Value Theory, Misc

Ever since the Harsanyi-Sen debate, it is controversial whether someone's welfare should be measured by her von-Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility, for instance when analysing welfare intensity, social welfare, interpersonal welfare comparisons, or welfare inequality. We prove that natural working hypotheses lead to a different welfare measure. It addresses familiar concerns about VNM utility, by faithfully capturing non-ordinal welfare features such as welfare intensity, despite resting on purely ordinal evidence such as revealed preferences or self-reported welfare comparisons. Using this welfare measure instead (...) of VNM utility alters social welfare analysis -- for instance, Harsanyi's `utilitarian theorem' now effectively supports prioritarianism. VNM utility is shown to be a hybrid object, determined by an interplay of two factors: welfare and attitude to intrinsic risk, i.e., to risk in welfare rather than outcomes. (shrink)

An overview, with links, of original approaches to six significant areas of philosophical concern, including the nature of perception and perceptual content, naturalistic approaches to representation and semantics, a representational explanation of generality, and a dual component theory of propositions. (This file also provides a useful demonstration of how webpage-like features may be simulated in a Word document).

Salvador Dali titled one of his books Diary of a Genius. You might think that anyone who would title his book thus must be a spoilt brat and should be “cured” of the illusion that he, or she, is so amazing. But it seems to me that there is a “position” one can occupy in which this is difficult.

This is a three-page refutation of the Rachels's denial of moral diversity. In sections 2.5 and 2.6 of ‘The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,’ James and Stuart Rachels argue that diversity amongst cultures with regard to moral rules is overstated because all cultures have some values in common. I show that their argument is invalid and otherwise unsound and that cultures differ substantially with regard to their moral rules.

لا شك أن بعض الوصايا التي تحملها أحجار جورجيا الإرشادية يتسم بالحكمة والنبل، ومن ثم يستحق الثناء ومحاولة التطبيق، لكن أغلبها في الحقيقة يحمل أفكارًا تستدعي بقوة نظريات المؤامرة بأشكالها المختلفة، لاسيما تلك التي تتعلق بطوفان العولمة وهيمنة رأس المال وبقاء الأصلح ومناهضة الأديان. لا شك أيضًا أن ثمة تفسيرًا جديرًا بالتأمل لهالة الغموض التي أحيط بها النُصب وبُناته، مؤداه أن هذا الغموض لا يعدو أن يكون مجرد نوعٍ من أنواع الترويج السياحي للنُصب ولولاية جورجيا، لكن الأحداث الجارية تقدم سببًا (...) للتوقف وإعادة التفكير في الأمر منذ بدايته. (shrink)

Relationships with international students can be beneficial to higher education in terms of financial and human resources. For this reason, establishing and maintaining such relationships are usually pre-eminent concerns. In this study, we extended the application of the disconfirmation expectation model by incorporating components from subjective task value to predict the loyalty of international students toward their host countries. On a sample of 410 Vietnamese students enrolled in establishments of higher education in over 15 countries across the globe, we employed (...) structural equation model to construct the conceptual model. Our empirical findings revealed that while the roles of satisfaction and disconfirmation are still important as direct and indirect antecedents of international student loyalty, its most powerful predictors are the three components of subjective task value: attainment, utility and intrinsic. These insights result in a number of implications for actors on the higher ducation scene, such as heads of institutions and policy makers. (shrink)

The character of Charlie Chaplin in his movies is the personification of forgetfulness but not forgiveness ------ Someone who is not susceptible to bad conscience: (Nietzsche: the sting of conscience teaches one to sting). He carries no guilt, no regret, and is a mechanism of historical forgetfulness (like a happy beast which grazes free from past and future) ------ He undergoes misfortunes and occasional fortunes and comes out the same mechanism of historical forgetfulness he used to be ------ He is (...) virtuoso in terms of accepting the external reality and its misfortunes and is delighted alright as long as a minimally descent condition of life obtains but is vigilant and agile otherwise in the face of danger and unjust irregularities. Agility means he is always on the verge of trusting and mistrusting the external environmental factors. He is suffering from borderline personality disorder. (shrink)

Problems in moral philosophy and philosophy of religion can take on new forms in light of contemporary physical theories. Here we discuss how the problem of evil is transformed by the Everettian "Many-Worlds" theory of quantum mechanics. We first present an Everettian version of the problem and contrast it to the problem in single-universe physical theories such as Newtonian mechanics and Bohmian mechanics. We argue that, pace Turner (2016) and Zimmerman (2017), the Everettian problem of evil is no more extreme (...) than the Bohmian one. The existence and multiplicity of (morally) terrible branches in the Everettian multiverse in contrast to the mere possibility of them in the Bohmian universe does not entail there is "more evil" in the former than in the latter. Low probability in the Bohmian case and low branch weight in the Everettian case should modulate how we respond to them in exactly the same way. We suggest that the same applies to the divine decision of creating an Everettian multiverse. For an empirically adequate Everettian quantum mechanics that justifies the Born rule, there is no special problem of evil. In order for there to be a special Everettian problem of evil, the Everettian interpretation must already have been exposed to decisive refutation. In the process, we hope to show how attention to the details of physical and metaphysical theories can and should impact the way we think about problems in moral philosophy and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In contemporary Western moral philosophy literature that discusses the Chinese ethical tradition, it is a commonplace practice to use the Chinese term daode 道德 as a technical translation of the English term moral. The present study provides some empirical evidence showing a discrepancy between the terms moral and daode. There is a much more pronounced difference between prototypically immoral and prototypically uncultured behaviors in English (USA) than between prototypically bu daode 不道德 and prototypically bu wenming 不文明 behaviors in Mandarin Chinese (...) (Mainland China). If the Western concept of immorality is defined in contraposition to things that are matters of etiquette or conventional norms and thus tied to a more or less tangible moral / conventional distinction, then we are dealing with a different structure in Mandarin Chinese – the prototypically bu daode and bu wenming behaviors seem to largely overlap. We also discuss whether bu lunli 不倫理 and bu hefa 不合法 can be considered adequate candidates for translation of immorality and we answer in the negative. (shrink)

1. 1.1. Suffering is bad. This is why, ceteris paribus, there are strong moral reasons to prevent suffering. Moreover, typically, those moral reasons are stronger when the amount of suffering at st...

