Value Theory

An examination of Sex and Gender under the most recent scientific discoveries in the areas of neuroscience, endocrinology, biology, psychology, medicine, and linguistics. Presented as part of the Conference "Gender: Ideology or Science?" at the "Accademia Tiberina," Rome, Italy, November 25, 2022.

This paper employs a feminist model of scapegoating designed to capture the function that scapegoating plays in the justification and masking of oppression, and examines specific forms of legislation that target the rights of trans people to uncover their scapegoating patterns. Because scapegoating is experienced as a justified attribution of blame, it evades the understanding of those participating in its dynamics. My aim is to make apparent the transphobic rhetoric that convinces people of its necessity, such that we can determine (...) the best means to undermine its discriminatory consequences. I do this by examining the scapegoating logic behind bills that seek to impact various aspects of the lives of trans people, including education, sports, identification, and healthcare. (shrink)

The question of whether or not one should procreate is rarely cast as a personal choice in philosophical discourse; rather, it is presented as an ethical choice made against a backdrop of aggregate concerns. But justifications concerning procreation in popular culture regularly engage with the role that identity plays in making procreative decisions; specifically, how one’s decision will affect who they are and who they might be in the future. Women in particular cite the personally transformative aspects of becoming a (...) parent – personal circumstances, including socioeconomic status, age, health, and relationship status – as the most important considerations for the decision they make regarding possible parenthood, and not the more aggregate concerns that an ethics of procreation prioritizes. I highlight women in particular because when women undergo a transformative experience related to parenthood, they do so in contexts where the social, economic, and emotional effects related to pregnancy and motherhood are extensive, and impose greater effects on women than men. These harmful material effects threaten a woman’s economic stability, career development, social relationships, and emotional health. Because of this, I argue that an ethics of procreation must engage with the ways in which women’s identities are transformed through procreative decisions. (shrink)

We set out longtermist political philosophy as a research field by exploring the case for, and the implications of, ‘institutional longtermism’: the view that, when evaluating institutions, we should give significant weight to their very long-term effects. We begin by arguing that the standard case for longtermism may be more robust when applied to institutions than to individual actions or policies, both because institutions have large, broad, and long-term effects, and because institutional longtermism can plausibly sidestep various objections to individual (...) longtermism. We then address points of contact between longtermism and some central values of mainstream political philosophy, focusing on justice, equality, freedom, legitimacy, and democracy. While each value initially seems to conflict with institutional longtermism, we find that these conflicts are less clear-cut upon closer inspection, and that some political values might even provide independent support for institutional longtermism. We end with a grab bag of related questions that we lack space to explore here. (shrink)

The idea that technologies can change moral beliefs and practices is an old one. But how, exactly, does this happen? This paper builds on an emerging field of inquiry by developing a synoptic taxonomy of the mechanisms of techno-moral change. It argues that technology affects moral beliefs and practices in three main domains: decisional (how we make morally loaded decisions), relational (how we relate to others) and perceptual (how we perceive situations). It argues that across these three domains there are (...) six primary mechanisms of techno-moral change: (i) adding options; (ii) changing decision-making costs; (iii) enabling new relationships; (iv) changing the burdens and expectations within relationships; (v) changing the balance of power in relationships; and (vi) changing perception (information, mental models and metaphors). The paper also discusses the layered, interactive and second-order effects of these mechanisms. (shrink)

Arab and English cultures are incongruent, where the former is greatly influenced by religion when compared to the latter. This study focuses on court interpreting from Arabic into English and questions the interpreters’ objectivity when rendering religious and cultural expressions, bearing in mind that certain cultures, like the Arab and Muslim ones, have significant religious ties. To this end, fifteen transcripts were randomly collected from Canadian court hearings. The analysis showed that interpreting religious and cultural expressions can be complex, especially (...) when the original speaker attempts to transmit a notion that may have negative implications in the target language. The results also showed that court interpreters either added explanations to religious and cultural expressions or omitted them. Such additions and omissions may be used to avoid negative stereotypes other cultures have about Muslims and Arabs. The study recommends that future researchers interested in legal interpreting consider the non-verbal factors that can be observed during court hearings. The study suggests allocating extensive training sessions to interpreters on how to impartially render culture-bound expressions, mainly in the legal context. (shrink)

