Value Theory, Miscellaneous

Reasons are essentially addressed to agents. Many contemporary efforts to illuminate this feature of reasons effectively reduce them to features of agents, e.g., to rationally-pruned desires, plans, or roles. Such reductive accounts neglect a second feature of reasons, namely, their capacity to transcend agential nature. They also neglect a feature of agents, namely, their orientation to normative entities as entities that transcend—and thus, that can guide and give shape to—agential nature. This dissertation offers a conception of the relation running from (...) reasons to agents that captures both the transcendent character of reasons and the transcended character of agents. -/- I synthesize two strains of thought about reasons. The first captures their formal dependence on agency, which is manifested in each reason’s being essentially a reason for some agent to do or think something. The second captures their substantive independence from agency, which is manifested in the fact that reasons needn’t answer to what agents are like. These two strains of thought can be united in a single conception, but only if the elaboration of the formal features of reasons isn’t taken to license the reduction of reasons to features of agents. In fact, unifying the two in a single conception requires that the relevant agential features be themselves depicted as formally dependent on features of reasons, so that the explanatory landscape for the philosophy of reasons and agents is properly represented in terms of the symmetric relations of a circle, rather than the asymmetric relations of reduction. -/- This refusal to reduce is best framed by primitivism about reasons, i.e., the view that characterizes the idea of reason as primitive. But such a primitivism must nevertheless supply the materials for an account of the practical thought by which agents can receive reasons as addressed to them. I seek to demonstrate how an idea can be primitive while at the same time supplying those materials, and thereby explaining the possibility of practical thought. (shrink)

Which entities should the desire theory of well-being deem basically good for you—good for you in the most fundamental way? On the object view, what is basically good for you when one of your desires is satisfied is the object of that desire. On the combo view, what is basically good for you when one of your desires is satisfied is the combination or conjunction of the object of that desire and the fact that you have that desire. I argue (...) that which of these views the desire theory accepts makes no difference to what it implies about anyone’s amount of well-being. Then, I consider the main arguments that have been given for the superiority of one or the other of those two views. Finding none of those arguments persuasive, I conclude that we lack good grounds for rejecting the initial impression that it would be natural to have about those views: that it does not matter which of them the desire theory accepts. (shrink)

Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the billiards rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...) normativity”: (1) that motivation for it originates in a parochial conception of “normative flavours”; (2) that arguments against alternative ways of explaining e.g., morality’s importance are overblown; and (3) that there are strong reasons against theorizing in terms of “authoritative normativity”. The overarching aim is not to show that “authoritative normativity” is incoherent or entirely unmotivated. Rather, it is to discuss some of “authoritative normativity’s” deeper commitments to correct the impression that is it largely benign or that it is entailed by familiar and popular “metanormative” positions. Authoritative normativity, it seems to us, is a solution in search of a problem. (shrink)

Critical notice of Guy Fletcher's 'Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse' and Dale Dorsey's 'A Theory of Prudence'.

Shelly Kagan notices in a recent, influential paper how philosophers of well-being tend to neglect ill-being—the part of the theory of well-being that tells us what is bad in itself for subjects—and explains why we need to give it more attention. This paper does its part by addressing the question, If desire satisfaction is good, what is the corresponding bad? The two most discussed ill-being options for theories on which desire satisfaction is a basic good are the Frustration View and (...) the Aversion View. I aim to show that the Frustration View is more plausible than Kagan and others think; to introduce and evaluate two additional desire-oriented theories of ill-being worth considering, the Pluralist View and the Deflationary View; and to present a new line of argument for the Aversion View. (shrink)