Epicurus famously argued that death cannot be bad for a person because only painful experiences or something that brings about them can be bad for people, but when a person dies, she cannot experience anything at all, let alone pain. If, as Epicurus argued, death is not something bad for us, then presumably, we have no reason to fear it. In contrast with Epicurus, however, contemporary philosophers of death generally subscribe to the deprivation account of the badness of death, which (...) allows that death can be comparatively bad for the one who dies. Still, many deprivation theorists believe that death, as merely comparatively bad, is not a fitting object of fear. Some of them argue that our attitudes would be unfitting if they respond to comparative value; while others contend that fear is not the kind of attitude that tracks comparative value. In this paper, I critically assess these arguments by deprivation theorists, and argue that, contrary to what these theorists claim, their arguments do not entail that death does not merit fear. (shrink)

We are called upon to favor good items and disfavor bad ones, but what about those that are neither good nor bad? Consider the state of a pebble lying unnoticed on a distant planet or a weevil not having a favorite color. If they possess neutral values, they would call upon us to react neutrally. Invoking the intuition that not everything makes normative demands, this paper defends a pluralistic view: among items that are neither good nor bad, some matter in (...) a neutral way and others do not matter at all. The ethical implications of this view are highlighted and discussed. (shrink)

Justin Garson introduces the distinction between two views on Madness we encounter again and again throughout history: Madness as dysfunction, and Madness as strategy. On the latter view, Madness serves some purpose for the person experiencing it, even if it’s simultaneously harmful. The strategy view makes intelligible why Madness often holds a certain allure – even when it’s prima facie terrifying. Moreover, if Madness is a strategy in Garson’s metaphorical sense – if it serves a purpose – it makes sense (...) to use consciously chosen strategies for living with Madness that doesn’t necessarily aim to annihilate or repress it as far as possible. In this paper, we use our own respective stories as case studies. We have both struggled to resist the allure of Madness, and both ended up embracing a kind of Pyrrhonian scepticism about reality instead of clinging to sane reality. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophical discourse, there is a widespread assumption that meaning in life is individual: that it is a value inherent in individual human lives, that the content of this meaning varies from individual to individual, and that it differs in degree based on the individual. Despite these claims, however, objectivist theories of meaningful life have so far failed to do full justice to this assumption of individuality, leading to certain deficiencies and distortions in the understanding of meaningful life. This (...) paper aims to highlight these shortcomings and to explain how the individuality of meaning in life can be better understood within an objectivist framework. This proposed individuality account provides a necessary correction and complement to existing objectivist accounts of meaningful life. The paper demonstrates how the individuality account successfully addresses common shortcomings, withstands various objections, and differs significantly from current approaches. (shrink)

This paper focuses on an underexplored challenge in infinite ethics. On realistic assumptions, if our universe is infinite, every nomologically possible history is actual and nothing we ever do makes a difference to the moral quality of the world as a whole. Call this thought Every History. This paper unpacks Every History and explores some of its ethical implications. Specifically, I argue that if Every History is true and the universe turns out to be infinite (1) our lives are globally (...) insignificant, (2) moral principles enjoining the promotion of value need to be given an appropriately scope-restricted interpretation, and (3) impersonal consequentialism faces a serious challenge. (shrink)

This paper focuses on an underexplored challenge in infinite ethics. On realistic assumptions, if our universe is infinite, every nomologically possible history is actual and nothing we ever do makes a difference to the moral quality of the world as a whole. Call this thought Every History. This paper unpacks Every History and explores some of its ethical implications. Specifically, I argue that if Every History is true and the universe turns out to be infinite (1) our lives are globally (...) insignificant, (2) moral principles enjoining the promotion of value need to be given an appropriately scope-restricted interpretation, and (3) impersonal consequentialism faces a serious challenge. (shrink)

In light of the acquisitiveness, the imperialism, and social hierarchies of the 19th and early 20th centuries, Dewey claims that a new psychology of human nature is required, and that education is the most effective and organized way to bring about this change. In this chapter McBride suggests that Dewey proffers insights into the ways in which impulses, habitual conduct, and social institutions condition and circumscribe the dominant mode of being human (and the ordering principles that enjoin the relations therein). (...) McBride maintains that these Deweyan insights may be helpful in changing the way we conceive human nature. While Dewey himself was not concerned with the reach and effect of Euroamerican techno-industrial coloniality, McBride believes that these particular Deweyan insights could potentially help us to conceive an education-based path toward a decolonial anthropos (human being). (shrink)

I classify emotions in the family of regret, remorse, and so on, in such a way that it is easy to see how there can be further emotions in this family, for which we happened not to have names in English. I describe some of these emotions.

