About this topic
Summary Two-dimensional semantic theories postulate two "dimensions" of meaning or content, each understood in terms of possible worlds.  The second dimension is typically depends on the external referents of expressions involved, while the first dimension captures the way that reference depends on the world.  There are many different two-dimensional frameworks.  David Kaplan develops a framework involving "character" and "content" to understand the meaning of indexicals and demonstratives.  Robert Stalnaker develops a framework involving "diagonal propositions" and "propositions expressed" to understand assertion and its relation to context.  David Chalmers and Frank Jackson develop frameworks involving "primary intensions" and "secondary intensions" (or "A-" and "C-intensions") to understand the relation between apriority and necessity and also to understand an internal Fregean dimension of content. 
Key works The origins of 2D semantics lie in work on 2D modal logic by  Kamp 1968 and Vlach 1973.  Various 2D analyses of meaning and content are given by Kaplan 1989, Stalnaker 1978, Evans 1979, Davies & Humberstone 1980, Chalmers 1996, and Jackson 1998Soames 2005 is a book-length critique of many different versions.  Numerous papers are collected in Garcia-Carpintero & Macia 2006.
Introductions Chalmers 2006 and Schroeter 2010 give overviews of various different two-dimensional semantic frameworks, along with their motivations and objections to them.
Related categories

120 found
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  1. added 2018-09-21
    Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals.Brian Weatherson - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
    This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, (...)
  2. added 2018-08-06
    Categories of First-Order Quantifiers.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2018 - In Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska & Ángel Garrido (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School. Past and Present. Basel, Switzerland: pp. 575-597.
    One well known problem regarding quantifiers, in particular the 1storder quantifiers, is connected with their syntactic categories and denotations. The unsatisfactory efforts to establish the syntactic and ontological categories of quantifiers in formalized first-order languages can be solved by means of the so called principle of categorial compatibility formulated by Roman Suszko, referring to some innovative ideas of Gottlob Frege and visible in syntactic and semantic compatibility of language expressions. In the paper the principle is introduced for categorial languages generated (...)
  3. added 2018-07-23
    Semantics, Two-Dimensional.Jens Kipper - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Two-dimensional semantic theories distinguish between two different aspects, or ‘dimensions’, of the meaning of linguistic expressions. Many other theories identify the meaning of an expression with a dependency of its extension on the state of the world. (The extension of a sentence is its truth-value, and the extension of a sub-sentential expression … Continue reading Semantics, Two-Dimensional →.
  4. added 2018-06-29
    On Considering a Possible World as Actual: Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1):141-156.
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of the statement (...)
  5. added 2018-03-09
    In the Mood.Kai Frederick Wehmeier - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):607-630.
    The purpose of the present paper is to challenge some received assumptions about the logical analysis of modal English, and to show that these assumptions are crucial to certain debates in current philosophy of language. Specifically, I will argue that the standard analysis in terms of quantified modal logic mistakenly fudges important grammatical distinctions, and that the validity of Kripke's modal argument against description theories of proper names crucially depends on ensuing equivocations.
  6. added 2018-02-16
    The Two-Dimensionalist Reductio.Robert J. Howell - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):348-358.
    Abstract: In recent years two-dimensional semantics has become one of the most serious alternatives to Millianism for the proper interpretation of modal discourse. It has origins in the works of a diverse group of philosophers, and it has proven popular as an interpretation of both language and thought. It has probably received most of its attention, however, because of its use by David Chalmers in his arguments against materialism. It is this more metaphysical application of two-dimensionalism that is the concern (...)
  7. added 2017-10-17
    Scott Soames, Reference and Description. The Case against Two-Dimensionalism. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005. [REVIEW]Jan Heylen - 2006 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):406-408.
  8. added 2017-09-08
    If-Clauses as Postsemantic Context-Shifters.Benj Hellie - manuscript
    A mainstay assumption in natural-language semantics is that \emph{if}-clauses bind indexical argument-places in \emph{then}-clauses. Unfortunately, recent work (compare \citealt{santorio12}) suggests that \emph{if}-clauses can somehow act to `shift the context'. On the framework of Kaplan's `Demonstratives' \citep{kaplan77}, that would be `monstrous' and somehow impossible `in English'. The superseding framework of Lewis's `Index, context, and content' \citep{lewis80icc} instead maintains that an indexical argument-place is just one that is bindable (compare~\citealt[ch.~1]{stalnaker14}), but maintains that these are rare---whereas the lesson of recent work is that (...)