What is the best way to account for the badness of pain and what sort of theory of welfare is best suited to accommodate this view? I argue that unpleasant sensory experiences are prudentially bad in the absence of contrary attitudes, but good when the object of positive attitudes. Pain is bad unless it is liked, enjoyed, valued etc. Interestingly, this view is incompatible with either pure objectivist or pure subjectivist understandings of welfare. However, there is a kind of welfare (...) theory that can incorporate this view of the badness of pain and which is very, very close to being a form of subjectivism. Moreover, this hybrid account of welfare is entirely compatible with the deep motivations of subjectivism. I therefore argue that those who lean towards welfare subjectivism should adopt this account of pain, and that we should revise our understanding of subjectivism to count such theories as subjective. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question whether or not philosophical discourse can avail the categories of the scientific image. I argue that the clash of the images is bet- ter understood on the semantic rather than the ontologic level and that it results from the challenge to the representational adequacy of the categories tha articulate the conceptual repertoires of the manifest image. A challenge that will be met by a succesful recategoriza- tion of the concept of a person in the scientific (...) image. I suggest some reasons to believe that such a recategoritazion is possible in principle without dismantling the philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Precise measurements of well-being would be of profound societal importance. Yet, the sceptical worry that we cannot use social science instruments and tests to measure well-being is widely discussed by philosophers and scientists. A recent and interesting philosophical argument has pointed to the psychometric procedures of construct validation to address this sceptical worry. The argument has proposed that these procedures could warrant confidence in our ability to measure well-being. The present paper evaluates whether this type of argument succeeds. The answer (...) is that it depends on which methodological background assumptions are motivating the sceptical worry to begin with. We show this by doing two things. First, we clarify (a) the different types of well-being theories involved in the science of well-being, and (b) the general methodological dimensions of well-being theorising. Second, we apply these distinctions and argue that construct validation is an unsuccessful response to measurement scepticism if this scepticism is motivated by a form of methodological non-naturalism. In the light of this, the overall point of the paper is that philosophers and scientists, when discussing measurement of well-being, should explicate their deeper methodological commitments. We further suggest that making such explicit commitments might present philosophers with a dilemma. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a fundamental but under-appreciated distinction between two ways of understanding the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being. According to proactive desire satisfactionism, a person is benefited by the acquisition of new satisfied desires. According to reactive desire satisfactionism, a person can be benefited only by the satisfaction of their existing desires. I first offer an overview of this distinction. I then canvass several ways of developing a general formulation of desire satisfactionism that would capture the reactive view, (...) and argue that all come with significant costs. (shrink)

Why are pains bad for us? A natural answer is that it is just because of how they feel (or their felt-qualities). But this answer is cast into doubt by cases of people who are unbothered by certain pains of theirs. These pains retain their felt-qualities, but do not seem bad for the people in question. In this paper, I offer a new response to this problem. I argue that in such cases, the pains in question have become ‘just more (...) of the same’, and for this reason have ceased to be bad for the relevant individuals. It is because they (implicitly) recognise this that they are unbothered by such pains. (shrink)

This paper explores the relations between self-esteem and competition. Self-esteem is a very important good and competition is a widespread phenomenon. They are commonly linked, as people often seek self-esteem through success in competition. Although competition in fact generates valuable consequences and can to some extent foster self-esteem, empirical research suggests that competition has a strong tendency to undermine self-esteem. To be sure, competition is not the source of all problematic deficits in self-esteem, and it can arise for, or undercut (...) goods other than self-esteem. But the relation between competition and access to self-esteem is still significant, and it is worth asking how we might foster a desirable distribution of the latter in the face of difficulties created by the former. That is the question addressed in this paper. The approach I propose neither recommends self-denial nor the uncritical celebration of the rat race. It charts instead a solidaristic path to support the social conditions of the self-esteem of each individual. The paper proceeds as follows. I start, in section 2, by clarifying key concepts involved in the discussion. In section 3, I identify ten mechanisms that support individuals' self-esteem and impose limits on competition. I focus, in particular, on the challenges faced by people in their practices of work. In section 4, I outline prudential and moral arguments to justify the use of the proposed mechanisms. Section 5 concludes with remarks on the role of social criticism in the processes of change implementing the mechanisms. (shrink)