A common idea, both in ordinary discourse and in the desert literature, is that wages can be deserved. The thought is not only highly intuitive, but it is also often appealed to in order to explain various injustices in employment income – pay gaps, for instance. In this paper, I challenge the idea that income from employment is the kind of thing that can be deserved. I argue that once one gets clear on the metaphysics of jobs and wages within (...) the context of economic exchange more generally, there are natural principles concerning such exchanges which generate puzzles for that view. The puzzles, I argue, are especially acute for meritocrats who conceive of justice in wages in terms of desert. Additionally, I argue that appealing to dignity (rather than desert) offers better hope of explaining the kinds of injustices in wages that motivate the appeal to desert. In that case, no explanatory gap is left by abandoning the idea that wages can be deserved either, and so, I argue, we have good reason to doubt it. (shrink)

A standard analysis of moral responsibility states that an agent A is morally responsible for ɸ-ing if and only if it is fitting to have – depending on the nature of ɸ – a negative or positive reactive emotion vis-à-vis A on account of A’s ɸ-ing. Proponents of Alethic views of moral responsibility maintain that the relevant notion of fittingness in the analysis should be understood in terms of accurate representation. The allure of understanding emotional fittingness as representational accuracy arguably (...) stems from the widespread idea that emotions are representational mental states with a mind-to-world direction of fit. Accordingly, defenders of Alethic views argue that the fittingness of a potential reactive emotion is a matter of whether the representational content of that emotion accurately matches the targeted agent. The aim of this paper is to argue against Alethic views of moral responsibility by means of exposing various problems that these accounts face in virtue of their inherent commitment to understand emotional fittingness in terms of representational accuracy. (shrink)

By integrating Bernard Williams’s internalism about reasons with his later thought, this article casts fresh light on internalism and reveals what wider concerns it speaks to. To be consistent with Williams’s later work, I argue, internalism must align with his deference to the phenomenology of moral deliberation and with his critique of ‘moral self-indulgence’. Key to this alignment is the idea that deliberation can express the agent’s motivations without referring to them; and that internalism is not a normative claim, but (...) an example of sense-making from ‘the ethnographic stance’. This leaves a worry over whether moral conviction can coexist with an internalist understanding of reasons. Here too, however, Williams’s later thought provides an answer. Differentiating corrosive from corroborative sense-making, it elucidates how internalism, though not normative, can nonetheless affect our confidence in reason statements, thereby informing how we deliberate and how we address those whose motivations differ from our own. (shrink)

Discussion of Iris Murdoch recalls Socrates' plea that he be allowed a crabwise approach to the Good. What his audience want of a direct approach is an explanation of precisely what sort of thing the Good is, where the demand for precision carries the force of: Tell me now, in which of the categories of thing I already allow to exist is the Good to be found? This is just what academia has done with the obscure singularity of Murdoch – (...) and the comedy of the exercise is the same. (shrink)

In the realm of Philosophical Practice, there remains a lack of clarity surrounding the essential characteristics that define a practice as “philosophical”. This paper aims to establish seven minimal criteria that must be met by a philosophical consultancy in order to be considered genuinely “philosophical”. Additionally, it explores the question of how one can assess the quality of such a philosophical consultancy. I provide a (non-exhaustive) answer from an Aristotelian point of view, according to which goodness is a matter of (...) balance. In the context of philosophical consultancy, the consultant should find this balance in two respects: first, between their concern for the topic and their concern for the individual seeking counsel, and, secondly, between a hermeneutical and a critical attitude in dialogue. Finally, I present a visual representation of my findings that can serve as a tool for evaluating whether a consultancy is philosophical and whether it is balanced. __ En el ámbito de la práctica filosófica, sigue habiendo una falta de claridad en torno a las características esenciales que definen una práctica como "filosófica". Este artículo pretende establecer siete criterios mínimos que debe cumplir una consultoría filosófica para ser considerada genuinamente "filosófica". Además, explora la cuestión de cómo se puede evaluar la calidad de dicha consultoría filosófica. Aporto una respuesta (no exhaustiva) desde un punto de vista aristotélico, según el cual la bondad es una cuestión de equilibrio. En el contexto de la consultoría filosófica, el consultor debe encontrar este equilibrio en dos aspectos: en primer lugar, entre su preocupación por el tema y su preocupación por el individuo que busca consejo, y, en segundo lugar, entre una actitud hermenéutica y una actitud crítica en el diálogo. Por último, presento una representación visual de mis conclusiones que puede servir de herramienta para evaluar si una consultoría es filosófica y si está equilibrada. (shrink)

This article presents a new argument against many forms of moral and prudential value incompleteness. The argument relies on two central principles: (i) a weak "negative dominance" principle, to the effect that Lottery 1 is better than Lottery 2 only if some possible outcome of Lottery 1 is better than some possible outcome of Lottery 2, and (ii) a weak form of ex ante Pareto, to the effect that, if Lottery 1 gives an unambiguously better (stochastically dominant) prospect to some (...) individuals than Lottery 2, and equally good prospects to everyone else, then Lottery 1 is better than Lottery 2. Given modest auxiliary assumptions, these two principles rule out incompleteness in the prudential ranking of individual lives, and many forms of incompleteness in the moral rankings of outcomes and lotteries. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the concept of attentional scaffolds and show the resemblance between social media platforms and slot machines, both functioning as hostile attentional scaffolds. The first section establishes the groundwork for the concept of attentional scaffolds and draws parallels to the mechanics of slot machines, to argue that social media platforms aim to capture users’ attention to maximize engagement through a system of intermittent rewards. The second section shifts focus to the interplay between emotions and attention, revealing (...) how online attentional capture through emotionally triggering stimuli leads to distraction. The final section elucidates the collective implications of scaffolding attention through social media platforms. The examination of phenomena such as emotional contagion and the emergence of group emotions underscores the transition from individual experiences to shared collective outcomes. Employing online moral outrage as a case study, we illustrate how negative emotions serve as scaffolds for individuals’ attention, propagate within social groups, and give rise to collective attitudes. (shrink)