    No categories
  9. added 2017-07-18
    Reference, Context, and Propositions.Kai-Yee Wong - 1990 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    The main chapters of this thesis develop and defend a version of two-dimensional semantics that provides an account of Kripkean a posteriori necessity.
  10. added 2017-07-01
    Chalmers, semantiikka ja välttämättömyys.Panu Raatikainen - 2016 - In Mahdollisuus. Helsinki: Suomen Filosofinen Yhdistys.
  11. added 2017-06-09
    Natural Deduction for Diagonal Operators.Fabio Lampert - 2017 - In Maria Zack & Dirk Schlimm (eds.), Research in History and Philosophy of Mathematics: The CSHPM 2016 Annual Meeting in Calgary, Alberta. Cham: Birkhäuser. pp. 39-51.
    We present a sound and complete Fitch-style natural deduction system for an S5 modal logic containing an actuality operator, a diagonal necessity operator, and a diagonal possibility operator. The logic is two-dimensional, where we evaluate sentences with respect to both an actual world (first dimension) and a world of evaluation (second dimension). The diagonal necessity operator behaves as a quantifier over every point on the diagonal between actual worlds and worlds of evaluation, while the diagonal possibility quantifies over some point (...)
  12. added 2017-04-07
    Abductive Two-Dimensionalism: A New Route to the A Priori Identification of Necessary Truths.Biggs Stephen & Wilson Jessica - forthcoming - Synthese:1-35.
    Epistemic two-dimensional semantics (E2D), advocated by Chalmers (2006) and Jackson (1998), among others, aims to restore the link between necessity and a priority seemingly broken by Kripke (1972/1980), by showing how armchair access to semantic intensions provides a basis for knowledge of necessary a posteriori truths (among other modal claims). The most compelling objections to E2D are that, for one or other reason, the requisite intensions are not accessible from the armchair (see, e.g., Wilson 1982, Melnyk 2008). As we substantiate (...)
  13. added 2017-03-31
    Assertability Conditions of Epistemic (and Fictional) Attitudes and Mood Variation.Mari Alda - unknown - Proceedings of SALT 26.
    Italian is a well-known exception to the cross-linguistic generalization according to which `belief' predicates are indicative selectors across languages. We newly propose that languages that select the subjunctive with epistemic predicates allow us to see a systematic polysemy between what we call an expressive-`belief' (featuring only a doxastic dimension) and an inquisitive-`belief' (featuring both a doxastic and an epistemic dimension conveying doxastic certainty (in the assertion) and epistemic uncertainty (in the presupposition)). We offer several previously unseen contrasts proving this distinction (...)
  14. added 2017-03-29
    Actuality, Tableaux, and Two-Dimensional Modal Logics.Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):403-443.
    In this paper we present tableau methods for two-dimensional modal logics. Although models for such logics are well known, proof systems remain rather unexplored as most of their developments have been purely axiomatic. The logics herein considered contain first-order quantifiers with identity, and all the formulas in the language are doubly-indexed in the proof systems, with the upper indices intuitively representing the actual or reference worlds, and the lower indices representing worlds of evaluation—first and second dimensions, respectively. The tableaux modulate (...)
  15. added 2017-03-26
    Actuality, Tableaux, and Two-Dimensional Modal Logics.Lampert Fabio - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):403-443.
    In this paper we present tableau methods for two-dimensional modal logics. Although models for such logics are well known, proof systems remain rather unexplored as most of their developments have been purely axiomatic. The logics herein considered contain first-order quantifiers with identity, and all the formulas in the language are doubly-indexed in the proof systems, with the upper indices intuitively representing the actual or reference worlds, and the lower indices representing worlds of evaluation—first and second dimensions, respectively. The tableaux modulate (...)
  16. added 2017-03-22
    A Bridge From Semantic Value to Content.Brian Rabern - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):181-207.
