Trying

Edited by Juan Pablo Bermúdez (Universidad Externado De Colombia, Université de Neuchâtel)
About this topic
Summary

Plausibly, trying is an essential component of agency. But what is trying? Philosophers of action differ on trying’s nature and its relation to agency more broadly (e.g., its relationship to the will, to intentional action, and more): nothing like a consensus view on trying exists. Some view trying as a special act of the will; others that trying is simply a functional component of action – trying is identical to the effects of an intentions’s normal causal work. In the 20th Century trying generated some conceptual puzzles for philosophers of action: so, one finds discussion of questions about whether an agent can intend to try, whether an agent can desire to try to A without desiring to A, and whether an agent can try to do what she believes to be impossible. More recently, some have focused on the psychology of trying – including the experience of trying to do things – and have thus connected trying to the growing literature on the phenomenology of agency.

Key works

Some key works are indicated in the 'introductions.' For discussion of whether trying can serve as the centerpiece of an answer to the problem of action (the problem of distinguishing actions from non-actions), see Armstrong 1973. For some interesting work on trying and its relationship to certain experiences of agency (i.e., the experience of effort), see Dewey 1897, Preston & Wegner 2009, Lafargue & Franck 2009. For work on some of the conceptual puzzles surrounding trying, see Adams 1994, [BROKEN REFERENCE: LUDTTI-2], Mele 1989, Mele 1994.

Introductions For important treatments of the nature of trying and its relationship to volition, see O'Shaughnessy 1973, McCann 1974, McCann 1975, Adams & Mele 1992.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:

139 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 139
  1. added 2020-05-04
    The Metaphysics of Action: Trying, Doing, Causing.David-Hillel Ruben - 2018 - London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    A discussion of three central ideas in action theory; trying to act, doing or acting, one's action causing further consequences.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-05-04
    Rethinking the Videogame Case: Trying and Intending.Jiajun Hu - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):338-351.
    In this paper, I defend the view that a person performs an action A intentionally only if she intends to A against Michael Bratman’s alleged counterexample to it: the videogame case. I object that Bratman is mistaken in assuming that the consistency among an agent’s intentions is about the consistency among intended goals or objectives. Instead, I argue that the real reason why an agent’s intentions need to be consistent with each other is due to the necessity of the compatibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-05-04
    Evaluational Internalism, Epistemic Virtues, and the Significance of Trying.Reza Lahroodi - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:1-20.
    While there is general agreement about the list of epistemic virtues, there has been much controversy over what it is to be an epistemic virtue. Three competing theories have been offered: evaluational externalism, evaluational internalism, and mixed theories. A major problem with internalism, the focus of this paper, is that it disconnects the value of epistemic virtue from actual success in the real world. Relying on a novel thesis about the relation of “trying” and “exercise of virtue,” James Montmarquet has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. added 2020-05-04
    Trying Without Willing: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]Timothy O’Connor - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):242-244.
    In the specialized and often peculiar conversation of philosophers, some speak of themselves and of others as willing our actions. Usually, they intend to imply thereby a distinctive kind of psychological event, one that lies at the origin of every instance of intentional action. This thesis, of course, has become highly controversial. Many argue that despite much traditional philosophical theorizing committed to such an essential feature of action, there is no basis for it in ordinary speech, introspection, or sound theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2020-05-04
    Acting, Willing and Trying.Timothy Eugene Cleveland - 1986 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
    In Brian O'Shaughnessy's recent works, primarily The Will, and Jennifer Hornsby's Actions, the traditional position of volitionism has been revived in a challenging fashion. Focusing on the concept of trying, they have argued that intentional physical actions essentially involve a special volitional element. My thesis is that, without recourse to volitions, an alternative account of physical action and physical trying can be provided in which physical actions and physical tryings are identified with physical movements performed by the agent. ;Drawing on (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2020-05-04
    VI—Trying and Doing.Frederick Broadie - 1966 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (1):27-40.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. added 2020-05-04
    ANALYSIS Problem No. 7 Can I Decide to Do Something Immediately Without Trying to Do It Immediately.R. B. Candidus - 1955 - Analysis 16:3.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2019-11-27
    Tracking Intentionalism and the Phenomenology of Mental Effort.Maria Doulatova - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Most of us are familiar with the phenomenology of mental effort accompanying cognitively demanding tasks, like focusing on the next chess move or performing lengthy mental arithmetic. In this paper, I argue that phenomenology of mental effort poses a novel counterexample to tracking intentionalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one’s environment in a certain way. I argue that an increase in the phenomenology of mental effort does not accompany a change in any of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2019-10-28
    Do We Reflect While Performing Skillful Actions? Automaticity, Control, and the Perils of Distraction.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):896-924.
