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Summary The truth-conditional theory of meaning states that the meaning of a proposition is given by its truth conditions.
Key works Davidson 1984; Lepore & Ludwig 2007 (the latter is an edited collection).  These works presume something between semantic minimalism and the mere fixing of pronominal anaphora and similar phenomena.  A pragmatic, fully contextualist view is to be found in Bezuidenhout 2002.  A full development which challenges the semantics-pragmatics divide can be found in Recanati 2010.
Introductions Because almost all introductions to logic use truth-theoretic semantics, the best introductions to this area are introductory logic textbooks which do so. There are literally hundreds of these; each instructor will have his own favorite.
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204 found
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  1. Models, Truth and Semantics.Barbara Abbott - 1997 - Linguistics and Philosophy 20 (2):117-138.
  2. Focus and Uninformativity in Yucatec Maya Questions.Scott AnderBois - 2012 - Natural Language Semantics 20 (4):349-390.
    Crosslinguistically, questions frequently make crucial use of morphosyntactic elements which also occur outside of questions. Chief among these are focus, disjunctions, and wh-words with indefinite semantics. This paper provides a compositional account of the semantics of wh-, alternative, and polar questions in Yucatec Maya (YM), which are composed primarily of these elements. Key to the account is a theory of disjunctions and indefinites (extending work by others) which recognizes the inherently inquisitive nature of these elements. While disjunctions and indefinites are (...)
  3. Peirce's Truth-Functional Analysis and the Origin of the Truth Table.Irving H. Anellis - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (1):87 - 97.
    We explore the technical details and historical evolution of Charles Peirce's articulation of a truth table in 1893, against the background of his investigation into the truth-functional analysis of propositions involving implication. In 1997, John Shosky discovered, on the verso of a page of the typed transcript of Bertrand Russell's 1912 lecture on ?The Philosophy of Logical Atomism? truth table matrices. The matrix for negation is Russell's, alongside of which is the matrix for material implication in the hand of Ludwig (...)
  4. Truth Conditions: A Causal Theory.Anthony Appiah - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press. pp. 25--45.
  5. Truth Conditional Discourse Semantics for Parentheticals.N. Asher - 2000 - Journal of Semantics 17 (1):31-50.
    It has been often argued that parentheticals, discourse adverbials and certain parts of speech like interjections do not contribute to the truth conditional content of the assertions of which they are part. In this paper I argue that many of these constructions do contribute a truth conditional content, and I propose a semantics for parentheticals and discourse adverbials that treats these constructions similarly to SDRT's treatment of presuppositions. I also point out differences between standard presupposition triggers on the one hand (...)
  6. A Default, Truth Conditional Semantics for the Progressive.Nicholas Asher - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):463 - 508.
  7. What Does '&' Mean?Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:45-50.
    Using conjunction as an example, I show a technical and philosophical problem when trying to conciliate the currently prevailing views on the meaning of logical connectives: the inferientialist (also called 'syntactic') one based on introduction and elimination rules, and the representationalist (also called 'semantic') one given through truth tables. Mostly I show that the widespread strategy of using the truth theoretical definition of logical consequence to collapse both definitions must be rejected by inferentialists. An important consequence of my argument is (...)
  8. 1. Meaning Dualism and its Criticism of Davidsonian Truth-Theories for Natural.Jay David Atlas - 2007 - In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press.
  9. Semantically Cued Contextual Implicatures in Legal Texts.Sol Azuelos-Atias - 2010 - Journal of Pragmatics 42 (3):728-743.
    In this article I discuss one of the linguistic means which enables speakers to represent content in their utterances without expressing it explicitly. I will argue, in line with Wilson and Sperber, that the logical form of the argument encoded by an utterance (however fragmentarily or incompletely) is sufficient as a cue directing the hearers to the implicit content of the speaker's meaning. I will suggest that the logical form of the encoded argument enables the speaker to represent in the (...)