    A common view relating compositional semantics and the objects of assertion holds the following: Sentences φ and ψ expresses the same proposition iff φ and ψ have the same modal profile. Following Dummett, Evans, and Lewis, Stanley argues that this view is fundamentally mistaken. According to Dummett, we must distinguish the semantic contribution a sentence makes to more complex expressions in which it occurs from its assertoric content. Stojnić insists that views which distinguish the roles of content and semantic value (...)
  17. added 2017-03-08
    Actuality and the a Priori.Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):809-830.
    We consider a natural-language sentence that cannot be formally represented in a first-order language for epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We also prove this claim in the “Appendix” section. It turns out, however, that the most natural ways to repair the expressive inadequacy of the first-order language render moot the original philosophical motivation of formalizing a priori knowability as necessity along the diagonal.
  18. added 2017-02-19
    Comment on ‘Two Notions of Necessity’.Gareth Evans - 2006 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Clarendon Press.
  19. added 2017-01-23
    A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence.Kristie Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):772-793.
    This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterisation that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct, thus affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed towards metaphysically equivalent theories in such a way that non-ideal agents can bear different propositional attitudes towards metaphysically equivalent theories.
  20. added 2017-01-14
    Soames. 2008. Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism.Juan José Acero - unknown
  21. added 2016-12-08
    Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (3):295-314.
    Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the interpretation is kept (...)
  22. added 2016-12-08
    Presuppositions and Quantifier Domains.Friederike Moltmann - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):179-224.
    In this paper, I will argue for a new account of presuppositions which is based on double indexing as well as minimal representational contexts providing antecedent material for anaphoric presuppositions, rather than notions of context defined in terms of the interlocutors’ pragmatic presuppositions or the information accumulated from the preceding discourse. This account applies in particular to new phenomena concerning the presupposition of quantifier domains. But it is also intended to be an account of presuppositions in general. The account differs (...)
  23. added 2016-12-08
    Aplicaciones Filosoficas Del Bi-Dimensionalismo.Otero Manuel Perez - 2002 - Theoria 17 (3):457-477.
    Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths, and tried to explain why some of them seem to be contingent. His main explanation motivated two philosophical proposals: the attempt - linked to some interpretations of two-dimensionalism - to analyse the epistemic concept of a priori truth using metaphysical modal concepts; the argument for psychophysical dualism worked out by Kripke relying on his explanation of the appearances of contingency. I point out several difficulties for , and argue that can (...)
  24. added 2016-12-08
    Deep Contingency and Necessary a Posteriori Truth.P. Mackie - 2002 - Analysis 62 (3):225-236.
  25. added 2016-12-05
    Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.John Hawthorne & Ofra Magidor - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):377-397.
    In his seminal paper 'Assertion', Robert Stalnaker distinguishes between the semantic content of a sentence on an occasion of use and the content asserted by an utterance of that sentence on that occasion. While in general the assertoric content of an utterance is simply its semantic content, the mechanisms of conversation sometimes force the two apart. Of special interest in this connection is one of the principles governing assertoric content in the framework, one according to which the asserted content ought (...)
  26. added 2016-11-25
    Dual Content Semantics, Privative Adjectives and Dynamic Compositionality.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2015 - Semantics and Pragmatics 8 (7):1-53.
    This paper defends the view that common nouns have a dual semantic structure that includes extension-determining and non-extension-determining components. I argue that the non-extension-determining components are part of linguistic meaning because they play a key compositional role in certain constructions, especially in privative noun phrases such as "fake gun" and "counterfeit document". Furthermore, I show that if we modify the compositional interpretation rules in certain simple ways, this dual content account of noun phrase modification can be implemented in a type-driven (...)
  27. added 2016-09-14
    Being at the Centre: Self-Location in Thought and Language.Clas Weber - forthcoming - In M. Garcia-Carpintero & S. Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press.
    Self-locating attitudes and assertions provide a challenge to the received view of mental and linguistic intentionality. In this paper I try to show that the best way to meet this challenge is to adopt relativistic, centred possible worlds accounts for both belief and communication. First, I argue that self-locating beliefs support a centred account of belief. Second, I argue that self-locating utterances support a complementary centred account of communication. Together, these two claims motivate a unified centred conception of belief and (...)
  28. added 2016-09-05
    Frege-Inspired Neo-Descriptivism and Its Problems.Jan G. Michel - 2015 - In D. Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e). Logos. pp. 161-175.
