  45. Creative Metaphors, Synchronicity, and Quantum Physics.Thomas Frentz - 2011 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 44 (2):101-128.
    In this work, I argue that creative metaphors are formed when some persistent problem, caused by an inadequacy in preexisting knowledge, descends into the collective unconscious, is reconfigured unconsciously in novel ways, and then reemerges back into consciousness where the impasse is resolved by the metaphorical expression of new knowledge. To develop this position, I (1) review and critique some well-known language-based studies of metaphor, (2) summarize psychoanalytic and depth psychological approaches to the psyche as one way to overcome the (...)
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  46. Tropes and Laws.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (1):57 - 82.
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  47. Review of Anna-Sofia Maurin, If Tropes[REVIEW]Eric Funkhouser - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (2).
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  48. Tropes and Topics in Scientific Discourse: Galileo's De Motu.Ofer Gal - 1994 - Science in Context 7 (1).
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  49. Sobre la Expresión “Propiedades Particularizadas”: Tropos Modificadores y Tropos Módulo.Robert K. Garcia - forthcoming - In Ezequiel Zerbudis (ed.), Poderes Causales, Tropos, y Otras Criaturas Extrañas: Ensayos de Metafísica Analítica. Título.
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  50. Tropes as Character-Grounders.Robert K. Garcia - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):499-515.
    There is a largely unrecognized ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation throws into relief two fundamentally different conceptions of a trope and provides two ways to understand and develop each metaphysical theory that put tropes to use. In this paper I consider the relative merits that result from differences concerning a trope’s ability to ground the character of ordinary objects. I argue that on each conception of a trope, there are unique implications and challenges concerning character-grounding.
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