Value Theory, Miscellaneous

Living agency is subject to a normative dimension (good-bad, adaptive-maladaptive) that is absent from other types of interaction. We review current and historical attempts to naturalize normativity from an organism-centered perspective, identifying two central problems and their solution: (1) How to define the topology of the viability space so as to include a sense of gradation that permits reversible failure, and (2) how to relate both the processes that establish norms and those that result in norm-following behavior. We present a (...) minimal metabolic system that is coupled to a gradient-climbing chemotactic mechanism. Studying the relationship between metabolic dynamics and environmental resource conditions, we identify an emergent viable region and a precarious region where the system tends to die unless environmental conditions change. We introduce the concept of normative field as the change of environmental conditions required to bring the system back to its viable region. Norm-following, or normative action, is defined as the course of behavior whose effect is positively correlated with the normative field. We close with a discussion of the limitations and extensions of our model and some final reflections on the nature of norms and teleology in agency. (shrink)

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral (...) progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort. (shrink)

Since the famous passage in which Socrates (Plato 38a5-6) says that the unexamined, and therefore non-reflected, life is not worth living, “reflection” has been a diffuse and iterant term in ethics, moral philosophy, epistemology, political philosophy (Tiberius 2008; Skorupski 2010), but also in psychology (Marsico, Andrisano Ruggieri & Salvatore 2015). This chapter outlines the discussion of reflection and presents the book "Thinking about Onself", a volume that opens a new perspective on the topic of reflection, considering the most recent approaches (...) in both philosophy (namely in epistemology ) and cultural psychology. (shrink)

Most people are skeptical of the claim that the expectation that a person would have a life that would be well worth living provides a reason to cause that person to exist. In this essay I argue that to cause such a person to exist would be to confer a benefit of a noncomparative kind and that there is a moral reason to bestow benefits of this kind. But this conclusion raises many problems, among which is that it must be (...) determined how the benefits conferred on people by causing them to exist weigh against comparable benefits conferred on existing people. In particular, might the reason to cause people to exist ever outweigh the reason to save the lives of existing people? (shrink)

I take issue with two suggestions of Joel Feinberg's: first, that it is incoherent to suppose that human life as such is absurd, and, second, that a particular human life may be absurd and yet saved from being tragic by being fulfilled. I also argue that human life as such may well be absurd and I consider various responses to this.

Quine's translation argumnent figures centrally in his views on logic. The goal of this paper is to get clear on that argument. It can be interpreted as an argument to the effect that one should never translate somebody’s speech as going against a law of the translator’s logic. Key to this reading of the translation argument is the premise that one should never translate somebody's speech such that their speech is unintelligible. Ultimately, it is my aim to reject this reading. (...) I argue that only a weaker conclusion—one that says “not most of the time” instead of the stronger “never”—should be attributed to Quine. Accordingly, I propose and defend a weaker version of the first premise that better coheres with the weaker conclusion of the translation argument. Instead of the claim that one should never translate somebody’s speech such that their speech is unintelligible I argue that we should only ascribe to Quine the claim that one should not most of the time translate somebody’s speech in a way that makes it unintelligible. I go on to sum up the results of my discussion and respond to a criticism of my reading. (shrink)

In this paper we present an overview of the current interpretations of the first volume of Arthur Schopenhauer’s main work The World as Will and Representation (W I) and discuss their problems. We discuss four issues, which in our opinion must clarify a current interpretation implicitly or explicitly, if it claims to be an interpretation of the whole book: (1) What does Schopenhauer mean by the fact that his work shares only one (single) thought? (2) How are the individual books (...) of W I related? (3) Do we have to read Schopenhauer’s W I as a normative guide to the denial of will-to-live or as a neutral description of the world? (4) Do the often discussed contradictions and aporias within the book follow a plan or are they errors of thought? (shrink)

One of the central questions within contemporary debates about collective intentionality concerns the notion and status of the we. The question, however, is by no means new. At the beginning of the last century, it was already intensively discussed in phenomenology. Whereas Heidegger argued that a focus on empathy is detrimental to a proper understanding of the we, and that the latter is more fundamental than any dyadic interaction, other phenomenologists, such as Stein, Walther and Husserl, insisted on the importance (...) of empathy for proper we-experiences. In this paper, I will present some of the key moves in this debate and then discuss and assess Husserl’s specific proposal, according to which reciprocal empathy, second-person engagement and self-alienation are all important presuppositions for group-identification and we-identity. (shrink)