  29. added 2016-09-05
    Qu’est-ce que la signification?Manuel Rebuschi - 2008 - Vrin.
    Quand nous utilisons le langage, nous nous appuyons sur le fait que les expressions linguistiques ont une signification. Comment cela fonctionne-t-il? La signification se réduit-elle à l’information? Y a-t-il un intermédiaire entre le langage et le monde? Les significations sont-elles dans la tête? Ces questions sont abordées en partant des conceptions héritées de Frege et de Russell jusqu’à la sémantique bidimensionnelle de Chalmers, en passant par les débats sur la référence des noms propres et des termes d’espèce naturelle. Le livre (...)
  30. added 2016-08-22
    On the Expressive Power of First-Order Modal Logic with Two-Dimensional Operators.Alexander Kocurek - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4373-4417.
    Many authors have noted that there are types of English modal sentences cannot be formalized in the language of basic first-order modal logic. Some widely discussed examples include “There could have been things other than there actually are” and “Everyone who is actually rich could have been poor.” In response to this lack of expressive power, many authors have discussed extensions of first-order modal logic with two-dimensional operators. But claims about the relative expressive power of these extensions are often justified (...)
  31. added 2016-07-29
    Propositional Apriority and the Nesting Problem.Jens Kipper - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1091-1104.
    According to the modal account of propositional apriority, a proposition is a priori if it is possible to know it with a priori justification. Assuming that modal truths are necessarily true and that there are contingent a priori truths, this account has the undesirable consequence that a proposition can be a priori in a world in which it is false. Epistemic two-dimensionalism faces the same problem, since on its standard interpretation, it also entails that a priori propositions are necessarily a (...)
  32. added 2016-07-03
    The A Priori‐Operator and the Nesting Problem.Eric Johannesson & Sara Packalén - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):169-176.
    Many expressions intuitively have different epistemic and modal profiles. For example, co-referring proper names are substitutable salva veritate in modal contexts but not in belief-contexts. Two-dimensional semantics, according to which terms have both a so-called primary and a secondary intension, is a framework that promises to accommodate and explain these diverging intuitions. The framework can be applied to indexicals, proper names or predicates. Graeme Forbes argues that the two-dimensional semantics of David Chalmers fails to account for so-called nested contexts. These (...)
  33. added 2015-09-27
    Unique Best Deserver Theory and Arguments From Misclassification.Richard Stillman - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):769-781.
    It is a core commitment of Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism that an utterance is 1-necessary iff it is a priori. But Jeff Speaks's Argument from Misclassification proves that, on a natural interpretation, E2D assigns necessary 1-intensions to many utterances that speakers deem a posteriori. Given that 1-intensions are meant to formalize a speaker's own understanding of the words she utters, this proof raises serious difficulties for E2D. In response, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber point out that the Argument from Misclassification presupposes a controversial (...)
  34. added 2015-09-22
    Jan G. Michel: Der qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse. Physikalismus und phanomenale Eigenschaften in der Philosophie des Geistes. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):279-283.
  35. added 2015-09-19
    Agreement and Communication.Max Kölbel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):101-120.
    I distinguish two notions of agreement in belief: believing the same content versus having beliefs that necessarily coincide/diverge in normative status. The second notion of agreement,, is clearly significant for the communication of beliefs amongst thinkers. Thus there would seem to be some prima facie advantage to choosing the conception of content operative in in such a way that the normative status of beliefs supervenes on their content, and this seems to be the prevailing assumption of many semanticists. I shall (...)
  36. added 2015-04-18
    Semántica bidimensional: desarrollos recientes. [REVIEW]J. J. Acero - 2008 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (2).
  37. added 2014-04-09
    Intensions and Indeterminacy: Reply to Soames, Turner, and Wilson.David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):249-269.
  38. added 2014-04-02
    Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem.David J. Chalmers & Brian Rabern - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):210-224.
    Graeme Forbes (2011) raises some problems for two-dimensional semantic theories. The problems concern nested environments: linguistic environments where sentences are nested under both modal and epistemic operators. Closely related problems involving nested environments have been raised by Scott Soames (2005) and Josh Dever (2007). Soames goes so far as to say that nested environments pose the “chief technical problem” for strong two-dimensionalism. We call the problem of handling nested environments within two-dimensional semantics “the nesting problem”. We show that the two-dimensional (...)
