Trust

An increasingly popular solution to the anti-scientific climate rising on social media platforms has been the appeal to more critical thinking from the user's side. In this paper, we zoom in on the ideal of critical thinking and unpack it in order to see, specifically, whether it can provide enough epistemic agency so that users endowed with it can break free from enclosed communities on social media (so called epistemic bubbles). We criticise some assumptions embedded in the ideal of critical (...) thinking online and, instead, we propose that a better way to understand the virtuous behaviour at hand is as critical engagement, namely a mutual cultivation of critical skills among the members of an epistemic bubble. This mutual cultivation allows members within an epistemic bubble (in contrast, as we will show, with the authority-based models of epistemic echo chambers) to become more autonomous critical thinkers by cultivating self-trust. We use the model of relational autonomy as well as resources from work on epistemic self-trust and epistemic interdependence to develop an explanatory framework, which in turn may ground rules for identifying and creating virtuous epistemic bubbles within the environments of social media platforms. (shrink)

Trust in the scientific enterprise — in science as an institution — is arguably important to individuals’ and societies’ well-being. Although some measures of public trust in science exist, the recipients of that trust are often ambiguous between trusting individual scientists and the scientific community at large. We argue that more precision would be beneficial — specifically, targeting public trust of the scientific community at large — and describe the development and validation of such an instrument: the Scientific Community Trust (...) Index (SCTI). We show the results of initial field testing to establish instrument reliability and validity. We then demonstrate certain advantages of the SCTI against other measures of trust and deference, and present correlations between the SCTI and participant scores in two trust-in-science scenarios. Our results suggest that the SCTI is a useful and compact tool for measuring public trust in the scientific community. (shrink)

an unpublished paper written in 1998-1999.

Corruption prevention can be more effective if it does not rely merely on legal enforcement. This theoretical review aimed to propose a hypothetical psychological model capable of explaining the behavior of corruption. Moral disengagement is a variable that is considered ontologically closest in “distance” to the variable of corruption behavior. Counterfeit self, implicit self-theory, ethical mindset and moral emotion are taken into account as the pivotal factors of the corruption behavior and its mechanism of moral disengagement. Counterfeit self along with (...) some moderating variables are regarded to “set” one’s future corrupt behavior based on his/her past/prior ethical or unethical behavior and moral emotions. This review discovered a conjectural-theoretical model of the corruption psychology. It can be used to design a social intervention and training for individuals to manage the mindset and emotion that can buffer counterfeit self effect. In addition, the users of these research findings are recommended to be aware of the surroundings that consist of groups of people with particular ethical mindset, moral emotion proneness and self-theory. (shrink)

Nietzsche talks about trust [vertraue*] and mistrust [misstrau*] in all of his published and authorized works, from The Birth of Tragedy to Ecce Homo. He refers to trust in 90 passages and mistrust in 101 – approximately ten times as often as he refers to resentment/ressentiment. Yet the scholarly literature on Nietzsche and trust includes just a handful of publications. Worse still, I have been unable to find a single publication devoted to Nietzsche and mistrust. This chapter aims to fill (...) the gap in the secondary literature by using digital humanities methods to systematically investigate the functions of trust and mistrust in Nietzsche’s writings. I argue that Nietzsche offers three main insights into trust and an additional two into mistrust. When it comes to trust, in his free spirit works, he reflects on the development of interpersonal trust, with an eye to situations in which trust is or is not reciprocated. He also criticizes some of the heuristics people use to identify trustworthy partners, especially the notion that all and only people with stable character are trustworthy. And perhaps Nietzsche’s most interesting thoughts about trust relate to self-trust, which he thinks is often unjustifiably undermined. When it comes to mistrust, although he regards generalized mistrust as a sign of bad character, he also thinks that harnessing mistrust can be valuable in at least two domains. One is morality, where we are disposed to accept traditional pieties and would benefit from turning a suspicious eye towards these pieties. The other is science, which systematizes both trust and mistrust in pursuit of the truth. (shrink)