    From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  10. added 2019-06-06
    Trying to Defend Attempts: Replies to Bratman, Brink, Alexander, and Moore: Trying to Defend Attempts.Gideon Yaffe - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (2):178-215.
    This essay replies to the thoughtful commentaries, by Michael Bratman, David Brink, Larry Alexander, and Michael Moore, on my book Attempts.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2019-06-06
    Mental Action. Edited by Lucy O'Brien and Matthew Soteriou. (Oxford UP, 2009. Pp. X + 286. Price £50.00).Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):401-403.
  12. added 2019-06-06
    ‘Can I Decide To Do Something Immediately Without Trying To Do It Immediately?”.Nicholas Rescher - 1955 - Analysis 16 (1):4-5.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Can I Decide To Do Something Immediately Without Trying To Do It Immediately?R. B. Candidus & Alonso Church - 1955 - Analysis 16 (1):3-4.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2019-06-06
    III.—The Psychology of Effort of Will.C. A. Campbell - 1939 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 40 (1):49-74.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2019-06-05
    Arguing as Trying to Show That a Target-Claim is Correct.David Hitchcock - 2011 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 26 (3):301-309.
    In Giving Reasons, Bermejo-Luque rightly claims that a normative model of the speech act of argumentation is more defensible if it rests on an internal aim that is constitutive of the act of arguing than if it rests, as she claims existing normative models do, on an aim that one need not pursue when one argues. She rightly identifies arguing with trying to justify something. But it is not so clear that she has correctly identified the internal aim of arguing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. added 2018-05-14
    Free Will and Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - forthcoming - In Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Beiträge. Paderborn: Schoeningh/Brill.
    This paper examines the view of abilities to act advanced by Kadri Vihvelin in Causes, Laws, and Free Will. Vihvelin argues that (i) abilities of an important kind are “structurally” like dispositions such as fragility; (ii) ascriptions of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals; (iii) ascriptions of abilities of the kind in question can be analyzed similarly; and (iv) we have the free will we think we have by having abilities of this kind and being in circumstances (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2018-02-16
    Why Actions Might Be Willings.Eugene Schlossberger & Ron Talmage - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (2):199 - 203.
  18. added 2018-02-02
    The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day.Thomas Pink & M. W. F. Stone (eds.) - 2003 - Routledge.
    What is the will? And what is its relation to human action? Throughout history, philosophers have been fascinated by the idea of 'the will': the source of the drive that motivates human beings to act. However, there has never been a clear consensus as to what the will is and how it relates to human action. Some philosophers have taken the will to be based firmly in reason and rational choice, and some have seen it as purely self-determined. Others have (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2017-12-19
    Towards a Definition of Efforts.Olivier Massin - 2017 - Motivation Science 3 (3):230-259.
    Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept ofeffort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for anexplicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at thisdefinition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and arguesthat few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues thatsuch a definition is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2017-06-12
    The Conative Mind: Volition and Action.Jing Zhu - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    This work is an attempt to restore volition as a respectable topic for scientific studies. Volition, traditionally conceived as the act of will, has been largely neglected in contemporary science and philosophy. I first develop a volitional theory of action by elaborating a unifying conception of volition, where volitions are construed as special kinds of mental action by which an agent consciously and actively bridge the gaps between deliberation, decision and intentional action. Then I argue that the major skeptical arguments (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2017-05-29
    Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet.Richard Malpas - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):134.
  22. added 2017-05-29
    Theory of Action.Charles Marks & Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):634.
  23. added 2017-05-24
    Actions.Carl Ginet - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):120.
  24. added 2017-04-30
    The Physical Action Theory of Trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2015 - Methode 4 (6).
    Metaphysically speaking, just what is trying? There appear to be two options: to place it on the side of the mind or on the side of the world. Volitionists, who think that to try is to engage in a mental act, perhaps identical to willing and perhaps not, take the mind-side option. The second, or world-side option identifies trying to do something with one of the more basic actions by which one tries to do that thing. The trying is then (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. added 2017-04-30
    Trying, Intending, and Attempted Crimes.Gideon Yaffe - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):505-531.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  26. added 2017-04-30
    The Concept of Trying.Severin Schroeder - 2001 - Philosophical Investigations 24 (3):213-227.