  10. Truth Conditions and Their Recognition.Alex Barber - 2003 - In Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers and defends a particular version of the view that it is the intentions with which it is performed that determine the truth conditions of an utterance. A competing version, implied by Grice's work on meaning, is rejected as inadequate. This latter is incompatible with the phenomenon of anti-lying: performing a true utterance with the intention that one's audience believe it to be false. In place of the quasi-Gricean version, the paper maintains that an utterance is true-iff-p just (...)
  11. Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid.Stephen Barker - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Cambridge University Press.
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
  12. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.Anne Bezuidenhout - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:105-134.
    Introduction The mainstream view in philosophy of language is that sentence meaning determines truth-conditions. A corollary is that the truth or falsity of an utterance depends only on what words mean and how the world is arranged. Although several prominent philosophers (Searle, Travis, Recanati, Moravcsik) have challenged this view, it has proven hard to dislodge. The alternative view holds that meaning underdetermines truth-conditions. What is expressed by the utterance of a sentence in a context goes beyond what is encoded in (...)
  13. A Never-Ending Story.Ben Blumson - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (40):111-120.
    Take a strip of paper with 'once upon a time there'‚ written on one side and 'was a story that began'‚ on the other. Twisting the paper and joining the ends produces John Barth’s story Frame-Tale, which prefixes 'once upon a time there was a story that began'‚ to itself. I argue that the ability to understand this sentence cannot be explained by tacit knowledge of a recursive theory of truth in English.
  14. Maps and Meaning.Ben Blumson - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:123-128.
    It's possible to understand an infinite number of novel maps. I argue that Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi's compositional semantics of maps cannot explain this possibility, because it requires an infinite number of semantic primitives. So the semantics of maps is puzzlingly different from the semantics of language.
  15. A Performadox in Truth-Conditional Semantics.Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan - 1980 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):71 - 100.
    An argument is developed at some length to show that any semantical theory which treats superficially nonperformative sentences as being governed by performative prefaces at some level of underlying structure must either leave those sentences semantically uninterpreted or assign them the wrong truth-conditions. Several possible escapes from this dilemma are examined; it is tentatively concluded that such hypotheses as the Ross-Lakoff-Sadock Performative Analysis should be rejected despite their attractions.
  16. English and Truth Functions.E. J. Borowski - 1976 - Analysis 36 (2):96 - 100.
  17. Davidson’s Account Of Truth And Fictional Meaning.Michael Bourke - 2012 - Praxis 3 (2):1-27.
    Fictional and non-fictional texts rely on the same language to express their meaning; yet many philosophers in the analytic tradition would say, with reason, that fictional texts literally make no truth claims, or more modestly that the rhetorical and literary devices to which fiction and non-fiction writers alike have recourse are unconnected to truth or have no propositional content. These related views are associated with a doctrine in the philosophy of language, most notably advanced by the late Donald Davidson, which (...)
  18. Unsuccessful Semantics.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):175-178.
  19. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics * by Francois Recanati.B. Brogaard - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):846-849.
  20. Counterfactuals and Context.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2008 - Analysis 68 (297):39–46.
    It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals. The following putative counter-examples are frequently cited, respectively.
  21. Meaning Without Analyticity: Essays on Logic, Language and Meaning.H. G. Callaway - 2008 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Meaning without Analyticity draws upon the author’s essays and articles, over a period of 20 years, focused on language, logic and meaning. The book explores the prospect of a non-behavioristic theory of cognitive meaning which rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction, Quinean behaviorism, and the logical and social-intellectual excesses of extreme holism. Cast in clear, perspicuous language and oriented to scientific discussions, this book takes up the challenges of philosophical communication and evaluation implicit in the recent revival of the pragmatist tradition—especially those (...)
  22. Review of Evnine, Donald Davidson. [REVIEW]H. G. Callaway - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (October):555-560.
