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  1. Quasi-Truth, Paraconsistency, and the Foundations of Science.Otávio Bueno & Newton C. A. da Costa - 2007 - Synthese 154 (3):383-399.
    In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, (...)
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  2. Belief Merging with the Aim of Truthlikeness.Simon D'Alfonso - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7).
    The merging/fusion of belief/data collections in propositional logic form is a topic that has received due attention within the domains of database and AI research. A distinction can be made between two types of scenarios to which the process of merging can be applied. In the first type, the collections represent preferences, such as the voting choices of a group of people, that need to be aggregated so as to give a consistent result that in some way best represents the (...)
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  3. Scientific Progress: Four Accounts.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
    Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories ‘get closer to the truth’, i.e. increase their degree of truthlikeness. A second answer is that progress consists in increasing theories’ effectiveness for solving scientific problems. A (...)
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  4. Ein Erkenntnismodell Des Nikolaus Von Kues Und der Grad der Bewährung Einer Wissenschaftlichen Hypothese.Otto-Joachim Grüsser - 1988 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (2):232-238.
    The degree of corroboration of a scientific hypothesis is an issue that has been repeatedly discussed in modern theory of sciences . In a preceding paper it was shown that the formulae advanced by Popper to calculate the degree of corroboration C are not very satisfactory because the probability values required in the computation of C are not available as a rule. Another equation to measure the degree of corroboration B was proposed ), whereby only the number n of unsuccessful (...)
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  5. Theory Status, Inductive Realism, and Approximate Truth: No Miracles, No Charades.Shelby D. Hunt - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):159 - 178.
    The concept of approximate truth plays a prominent role in most versions of scientific realism. However, adequately conceptualizing ?approximate truth? has proved challenging. This article argues that the goal of articulating the concept of approximate truth can be advanced by first investigating the processes by which science accords theories the status of accepted or rejected. Accordingly, this article uses a path diagram model as a visual heuristic for the purpose of showing the processes in science that are involved in determining (...)
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  6. Aim-Oriented Empiricism Since 1984.Nicholas Maxwell - 2007 - In From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities. Pentire Press.
    This chapter outlines improvements and developments made to aim-oriented empiricism since "From Knowledge to Wisdom" was first published in 1984. It argues that aim-oriented empiricism enables us to solve three fundamental problems in the philosophy of science: the problems of induction and verisimilitude, and the problem of what it means to say of a physical theory that it is unified.
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  7. The Argument From Underconsideration and Relative Realism.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407.
    In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories (...)
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  8. Value, Reality, and Desire – by Graham Oddie.Debbie Roberts - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):118-122.
  9. Realism, Method and Truth.Howard Sankey - 2002 - In Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism. Ashgate. pp. 64.
    But while it is evident that there is a close relation between method and rational justification, substantive questions remain about the relation between method and truth. For example, are scientists whom method licenses in accepting a theory or experimental result thereby licensed in accepting the theory or result as true? Does use of scientific method lead scientists to discover the truth about the world? Questions such as these are questions about the truth-conduciveness of method. While they relate directly to the (...)
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  10. Value, Reality, and Desire - by Graham Oddie.Patricia A. Sayre - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (2):189-190.
  11. Reason, Social Practice, and Scientific Realism.Frederick L. Will - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):1-18.
    Accompanying the decline of empiricism in the theory of knowledge has been an increased interest in the social determinants of knowledge and an increased recognition of the fundamental place in the constitution of knowledge occupied by accepted cognitive practices. The principal aim of this paper is to show how a view of knowledge that fully recognizes the role of these practices can adequately treat a topic that is widely considered to be an insuperable obstacle to such a view. The topic (...)
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  12. Review of Elijah Millgram's Hard Truths. [REVIEW]Cory Wright - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1218-1221.