Few recent developments in information technology have been as hyped as blockchain, the first implementation of which was the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. Such hype furnishes ample reason to be skeptical about the promise of blockchain implementations, but I contend that there’s something to the hype. In particular, I think that certain blockchain implementations, in the right material, social, and political conditions, constitute excellent bases for common knowledge. As a case study, I focus on trust in election outcomes, where the ledger records (...) not financial transactions but vote tallies. I argue that blockchain implementations could foster warranted trust in vote tallies and thereby trust in the democratic process. Finally, I argue that if the promise of blockchain implementations as democratic infrastructure is to be realized, then democracies first need to ensure that these material, social, and political conditions obtain. (shrink)

First, we explain the conception of trustworthiness that we employ. We model trustworthiness as a relation among a trustor, a trustee, and a field of trust defined and delimited by its scope. In addition, both potential trustors and potential trustees are modeled as being more or less reliable in signaling either their willingness to trust or their willingness to prove trustworthy in various fields in relation to various other agents. Second, following Alfano (forthcoming) we argue that the social scale of (...) a potential trust relationship partly determines both explanatory and normative aspects of the relation. Most of the philosophical literature focuses on dyadic trust between a pair of agents (Baier 1986, Jones 1996, Jones 2012, McGeer 2008, Pettit 1995), but there are also small communities of trust (Alfano forthcoming) and trust in large institutions (Potter 2002, Govier 1997, Townley & Garfield 2013, Hardin 2002). The mechanisms that induce people to extend their trust vary depending on the size of the community in question, and the ways in which trustworthiness can be established and trusting warranted vary with these mechanisms. Mechanisms that work in dyads and small communities are often unavailable in the context of trusting an institution or branch of government. Establishing trust on this larger social scale therefore requires new or modified mechanisms. In the third section of the paper, we recommend three policies that – we argue – tend to make institutions more trustworthy and to reliably signal that trustworthiness to the public. First, they should ensure that their decision-making processes are as open and transparent as possible. Second, they should make efforts to engage stakeholders in dialogue with decision-makers such as managers, members of the C-Suite, and highly-placed policy-makers. Third, they should foster diversity – gender, ethnicity, age, socioeconomic background, disability, etc. – in their workforce at all levels, but especially in management and positions of power. We conclude by discussing the warrant for distrust in institutions that do not adopt these policies, which we contend is especially pertinent for people who belong to groups that have historically faced (and in many cases still do face) oppression. (shrink)

What do humility, intellectual humility, and open-mindedness mean in the context of inter-group conflict? We spend most of our time with ingroup members, such as family, friends, and colleagues. Yet our biggest disagreements —— about practical, moral, and epistemic matters —— are likely to be with those who do not belong to our ingroup. An attitude of humility towards the former might be difficult to integrate with a corresponding attitude of humility towards the latter, leading to smug tribalism that masquerades (...) as genuine virtue. These potentially conflicting priorities have recently come to the fore because “tribal epistemology” has so thoroughly infected political and social discourse. Most research on these dispositions focuses on individual traits and dyadic peer-disagreement, with little attention to group membership or inter-group conflict. In this chapter, we dilate the social scale to address this pressing philosophical and social problem. (shrink)

The testimonies of celebrities affect the lives of their many followers who pay attention to what they say. This gives celebrities a high degree of epistemic power, which has come under close scrutiny during the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper investigates the duties that arise from this power. We argue that celebrities have a negative duty of testimonial justice not to undermine trust in authoritative sources by spreading misinformation or directing attention to untrustworthy sources. Moreover, celebrities have a general imperfect duty (...) to try to correct for an unjust distribution of attention by redirecting it to those who deserve it. During a pandemic this may become a perfect one, due to the harm that could be prevented if people follow the advice of experts. Relatedly, we argue that celebrities have an imperfect duty to promote behavior that will reduce the spread of a pandemic. We outline three ways they might do so: they might take on the position of a role model, they may act as a salience magnet or they can direct people’s attention towards others who have taken on these roles. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the topics of trust and expertise from the perspective of political epistemology. In particular, it addresses four main questions: (§1) How should we characterise experts and their expertise? (§2) How can non-experts recognize a reliable expert? (§3) What does it take for non-experts to trust experts? (§4) What problems impede trust in experts?