Além de responder à pergunta título, pretende-se também apresentar as linhas gerais de um caminho que vem sendo proposto por alguns pensadores sobre de que modo a ciência poderia se modificar de modo a que pudéssemos utilizá-la para resolver nossos principais problemas. Para tanto iniciaremos explicitando o que consideramos as características mais fundamentais da racionalidade científica hegemônica, a saber: o atomismo e o método axiomático. Em seguida, apresentamos alguns conhecidos problemas das ciências, evidenciando suas relações com estas características fundamentais. Tais (...) problemas são tanto epistemológicos e metodológicos, internos ao próprio conhecimento, quanto éticos, relacionados às suas consequências. Em seguida, indicamos como a forte interconexão destes dois tipos de problemas pode ser compreendida quando entendemos a ciência de modo instrumental como uma resposta ao interesse de previsão para manipulação e controle. Por fim, partindo do reconhecimento do caráter contingente e socialmente construído do conhecimento científico, inclusive de suas características fundamentais, respondemos à questão título e apontamos, ainda de modo incipiente, algumas possibilidades de modificações metodológicas que têm sido propostas nos últimos anos. Em especial, apresentamos as que foram rotuladas de complexidade e a transdisciplinaridade, indicando algumas questões e possíveis linhas de pesquisa que estas abordagens suscitam. (shrink)

As the title of the article suggests, “The Burqa Ban”: Legal Precursors for Denmark, American Experiences and Experiments, and Philosophical and Critical Examinations, the authors embark on a factually investigative as well as a reflective response. More precisely, they use The 2018 Danish “Burqa Ban”: Joining a European Trend and Sending a National Message (published as a concurrent but separate article in this issue of INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JOURNAL) as a platform for further analysis and discussion of different perspectives. These include (...) case-law at the international level while focusing attention on recent rulings and judicial reasoning by the ECtHR and the ECJ; critical thought-experiments in religion, morality, human rights, and the democratic public space; a contextualized account of burqa-wearing interventions by federal and state governments and, moreover, various courts in the United States; and philosophical commentary and, in some instances, criticism of the Danish and/or European (French, etc.) approach. The different contributions have different aims. The section on case-law at the international level reports on those central judgments that, in effect, helped to pave the path for the Kingdom of Denmark’s burqa ban. Concerning the concurring judges at the ECtHR, the opinions served to uphold a preexisting ban and to grant a wide margin of appreciation to the national authorities, thereby limiting the Court’s own review. -/- As regards to the ECJ, the legality of company rules that contain a policy of neutrality for the workplace was examined, with a similar outcome. The authors who discuss religion, morality, human rights and the democratic public space are endeavoring to, respectively, appeal to ethics as a testing stone for law and to both challenge and address several forms of “expressivist worry” in connection with face veils. In doing so, the authors ask a number of thought-provoking questions that hopefully will inspire public policymakers to careful analysis. While the section that is devoted to American perspectives highlights a comprehensive survey of political and legal responses to, in particular, full-face veils like the burqa, the relevant author also incorporates public perceptions and, in the course of examining these, draws a parallel to “the fate” of the hoodie. The constitutionality of burqa-wearing in America, so it also appears, is partially an open question, but differentiating between religious, political, or personal reasons is a de jure premise. Given that the Danish legislators who drafted law L 219 to ban burqa-wearing in public places rely on a reference to political Islam, they relegate religious and personal reasons to the private domain, thereby also adopting secularism as a premise. This is explored in the last author response of the article, more precisely, in an account of the underlying materialism that, in turn, is applied to Muslim women. If policymakers and legislators engaged in Thinking Things Through exercises, they could, as a minimum, avoid law-making strategies that are not in the spirit of the theory they themselves invoke, albeit tacitly. While the aim of, as it were, arresting culturally self-contradicting legislators is unique for the section in question, all the authors who contribute to the joint research project have one end-goal in common, namely to inform about important perspectives while at the same time opening up for parameters for (more) fruitful, constructive and (if need be) critical debate in the future. With this in mind, four recommendations are presented by the research director for the project. Legally, politically, socially and culturally, conflict-resolution should not translate the relationship between rulers and the ruled into a separation ideology, an instance of controllers versus the controlled. All things being equal, that is the objective limit for a democratic society. (shrink)

