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  1. Barbara Abbott, Some Remarks on Indicative Conditionals.
    We will look at several theories of indicative conditionals grouped into three categories: those that base its semantics on its logical counterpart (the material conditional); intensional analyses, which bring in alternative possible worlds; and a third subgroup which denies that indicative conditionals express propositions at all. We will also look at some problems for each kind of approach.
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  2. Barbara Abbott (2009). Part V. Back to Grice: Conditionals in English and Fopl. In Dingfang Shu & Ken Turner (eds.), Contrasting Meanings in Languages of the East and West. Peter Lang
    In the 1960’s, both Montague (e.g. 1970, 222) and Grice (1975, 24) famously declared that natural languages were not so different from the formal languages of logic as people had thought. Montague sought to comprehend the grammars of both within a single theory, and Grice sought to explain away apparent divergences as due to the fact that the former, but not the latter, were used for conversation. But, if we confine our concept of logic to first order predicate logic (or (...)
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  3. E. Adams (1992). Grice on Indicative Conditionals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:83-102.
    Grice's arguments that ordinary language indicative conditionals are logically equivalent to material conditionals are criticized. It is agreed that 'indirectness conditions' going beyond the material conditional can "sometimes" be detached' from ordinary language conditionals, but it is argued that this is not always possible. An example in which a speaker who knows that some mushrooms are non-poisonous tells a hearer "if you eat those mushrooms you will be poisoned", causing the hearer not to eat the mushrooms, is discussed, and it (...)
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  4. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1956). Conditional Sentence and Material Implication. Studia Logica 4 (1):135-153.
  5. R. B. Angell (1986). Truth-Functional Conditionals and Modern Vs. Traditional Syllogistic. Mind 95 (378):210-223.
  6. Rani Lill Anjum, Conditionals and Truth Functionality.
    The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘if p then q’. This inadequacy also affects the ability of the overall formal system to establish whether or not (...)
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  7. Rani Lill Anjum, Paul Grice on Indicative Conditionals.
    Grice argues that indicative conditionals ‘if p then q’ have conventional, truth conditional meaning according to the material conditional ‘p  q’. In order to explain away the known paradoxes with this interpretation, he distinguishes between truth conditions and assertion conditions, attempting to demonstrate that the assumed connection between ‘p’ and ‘q’ (the Indirectness Condition) is a conversational implicature; hence a matter only relevant for the assertion conditions of a conditional. This paper argues that Grice fails to demonstrate i) that (...)
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  8. Rani Lill Anjum (2012). What's Wrong with Logic? Argumentos 4 (8).
    The truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ is not only inadequate; it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. All approaches that treat conditionals as functions of their antecedents and consequents will end up in some sort of logical atomism where causal matters simply are reduced to the (...)
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  9. Anthony Appiah (1984). Jackson on the Material Conditional. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):77 – 81.
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  10. Anthony Appiah (1982). Conversation and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (129):327-338.
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  11. Lee C. Archie (1979). A Simple Defense of Material Implication. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (2):412-414.
  12. Stephen Barker (1997). Material Implication and General Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):195-211.
    This paper falls into two parts. In the first part, I argue that consideration of general indicative conditionals, e.g., sentences like If a donkey brays it is beaten, provides a powerful argument that a pure material implication analysis of indicative if p, q is correct. In the second part I argue, opposing writers like Jackson, that a Gricean style theory of pragmatics can explain the manifest assertability conditions of if p, q in terms of its conventional content – assumed to (...)
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  13. Stephen J. Barker (1993). Conditional Excluded Middle, Conditional Assertion, and 'Only If'. Analysis 53 (4):254 - 261.
  14. Gunnar Björnsson (2008). Strawson on 'If' and ⊃. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):24-35.
    This paper is concerned with Sir Peter Strawson’s critical discussion of Paul Grice’s defence of the material implication analysis of conditionals. It argues that although Strawson’s own ‘consequentialist’ suggestion concerning the meaning of conditionals cannot be correct, a related and radically contextualist account is able to both account for the phenomena that motivated Strawson’s consequentialism, and to undermine the material implication analysis by providing a simpler account of the processes that we go through when interpreting conditionals.
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  15. Eliza Block (2008). Indicative Conditionals in Context. Mind 117 (468):783-794.
    I discuss an argument given by Dorothy Edgington for the conclusion that indicative conditionals cannot express propositions. The argument is not effective against Robert Stalnaker's context-dependent propositional theory. I isolate and defend the feature of Stalnaker's theory that allows it to evade the argument.
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  16. Jean-François Bonnefon & Guy Politzer (2011). Pragmatics, Mental Models and One Paradox of the Material Conditional. Mind and Language 26 (2):141-155.