Faced with current urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex and problematic nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic (...) trust. In this paper, we investigate the tension between the value of mitigated scepticism – understood as the exercise of reason-based doubt in a particular domain – and the need for trust in experts. We offer four arguments in favour of mitigated scepticism: the argument from loss of intellectual autonomy; the argument from democratic deficit; the argument from the normative failures of science; and the argument from past and current injustices. These arguments highlight the tension between the requirements for trust and justified scepticism about the role of experts. One solution, which we reject, is the idea that reliance, rather than trust, is sufficient for the purposes of accommodating experts in policy matters. The solution we endorse is to create a ‘climate of trust’, where questioning experts and expertise is welcomed, but the epistemic trust necessary for action upon information which the public cannot obtain first-hand is enabled and encouraged through structural, institutional, and justice-based measures. (shrink)

Computer simulations are nowadays often directly involved in the generation of experimental results. Given this dependency of experiments on computer simulations, that of simulations on models, and that of the models on free parameters, how do researchers establish trust in their experimental results? Using high-energy physics (HEP) as a case study, I will identify three different types of robustness that I call conceptual, methodological, and parametric robustness, and show how they can sanction this trust. However, as I will also show, (...) simulation models in HEP themselves fail to exhibit a type of robustness I call inverse parametric robustness. This combination of robustness and failures thereof is best understood by distinguishing different epistemic capacities of simulations and different senses of trust: Trusting simulations in their capacity to facilitate credible experimental results can mean accepting them as means for generating belief in these results, while this need not imply believing the models themselves in their capacity to represent an underlying reality. (shrink)

One challenge in developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame is to explain what differentiates epistemic blame from mere negative epistemic evaluation. The challenge is to explain the difference, without invoking practices or behaviors that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. In this paper, I examine whether the most sophisticated recent account of the nature of epistemic blame—due to Jessica Brown—is up for the challenge. I argue that the account ultimately falls short, but does so in (...) an instructive way. Drawing on the lessons learned, I put forward an alternative approach to the nature of epistemic blame. My account understands epistemic blame in terms of modifications to the intentions and expectations that comprise our “epistemic relationships” with one another. This approach has a number of attractions shared by Brown’s account, but it can also explain the significance of epistemic blame. (shrink)

This paper seeks to reconceptualise the basis for trusting teachers in current educational discourses. It proposes moving away from trust based on ‘absolute accuracy’ to trust as encapsulated in the practice of parrhesia. On the surface, parrhesia appears to be the opposite of Sartre’s concept of ‘bad faith’. Paradoxically, however, our attempts to be sincere in our accounts are inevitably tainted by this. This paradox is especially evident in autobiographical writing, an activity that is both parrhesiastic in nature and susceptible (...) to bad faith. This does not mean that we should abandon trust in these ways of accounting for oneself, however. Rather, parrhesiastic practices in autobiographical writing can offer a different understanding of how we account for ourselves and our practices, one that does not pertain to a narrow definition of truth as accuracy, but instead leads to a form of self-criticism where one situates oneself in relation to the ‘truth’ of their accounts in new ways. Towards the end of the paper, I explore three ‘parrhesiastic techniques’ and their relationship to accounting for oneself as a teacher, to reimagine these techniques from technicist to existential ways of relating to our practices. (shrink)

Trust is essential for our democracy. We trust our political leaders and institutions to put the public interest before their personal or partisan advantage. We trust each other to work and live together. No system is perfect and there is rarely one right answer to the big challenges faced, but we expect leaders to be honest, competent and compassionate – and punish any breaches harshly in the polls or the ballot box. But not any longer. Now is a time of (...) political crisis that’s fuelled by a lack of trust in government and the mainstream. This carries significant and damaging consequences for the future of our democracy fragmenting and polarising our communities. While election results from Brexit to Trump shocked political pundits on both sides of the Atlantic, the roots of an alienated and divided public who increasingly do not trust public figures to put the public interest first have root causes that run deep. The absence of trust creates a political shift akin to a new kind of revolution putting at risk our democracy’s future health. Awareness and action have never been needed more urgently. For over two decades, Thom Brooks has been a leading voice in exposing this crisis in trust and challenging its foundations. This provocative collection of new and recent reflections brings together his work as a freelance columnist and essayist covering Brexit, British values, citizenship and immigration, Scotland’s independence referendum, tackling the Covid-19 pandemic, education policy and legal reform. These essays highlight his substantial contributions to some of the leading political issues of our day. How deep is our current crisis – and what can we do about it to rebuild trust in our politicians, public institutions and each other? Brooks provides clear insights into these issues and more with his ‘realistic optimism’ for the future and why we can be the solution to our political crisis. (shrink)