Abstract: One approach to alignment with human values in AI and robotics is to engineer artiTicial systems isomorphic with human beings. The idea is that robots so designed may autonomously align with human values through similar developmental processes, to realize project ideal conditions through iterative interaction with social and object environments just as humans do, such as are expressed in narratives and life stories. One persistent problem with human value orientation is that different human beings champion different values as ideal, (...) meaning that the values to which an AI should be aligned are ambiguous. Prior work considered human development of purpose and source of meaning in life in terms of project ideal conditions, in effect establishing lifelong value orientations according to which intermediate situations are evaluated. The present work compares views on motivating values from St. Augustine and from popular cognitive science. These accounts are described as divergent error theories which present to their proponents as mutually exclusive yet accurate accounts of personal experience due to differential development of variable innate potentials. SpeciTically, the hypothesis proposed is that differential development of spindle neural projections establishes enduring connections between prior established relatively immediate routine processes entrained during childhood and prioritized in popular cognitive science, and later developing higher-level social and self-processes entrained during adolescence and emphasized in Augustine's account, with these projections hard-wiring lifelong motivating value orientations more or less inaccessible to modiTication through material interaction. Robot experiments informed by this study may evaluate variable value orientation by design, with for example autonomous robots developing motivating associations with temporally distal project ideal conditions through love for humanity, as described by Augustine, and others pursuing adaptive Tit to passing norms consistent with popular contemporary accounts. (shrink)

This article offers a novel interpretation of enacted knowledge through the lens of Wang Yangming’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action. By framing Wang’s concept of knowledge within an enactive model, it advances a holistic perspective that integrates mind, body, and world, as well as knowledge and action, into a unified whole. To bridge historical analysis with contemporary philosophical discourse, this article engages in dialogue with Harvey Lederman’s introspective model, offering a complementary framework that, together, provides a more (...) precise and comprehensive understanding of Wang’s philosophy. Moving beyond Lederman’s dichotomy of correspondence and identity, I introduce a third interpretation of “unity”: the Continuum Thesis. This interpretation places a more fundamental focus on the original condition of moral knowledge, presenting it as a singular entity that inherently integrates the distinct aspects of knowledge and action. By asserting that “action just is knowledge,” Wang indeed affirmed their original unity. (shrink)

Joseph Raz (1939–2022) was a towering figure in late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century analytical philosophy. His work in moral, political, and legal philosophy profoundly influenced the discipline, informing debates about practical reasoning, value theory, foundations of liberalism, personal autonomy, perfectionism, the nature of authority, theories of rights, free expression, multiculturalism, the nature of promises, the rule of law, toleration and pluralism, and the nature of law, among others. This collection—the product of two highly selective, international conferences held in Raz’s honor (...) soon after his passing—pays tribute to Raz’s enormous influence in moral, political, and legal philosophy. The collected essays all engage with Raz’s work, but not necessarily as critiques or interpretations of his work. The collection is a testament to Raz’s impact, direct and indirect, on a wide range of philosophical issues and on a large and diverse set of philosophical communities. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers are attracted by the Indispensability Claim, according to which emotions are indispensable in acquiring knowledge of some important values. The truth of this claim is often thought to depend on that of Emotional Dogmatism, the view that emotions justify evaluative judgements because they (seem to) make us aware of the relevant values. The aim of this paper is to show that the Indispensability Claim does not stand or fall with Emotional Dogmatism and that there is actually an attractive (...) alternative way of developing it. We first argue that the Indispensability Claim requires a deflationary account of the cognitive bases of emotions, which we call the Simple View and defend against a variety of criticisms. Armed with the Simple View, we show that the Indispensability Claim is made true by three roles of the emotions: they help us access the relevant evidence, provide a needed hook-up between evidence and judgement, and contribute to evaluative understanding. (shrink)