Does martial arts practice contribute to psychological well-being in professional martial artists? If so, what are the specific ways that martial arts practice accomplishes this? It has been a long-standing and widely held belief that martial arts practice can contribute to psychological well-being, however, there has been a lack of empirical research in the psychological literature focused on investigating the details of this hypothesis. The purpose of this research is therefore to investigate the impact of a paradigmatic martial arts practice—shadowboxing—on (...) the psychological well-being of professional martial artists. In this article I present the results from an original empirical study on professional Muay Thai practitioners (n = 14) that reveals how a martial arts practice (shadowboxing) contributes to their overall psychological well-being by contributing to their positive emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning, and accomplishment. I present general results for how shadowboxing contributes to the psychological well-being of these professional martial artists overall, as well as more specific results for how shadowboxing contributes to the psychological well-being of these professional martial artists based on factors such as their gender, fight experience, and training location. This article also provides qualitative first-person reports from professional Muay Thai practitioners (n = 14) about their use of visualization and mental imagery and their experience of flow while shadowboxing, offering unique insight into the minds of professional martial artists as they are actively engaged in their craft. Finally, this article discusses the value and limitations of the present study and outlines suggestions for future research. (shrink)

This essay draws on Heidegger’s account of technology and boredom and argues that the smartphone reveals a new kind of loneliness – profound loneliness. I examine three features of modern life – authenticity, boredom, and loneliness – and ask if any of these modes of being are the poièsis of the smartphone. I introduce three historical types of loneliness – primordial loneliness, existential loneliness, and profound loneliness. Whereas modern, industrialized life makes existential loneliness possible, the smartphone reveals our capacity for (...) profound loneliness. Like profound boredom, profound loneliness is “inconspicuous and wide-ranging,” concealed from us, hidden from view. Profound loneliness isolates us from everything, including ourselves. I also introduce a new form of boredom, profound boredom with something, and argue that the smartphone also reveals this new form of boredom, a pervasive, wide-ranging boredom of which we are unaware. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to three critical notices of The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering, written by Cheryl Misak, Alexander Prescott-Couch, and Paul Roth, respectively. After contrasting genealogical conceptual reverse-engineering with conceptual reverse-engineering, I discuss pragmatic genealogy’s relation to history. I argue that it would be a mistake to understand pragmatic genealogy as a fiction (or a model, or an idealization) as opposed to a form of historical explanation. That would be to rely on precisely the (...) stark dichotomy between idealization and history that I propose to call into question. Just as some historical explanations begin with a functional hypothesis arrived at through idealization as abstraction, some pragmatic genealogies embody an abstract form of historiography, stringing together, in a way that is loosely indexed to certain times and places, the most salient needs responsible for giving a concept the contours it now has. I then describe the naturalistic stance that I find expressed in the pragmatic genealogies I consider in the book before examining the evaluative standard at work in those genealogies, defusing the charge that they involve a commitment to a ‘stingy axiology’. (shrink)

The paper investigates whether imaginative states about propositions can be assessed in terms of fittingness (also known as correctness, appropriateness, aptness). After characterizing propositional imaginings and explaining the idea of fittingness, I present some considerations in favour of the no conditions view: imagining seems to be the sort of action that cannot be done unfittingly, and imaginings have no external cognitive nor conative goals in light of which they could be unfitting. I then examine the local conditions view, that there (...) can be fittingness conditions on imaginings, but that these are inherited from the mental projects in which imaginings can play a role. Given that there are virtues of the imagination such as creativity and spontaneity, and given that imaginings are subject to purposive mechanisms, and given that there are cases in which it is unfitting to fail to imagine, I endorse the general conditions view, on which imaginings have a goal, and therefore fittingness conditions, even outside the context of mental projects. I then examine 4 versions of the general conditions view and argue that imaginings aim to make contents available to mental projects. (shrink)

Stephen Turner claims that social science can explain away normativity. By exploiting a non-normative view of rationality and a causal view of belief, he claimed that normativist views are akin to what he calls Good Bad Theories (GBT). GBT are false accounts that play a role of social coordination like primitive rituals (Taboo and the like). Hence, “norms”, “commitments”, and “obligations” are just like Taboo and can be explained away as GBT. Normativism, as a consequence, is doomed to disappear in (...) a disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the normativist idea that the normative does not reduce to the causal: he claims that social science succeeds in the reduction. This claim is presented as a major challenge to philosophical normativism. In what follows, I try to discuss some aspects of Turner’s challenge by focusing on certain features of belief and belief-change that prima facie promote a normativist view: this is the basis to focus on some problems concerning the scope of Turner’s argument. (shrink)

It is natural to assume that every value bearer must be good, bad, or neutral. This paper argues that this assumption is false if value incomparability is possible. More precisely, if value incommensurability is possible, then there is a fourth category of absolute value, in addition to the good, the bad, and the neutral.