Western European liberal democracies have recently enacted laws that prohibit the diffusion of fake news on social media. Yet, many consider that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression. In this paper, I argue that democratic governments have strong pro tanto reasons to prohibit fake news, and that doing so is compatible with free speech. First, I show that fake news disrupts a mutually beneficial form of epistemic dependence in which members of the public are engaged with journalists. Second, (...) I contend that laws against fake news enhance rather than thwart personal autonomy. If these suggestions are plausible, then the same considerations about truth and autonomy that underpin the value of free speech give us reasons to prohibit fake news. (shrink)

Throughout the era of socialist Yugoslavia, the Institute of Virology, Vaccines and Sera ‘Torlak’ in Belgrade was a well known producer and exporter of vaccines. After the dissolution of the country, it gradually lost its significance in both global and domestic vaccine markets. However, in Serbian public discourse, Torlak’s vaccines are still remembered as of the highest quality. Many people would willingly vaccinate themselves or their children with Torlak’s vaccines. But how do overly positive Yugoslav vaccination experiences influence vaccination narratives (...) in contemporary postsocialist Serbia? To answer this question, I analysed electronic word of mouth from 2005 until 2020 from Serbia’s main daily news sources. Public narratives on Torlak’s vaccine production seem to be a local response and a consequence of global changes in the international vaccine market. Furthermore, this study shows that public calls for the revival of Torlak’s vaccine production are part of wider public yearning for ‘normal life’ in postsocialist Serbia. In this respect, positive memories of Torlak vaccines do not serve as a strategy for dealing with the past. As a special form of Yugo-nostalgia and as a ‘material embodiment’ of normal life under socialism, narratives represent a strategy for dealing with the present: a therapy for dealing with the ‘abnormality’ of life in today’s Serbia. Contemporary public vaccination attitudes are shaped both by collective memory of the production and administration of Torlak’s vaccines in socialist Yugoslavia, and by narratives on Torlak’s unfavourable current position. They also reflect wider opinions, hopes and yearning for the restoration of the country’s political, health and economic institutions. (shrink)

In this paper, I distinguish three general approaches to public trust in science, which I call the individual approach, the semi-social approach, and the social approach, and critically examine their proposed solutions to what I call the problem of harmful distrust. I argue that, despite their differences, the individual and the semi-social approaches see the solution to the problem of harmful distrust as consisting primarily in trying to persuade individual citizens to trust science and that both approaches face two general (...) problems, which I call the problem of overidealizing science and the problem of overburdening citizens. I then argue that in order to avoid these problems we need to embrace a (thoroughly) social approach to public trust in science, which emphasizes the social dimensions of the reception, transmission, and uptake of scientific knowledge in society and the ways in which social forces influence both positively and negatively the trustworthiness of science. (shrink)

For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect, what difference should your awareness of others’ disagreement make to your conviction that you, and not those who think otherwise, have the correct belief? Are there circumstances in which an awareness of others’ disagreement should lead you to suspend a moral belief? If so, what are they, and why? This paper (...) argues that three principles, taken together, give us a good answer to these questions; that they license a form of provisional moral self-trust; and that they reveal an interestingly distinctive form of pragmatic encroachment in relation to the epistemic standards governing moral belief. (shrink)

Leaders, particularly new leaders, seek to establish high levels of trust, as it has been associated with higher levels of effectiveness and group outcomes. This study is designed to understand how trust changes and develops for leaders in a new role and the implications of that change. Although calls for research on trust over time have been made for the past 2 decades, our knowledge of this phenomenon is still quite limited. The findings indicate that leader and unit performance is (...) a function not only of absolute trust level, but is also affected by the direction and magnitude of change in trust across time periods, with the highest levels of effectiveness being associated with leaders who exhibited an increase in trust from the group over time. The data also suggest that the direction and rate at which trust grew was determined by initial expectations and transformational leadership behaviors. (shrink)