تقترب التقاليد الفلسفية من الأخلاق اعتمادًا بشكل أساسي على المفاهيم والنظريات الميتافيزيقية واللاهوتية. ومن بين مفاهيم الأخلاق التقليدية، يُعتبر نظرية الأمر الإلهي (DCT) الأكثر بروزًا. وفقًا لهذه النظرية، يمنح الله الأسس الأخلاقية للبشرية من خلال الخلق والوحي. الأخلاق والألوهية لا ينفصلان منذ أقدم الحضارات. هذه المفاهيم تنغمس في إطار لاهوتي وتُقبل بشكل واسع من قبل معظم أتباع التقاليد الإبراهيمية الثلاثة: اليهودية، المسيحية، والإسلام، التي تشمل الجزء الأكبر من سكان العالم. وبما أن نظرية الأمر الإلهي تعتمد على الإيمان والوحي كأساس، فهي (...) ليست خاضعة تمامًا للإثبات العلمي. وقد حاول معارضو التصور الأخلاقي المستند إلى الأمر الإلهي، بناءً على استحالة إثبات افتراضاته الميتافيزيقية والدينية، لعدة قرون (وإن كان ذلك دون نجاح) تقليل أهميته. واستندوا إلى الحجة القائلة بأنه لا يظهر أدلة مادية ولا اتساقًا منطقيًا، ولهذا السبب، لا يمكن اعتباره لأغراض علمية أو فلسفية. إنه مجرد اعتقاد، ويجب فهمه كذلك. إلى جانب هذه المعارضة الشديدة، هناك العديد من المفاهيم الأخرى التي تعارض نظريات الأمر الإلهي، بطريقة أو بأخرى، جزئيًا أو كليًا. العديد من الفلاسفة والعلماء الاجتماعيين، بدءًا من الفلسفة اليونانية الكلاسيكية وحتى يومنا هذا، على سبيل المثال، يؤكدون أن الأخلاق مجرد بناء، وبالتالي فهي نسبية ثقافيًا ومحددة ثقافيًا. ومع ذلك، يثير هذا العديد من النقاشات الأخرى ويفرض تحديًا لتحديد معنى الثقافة، وأي عناصر من الثقافة تُعتبر محددة أخلاقيًا، وأخيرًا، ما هي حدود هذه النسبية. يدعي الحتميون الأخلاقيون أن كل شيء يتعلق بالسلوك البشري، بما في ذلك الأخلاق، محدد مسبقًا، نظرًا لعدم وجود إرادة حرة. وفي الآونة الأخيرة، جادل المفكرون الحديثون بأن هناك علمًا صارمًا للأخلاق. ومع ذلك، فإن المنهج العلمي وحده، رغم تفسيره للعديد من الحقائق والأدلة، لا يمكنه إلقاء الضوء على المحتوى الكامل والمعنى الشامل للأخلاق. فهم الأخلاق يتطلب تصورًا أوسع، واتفاقًا بين الفلاسفة، وهو أمر لم يتحقق أبدًا. كل هذه الأسئلة تأخذ أشكالًا مختلفة اعتمادًا على كل اتجاه فلسفي، وتبدأ تحليلات معقدة ونقاشات لا تنتهي، حيث أن العديد منها يتضارب بشكل متبادل. الكون والأجواء المحيطة بهذه الأطروحات هي ميادين كل هذه الصراعات المفاهيمية، التي تُلاحظ من منظور موضوعي وتطوري. بغض النظر عن هذه الظروف وأهميتها الجوهرية، فإن هذه الأسئلة بعيدة كل البعد عن النهج المنهجي لمناقشة تحليلية حول الأخلاق الموضوعية، وهو بالفعل هدف ونطاق هذا العمل. يجب علينا استعراض هذه النظريات التقليدية البارزة باختصار لأن هذه الأطروحة تحتوي على دراسة مقارنة، وفرضياتها تختلف على الأقل بشكل عميق عن جميع النظريات التقليدية. لذلك، يصبح من الضروري تقديم عناصر مباشرة ومحددة للمقارنة للقارئ، لأجل النقد الصحيح، دون الحاجة إلى أبحاث مقاطعة. ومع ذلك، حتى عند استعراض النظريات التقليدية، لأغراض هذا العرض المقارن والنقدي، ستظل هذه النظريات جانبًا من اهتماماتنا الرئيسية، كـ"مواد خارجية". بغض النظر عن صحة أي أو جميع عناصر هذا النقاش، ومعناها كجزء من الكون الفلسفي لهذه الأطروحة، فإن الغرض من هذا العمل هو إثبات وتبرير وجود ومعنى النماذج الأخلاقية البدائية التي نشأت مباشرة من الاحتياجات الاجتماعية الأولى وجهود البقاء. هذه النماذج هي تعريف الأساس الأساسي للأخلاق، وارتباطها باللاوعي الجمعي والتنظيم المنطقي المقابل لها وانتقالها إلى المراحل التطورية للجينوم البشري وعلاقات الزمان والمكان المختلفة، بغض النظر عن أي تجربة معاصرة للأفراد. النظام الذي تحدده هذه النماذج يشكل نموذجًا اجتماعيًا تطوريًا للبشر. هل هذا موقف ميتاأخلاقي؟ نعم، هو كذلك. وعلاوة على ذلك، كما هو الحال في أي تفكير ميتاأخلاقي، يجب علينا أن نبحث بعناية عن أفضل الطرق وأكثرها اتساقًا، كما تقدمها الفلسفة التحليلية. وبالتالي، يجب أن يُظهر هذا العمل بشكل معقول أن الأخلاق ليست نتاجًا ثقافيًا للإنسان المتحضر أو المجتمعات الحديثة، وأنه على الرغم من خضوعها للعديد من الإضافات والطرح الثقافي النسبي، فإن أسسها الأساسية هي نماذج بدائية ولم تتغير هيكليًا أبدًا. هذا التفكير يستنتج أن الأخلاق هي صفة أصلية لـ"الإنسان العاقل"، فهي ليست ملكية ولا حادثة: إنها تدمج جوهر الإنسان وتنتمي إلى مجال الهوية الأنطولوجية للإنسان. الظاهرة البشرية هي عملية مستمرة، تلعب دورها بين التحديد العشوائي والإرادة الحرة، ويجب أن نتساءل كيف بدأت الأخلاق وكيف وصلت إلينا في الحاضر. -/- . (shrink)