According to a number of contemporary theorists, aesthetic reasons can invite or entice us but never compel us. In this paper, I develop a Kantian account of the normative force of aesthetic reasons. While Kant would likely agree that aesthetic reasons do not give rise to obligations, his account nevertheless gives us the resources for explaining how aesthetic reasons can still have more force than merely enticing reasons. This account appeals to the distinct normativity of aesthetic judgments on Kant's theory (...) and the way in which this kind of normativity structures aesthetic exchanges with other judging subjects. I argue that, in addition to the moral reasons we have for appreciating and preserving beauty, Kant’s account can accommodate distinctly aesthetic reasons for doing so that stem from our membership in aesthetic communities. (shrink)

I want to suggest that it would be bad if compatibilism were true, and that this gives us good reason to think that it isn’t. This is, you might think, an outlandish argument, and the considerable burden of this paper is to convince you otherwise. There are two key elements at stake in this argument. The first is that it would be – in a distinctive sense to be explained – bad if compatibilism were true. The thought here is that (...) compatibilism ultimately presents us with a picture on which, in principle, powerful manipulators can effectively guarantee that finite moral agents should become blameworthy. To my mind, this isn’t just false – though I think that it is – it is also such that it would be bad (unfortunate, undesirable…) if it were true. The second is that the fact that it would be – in this sense – bad if true gives us reason to think that it isn’t. It may be bad that there is no afterlife. But that, in itself, hardly gives us reason to think that there is an afterlife. That is true, but – as others before me have suggested – when the object of the relevant badness is morality itself, the inference seems secure. A more general aim of the paper is to investigate the nature of this very form of argument in itself, and I compare my argument (inter alia) to a recent argument from Sayre-McCord against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. -/- . (shrink)

Being built on the ground of mutual effect, facing the current state-isolation, international law is losing its grip on efficiency. This makes some of us to question (1) If law is not working, do we still need law? If we would say no, the history shows that such is the path to the state-suicide. As Smithian mutual benefits is the assurance of the individual benefits, we need international relationships to create the benefits for the individual states, hence international law, Yet (...) the current one is certainly not working, then, the question, (2) What should the international law be? The enforcement of the international law could be accomplished through the blockchain. As blockchain “went bypass” the national law, and simply negated it, yet it is still not immune to the scope of international jurisdiction. We also argue that the blockchain’ smart contract is not sufficient enough to operate smoothly. Human brain is structured as the mirror rather than a glass and transferring the law interpretation to the machine would not work, hence, we designed the formula of langue and parole, blockchain multiseg operating under the semiotics of the international law. Here the language learning is modelled with the supervisory and reinforcing algorithms, with supervisory predetermined with bias X,Y towards the values of law. Sort of form of constant repetends of Heidegger’s hermeneutics circle. The most important part in this paper is written with the purpose to explain that international law is at the same struggle that Kafka had. Carrying the weight of both, the clothed façade and true self, first being the morality guide and later the states will, and not being neither, international law is self-isolated from the real world, as Gregor Samsa was. Hence, this is not the paper of secularization, no customs, no higher purpose, nothing except the will of states, that can be constantly renewed with the signifier and signified being linked and re-linked. (shrink)

Trusting relationships are both valuable and risky. Where the risks are high and the fears of betrayal are also high, it might seem rational to try to mitigate the risks, while still enjoying the benefits of the trusting relationship, by forming a contingency plan. A contingency plan—in the sense I am interested in—involves contingent punishments for defection, which are primarily meant to encourage the trusted partner to act trustworthily. I argue, however, that such contingency plans suffer from an internal tension (...) wherein the contingency planner both seeks and undermines a particular level (or kind) of trust. There are two problems in particular, either of which is sufficient to undermine trusting relationships: one, the planner fails to see the trusted partner as sincerely engaged in the trusting relationship, and two, the planner separates herself out from the trusting relationship by seeing her flourishing as separate from her partner’s (or, even worse, as dependent on her partner’s harm). Contingency plans, then, are not just about the future; they cast a moral shadow on what we are doing now. (shrink)

We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are endowed with responsive preferences. Envy-freeness is a weakening of stability that allows blocking contracts involving a hospital with a vacant position and a doctor that does not envy any of the doctors that the hospital currently employs. We show that the set of (...) envy-free allocations has a lattice structure. Furthermore, we define a Tarski operator on this lattice and use it to model a vacancy chain dynamic process by which, starting from any envy-free allocation, a stable one is reached. (shrink)

Should we let personal responsibility for health-related behavior influence the allocation of healthcare resources? In this paper, we clarify what it means to be responsible for an action. We rely on a crucial conceptual distinction between being responsible and holding someone responsible, and show that even though we might be considered responsible and blameworthy for our health-related actions, there could still be well-justified reasons for not considering it reasonable to hold us responsible by giving us lower priority. We transform these (...) philosophical considerations into analytical use first by assessing the general features of health-related actions and the corresponding healthcare needs. Then, we identify clusters of structural features that even adversely affected people cannot reasonably deny constitute actions for which they should be held responsible. We summarize the results in an analytical framework that can be used by decision-makers when considering personal responsibility for health as a criterion for setting priorities. (shrink)