The Concept of Hell examines a wide range of topics, problems, and concepts of interest to philosophers, theologians, and anyone curious about religious thinking concerning damnation. Acting as a platform for philosophers from many different views and traditions, this book provides a myriad of approaches to thinking about Hell. From the nature of Hell to philosophical justifications of damnation, to the way in which Hell informs us about our relationships with each other, the discussions offer a tantalizing exploration of how (...) philosophical thinking can engage Hell in a wide variety of ways from many different perspectives. Anyone with a desire to think about what happens after we die, damnation, and related religious and theological issues will find The Concept of Hell interesting and enlightening. (shrink)

Welfarism is a theory of value (or the good) simpliciter. Theories of value are fundamentally concerned with explaining what makes some possible worlds better than others. Welfarism is the view according to which the relative value of possible worlds is fully determined by how individuals are faring—or, in other words, by the facts about well-being that obtain—in these worlds. This entry begins by distinguishing between various forms of welfarism (pure vs. impure welfarism, and then narrow vs. wide welfarism). It then (...) outlines some of the key attractions of welfarism. Finally, it surveys some of the most serious objections to welfarism (including malicious pleasure, the well-being of the wicked, great works of art, the non-identity problem, human extinction, transitivity of betterness, and distribution). (shrink)

Scholars who have attempted to explain Iris Murdoch’s moral realism have done so in widely divergent ways, some characterizing her as a classical moral realist, others as a pragmatic moral realist, and still others as a “reflexive realist.”See, e.g., respectively, Fergus Kerr, “Back to Plato with Iris Murdoch,” in Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1997), 68–88; Sami Pihlstrom, Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defence (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005); and Maria Antonaccio, Picturing the Human: The (...) Moral Thought of Iris Murdoch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For the purpose of this article, I follow Maria Antonaccio’s characterization of these realisms. See pages 3–4. None of these attempts, however, capture adequately Murdoch’s distinctive position. In an effort to improve upon these accounts, this article argues that a proper characterization of Murdoch’s view must regard her as developing a version of m. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that there is a connection between love and death. But what can be said philosophically about the nature of that connection (if indeed it exists)? Plato's Symposium suggests at least three possible ways in which love and death might be connected: first, that love entails (or ought to entail) a willingness to die for one’s beloved; second, that love is a desire for (or perhaps itself is) a kind of death; and third, that love is linked (...) to human mortality and the desire for immortality. I argue that each of these three suggestions is problematic, and should not be accepted at face value. I am ultimately skeptical as to whether any one, overriding connection—be it moral or causal or metaphysical—between love and death exists. At the very least, the matter deserves more nuanced and multi-faceted reflection than what we find in the Symposium. (shrink)

Some skeptics question the very possibility of moral bioenhancement by arguing that if we lack a widely acceptable notion of morality, we will not be able to accept the use of a biotechnological technique as a tool for moral bioenhancement. I will examine this skepticism and argue that the assessment of moral bioenhancement does not require such a notion of morality. In particular, I will demonstrate that this skepticism can be neutralized in the case of recent neurofeedback techniques. This goal (...) will be accomplished in four steps. First, I will draw an outline of the skepticism against the possibility of moral bioenhancement and point out that a long-lasting dispute among moral philosophers nourishes this skepticism. Second, I will survey recent neurofeedback techniques and outline their three features: the variety of the target human faculties, such as emotion, cognition, and behavior; the flexibility or personalizability of the target brain state; and the nonclinical application of neurofeedback techniques. Third, I will argue that, by virtue of these three unique features, neurofeedback techniques can be a tool for moral bioenhancement without adopting any specific notion of morality. Fourth, I will examine the advantages and threats that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement may have. Finally, I will conclude that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can become a new and promising tool for moral bioenhancement and requires further ethical investigations on its unique features. (shrink)