An often-cited convention for discovery-oriented behavioral science research states that the general relative seriousness of the antecedently accepted false positive error rate of α = 0.05 be mirrored by a false negative error rate of β = 0.20. In 1965, Jacob Cohen proposed this convention to decrease a β-error rate typically in vast excess of 0.20. Thereby, we argue, Cohen (unintentionally) contributed to the wide acceptance of strongly uneven error rates in behavioral science. Although Cohen’s convention can appear epistemically reasonable (...) for an individual researcher, the comparatively low probability that published effect size estimates are replicable renders his convention unreasonable for an entire scientific field. Appreciating Cohen’s convention helps to understand why even error rates (α = β) are “non-conventional” in behavioral science today, and why Cohen’s explanatory reason for β = 0.20—that resource restrictions keep from collecting larger samples—can easily be mistaken for the justificatory reason it is not. (shrink)

The picture theory of disability shows how the irremediable impediment to daily living tasks or goals can be ‘pictured’, and how a linguistic analysis of that picture can be used to represent the experience of disability. Technically constituting a species of ‘relational approach’ due to its consideration of the interplay between an individual and their environment, the theory differs from other relational accounts by focusing on the nature of the experience rather than the function of the relationship. The main deviation (...) from other theories of disability is in the conceptual shift away from a ‘nounal’ interpretation of disability in which disability is that which is caused or embodied, to an ‘adverbial’ description in which disability is experienced as a personally irremediable impediment to daily living tasks or goals. This chapter overviews the picture theory of disability, positions it within a broader disability theory context, and critically analyses it. (shrink)

Contemporary scholarship is divided over whether Anselm maintains a version of Eudaemonism. The debate centers on the question of whether the will for justice only moderates the will for happiness or, instead, provides a distinct end for which to act. Because of two key passages, various scholars hold that Anselm maintained elements of medieval Eudaemonism. In this article, I argue that Anselm separates morality from happiness, and I provide a sketch of his alternative view. First, I argue against some recent (...) perspectives that Anselm maintained Eudaemonism. To do so, I provide a non-Eudaemonist reading of the two key passages and show how Eudaemonist readings are lacking in different respects. Second, I examine what this argument means for Anselm’s understanding of happiness and moral obligation. While there are some Eudaemonist themes in Anselm’s thinking, he flatly denies and revises aspects of the system. (shrink)

In Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers argues, among other things, that: if we are living in a full-scale simulation, we would still enjoy broad swathes of knowledge about non-psychological entities, such as atoms and shrubs; and, our lives might still be deeply meaningful. Chalmers views these claims as at least weakly connected: The former claim helps forestall a concern that if objects in the simulation are not genuine (and so not knowable), then life in the (...) simulation is illusory and therefore, not as valuable as a non-simulated life. Taking up these questions, I argue that in general, the value of social knowledge for a meaningful life dramatically swamps the value of non-social knowledge for a meaningful life. Along the way, I propose a non-additive model of the meaningfulness of life, according to which the overall effect of some potential contributor of value to a life depends in part on what is already in a life. One upshot is that the vindication of non-social knowledge, absent a correlative vindication of social knowledge, contributes either not at all or scarcely at all to the claim that our lives in the simulation might be deeply meaningful. This is so even though the vindication of non-social knowledge does forestall the concern that in the simulation, our lives might be wholly meaningless. (shrink)

Welfare subjectivists face a dilemma. On the one hand, traditional subjectivist theories—such as the desire-fulfillment theory—are too permissive to account for the well-being of typical mature human beings. On the other hand, more “refined” theories—such as the life-satisfaction theory—are too restrictive to account for the well-being of various welfare subjects, including newborns, those with profound cognitive impairments, or non-human animals. This paper examines a class of welfare subjectivism that addresses this dilemma with sensitivity to the diversity in welfare subjects. First, (...) the most-sophisticated-attitude view (MSA) is introduced. MSA holds that an object, x, is good for a subject, S, in proportion to the strength of S’s pro-attitude towards x if and only if the pro-attitude at issue is S’s most sophisticated type. Typically, the well-being of typical mature human beings is assessed in terms of one’s authentic whole-life satisfaction, whereas that of human newborns is assessed in terms of something less sophisticated such as pleasure. MSA offers the rationale for this difference based on an underexplored version of perfectionism: procedural perfectionism. Next, provided that MSA may involve an implausibly strong claim, this paper examines two moderate variations of MSA that accept the partial relevance of less sophisticated types of valenced attitude. Finally, it is illustrated how MSA and its variations have plausible implications regarding the well-being of enhanced or dis-enhanced people. (shrink)

Emil Lask provides the bridge from Kant to phenomenology but also from Kant to Kyoto School philosophy. Heidegger and Nishida, contemporaneously but independently, took Lask's collapsing of Neo-Kantian hylomorphism in distinct directions. They accepted Lask's anti-subjectivism while moving beyond his object-centrism. Heidegger broadened Lask's notion of lived experience in the direction of the "horizon" explicated in terms of temporality. Nishida takes it in terms of a pre-objective "predicate,” indicative of the "place" wherein beings, objects, grammatical subjects are implaced. Both assume (...) "world" as contextual (back)ground. The essay thus examines Heidegger and Nishida in light of Lask as a common source. In the conclusion I also address a few other related issues surrounding their relationship to Neo-Kantianism and transcendental philosophy in general. (shrink)

The value alignment problem for artificial intelligence (AI) asks how we can ensure that the “values”—i.e., objective functions—of artificial systems are aligned with the values of humanity. In this paper, I argue that linguistic communication is a necessary condition for robust value alignment. I discuss the consequences that the truth of this claim would have for research programmes that attempt to ensure value alignment for AI systems—or, more loftily, those programmes that seek to design robustly beneficial or ethical artificial agents.

