||In ethics, a pluralist view is one that assumes that more than one principle or value provides the foundation for a certain ethical domain: in morality; in value theory (including but not restricted to moral theory); in politics; in aesthetics, and so on. Pluralism as such contrasts with monism, the view that there is only one basic principle or value in such domains. Monist views in moral theory include utilitarianism, divine command theory, and Kant's moral theory at least on some readings. Hedonism is a monist view in value theory: only pleasure is valuable for its own sake. Pluralist views include, for example, Ross's deontology and 18th c. ethical rationalism (Clarke, Price) whereby there are several basic, irreducible, duties; so-called 'ideal utilitarianism', whereby there are many goods besides pleasure that require to be promoted; so-called 'objective list' theories of well-being, whereby different elements (pleasure, knowledge, achievement, personal relationships etc.) compose a person's well-being; and some versions of virtue ethics - on which there is no single master virtue but different and possibly diverging ones (say, benevolence and justice). In the political area, Rawls's two principles of justice provide another example of pluralism, in this minimal sense outlined. Key questions under consideration include the arguments for and against pluralism (within one or more of these areas), how a pluralist view ought to deal with conflicts between heterogeneous principles or values, and whether some sort of unification of different values can be achieved without slipping into monism.