Background: Providing care for a home-dwelling person with dementia who resists care is an ethical and practical complex and challenging task. Faced with a growing number of persons with dementia, the healthcare professional’s understanding of how to best care for and prevent unnecessary use of coercion with persons with dementia is of key importance. Research aim: The aim of this study was to explore the use of trust-building interventions in home-dwelling persons with dementia resisting care, as described by health professionals (...) in documents of decisions of forced treatment and care. Research design: A qualitative thematic document analysis inspired by critical realism was conducted. Participants and research context: Descriptions of trust-building interventions were extracted from 88 documents of forced treatment and care for home-dwelling persons with dementia, receiving home healthcare, in 2015 and 2016. Ethical considerations: Approved by the Regional Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics, reference number 2017/788, and controlled by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data, reference number 54897. The study adhered to the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki. Findings: We found that “balancing safe care with the person’s integrity” was an overarching theme that permeated the descriptions of trust-building interventions in the study. Three main themes were identified when the data were analyzed: safeguarding care, protecting integrity, and optimizing the environment. Discussion and conclusion: Health professionals balanced on a thin line between care and integrity when met with resistance from person with dementia. However, the trust-building interventions used in the most challenging situations did not differ from the interventions used in general in dementia care. Two knowledge gaps were identified: how to perform appropriate assessments of situations of home-dwelling persons with dementia when met with resistance to care, and whether environmental initiatives may also benefit home-dwelling persons with dementia who are not easily cared for. (shrink)

It is often taken for granted that monitoring stands in some kind of tension with trusting — especially three-place trust, but sometimes also two-place trust. Using a case study involving relationship breakdown, repair, and formation, I will argue there are some ways in which monitoring can be conducive to two-place trust, and to instances of three-place trust that are likely to be repeated over time—especially when previously established two-place trust has broken down. The result, I hope, is not any kind (...) of abandoning of the important idea that monitoring can undermine trust, but an appreciation of where the conflict between monitoring and trust doesn’t lie – one from which future work will hopefully be better positioned to illuminate where exactly the conflict is. (shrink)

It is often taken for granted that monitoring stands in some kind of tension with trusting — especially three-place trust, but sometimes also two-place trust. Using a case study involving relationship breakdown, repair, and formation, I will argue there are some ways in which monitoring can be conducive to two-place trust, and to instances of three-place trust that are likely to be repeated over time—especially when previously established two-place trust has broken down. The result, I hope, is not any kind (...) of abandoning of the important idea that monitoring can undermine trust, but an appreciation of where the conflict between monitoring and trust doesn’t lie – one from which future work will hopefully be better positioned to illuminate where exactly the conflict is. (shrink)

In this chapter, I survey and assess various answers to two basic questions concerning experts: (1) What is an expert?; (2) How can laypeople identify the relevant experts? These questions are not mutually independent, since the epistemology and the metaphysics of experts should go hand in hand. On the basis of our platitudes about experts, I will argue that the prevailing accounts of experts such as truth-linked, knowledge-linked, understanding-linked or service-oriented accounts are inadequate. In contrast, I will defend an evidence-linked (...) account of expertise. In the second part of the chapter, I address the question of how laypeople can identify experts in this sense. Here, I will argue that agreement among experts plays a major role. I will outline how laypeople can follow this criterion without running into circularity. (shrink)

Accountability is present in many types of social relations; for example, the accountability of elected representatives to voters is the key characteristic of representative democracy. We distinguish between two institutional mechanisms of accountability, i.e., opportunity to punish and requirement of a justification, and examine the separate and combined effects of these mechanisms on individual behavior. For this purpose, we designed a decision-making experiment where subjects engage in a three-player trust game with two senders and one responder. We ask whether holding (...) the responder accountable increases senders’ and responders’ contributions in a trust game. When restricting the analysis to the first round, the requirement of justification seems to have a positive impact on senders’ contributions. When the game is played repeatedly, the experience of previous rounds dominates the results and significant treatment effects are no longer seen. We also find that responders tend to justify their choices in terms of reciprocity, which is in line with observed behavior. Moreover, the treatment combining punishment and justification hinders justifications that appeal to pure self-interest. (shrink)