The paper identifies a distinctive feature of friendship. Friendship, it is argued, is a relationship between two people in which each participant values the other and successfully communicates this fact to the other. This feature of friendship, it is claimed, explains why friendship plays a key role in human happiness, why it is praised by philosophers, poets, and novelists, and why we all seek friends. Although the characterization of friendship proposed here differs from other views in the literature, it is (...) shown that it accommodates key insights of other writers on the topic. Thus, in accordance with the Aristotelian strategy the paper employs, it is shown that the account on offer preserves the received opinions on friendship. (shrink)

El trabajo reflexiona sobre los fundamentos originarios de la ética. La tesis central que se defiende y que se busca mostrar consiste en asumir que las raíces históricas últimas de lo ético están en la vida humana misma, que lo ético responde a una necesidad humana vital y que es precisamente en la vida donde ha de encontrarse el buscado criterio de última instancia sobre lo que lo ético es. Esta hipótesis conduce necesariamente a analizar el tema de la vida, (...) a abordar el asunto también desde una perspectiva antropológica y a buscar lo que podría llamarse pre-historia biológica de lo ético. (shrink)

In this essay I attempt to unpack Andy Kaufman in his many manifestations, ultimately arguing that traditional notions of comedy cannot help us get at the root of what is going on here. Through a discussion and criticism of the theories of comedy presented by Christopher Fry, Susanne Langer, Walter Kerr, and Maurice Charney, I suggest how Andy's comedy employs a rejection of the modernist conceits of a fixed identity, a denotative language, a progressive history, and a separation of temporality (...) from Being. Ultimately focusing on the way in which Freud's theory of comedy gets deconstructed when we read it through the lens of Andy’s work, I take apart specific jokes and comedic “moments” in Andy's work and show how the Freudian framework cannot support such an aesthetic. What is, in fact, most challenging in Andy's work as a comedian is not merely the way in which his own identity is up for grabs but the way in which he forces the audience to have its identity as an audience called into question, the way in which a Baudrillardean simulacrum stands in for a missing punchline while we, his fans, wait for something that is never coming. And yet we, his fans, laugh. Sometimes uncomfortably, but always more authentically. (shrink)

Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing” and Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida are tragi-comic consternations. They are theatres of ethical panentheism: they present dramatic “absolute” ethical interpretations and actions, each of which is at once ungrounded and completely seeded. I start with the etymology of “consternation.” Then I discuss the comic vs. tragic interpretations of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, arguing it is a consternating tragi-comedy. I analyze the predicate “absolute” in terms of consternations, in a few passages of the book. I elaborate especially upon (...) phenomenological reasoning’s Sache selbst. In the Phenomenology, reason develops by thinking the absolute thing through culture, politics, morality, and religion, reaching completion in “Absolute Knowing.” That absolute is reason’s comprehensive insight into its phenomenological absolutes, and its own absolute sublating. Northrop Frye’s cited claim about myth can be understood in this phenomenological way. With all this in hand, Hegel’s science of experience is formally complete. But the experience of Absolute Knowing is still consternation. To capture the consternating essence of sublation – a consternation by which experience becomes something it was not before – I season this formal science with Shakespeare’s “comedy” Troilus and Cressida, revealing its structural roots to be consternations. (shrink)

I argue that the uniqueness of comedy lies in its potential for social critique. Reading through Aristotle, Hegel, and Umberto Eco, I show that because comedy is not negative, not a counter-argument, it can expose social structures for what they are.

The vastly underrated Plutus receives at least some of its due in this paper. At its beginning, I attempt to locate Plutus within both the Hegelian discourse on comedy and within Hume's poetical and philosophical fictions. Employing the same method of close textual analysis that I employed in Philosophy and Comedy: Aristophanes, Logos, and Eros, I focus upon the thoroughgoing materialism of the poor farmer Chremylus who laments the unjust distribution of wealth, and who seeks to restore the god's sight (...) so as to obtain a large amount of the wealth he lacks. The critical section of the play occurs in an exchange with Poverty or Need, who is depicted as an ugly hag but who speaks beautifully. Aristophanic music subtly sings the glory of need as the spur to all that is good in human actions, as it mocks wealth as a standard of human worth. (shrink)