The history of philosophy is a history of moral circle expansion. This history correlates with a history of expansionism about consciousness. Recently, expansionism about consciousness has exploded: to invertebrates, to plants, to logic gates, and to fundamental entities. The last of these expansions stems from a surge of interest in panpsychism. In an exploratory spirit, this paper considers some largely uncharted territory: the ethical implications of panpsychism. Our conclusion is that while panpsychism probably does significantly expand our moral circle, it's (...) also probably short on anything of practical significance. (shrink)

In this paper, I first consider three possible explanations for why celebrities typically apologise publicly and sometimes also include their fans among the targets of their apology. I then identify three moral dangers of celebrity apologies, the third of which arises specifically for fan-targeted apologies, and each of which teaches us important lessons about the practice of celebrity apologies. From these individual lessons, I draw more general lessons about apologies from those with elevated social positions and the powers they are (...) associated with. (shrink)

Stephen Turner claims that social science can explain away normativity. By exploiting a non-normative view of rationality and a causal view of belief, he claimed that normativist views are akin to what he calls Good Bad Theories (GBT). GBT are false accounts that play a role of social coordination like primitive rituals (Taboo and the like). Hence, “norms”, “commitments”, and “obligations” are just like Taboo and can be explained away as GBT. Normativism, as a consequence, is doomed to disappear in (...) a disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the normativist idea that the normative does not reduce to the causal: he claims that social science succeeds in the reduction. This claim is presented as a major challenge to philosophical normativism. In what follows, I try to discuss some aspects of Turner’s challenge by focusing on certain features of belief and belief-change that prima facie promote a normativist view: this is the basis to focus on some problems concerning the scope of Turner’s argument. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The authors of this article aim to reveal how motivation and legitimacy ensure the normativity of the structuring and genesis of multiple social identity. _Theoretical basis._ Social constructivism was chosen as a research methodology. It reveals social identity as an identity constructed by its bearer on the basis of ready-made versions of social identity proposed by social groups and society. Social circles, identified by Georg Simmel, unite representatives of different social groups into a wider oneness, which can be interpreted (...) as a multiple social identity, and the motivation for its formation can be identified on the basis of Weber’s concept of legitimacy. _Originality._ Identifying the structure and genesis of a multiple social identity creates prerequisites for establishing its normative foundations, as well as for a specific analysis of the procedures for achieving its motivation and legitimacy. Georg Simmel’s concept of social virtues promotes consideration of the basic virtues of an individual as those that enable one’s to be a member of various social groups in which these virtues are manifested. _Conclusions._ The social virtues present in the social identities that are part of a multiple social identity determine not only the social status of these individuals in these social groups but also the ranking and normative significance of these groups for this individual. If the observance of virtues in a certain social group causes a higher motivation of an individual’s behavior, then this group acquires a higher legitimacy for her/him. Using the example of virtues, it is possible to search for other possible grounds for the formation of multiple social identity. Such grounds are primarily other characteristics of key social practices that support different social groups. (shrink)

A number of paradigms have been proposed to understand the sources of meaningful work, but a non-Western approach has attracted little attention. Because some authors have argued that meaningful work has positive valence that has eudaimonic rather than hedonic content, a virtue-ethics approach to meaningful work has been used. Virtue ethicists acknowledge that our work and places of employment have a profound influence in shaping our character and living a fulfilled life. This study aims to make a theoretical contribution toward (...) an understanding of meaningful work from a virtue-ethics framework that is culturally meaningful and ethically relevant to Filipino realities and their distinct national heritage. It develops a conceptual model for a Filipino view of meaningful work that could guide both researchers and practitioners in business ethics by explaining what makes work meaningful, justifying why this is important, and presenting some examples of concrete measures that management can utilize to promote meaningful work in the Philippine workplace. By integrating Filipino virtues in conceptualizing meaningful work, I believe that a theoretical advancement is made toward a pluralistic and multicultural understanding of the concept, especially through the lens of virtue-ethics. (shrink)