In this Handbook, philosophers from around the world address the metaphysics, epistemology, and value of psychoactive (mind-altering) drug use. In so doing, they attempt to answer questions such as: What does the fact of drug-induced mind-altering experiences tell us about natures of the mind, free will, and God? What does it tell us about what, and how, we can know? Are drug-induced mind-altering experiences valuable, morally, aesthetically, or otherwise? Is the acquisition of drug-induced mind-altering experiences ever immoral? Should the acquisition (...) of drug-induced mind-altering experiences ever be legally prohibited? The Handbook gives an overview of the current research, and sets the stage for future directions in philosophical thought relating to psychoactive drug use. (shrink)

This dissertation answers the three value problems in epistemology. These three problems require an answer as to how knowledge is more valuable 1) than mere true belief, 2) any of the proper subsets of knowledge, and 3) in kind than that which falls short of knowledge. The methodology used to provide an answer to these problems relies on the arguments put forth in a rarely discussed paper from Ward Jones. In short, the Jonesian approach can be summed up as the (...) view that epistemic axiology and analysis ought to be kept separate. The Jonesian framework instead looks outside of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge to find properties of knowledge which, though contingent, can explain the distinctive value of knowledge. Thisframework, though remarkably robust, requires going against what I consider to be the orthodox approach to the problems. This orthodox approach relies on two axiological assumptions. The first is that every component of an analysis on knowledge must provide independent value to knowledge. The second assumption is that the value of knowledge cannot be derived from factors excluded from an analysis of knowledge. Once these assumptions are appropriately discarded, the Jonesian view has a straightforward answer to the first problem. Answering the second requires assessing Jonathan Kvanvig’s claim that a satisfied Gettier condition contributes no independent value. While I agree with Kvanvig regarding a satisfied Gettier condition, I will argue that an unsatisfied Gettier condition is not likewise neutral; it contributes disvalue. With that distinction in place, a solution to the second problem follows immediately. The third value problem, however, is a different kind of problem altogether. Answering it requires not only the Jonesian framework, but also a novel account of how we determine final value. Once this account is offered, a Jonesian answer to the tertiary problem follows immediately. This dissertation closes by applying the Jonesian framework to an argument that claims there can be no modal conditions on knowledge due to such conditions failing to help answer the value problems. This claim will be found wanting. (shrink)

Our reasons for emotions such as sadness, anger, resentment, and guilt often remain long after we cease experiencing these emotions. This is puzzling. If the reasons for these emotions persist, why do the emotions not persist? Does this constitute a failure to properly respond to our reasons? In this paper we provide a solution to this puzzle. Our solution turns on the close connection between the rationality of emotion and the rationality of attention, together with the differing reasons to which (...) attention and emotion are properly responsive. (shrink)

A philosopher’s case for the importance of good—if ethically questionable—humor. A good sense of humor is key to the good life, but a joke taken too far can get anyone into trouble. Where to draw the line is not as simple as it may seem. After all, even the most innocent quips between friends rely on deception, sarcasm, and stereotypes and often run the risk of disrespect, meanness, and harm. How do we face this dilemma without taking ourselves too seriously? (...) In Wisecracks, philosopher David Shoemaker examines this interplay between humor and morality and ultimately argues that even morally suspect humor is an essential part of ethical life. Shoemaker shows how improvised “wisecracks” between family and friends—unlike scripted stand-up, sketches, or serials—help us develop a critical human skill: the ability to carry on and find the funny in tragedy. In developing a new ethics of humor in defense of questionable gibes, Wisecracks offers a powerful case for humor as a healing presence in human life. (shrink)

The cosmic perspective (or view sub specie aeternitatis) is associated with concerns about the meaning of life, our significance in the universe, and the universe’s indifference. I suggest that there is another important and common, albeit tacit, concern related to the cosmic view. Adopting the cosmic view can justifiably bring about a sense of disconnection from one’s life. Moreover, many of the explicit concerns we have regarding the cosmic view are issues that have a rational bearing upon this sense of (...) disconnection. As I argue, issues concerning our normative reasons (viewed from the cosmic perspective), our cosmic significance, and the universe’s vastness and indifference all warrant a sense of disconnectedness from our lives. At least, such disconnection is warranted for the duration of our attentive engagement with the cosmic view. But in small enough doses, this can be a good thing. The cosmic view and the sense of disconnection it brings about can foster experiences of awe. Awe, in turn, can promote a greater feeling of connection to the world around us and make us, as Bertrand Russell (1935/1973) would put it, less ‘trivial’ and ‘arrogant.’. (shrink)