The writings of Stanley Cavell and Jacques Derrida share many points of intersection. One of these is their mutual interest in Shakespeare’s Hamlet; another is their assessments of J.L. Austin’s philosophy, and his concept of performativity. In this paper, we demonstrate that Cavell’s and Derrida’s respective essays on Hamlet offer a surprising insight into their views on Austin’s notion of performativity. Since Hamlet abounds with oaths and promises, testimonies and bearing witness, what is surprising is not that these philosophers should (...) have identified this theme but rather how they respond to it. We show that Derrida’s writings on Hamlet repeatedly draw and depend on the idea of performativity, amounting to a rapprochement with Austin’s concept; and we also show that Cavell questions the effectiveness of performatives in the play, in ways that sometimes resemble Derrida’s invocation of spectrality in the play. (shrink)

James Joyce’s Ulysses can be read through the prism of the New Materialist School of contemporary critical thought to shed light on ongoing questions in the humanities about the relationship between language and embodiment. Specifically, Ulysses resonates with three thematic concerns of New Materialisms: the nature of matter, the correspondence between human and animal, and the role of affect. Contra some calls for the humanities to retrench in a conservative posture that reaffirms the special status of human reason and “consciousness” (...) – corresponding to Catholic readings of Ulysses that find in Joyce a metaphysical philosopher of transcendence – New Materialisms take human continuity with animals and matter seriously. Joyce’s Ulysses, by developing robust accounts of the interactions between matter, language, and thinking bodies, offers a template for exploring this convergence, demonstrating that the human “ghost” must be understood as radically inextricable from its material body and the material formations of its world. (shrink)

The politics of precarity have emerged on the contemporary scene of critical theory with great social force in recent years. This paper looks at the risks and obstacles of positing precariousness and vulnerability as the basis of a universal ethics while also arguing for the socially transformative potential of such a model. More broadly, it considers the crucial question of what stands in the way of human relation and ethical life in an age of neoliberalism and biopolitics, and posits an (...) ethics of resemblance grounded in the commonality of flesh and in the at once singular and universal experience of loss. (shrink)

:This paper examines the transmediation of sacrifice in the Isuma “Fast Runner” trilogy, focusing in particular upon The Journals of Knud Rasmussen. In this film the impact of the introduction of Christianity upon traditional Inuit culture in the 1920s sets the stage for literal and metaphorical sacrifice, tied inexorably to the parallel threat of conversion and the transvaluation of traditional shamanistic beliefs. In the process, the film maintains a critical stance with respect to both the ethnographic perspective of the outsider, (...) which it incorporates, and to its own preferred Inuit perspective. My reading of the transmediation of sacrifice in The Journals rests upon the relation between sacrificial substitution and the notion of communion, in both doctrinaire and more secular senses. I argue that the film presents the Inuit characters negotiating a necessary détente with Christian culture, both at the cost of traditional beliefs and in the form of the co-optation and transmediation of ritual within the film's story, a process mirrored in the appropriation of the digital video medium in the fictional re-creation of these events. (shrink)

:Terrence Malick's film The Tree of Life revisits many of the questions regarding a Christian theodicy. How, for example, can one reconcile the idea of providence or believe in the meaning of human suffering when life itself is subject to and even dependent on chance and violence? In order to sustain faith in providence in such a universe, Malick suggests that one must be willing to absorb the insults of accident and sacrifice the human drive to control and master one's (...) own destiny. In his invocation of Job, his allusions to Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, and his debt to Kierkegaard, Malick suggests that the recompense for this sacrifice is an intensification of appreciation for existence itself and for the spiritual value of biological and geological processes. In this way, the film offers an insightful ecotheology that makes earth more central to a Christian ethos. (shrink)

:In this essay, I argue that what I consider a generally valid critique of the traditional model of representation remains too closely focused on its limitations and not its liminality. To make this distinction, I couch my analysis in terms of sacrifice. The canonical model of mimesis was concerned by the sacrificed thickness of “presence” in the thin re-presentation; today's anti-essentialist model is instead concerned that presence or sameness comes at the sacrificial cost of the other. Although the latter is (...) accordingly more sensitive to racial representation, it still fails to come to terms with liminality, which is the structural inability to represent the margins. The Lacanian analysis of an Iranian film that cannot rely on traditional visual cues opens the door to appreciating liminality. But unless a “narcissistic” tendency of the Lacanian scholarship is addressed, liminality becomes a fetish for the other as a “stain.”. (shrink)

:In this essay I will look at four recent films that have organ transplantations “at their heart”: 21 Grams, L'Intrus, Dirty Pretty Things and Heart of Jenin. Each film in its own way shows how Nancy's concept of the intruder balances in a different dynamics between biopolitical and biophilosophical concerns and proposes in various ways a changed concept of sacrifice, transforming sacrifice from religious offering into political or ethical resistance and allowing a-religious strivings to persist.