  39. added 2014-04-02
    No Easy Argument for Two-Dimensionalism.Jeff Speaks - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):775-781.
    Some opponents of epistemic two-dimensionalism say that the view should be rejected on the grounds that it misclassifies certain a posteriori claims as a priori. Elliott, McQueen, & Weber [2013] have argued that any argument of this form must fail. I argue that this conclusion is mistaken, and defend my argument [Speaks (2010] against their criticisms.
  40. added 2014-03-26
    Sentence-Relativity and the Necessary a Posteriori.Kai-Yee Wong - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):53 - 91.
  41. added 2014-03-20
    Two Types of Rigid Designation.Iris Einheuser - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):367–374.
    The notion of a rigid designator was originally introduced with respect to a modal semantics in which only one world, the world of evaluation, is shifted. Several philosophical applications employ a modal semantics which shifts not just the world of evaluation, but also the world considered as actual. How should the notion of a rigid designator be generalized in this setting? In this note, I show that there are two options and argue that, for the currently most popular application of (...)
  42. added 2014-03-19
    Analytic Truths—Still Harmless After All These Years?Christian Nimtz - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):91-118.
    Hilary Putnam once proposed a semantic approach to, as well as a deflationist resolution of, the problem of analyticity. I take up and defend both ideas. First of all, I defend Putnam's semantic construal of the issue against Quine's reductive understanding. Secondly, I devise a semantics that successfully explains the genesis of the relevant analytic truths and that shows them to be harmless. Finally, I rebut the aspirations of the neo-descriptivist semantics, prominently propounded by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, that (...)
  43. added 2014-03-18
    Two-Dimensionalism and Natural Kind Terms.Christian Nimtz - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):125-48.
    Kripke and Putnam have convinced most philosophers that we cannot do metaphysics of nature by analysing the senses of natural kind terms -- simply because natural kind terms do not have senses. Neo-descriptivists, especially Frank Jackson and David Chalmers, believe that this view is mistaken. Merging classical descriptivism with a Kaplan-inspired two-dimensional framework, neo-descriptivists devise a semantics for natural kind terms that assigns natural kind terms so-called 'primary intensions'. Since primary intensions are senses by other names, Jackson and Chalmers conclude (...)
  44. added 2014-03-18
    The Diagonal and the Demon.Juan Comesaña - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
    Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not - the objector claims - reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is (...)
  45. added 2014-03-18
    On Considering a Possible World as Actual.Thomas Baldwin - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):157–174.
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of the statement (...)
  46. added 2014-03-17
    Two-Dimensional Semantics.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macia (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that helps us better understand some of the most fundamental issues in philosophy: those having to do with the relationship between the meaning of words, the way the world is, and our knowledge of the meaning of words. This selection of new essays by some of the world's leading authorities in this field sheds fresh light both on foundational issues regarding two-dimensional semantics and on its specific applications. Contributors: Richard Breheny, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Martin (...)
  47. added 2014-03-17
    Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism.Scott Soames - 2005 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    In this book, Scott Soames defends the revolution in philosophy led by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and David Kaplan against attack from those wishing to revive ..
  48. added 2014-03-15
    Low-Grade Two-Dimensionalism.Josh Dever - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (1):1-16.
    As tends to be the way with philosophical positions, there are at least as many two-dimensionalisms as there are two-dimensionalists. But painting with a broad brush, there are core epistemological and metaphysical commitments which underlie the two-dimensionalist project, commitments for which I have no sympathies. A sketch of three signi?cant points of disagreement.
  49. added 2014-03-15
    The Substance and Significance of the Dispute Over Two-Dimensionalism.Scott Soames - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (1):34-49.
  50. added 2014-03-14
    Two-Dimensional Truth.Wolfgang Spohn - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):194-207.
    The paper identifies two major strands of truth theories, ontological and epistemological ones, and argues that both are of equal primacy and find their home within two-dimensional semantics. Contrary to received views, it argues further that epistemological truth theories operate on Lewisian possible worlds and ontological truth theories on Wittgensteinian possible worlds and that both are mediated by the so-called epistemic-ontic map the further specification of which is of utmost philosophical importance.
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