It is envisioned that one day xenotransplantation will bring about a future where transplantable organs can be safely and efficiently grown in transgenic pigs to help meet the global organ shortage. While recent advances have brought this future closer, worries remain about whether it will be beneficial overall. The unique challenges and risks posed to humans that arise from transplanting across the species barrier, in addition to the costs borne by non-human animals, has led some to question the value of (...) xenotransplantation altogether. In response, we defend the value of xenotransplantation research, because it can satisfy stringent welfare conditions on the permissibility of animal research and use. Along the way, we respond to the alleged concerns, and conclude that they do not currently warrant a cessation or a curtailing of xenotransplantation research. (shrink)

THIS BOOK REVEALS an amazingly long-overlooked psychological reality that dawned on the author when he woke up from a dream and thought: “Suppose I had never woken up? Though others would know, how would I ever know it was over?” Based on cognitive science research and analysis, the author found that consciousness is not extinguished with death but, from a dying person’s perspective, only imperceptibly “paused.” -/- Given this, from your perspective, you’ll never lose your mind, self, and soul. And, (...) given dreams and near-death experiences, you may experience a timeless natural—i.e., scientifically supported—afterlife, which can be a heaven of utmost happiness. -/- Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection was an earth-shattering revelation about how life evolved. This book is about an equally earth-shattering scientific theory about how human life ends, including its possible impact on society and on you. -/- . (shrink)

This essay discusses Mary Beth Willard's _Why It's OK to Enjoy the Work of Immoral Artists_ and puts it into dialogue with my book _Drawing the Line._ In particular, I focus on the role of aesthetic projects in thinking about artistic immorality, and develop further thoughts on the public/private and individual/social distinctions with respect to our engagement with the arts.

This collection of articles is a tribute to Nenad Smokrović, our friend and colleague from the Philosophy Department. He has been working on human rationality for over 25 years. Consequently, articles in this collection are either directly or indirectly related to this subject matter. In this volume, 19 authors from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Italy, Israel, USA, and GB write about human rationality. What human rationality consists in? What is the relationship between its normative aspect (logic) and its descriptive aspect (psychology)? (...) Do people in fact reason according to the laws of logic? What is the nature and the function of reasoning, argumentation, and inference? ... We are publishing this volume in the hope that it will provide further contribution to the research in the field. (shrink)

This paper is about two seemingly inconsistent theories of well-being and how to reconcile them. The first theory is perfectionism, the view that the good of a human is determined by human nature. The second theory is preferentism, the view that the good of a human lies in the satisfaction of her preferences. I begin by sketching the theories and then developing an objection against each from the standpoint of the other. I then develop a version of each theory that (...) is meant to address the objection from the other theory. It turns out that these modified perfectionist and preferentist theories are mutually supporting and co-extensive. They can be combined into a new theory, perfectionist preferentism, which is an independently plausible theory of well-being. (shrink)

The essay contributes to the philosophical literature on emotions by advancing a detailed analysis of jadedness and by investigating whether jadedness can be subject to the various standards that are often thought to apply to our emotional states. The essay argues that jadedness is the affective experience of weariness, lack of care, and mild disdain with some object, and that it crucially involves the realisation that such an object was previously, but is no longer, significant to us. On the basis (...) of such a characterisation, jadedness is shown to be an affective call to restructure our commitments and values in a manner that we no longer assign any kind of significance to its object. Precisely because of its potential to affect our lives in such a fashion, jadedness is shown to carry philosophical, psychological, and even social importance. -/- . (shrink)