:This essay provides a reading of Steve McQueen's critically acclaimed movie Hunger, which tells the story of the hunger strike of Bobby Sands in light of contemporary hunger strikes around the world and especially in Guantánamo. The central concern of the essay is to read Hunger together with Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, showing how both works problematize the sacrificial subjectivity of enlightenment, its instrumental rationality, and sovereign temporality, while advancing a devastating critique of Western civilization. I argue that (...) Hunger situates the high-security prison within the self-destructive tendency of enlightenment and depicts how self-sacrificial resistance emerges as a response to sovereign domination. Interpreting the figure of Bobby Sands as the reversal of Odysseus in the encounter with the Sirens, I explore how insurgent sacrifice interrupts the dialectic of enlightenment and points to a new configuration of subjectivity and time. (shrink)

The case of the Arabian babblers is a controversial and significant one in ethology that troubles standard sociobiological theories of the evolution of behaviour. In this chapter from her book Naissance d'une théorie éthologique, Vinciane Despret examines the divergent models and methods of the scientists studying the babblers, their different epistemologies and ontologies that are only truly visible and understandable if one takes into account their particular ways of comporting themselves with the birds, and the babblers’ active role in writing (...) their own scripts. In so far as it resembles the immersive participation and individual biographing of anthropological and primatological methods, and pays skilful attention to the reasons for their actions, Zahavi's way of relating to and questioning the babblers gives them the opportunity to respond. (shrink)

This interview ranges across a number of topics relevant to Roberto Marchesini’s thought: the history and philosophy of ethology and entomology; zooanthropology and animal culture; philosophical ethology and philosophical anthropology; animal studies; and animals in laboratories, in the field, on farms, and in household/urban settings. It touches on thinkers including Margherita Hack, Giorgio Celli, Donna Haraway, Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Charles Darwin, and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck.

Roberto Marchesini is an Italian philosopher and ethologist whose work is significant for the rethinking of animality and human–animal relations. Throughout such important books as Il dio Pan,Il concetto di soglia, Post-human, Intelligenze plurime, Epifania animale, and Etologia filosofica he offers a scathing critique of reductive, mechanistic models of animal behaviour, as well as a positive contribution to zooanthropological and phenomenological methods for understanding animal life. Centred on the dynamic and performative field of interactions and relations in the world, his (...) critical and speculative approach to the cognitive life sciences offers a vision of animals as acting subjects and bearers of culture, whose action and agency is also indispensable to human culture. In tracing the ways in which we share our lives and histories with animals in different contexts of interaction, Marchesini's cutting-edge philosophical ethology also contributes to an overarching philosophical anthropology of the human as the animal that most requires the presence and input of other animals. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to formulate a sociological critique of the concept of scarcity in mainstream economics by synthesising necessary conceptions in the construction of a theoretical structure with greater explanatory power than the current mainstream articulation. Mainstream economics asserts the universality of scarcity. A critical scrutiny of this assertion is conducted by discussing the empirical phenomenon of global hunger in relation to a theoretical elaboration of the concepts of scarcity and abundance. The historical origins of the scarcity (...) postulate is traced to the work of Carl Menger. The concern of global hunger shows that there is abundance of food goods, but still frustration of human needs occurs. An alternative approach is developed through a theoretical synthesis of Menger, Amartya Sen and critical realism, which asserts an ontologically stratified, differentiated and geo-historically conditioned understanding of scarcity and abundance. It is proposed that this approach is more fruitful than the scarcity postulate in explaining the process and conditions of frustration and satisfaction of human needs. Merely postulating scarcity tends to veil the underlying causes of poverty in general and hunger in particular. Central implications of the new model for socioeconomic analysis are considered. (shrink)