تقديم: في الحاجة إلى الترجمة في قضايا علوم التربية. الدكتور الصديق الصادقي العماري. باحث في علم الاجتماع. وجدت التربية مع وجود الحياة الإنسانية، وهي ظاهرة اجتماعية بامتياز عرفها الإنسان منذ أن وطئت قدماه الأرض، كما أنها كانت موضوع اهتمام الأديان عبر العصور والأزمنة، وهذا يدل على دورها الفاعل والهام في تطوير الشعوب والأمم وتقدمها. وقد عرفت تطورات نوعية وكيفية عميقة جنبا إلى جنب مع التحولات الاقتصادية والثقافية والاجتماعية والسياسية... إلى أن أصبحت علما بل علوما متعددة ومتنوعة، وكذلك من بين التخصصات (...) التي تدرس في الجامعات والمعاهد العامة والخاصة، وبذلك أضحت عابرة للقارات ولا تعترف بالحدود الجغرافية والعلمية. وقد عرف عالم اليوم ثورة علمية ومعلوماتية بفعل العولمة التي اخترقت كل الحدود القومية، مما وضع النظم التربوية أمام ضرورة اعتماد منهج تربوي قويم كفيل بأن يخلق نوعا من التوازن داخل المجتمع الذي أصبح مفقودا نتيجة أزمات متعددة، خاصة أزمة القيم التي أفرزت مشاكل اجتماعية متعددة كالانحرافات بكل أشكالها والأمية الوظيفية بالخصوص وغيرها من المشكلات التي احتار المختصون في حلها. حيث أصبح لزاما علينا اليوم الانفتاح على تجارب إنسانية تربوية عالمية ناجحة أثبتت نجاعتها في الواقع، عن طريق الترجمة والتفكيك والتحليل والتفسير والتأويل، وتفادي النظرة الضيقة للتربية والتعليم التي تبقى حبيسة الصراعات والأيديولوجيات المحلية. ساهمت الترجمة في الانفتاح والتواصل بين الثقافات على اختلاف أنواعها، حيث لعبت دورا كبيرا في تقليص هوة الاختلاف والصراع بين الشعوب والأمم، وتوحيد المعرفة العلمية ومناهج وتقنيات بنائها بجميع اللغات، حيث تؤدي ترجمة المصطلحات والمفاهيم في أي تخصص علمي إلى إغنائه وتوضيح رؤيته أكثر. وتخصص علوم التربية ليس بمعزل عن هذه الصناعة، إلا أن الغرب عرف تجارب كبيرة في مجال التأليف والإنتاج العلمي في موضوع التربية عكس العرب. وتتأسس علوم التربية على العديد من المصطلحات العلمية التي تحدد هويتها وتتحكم في فعاليتها ونجاعتها، من ضمنها نذكر التربية والمقاربة والتعليم والبيداغوجيا والديدكتيك والتقويم والتقييم والمنهاج والبرنامج والمحتوى والدعم والكفاية والقدرة والمهارة وغيرها كثير، والتي تختلف في معانيها ودلالاتها من باحث أكاديمي إلى آخر، حسب طبيعة المدرسة الفكرية التي ينتمي إليها، ونوع التخصص الذي ينتصر إليه وغيرها من المحددات. ///// Editions Revue Brochures Educatives منشورات مجلة كراسات تربوية سلسلة كتب جماعية رقم 02. (shrink)

This chapter explores the hidden depths beneath the vibrant veneer of AppleTV's breakout, award-winning sitcom – Ted Lasso. Ted Lasso depicts several flavors of toxic masculinity. Toxic masculinity is the wrong path, clearly a moral vice. It encourages harmful behavior, such as sexual assault and domestic violence. Toxic masculinity has also been found to harm men, increasing rates of depression, stress, and substance abuse, as well as alcoholism, cancer, and sexually transmitted infections. In contrast, Ted Lasso consistently depicts positive masculinity (...) as balancing traditionally masculine and feminine traits. (shrink)

Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances intrinsic value is in tension with another deeply plausible and widely held thesis, namely the thesis that there is a pro (...) tanto reason to promote the good. It is argued that there is a second, distinct type of uniqueness that plays a more interesting and important axiological role: uniqueness imparts irreplaceable value. This gives occasion to develop the surprisingly undertheorized notion of irreplaceable value. (shrink)

This essay accomplishes two goals. First, I explore Husserl’s study of “tension” from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest,” to reveal that it comprises his de facto first analysis of instinct. Husserl there describes tension as the innate pull to execute ever new objectifications. He clarifies this pull of objectification by contrasting it to affective and volitional experiences. This analysis surprisingly prefigures a theory of drive-feelings and anticipates the idea that consciousness is both teleological and (...) autotelic. Second, I show how Husserl’s de facto account of instincts from 1893 inspires his robust philosophy of instincts from Studies concerning the Structures of Consciousness and other late manuscripts. While Husserl maintains many 1893 insights, he now claims that the instinct towards objectification comprises affective and volitional moments. Finally, I demonstrate that Husserl’s analyses of instincts throughout his life are united by the idea that consciousness possesses an essential structural lack. (shrink)

The development of AI appears to be not only rendering humans obsolete, but in being empowered could decide that humans should be eliminated for the benefit of life and the conditions for its own future. Given the behaviour of humans, this could be seen as a relief to the rest of terrestrial life, as Günter Grass suggested in his novel, The Rat. While there are many reasons to support this contention, in this paper I argue that humans do have the (...) potential to augment rather than undermine terrestrial life, a potential celebrated by the subordinated tradition of the Radical Enlightenment. Rather than accepting the demise of humanity, it is now time to put the Radical Enlightenment into practice. (shrink)

Philosophers struggle to explain why human beings with deep cognitive impairments have a higher moral status than certain non-human animals. Modal personism promises to solve this problem. It claims that humans who lack the capacities of “personhood” and the potential to develop them nonetheless could have been persons. I argue that modal personism has poor prospects because it's hard to see how we could offer a plausible account of modal personhood. I search for an adequate understanding of modal personhood by (...) considering existing accounts and sketching new ones. But each account fails, either because it objectionably excludes some deeply cognitively impaired humans from the class of modal persons or because it makes modal personhood doubtfully relevant to moral status. And the modal personist cannot solve this problem by appealing to the misfortune suffered by modal persons. (shrink)