    It is widely held that whenever someone φs, that person tries to do φ. I examine arguments by B. O’Shaughnessy and J. Hornsby, and considerations by P. Grice in support of that thesis. I argue that none of them are convincing. The remainder of the paper defends an analysis of the concept of trying along the lines opposed by Grice et al. By speaking of someone’s trying to φ the speaker leaves the room for failure or the possibility of failure. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. added 2017-04-30
    Hornsby on Trying.Myles Brand - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:541-547.
    In “Reasons for Trying”, Jennifer Homsby rejects several views about trying, including the volitional account, which identifies trying with an ‘inner’ uniform mental occurrence leading to action and the instrumental view, which explicates trying as doing one thing in order to accomplish something else. She proffers, rather, an explication, which I label ‘the capacity view,’ that identifies trying with the agent doing all that she can to accomplish the goal. In this note, I argue, first, that Hornsby’s approach more nearly (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. added 2017-04-30
    Trying: You’Ve Got to Believe.Frederick Adams - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:549-561.
    Sue knows that, unaided, she cannot lift the 1,000 pound weight, but surely she can try. Can she not? For even if she believes it is impossible to succeed in lifting the weight, trying to lift the weight need not involve success. So surely, it would seem that nothing could be easier than for Sue to give lifting the weight a try. In this paper, I agrue that, appearances aside, it is not possible for someone to try to do what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2016-12-12
    Trying to Make Sense of Criminal Attempts. [REVIEW]Ken Levy - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (3):656-664.
    Issues include attempts generally; the problem of outcome luck; the impossibility defense; physical movement and intent; and reckless attempts, attempted rape, and attempted theft. In the final section, I offer a hypothetical that challenges Prof. Donnelly-Lazarov's theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2016-12-08
    Pollock on Rational Choice and Trying.Peter K. Mcinerney - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):253-261.
    In everyday life people frequently recognize that a person at a time may be more or less strongly motivated to carry out an intentional action and that “trying harder” frequently affects the successful completion of an intentional action. In “Rational Choice and Action Omnipotence,” John Pollock provides an original account of rational choice in which “trying to do an action” is a basic factor. This paper argues that Pollock’s “expected-utility optimality prescription” is deficient because it lacks a parameter for intensity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. added 2016-12-08
    Is Raising One's Arm a Basic Action?Hugh McCann - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (9):235.
    I hold no view as to what actions are basic, but I shall attempt to show in what follows that actions like raising an arm never are. My contention is that these actions involve actions of physical exertion on the part of the agent, the involvement being of a sort generally taken to be excluded by an actions being basic.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  32. added 2016-12-05
    Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology.Christopher Peacocke - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  33. added 2016-11-18
    Action Reconceptualized: Human Agency and its Sources.David K. Chan - 2016 - Lexington Books.
    In re-examining the concepts of desire, intention, and trying, David K. Chan brings a fresh approach toward resolving many of the problems that have occupied philosophers of action for almost a century. This book not only presents a complete theory of human agency but also, by developing the conceptual tools needed to do moral philosophy, lays the groundwork for formulating an ethics that is rooted in a clear, intuitive, and coherent moral psychology.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2016-09-06
    Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency.Pietroski Pm - 1998 - In Daniel N. Robinson (ed.), The Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 107--425.
  35. added 2016-08-25
    Action.J. Proust - 2003 - In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 102--127.
  36. added 2016-08-25
    Carl Ginet, On Action. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Philosophy in Review 12:196-199.
  37. added 2016-08-10
    Actions.James S. Morgan - 1982 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 29:345-348.
  38. added 2016-07-05
    Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):264-272.
    : I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property. I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal component (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. added 2016-06-20
    Volitions and Actions.Michael Martin - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):187 - 190.
    In a recent paper Lawrence Davis has argued that the difference between an arm raising and someone raising his arm is that in the latter case a volition causes the arm to rise. In this paper I will show that Davis's theory is faulty and that certain obvious ways of repairing his theory do not work.Davis proposes the following as an account of Sam's raising his arm: Sam raises his arm if he willed to raise his arm and this caused (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2015-09-18
    It's Not Too Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the Impossibility Defense.Ken Levy - 2014 - New Mexico Law Revview 45:225-274.
    Suppose you are at the gym trying to see some naked beauties by peeping through a hole in the wall. A policeman happens by, he asks you what you are doing, and you honestly tell him. He then arrests you for voyeurism. Are you guilty? We don’t know yet because there is one more fact to be considered: while you honestly thought that a locker room was on the other side of the wall, it was actually a squash court. Are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2015-09-16
    The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as Punishable as the Wrongful Action That Causes It.Ken Levy - 2005 - Law and Philosophy 24 (3):263-303.