    Most instantiations of the inference ‘y; so if x, y’ seem intuitively odd, a phenomenon known as one of the paradoxes of the material conditional. A common explanation of the oddity, endorsed by Mental Model theory, is based on the intuition that the conclusion of the inference throws away semantic information. We build on this explanation to identify two joint conditions under which the inference becomes acceptable: (a) the truth of x has bearings on the relevance of asserting y; and (...)
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  17. Richard Bradley (2002). Indicative Conditionals. Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
    Adams Thesis has much evidence in its favour, but David Lewis famously showed that it cannot be true, in all but the most trivial of cases, if conditionals are proprositions and their probabilities are classical probabilities of truth. In this paper I show thatsimilar results can be constructed for a much wider class of conditionals. The fact that these results presuppose that the logic of conditionals is Boolean motivates a search for a non-Boolean alternative. It is argued that the exact (...)
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  18. Aaron Bronfman & Janice Dowell, J. L., Contextualism About Deontic Conditionals.
  19. James Cain (1999). Teaching Truth-Functional Conditionals. APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 98 (2):160-162.
  20. Chhanda Chakraborti (1995). The Logic of Indicative Conditionals. Dissertation, The University of Utah
    Reasoning with indicative conditionals, i.e., with statements such as 'If the weather is bad, then the plane will be late', constitutes a significant part of ordinary reasoning. How are we to proceed in the logical treatment of ordinary language arguments involving indicative conditionals? In particular, is standard formal truth-functional sentential logic applicable to these conditionals, and if so, under what circumstances? This dissertation first examines two sharply contrasting theories proposed in response to these questions. One of them is the dominant (...)
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  21. Nate Charlow (2016). Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals. Noûs 50 (3):533-564.
    I present two Triviality results for Kratzer's standard “restrictor” analysis of indicative conditionals. I both refine and undermine the common claim that problems of Triviality do not arise for Kratzer conditionals since they are not strictly conditionals at all.
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  22. Nate Charlow (2013). Conditional Preferences and Practical Conditionals. Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):463-511.
    I argue that taking the Practical Conditionals Thesis seriously demands a new understanding of the semantics of such conditionals. Practical Conditionals Thesis: A practical conditional [if A][ought] expresses B’s conditional preferability given A Paul Weirich has argued that the conditional utility of a state of affairs B on A is to be identified as the degree to which it is desired under indicative supposition that A. Similarly, exploiting the PCT, I will argue that the proper analysis of indicative practical conditionals (...)
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  23. Lauchlan Chipman (1971). Material and Illative Implication. Mind 80 (318):179-193.
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  24. Joseph T. Clark (1952). Truth-Functional Conditionals. Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 3:27-28.
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  25. Michael Clark (1974). Ifs and Hooks: A Rejoinder. Analysis 34 (January):77-83.
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  26. Michael Clark (1971). Ifs and Hooks. Analysis 32 (2):33 - 39.
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  27. Daniel Dohrn, What Zif.
    In a series of articles, David Barnett (2006, 2009, 2010) has developed a general theory of conditionals. The grand aim is to reconcile the two main rivals: a suppositional and a truth-conditional view (Barnett 2006, 521). While I confine my critical discussion to counterfactuals, I will give some hints how they might spell trouble for his suppositional view in general.
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  28. Frank Döring (1997). The Ramsey Test and Conditional Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):359-376.
    Proponents of the projection strategy take an epistemic rule for the evaluation of English conditionals, the Ramsey test, as clue to the truth-conditional semantics of conditionals. They also construe English conditionals as stronger than the material conditional. Given plausible assumptions, however, the Ramsey test induces the semantics of the material conditional. The alleged link between Ramsey test and truth conditions stronger than those of the material conditional can be saved by construing conditionals as ternary, rather than binary, propositional functions with (...)
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  29. Igor Douven (2007). On Bradley's Preservation Condition for Conditionals. Erkenntnis 67 (1):111 - 118.
    Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.
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  30. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2012). Contextualist Solutions to Three Puzzles About Practical Conditionals. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 7. Oxford
  31. Dorothy Edgington (2003). What If ? Questions About Conditionals. Mind and Language 18 (4):380–401.
    Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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  32. Dorothy Edgington (1986). Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions. Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.
  33. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2005). The Social and Communicative Function of Conditional Statements. Mind and Society 4 (1):97-113.
    In this paper, I discuss conditionals as illocutionary speech acts whose interpretation depends upon the whole of the social context in which they are uttered and whose purpose is to affect the opinions and actions of others. I argue for a suppositional approach to conditional statements based in what philosophers call the Ramsey test and developing the psychological theory that conditionals elicit a process of hypothetical thinking in their listeners. By reference to the experimental psychological literature on conditionals, I show (...)