    Tracing the background of Davidson’s work in the positivists’ philosophical emigration of the 30’s and in Quine, Evnine’s “Introduction” offers a “map of the terrain to be covered” which stresses the “rationalistic” character of Davidson’s views on holism and rationality. Thus, “his main philosophical concerns ... language, the mental and action...are the ingredients of a philosophical anthropology.” In spite of Quinean roots, the view is that “Davidson has now wholly removed himself, philosophically speaking, from the empiricist tradition.” The result: a (...)
  23. Sense, Reference and Purported Reference.H. G. Callaway - 1982 - Logique Et Analyse 25 (March):93-103.
    This paper argues for the importance of the concept of purported reference in understanding linguistic meaning and reference.
  24. Semantic Theory and Language: A Perspective (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning Without Analyticity).H. G. Callaway - 1981 - Proceedings of the Southwestern Philosophical Association; Philosophical Topics 1981 (summer):93-103.
    Chomsky’s conception of semantics must contend with both philosophical skepticism and contrary traditions in linguistics. In “Two Dogmas” Quine argued that “ is non-sense, and the root of much non-sense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement.” If so, it follows that language as the object of semantic investigation cannot be separated from collateral information. F. R. Palmer pursues a similar contention in his recent survey of issues in semantic theory: (...)
  25. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. By Francois Recanati. (Oxford UP, 2010. Pp. Vii + 324. Price £55.00 (Hardcover), £18.99 (Paperback).). [REVIEW]Fabrizio Cariani - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):415-418.
  26. A Truth-Functional Logic for Near-Universal Generalizations.Ian F. Carlstrom - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (4):379 - 405.
  27. The Pragmatics of Truth Functions.Lucio Chiaraviglio & Albert M. Sweet - 1964 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 5 (3):191-198.
  28. Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals: A study of truth conditionality and minimal change.Ivano Ciardelli, Linmin Zhang & Lucas Champollion - manuscript
    Based on a crowdsourced truth-value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally (...)
  29. Indexical Color Predicates: Truth Conditional Semantics Vs. Truth Conditional Pragmatics.Lenny Clapp - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):71-100.
  30. Three Challenges for Indexicalism.Lenny Clapp - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):435-465.
    Indexicalism is a strategy for defending truth-conditional semantics from under-determination arguments. According to indexicalism the class of indexical expressions includes not only the obvious indexicals, e.g. demonstratives and personal pronouns, but also unobvious indexical expressions, expressions which allegedly have been discovered to be indexicals. This paper argues that indexicalism faces significant obstacles that have yet to be overcome. The issue that divides indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics is first clarified. And then three general problems for indexicalism are presented, and some potential (...)
  31. Davidson's Program and Interpreted Logical Forms.Lenny Clapp - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):261-297.
  32. Truth-Functional Conjunction.Joseph T. Clark - 1952 - Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 3:24-25.
  33. Metaphor and Truth-Conditional Semantics: Meaning as Process and Product.Finn Collin & Anders Engstrøm - 2001 - Theoria 67 (1):75-92.
  34. New Inquiries Into Meaning and Truth.Neil Cooper & Pascal Engel (eds.) - 1991 - St. Martin's Press.
  35. The Logic Instinct.Stephen Crain & Drew Khlentzos - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):30-65.
    We present a series of arguments for logical nativism, focusing mainly on the meaning of disjunction in human languages. We propose that all human languages are logical in the sense that the meaning of linguistic expressions corresponding to disjunction (e.g. English or , Chinese huozhe, Japanese ka ) conform to the meaning of the logical operator in classical logic, inclusive- or . It is highly implausible, we argue, that children acquire the (logical) meaning of disjunction by observing how adults use (...)
  36. Truth and Meaning.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 175-197.
    D O N A L D D AV I D S O N’S “ Meaning and Truth,” re vo l u t i o n i zed our conception of how truth and meaning are related (Davidson    ). In that famous art i c l e , Davidson put forw a rd the bold conjecture that meanings are satisfaction conditions, and that a Tarskian theory of truth for a language is a theory of meaning for that language. (...)
  37. Intention, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Robert C. Cummins - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (4):345 - 360.