Firms located in communities in which people are, on average, more trusting enjoy some benefits in terms of the power of CEO contracts. We present two pieces of empirical evidence to support this claim: higher average trust in a county is associated with “flatter” executive contracts and when an exogenous shock occurs, both trust and contracting move in similar directions. We obtain the first result in a panel specification and the second in a “difference-in-difference” specification that uses the revelation of (...) sex scandals involving the Catholic Church across different U.S. localities. (shrink)

Several science studies scholars report instances of scientific “hype,” or sensationalized exaggeration, in journal articles, institutional press releases, and science journalism in a variety of fields. Yet, how “hype” is being conceived varies. I will argue that hype is best understood as a particular kind of exaggeration, one that explicitly or implicitly exaggerates various positive aspects of science in ways that undermine the goals of science communication in a particular context. This account also makes clear the ways that value judgments (...) play a role in judgments of “hype,” which has implications for detecting and addressing this problem. (shrink)

Faith is a trusting commitment to someone or something. Faith helps us meet our goals, keeps our relationships secure, and enables us to retain our commitments over time. Faith is thus a central part of a flourishing life. -/- This article is about the philosophy of faith. There are many philosophical questions about faith, such as: What is faith, and what are its main components or features? What are the different kinds of faith? What’s the relationship between faith and other (...) similar states, like belief, trust, knowledge, desire, doubt, and hope? Can faith be epistemically rationally? Practically rational? Morally permissible? -/- This article addresses these questions. It is divided into three main parts. The first is about the nature of faith. This includes different kinds of faith and various features of faith. The second discusses the way that faith relates to other states. For example, what’s the difference between faith and hope? Can someone have faith that something is true even if they don’t believe it is true? The third discusses three ways we might evaluate faith: epistemically, practically, and morally. While faith is, of course, not always rational or permissible, this section will cover when and how it can be. The idea of faith as a virtue is also discussed. (shrink)

We advance an argument that the virtue of hope holds pride of place in development of psychological traits that promote one’s flourishing. We define hope, the virtue, as the disposition to envision future good possibilities for oneself and one’s community and to move towards those possibilities. Our argument is partly theoretical and partly empirical. On the theoretical side, we show that hope is not simply one virtue among many, but rather, hope is a necessary condition for the development of other (...) virtues, and so for flourishing. We then draw on empirical data from psychology to argue that early in development, we need relationships of trust with caregivers to develop the future orientation and features of agency constitutive of hope, the virtue. It follows that hope and its components need to be fostered partly through trusting relationships early on for a person to flourish. (shrink)

One fundamental divide among philosophers studying the nature of trust concerns the relation between trust and belief. According to doxastic accounts of trust, trust entails a belief about the trustee: either the belief that she is trustworthy with respect to what she is trusted to do, or that she will do what she is trusted to do. Non-doxastic accounts deny that trusting entails holding such a belief. The chapter describes and evaluates the main considerations which have been cited for and (...) against doxastic accounts of trust. It argues that a preemptive reasons account of trust neutralizes some of the key objections to doxastic accounts, and that considerations favoring a doxastic account appear to be stronger than those favoring non-doxastic accounts. The chapter also suggests that the debate about the nature of trust, and the mental state required for trusting can benefit from linking it with the debate about the value of trust. (shrink)

This commentary draws critical attention to the ongoing commodification of trust in policy and scholarly discourses of artificial intelligence and society. Based on an assessment of publications discussing the implementation of AI in governmental and private services, our findings indicate that this discursive trend towards commodification is driven by the need for a trusting population of service users to harvest data at scale and leads to the discursive construction of trust as an essential good on a par with data as (...) raw material. This discursive commodification is marked by a decreasing emphasis on trust understood as the expected reliability of a trusted agent, and increased emphasis on instrumental and extractive framings of trust as a resource. This tendency, we argue, does an ultimate disservice to developers, users, and systems alike, insofar as it obscures the subtle mechanisms through which trust in AI systems might be built, making it less likely that it will be. (shrink)