Methodological nationalism is the assumption that nation-states are the relevant units for analyzing social phenomena. Most of the social sciences recognized it as a source of bias, but not the ethics of immigration. Is this field biased by methodological nationalism—and if so, to what extent? This article takes nationalism as an implicit bias and provides a method to assess its depth. The method consists in comparing principles that ethicists commonly discuss when immigration is not at stake with principles advocated in (...) the ethics of immigration. To interpret the results, a distinction between mild and heavy bias is established. When a basic principle in ethics is underdiscussed or absent from the ethics of immigration, the field is ‘mildly biased’. When its negation is commonly advocated, the field is ‘heavily biased’. Here, the method is illustrated with two principles: equal opportunity and reparation. They are common in theories of distributive justice and of corrective justice, respectively. But in the ethics of immigration, scholars often argue for the opposite. Instead of equal opportunity, they implicitly support discrimination based on national origin; instead of sanctions or amnesty for the offenders, scholars plead amnesty for those who they otherwise regard as victims. These preliminary results suggest that the field is heavily biased: methodological nationalism seems to turn ethics into its opposite. (shrink)

There are important similarities between moral thought and talk and thought and talk about gender: disagreements about gender, like disagreements about morality, seem to be intractable and to outstrip descriptive agreement; and it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be a woman in terms of particular social, biological, or other descriptive features, just as it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be good or right in terms of any set of (...) descriptive properties. These similarities give us reason to investigate the idea that, like moral thought and talk, gender thought and talk is inherently normative. This paper proposes a normative account of gender thought and talk in terms of fitting treatment. On this fitting treatment account, to judge that A is gender G is just to judge that it is fitting to treat A as a G. This account is a descriptive or hermeneutical account of our gender thought and talk rather than an ameliorative account of our gender concepts or a metaphysical account of gender properties in social metaphysics. This paper argues that other descriptive accounts of gender thought and talk face problems that the fitting treatment account overcomes. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

To fully rationally answer Socrates’s question, ‘How should one live?’, we need to answer the epistemic question: ‘How can one know how one should live?’. This paper attempts to answer both. ` The issue of rationality is crucial here. ‘Rationality’ here only concerns knowledge, e.g., ways to acquire scientific knowledge, and meta-knowledge concerning values. No values as such are rational or knowledge. However:- Many factors are required for human rationality to exist and develop, e.g., life, mental health and evidence-based education. (...) Human rationality’s need for those factors, hence their value to rationality, is rationally-unquestionable – and that applies to the practised values prescribing the prescribable factors. Those prescribable factors require certain interrelated epistemic, moral, social, political, legal, educational and other values to be practised. This implies a pro-rationality values-theory with one obligatory, general end – a uniquely rationally-unquestionable end. This end provides the basis for answering Socrates’s question as rationally (correctly) as is possible for values. That end is fundamentally epistemic, namely ‘Be pro-rationality’, yet the theory has deeply-humanly-meaningful, universal applications. It has implications for current and all possible moral, social, political, legal, educational, environmental etc issues. E.g., the theory shows that human rationality crucially requires certain emotions, health-care, education and upbringing. With this, the paper discusses affection, free speech, journalism, psychotherapy, political and sexual consent, rights, responsibilities, freedom and government. The theory’s sub-values prescribe much prescribed by some other theories, e.g., broad and deep knowledge-acquisition (in certain areas), rationally-critical thinking, non-sexism, non-racism, general types of liberalism, holistic flourishing, happiness, unselfishness and fairness. However, all other values-theories lack pro-rationality theory’s maximum possible rational-unquestionability, internal coherence and coherence with rationality. The theory encourages total freedom in a-rationality areas, areas irrelevant to its obligatory end. The theory inherently requires its advocates to be (self )critical, rationally viewing the theory’s necessarily human-suggested specifics as often fallible or unavoidably approximate. So the theory is a work-in-progress. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence and robotics is pervasive in daily life and set to expand to new levels potentially replacing human decision-making and action. Self-driving cars, home and healthcare robots, and autonomous weapons are some examples. A distinction appears to be emerging between potentially benevolent civilian uses of the technology (eg unmanned aerial vehicles delivering medicines), and potentially malevolent military uses (eg lethal autonomous weapons killing human com- batants). Machine-mediated human interaction challenges the philosophical basis of human existence and ethical conduct. Aside (...) from technical challenges of ensuring ethical conduct in artificial intelligence and robotics, there are moral questions about the desirability of replacing human functions and the human mind with such technology. How will artificial intelligence and robotics engage in moral reasoning in order to act ethically? Is there a need for a new set of moral rules? What happens to human interaction when it is mediated by technology? Should such technology be used to end human life? Who bears responsibility for wrongdoing or harmful conduct by artificial intelligence and robotics? -/- Whilst Kant may be familiar to international lawyers for setting restraints on the use of force and rules for perpetual peace, his foundational work on ethics provides an inclusive moral philosophy for assessing ethical conduct of individuals and states and, thus, is relevant to discussions on the use and development of artificial intelligence and robotics. His philosophy is inclusive because it incorporates justifications for morals and legitimate responses to immoral conduct, and applies to all human agents irrespective of whether they are wrongdoers, unlawful combatants, or unjust enemies. Humans are at the centre of rational thinking, action, and norm-creation so that the rationale for restraints on methods and means of warfare, for example, is based on preserving human dignity as well as ensuring conditions for perpetual peace among states. Unlike utilitarian arguments which favour use of autonomous weapons on the basis of cost-benefit reasoning or the potential to save lives, Kantian ethics establish non-consequentialist and deontological rules which are good in themselves to follow and not dependent on expediency or achieving a greater public good. -/- Kantian ethics make two distinct contributions to the debate. First, they provide a human-centric ethical framework whereby human exist- ence and capacity are at the centre of a norm-creating moral philosophy guiding our understanding of moral conduct. Second, the ultimate aim of Kantian ethics is practical philosophy that is relevant and applicable to achieving moral conduct. -/- I will seek to address the moral questions outlined above by exploring how core elements of Kantian ethics relate to use of artificial intelli- gence and robotics in the civilian and military spheres. Section 2 sets out and examines core elements of Kantian ethics: the categorical imperative; autonomy of the will; rational beings and rational thinking capacity; and human dignity and humanity as an end in itself. Sections 3-7 consider how these core elements apply to artificial intelligence and robotics with discussion of fully autonomous and human-machine rule-generating approaches; types of moral reasoning; the difference be- tween ‘human will’ and ‘machine will’; and respecting human dignity. (shrink)