    A surprisingly large number of scholars believe that (a) we are blameworthy, and therefore punishable, only for what we have control over; (b) we have control only over our actions and intentions, not the consequences of our actions; and therefore (c) if two agents perform the very same action (e.g., attempting to kill) with the very same intentions, then they are equally blameworthy and deserving of equal punishment – even if only one of them succeeds in killing. This paper argues (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. added 2015-04-27
    A Conditional Theory of Trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):271-287.
    What I shall do in this paper is to propose an analysis of ‘Agent P tries to A’ in terms of a subjunctive conditional, that avoids some of the problems that beset most alternative accounts of trying, which I call ‘referential views’. They are so-named because on these alternative accounts, ‘P tries to A’ entails that there is a trying to A by P, and therefore the expression ‘P’s trying to A’ can occur in the subject of a sentence and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43. added 2015-04-27
    Embarking on a Crime.Sarah K. Paul - 2014 - In Enrique Villanueva V. (ed.), Law and the Philosophy of Action. Rodopi. pp. 101-24.
    When we define something as a crime, we generally thereby criminalize the attempt to commit that crime. However, it is a vexing puzzle to specify what must be the case in order for a criminal attempt to have occurred, given that the results element of the crime fails to come about. I argue that the philosophy of action can assist the criminal law in clarifying what kinds of events are properly categorized as criminal attempts. A natural thought is that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44. added 2015-04-27
    Two Objections to Yaffe on the Criminalization of Attempts.Alexander Sarch - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (3):569-587.
    In his recent book Attempts, Gideon Yaffe suggests that attempts should be criminalized because of a principle he dubs the “Transfer Principle.” This principle holds that if a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized. Although Yaffe provides a powerful defense of the Transfer Principle, in this paper I argue that Yaffe’s argument for it ultimately does not succeed. In particular, I formulate two objections to Yaffe’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2015-04-27
    Yaffe on Attempts.Larry Alexander - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (2):124-135.
    Gideon Yaffe's Attempts is a masterfully executed philosophical investigation of what it means to attempt something. Yaffe is obviously motivated by the fact that the criminal law punishes attempted crimes, and he believes that his philosophical analysis can shed light on and be used to criticize the law's understanding of those crimes. I focus exclusively on the relevance of Yaffe's philosophical analysis of attempts to the criminal law of attempts. I assume that Yaffe's account of what it is to attempt (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2015-04-27
    First Acts, Last Acts, and Abandonment.David O. Brink - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (2):114-123.
    This contribution reconstructs and assesses Gideon Yaffe’s claims in his book Attempts about what constitutes an attempt, what can count as evidence that an attempt has been made, whether abandonment is a genuine defense, and whether attempts should be punished less severely than completed crimes. I contrast Yaffe’s account of being motivated by an intention and the completion of an attempt in terms of the truth of the completion counterfactual with an alternative picture of attempts as temporally extended decision trees (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. added 2015-04-27
    Yaffe's Attempts.Michael S. Moore - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (2):136-177.
    Yaffe's handling of two general questions is assessed in this review. The first question is why mere attempts (as opposed to successful wrongdoing) should be made punishable in a well-conceived criminal code. The second question is how attempt liability should be conceived in such a code. As to the first question, Yaffe's nonsubstantive mode of answering it (in terms of his ) is contrasted to answers based on some more substantive desert-bases; Yaffe's own more substantive kind of answer (in terms (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. added 2015-04-27
    Yaffe on Attempts.Lawrence Alexander - 2013 - Legal Studies Research Papers Series:13-113.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2015-04-27
    Yaffe on Criminal Attempts.Michael E. Bratman - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (2):101-113.
    Central to Gideon Yaffe's powerful theory of the legitimate criminalization of unsuccessful attempts is his according to which, I argue that this principle, taken together with Yaffe's theory of the nature of attempts, threatens to lead to a normatively problematic conclusion in support of the legitimate criminalization of attempts that are merely a matter of thinking and do not involve action in the public space. And I argue that Yaffe's efforts to block this conclusion are themselves problematic. This leads to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2015-04-27
    Guiding Commitments and Criminal Liability for Attempts.R. A. Duff - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):411-427.
    A critical discussion of Gideon Yaffe's "guiding commitment" account of attempts, with special reference to attempts in the criminal law.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 139