In combating the ongoing global health threat of the COVID-19 pandemic, decision-makers have to take actions based on a multitude of relevant health data with severe potential consequences for the affected patients. Because of their presumed advantages in handling and analyzing vast amounts of data, computer systems of algorithmic decision-making are implemented and substitute humans in decision-making processes. In this study, we focus on a specific application of ADM in contrast to human decision-making, namely the allocation of COVID-19 vaccines to (...) the public. In particular, we elaborate on the role of trust and social group preference on the legitimacy of vaccine allocation. We conducted a survey with a 2 × 2 randomized factorial design among n = 1602 German respondents, in which we utilized distinct decision-making agents and prioritization of a specific social group as design factors. Our findings show that general trust in ADM systems and preference for vaccination of a specific social group influence the legitimacy of vaccine allocation. However, contrary to our expectations, trust in the agent making the decision did not moderate the link between social group preference and legitimacy. Moreover, the effect was also not moderated by the type of decision-maker. We conclude that trustworthy ADM systems must not necessarily lead to the legitimacy of ADM systems. (shrink)

Life is a group project. It takes a village. The same is true of our intellectual lives. Since we are finite cognitive creatures with limited time and resources, any healthy intellectual life requires that we rely quite heavily on others. For nearly any question you want to investigate, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer. For most people, their expertise does not extend far beyond their own personal lives, and even (...) here we can sometimes find others who are more reliable. Without relying on them we would know very little about the world. Since others are typically better positioned to determine the answers to the questions we have, it should make us wonder why we should bother to try and figure out much of anything at all for ourselves. After all, when trying to find an answer to a question, we should take the best route to the answer, and the most reliable route to the answer to most questions is to rely on the minds of others. At the same time, there is something defective about an intellectual life that outsources nearly all of its intellectual projects. That is, it seems that individuals ought to think for themselves, at least about some issues and at least some of the time. The puzzle is in determining why it is epistemically valuable to think for yourself, since doing so will almost always not be the best available route to the answer of your question. In this paper, I will first clarify our central question and sharpen this puzzle regarding epistemic autonomy. Having done so, I will argue that autonomous deliberation can be epistemically valuable to inquirers both when it is successful, as well as when it is unsuccessful. I conclude by gesturing at how these considerations point us toward an account of epistemic autonomy as an intellectual virtue. (shrink)

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types (...) of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation. (shrink)

Untersucht wird die These, dass die zunehmende Digitalisierung wissenschaftlicher Arbeitsprozesse einen nicht zu vernachlässigenden Einfluss auf das Problem des Vertrauensverlustes in wissenschaftliche Expertise ausüben kann. Zwar bieten die digitalen Medien einerseits die Möglichkeit, transparent über wissenschaftliche Ergebnisse zu berichten und dabei auch vielfältige Positionen zu beleuchten. Andererseits zeigt sich, dass die gegenwärtigen Instrumente der Wissenschaftskommunikation gerade diese Erwartungen nicht erfüllen. Letzteres wird mittels eines Fallbeispiels der Umgestaltung wissenschaftlicher Publikationsprozesse durch Datenbanken wie z.B. Scopus detailliert analysiert.

Datafizierung, Publizierung, Metrisierung – unter diesen Stichpunkten untersuchen die AutorInnen des vorliegenden Bandes die Auswirkungen der zunehmenden Digitalisierung auf die Erzeugung, Auswahl, Bereitstellung und Bewertung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis. Wie wird Wissen aus den Weiten des digitalen Raums herausgefiltert? Wie wird es generiert? Was wird als Wissen verfügbar gemacht – und was nicht? Wie und von wem wird das digital erfasste Wissen evaluiert? Diese den Wissenschaftsbetrieb herausfordernden Fragen diskutieren ExpertInnen aus Philosophie, Informations- und Bibliothekswissenschaft sowie Informatik. Ihre Beiträge reflektieren in kritischer und (...) konstruktiver Weise die Gestaltung und Folgen der digitalisierten Wissenschaftspraxis. (shrink)