The article talks about the emergence of the theory of imperialism and neocolonialism, the reasons that gave rise to it, and its effects on the development of humanity in the current period. Imperialism is a multifaceted, multidimensional problem. It is a political issue, it has philosophical, scientific and technological foundations, it has economic, sociological, geographical, ethnic, religious and educational dimensions. But the fact that it is primarily a human problem makes it a multifaceted problem. Surely we can increase these reasons. (...) But no matter how much we multiply, colonization of one society by another society, confiscation of its wealth, enslavement and cultural separation is the most visible form of this. But this experience is not unprecedented in human history. Because human history has been a kind of exploitation, enslavement and attempts to create superiority. As Camus said, "Man emerges as the most dangerous being for his species". Attitudes to imperialism may vary between tribal and celestial cultures. After all, the culture of heaven is a culture cultivated by divine teaching. Exploitation and slavery are the dominant attitudes of tribal cultures. In these cultures, the relationship between man and man is based on power, wealth and nobility. In celestial cultures, the relationship between man and man was determined by nomos, divine laws. Heavenly culture is the product of a will that emerges for "good will" to prevail. It should be known that colonialism is a tribal behavior wherever and whenever it occurs. Because they do not see other societies as equal to themselves, it is a desire to dominate, exploit and enslave those who are not like themselves. From this perspective, colonialism can be seen as one of the oldest forms of behavior in history. This situation appears as the victory of the strong over the weak. Since transcendental attachment does not occur, they are in a position to absolutize their self. As a result, they see themselves as masters to be served, they see in themselves the right to such an inclination. It can be misleading to associate the colonial movement with human nature. It is more about the degradation and degeneration of human nature, it is about self-cultivation. It is a matter of outlook. The heavenly cultures, where the powerless were protected and spared, showed themselves not in a colonial style, but in a protective and compassionate way. We can see this patronizing relationship in the states established within the celestial cultures. (shrink)