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  34. Robert J. Fogelin (1972). Austinian Ifs. Mind 81 (324):578-580.
  35. Hans Freudenthal (1975). Review: Ernest W. Adams, Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (3):466-466.
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  36. Andrew Jb Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, Bastian Mayerhofer & Gernot D. Kleiter (2009). How People Interpret an Uncertain If. In T. Kroupa & J. Vejnarova (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. 80-91.
    Conditionals are central to inference. Before people can draw inferences about a natural language conditional, they must interpret its meaning. We investigated interpretation of uncertain conditionals using a probabilistic truth table task, focussing on (i) conditional event, (ii) material conditional, and (iii) conjunction interpretations. The order of object (shape) and feature (color) in each conditional's antecedent and consequent was varied between participants. The conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and took longer to process than conjunction (mean di (...)
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  37. Joseph Fulda (1999). Broadening and Deepening Yoes: The Theory of Conditional Elements. Sorites 10:15-18.
    We put forth a theory of conditional elements which can be used to dismiss apparent challenges to the truth-functionality of the conditional without apparent circularity. In the process, we refine the ideas of Yoes, published in an earlier paper in this journal, broadening and deepening them.
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  38. Joseph Fulda (1995). Denied Conditionals Are Not Negated Conditionals. Sorites 2:45-45.
    This note addresses the problems that arise from denying conditionals in classical logic and concludes that such problems result from using propositional logic where predicate logic with quantification over cases is indicated.
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  39. Joseph S. Fulda (2012). Austinian Ifs Revisited – And Squared Away with the Equivalence Thesis and the Theory of Conditional Elements. RASK 36:51-71.
    This paper deals with Austinian ifs of every stripe within classical logic. It is argued that they are truth-functional and the theory of conditional elements is used. Ellipsis is key. Corrects an error in Fulda (2010) in translation and therefore scope. -/- The PDF is made available gratis by the Publisher.
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  40. Joseph S. Fulda (2010). The Full Theory of Conditional Elements: Enumerating, Exemplifying, and Evaluating Each of the Eight Conditional Elements. Acta Analytica 25 (4):459-477.
    This paper presents a unified, more-or-less complete, and largely pragmatic theory of indicative conditionals as they occur in natural language, which is entirely truth-functional and does not involve probability. It includes material implication as a special—and the most important—case, but not as the only case. The theory of conditional elements, as we term it, treats if-statements analogously to the more familiar and less controversial other truth-functional compounds, such as conjunction and disjunction.
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  41. Joseph S. Fulda (2010). Vann McGee’s Counterexample to Modus Ponens: An Enthymeme. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):271-273.
    Solves Vann McGee's counterexample to Modus Ponens within classical logic by disclosing the suppressed premises and bringing them /within/ the argument.
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  42. Joseph S. Fulda (2009). Rendering Conditionals in Mathematical Discourse with Conditional Elements. Journal of Pragmatics 41 (7):1435-1439.
    In "Material Implications" (1992), mathematical discourse was said to be different from ordinary discourse, with the discussion centering around conditionals. This paper shows how.
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  43. Joseph S. Fulda (2005). A Pragmatic, Truth-Functional Solution to a Logical Difficulty with Biconditionals Absent in Conditionals. Journal of Pragmatics 37 (9/12):1419-1425/2120.
    Solves what is sometimes, but not always, referred to as the third paradox of material implication. Readers downloading this piece should please also download the corrigendum. Note that "pragmatic" is here used in its original sense of context-sensitive, that is, adjacency. (This comment is made in response to an article in a student journal published in the western U.S. which claimed that I said that because something involves translation it must be pragmatic; that is so, in the original sense; only (...)
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  44. Joseph S. Fulda (1992). Material Implications. American Mathematical Monthly 99 (5):480.
  45. Joseph S. Fulda (1989). Material Implication Revisited. American Mathematical Monthly 96 (3):247-250.
    Demonstrates that the "paradoxes of material implication" are only apparent, sticking entirely within the confines of classical logic.
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  46. Todd M. Furman (2008). Making Sense of the Truth Table for Conditional Statements. Teaching Philosophy 31 (2):179-184.
    This essay provides an intuitive technique that illustrates why a conditional must be true when the antecedent is false and the consequent is either true or false. Other techniques for explaining the conditional’s truth table are unsatisfactory.
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  47. Anthony S. Gillies (2009). On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If ). Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
    What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and (...)
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  48. Gilberto Gomes (2009). Are Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Converse Relations? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):375 – 387.
    Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B . The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in (...)
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  49. Gilberto Gomes (2006). If A, Then B Too, but Only If C: A Reply to Varzi. Analysis 66 (290):157–161.
  50. William H. Hanson (1991). Indicative Conditionals Are Truth-Functional. Mind 100 (1):53-72.
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