    In this paper, I sketch a revision of jonathan bennett's "meaning-Nominalist strategy" for explaining the conventional meanings of utterance-Types. Bennett's strategy does not explain sentence-Meaning by appeal to sub-Sentential meanings, And hence cannot hope to yield a theory that assigns a meaning to every sentence. I revise the strategy to make it applicable to predication and identification. The meaning-Convention for a term can then be used to fix its satisfaction conditions. Adapting a familiar trick of tarski's, We can then determine (...)
  38. On an Argument for Truth-Functionality.Robert C. Cummins & Dale Gottlieb - 1972 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):265 - 269.
    Quine argued that any context allowing substitution of logical equivalents and coextensive terms is truth functional. We argue that Quine's proof for this claim is flawed.
  39. Generalized Quantifiers: Logic and Language.Duilio D'Alfonso - 2011 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 9 (No. 1):85-94.
    The Generalized Quantifiers Theory, I will argue, in the second half of last Century has led to an important rapprochement, relevant both in logic and in linguistics, between logical quantification theories and the semantic analysis of quantification in natural languages. In this paper I concisely illustrate the formal aspects and the theoretical implications of this rapprochement.
  40. Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Synthese. Routledge. pp. 304 - 323.
  41. The Essential Davidson.Donald Davidson - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    The Essential Davidson compiles the most celebrated papers of one of the twentieth century's greatest philosophers. It distills Donald Davidson's seminal contributions to our understanding of ourselves, from three decades of essays, into one thematically organized collection. A new, specially written introduction by Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, two of the world's leading authorities on his work, offers a guide through the ideas and arguments, shows how they interconnect, and reveals the systematic coherence of Davidson's worldview. Davidson's philosophical program is (...)
  42. Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, (...)
  43. On Saying That.Donald Davidson - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):130-146.
  44. Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
  45. Off-Target Responses to Occasion-Sensitivity.Alex Davies - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):499-523.
    In the literature on linguistic context-sensitivity, a recurrent move has been made with the intention of attacking Charles Travis's occasion-sensitivity. The move is to provide a semantic analysis of the meaning of an expression which makes the content of that expression context sensitive but without providing any reason to think that the meaning of the expression is a character. I argue that this move is off-target. Such proposals are entirely consistent with occasion-sensitivity and so don't constitute an attack on it.
  46. Meaning and Structure.Martin Davies - 1983 - Philosophia 13 (1-2):13-33.
  47. From Aristotle's Syllogistic to Stoic Conditionals: Holzwege or Detectable Paths?Mauro Nasti De Vincentis - 2004 - Topoi 23 (1):113-137.
    This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's metasyllogistic equimodality condition and truth-conditions for third type conditionals. In fact, as is shown in §1, Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-conditions of which turn out to be logically equivalent to truth-conditions of third type conditionals, according to which only the impossible follows from the (...)
  48. Dual Content Semantics, Privative Adjectives and Dynamic Compositionality.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2015 - Semantics and Pragmatics 8 (7):1-53.
    This paper defends the view that common nouns have a dual semantic structure that includes extension-determining and non-extension-determining components. I argue that the non-extension-determining components are part of linguistic meaning because they play a key compositional role in certain constructions, especially in privative noun phrases such as "fake gun" and "counterfeit document". Furthermore, I show that if we modify the compositional interpretation rules in certain simple ways, this dual content account of noun phrase modification can be implemented in a type-driven (...)
  49. The Structure of Semantic Competence: Compositionality as an Innate Constraint of The Faculty of Language.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (4):375–413.
    This paper defends the view that the Faculty of Language is compositional, i.e., that it computes the meaning of complex expressions from the meanings of their immediate constituents and their structure. I fargue that compositionality and other competing constraints on the way in which the Faculty of Language computes the meanings of complex expressions should be understood as hypotheses about innate constraints of the Faculty of Language. I then argue that, unlike compositionality, most of the currently available non-compositional constraints predict (...)
  50. Against Crude Semantic Realism?Florian Demont - 2010 - ILLC Technical Notes (X) Series.
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