Jedno od najznačajnijih pitanja u filozofiji morala jest predstavljaju li moralni zahtjevi ujedno i razloge za djelovanje prema kojima se trebaju ravnati sve racionalne osobe. Prema jednoj koncepciji, moralni apsolutizam tvrdi da sve racionalne osobe imaju dovoljan razlog da poštuju moralne zahtjeve. Prema tom shvaćanju, moralni relativizam je tvrdnja da neće svi racionalni djelatnici imati dovoljan razlog da poštuju iste moralne zahtjeve. manje je istraženo pitanje što se događa ako pokušamo povezati filozofski naturalizam s pitanjem daju li moralni zahtjevi razloge (...) za djelovanje svim racionalnim djelatnicima. u ovom radu bavimo se potonjim pitanjem. neki autori smatraju da prihvaćanje filozofskog naturalizma nije važno za ovo pi- tanje. Drugi autori smatraju da filozofski naturalizam implicira relativizam u pogledu praktičnih razloga koji nije spojiv s moralnim apsolutizmom. u radu argumentiramo za to da su oba gledišta donekle ispravna. tvrdimo da ako se naturalizam shvati kao ontološka tvrdnja onda se možemo složiti s time da naturalizam ne igra ulogu u razrješenju debate između relativista i apsolutista. međutim, ako se naturalizam shvati kao metodološko gledište, onda smatramo da naturalizam podržava relativizam u pogledu praktičnih razloga, tj. ideju da moralni zahtjevi ne pružaju razloge za djelovanje svim racionalnim djelatnicima. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to situate the ethics of Karol Wojtyla in the context of personalist philosophy - a 20th century philosophical and theological movement that seeks to investigate reality from the point of view of the human person. Personalism places persons and personal relationships at the center of theory and practice and explores the significance of personhood across disciplines and traditions. In terms of methodology, personalism takes into consideration the data gathered by empirical sciences and our lived (...) experiences as part of our community. While not to be thought of exclusively as a moral philosophy, most personalist philosophies place strong emphasis on ethical concerns. Personalist philosophers maintain that experience ought to be the starting point for the philosophical analysis of the person. At the outset, it must be clarified that this paper is not a systematization of the ethics of Wojtyla per se for there is no such thing as Wojtyla's ethics that can be set apart from other ethical systems in general or from Christian ethics in particular. Wojtyla did not develop his own “original” ethical system or philosophy. As many critics have pointed out, Wojtyla’s philosophical project can be best described as incomplete. His work is a picture of Aristotelian-Thomism enriched by phenomenological analysis of the human person. He develops a phenomenology of the subject grounded on a personalist principle. (shrink)

The fundamental laws of logic hold independently of us. Thus, if there were beings who thought in contradiction to these laws, they would be in error. The paper defends this stance of Frege's against Wittgenstein's combination of logical constitutivism and logical naturalism. Frege's arguments against psychologism are more general than his usual wording suggests and are, at their core, directed against the whole of logical naturalism. Contrary to prevailing opinions on this subject, I argue that constitutivism alone cannot deflect Frege's (...) attack. Rather, constitutivism is neutral to the opposition between logical realism and logical naturalism. The later Wittgenstein was not only a constitutivist, but, as will be explained, also a logical naturalist. By shedding new light on the logical alien problem, I attempt to apply Frege's generalized arguments to Wittgensteinian naturalism. This naturalism inevitably leads to a radical and self-undermining relativism. (shrink)

The consciousness of the Japanese Volk -- Foundational attitudes in world consciousness -- A heart that loves the eternal now -- Faith in national polity -- Cultivating character: on Yamaga Sokō -- The way of the patriot (1): on Yoshida Shōin -- The way of the patriot (2): on Takasugi Tōkō -- The way of the patriot (3): on Takahashi Deishū -- Faith and the ultimate act of loyalty: on Kusunoki Masashige -- Bushido as viewed by the Japanese Volk: on (...) Gandhism, Mohism, and Bushido -- Learning the way and moral indignation: on Ōshio Chūsai -- The essence of governance: on Saigō Nanshū's political thought -- The spirit of kendo -- Kendo and mental principles: on Miyamoto Musashi -- Womanhood in Japan. (shrink)