I propose a new account of the limits of aesthetic testimony. One of this new account’s main claims is that, among the kinds of aesthetic cognitive achievements, it is useful to distinguish aesthetic understanding. In particular, I suggest that the aesthetic understanding of X involves an understanding of why X is aesthetically valuable. In turn, aesthetic understanding is essentially connected to the deployment of aesthetic concepts. Given the fine-grained structure of some of these concepts, certain forms of testimony are not (...) adequate to acquire them. (shrink)

The essay examines the various manifestations of Russian influence on present-day Bulgarian nationalism. Although this phenomenon dates back to the early days of Bulgarian nationalist thought in the 19 th century, it gained particular prominence in recent years, especially in the context of Russian hybrid warfare. After outlining the political landscape of Bulgarian nationalism in the post-communist period, the article offers an in-depth analysis of the dominant pro-Russian narratives that are vociferously reproduced by the country’s major nationalist actors. While some (...) of these messages have been firmly adapted in the collective memory of generations of Bulgarians due to various historical reasons (e.g., the narrative of the “Russian liberators”), others are a direct product of today’s Kremlin propaganda (the notions of the alleged “decadence” of the West). Furthermore, the growing divisions within Bulgarian society that took shape against the background of this prolonged Russian influence have also been thoroughly addressed. The paper argues that Kremlin-backed actors are trying to monopolize and privatize the patriotic discourse in Bulgaria, thereby disrupting the country’s pro-Western orientation. (shrink)

Generative AI programs can produce high-quality written and visual content that may be used for good or ill. We argue that a credit–blame asymmetry arises for assigning responsibility for these outputs and discuss urgent ethical and policy implications focused on large-scale language models.

Philosophers have distinguished at least three different interpretations of Rawls’s difference principle. This principle claims that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. My aim in this paper is to show that according to the most attractive and plausible interpretation of that principle, which I call the reciprocity view, Rawls’s difference principle allows us to limit economic growth in order to preserve nature and protect the interests of (...) future generations, while still meeting the demands of justice concerning the least advantaged members of society. (shrink)

Pure quality of will theories claim that ‘the ultimate object’ of our responsibility responses (i.e., praise and blame) is the quality of our will. Any such theory is false—or so I argue. There is a second dimension of (moral) responsibility, independent of quality of will, that our responsibility responses track and take as their object—namely, how adroitly we are able to translate our will into action; I call this competence of will. I offer a conjectural explanation of the two dimensions (...) of (moral) responsibility: it matters to us that people actually perform adequately well because of how much it matters to us that we are able to live and work together successfully. (shrink)

This essay sets out reflections on happiness that, it is argued, can be drawn from the 2013 film Blue Jasmine. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate a certain epistemic potential of sound film, specifically, in the present case, a philosophical and psychological potential. It is argued that this kind of potential resides in a filmmaker’s ability to realistically represent aspects of the world that can otherwise rarely, if ever, be experienced so reflectively.

This chapter is Grace Andrus de Laguna's discussion of Margaret Floy Washburn’s The Animal Mind.

Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal conse- quences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality’s intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity’s (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations (...) and so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality’s short-term con- sequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality. (shrink)

In this chapter, Dorothy Walsh argues that any ethical theory requires an underlying speculative metaphysics.

Racial and ethnic disparities exist for many nervous system disorders that are intervention targets for neuromodulation investigators. Yet, to date, there has been both a lack of racial and ethnic diversity and a lack of emphasis on diversity in neuromodulation research. In this paper, we suggest three potential reasons for the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in neuromodulation research: 1) the lack of diversity in the neuromodulation workforce, 2) incompatibility between the technologies employed and phenotypic traits (e.g., hair texture) (...) commonly present in minoritized populations, and 3) minoritized populations’ reluctance to participate in clinical trials. We argue that increasing diversity in the neuromodulation workforce, in conjunction with mutual collaboration between current neuromodulation researchers and underrepresented communities in neuromodulation, can aid in removing barriers to diversity, equity, and inclusion in neuromodulation research. This is important, because greater diversity, equity, and inclusion in neuromodulation research brings with it the development of novel, yet safe and effective, treatment approaches for brain disorders and enhances the rigor and generalizability of discoveries in the field. (shrink)

In this chapter, Mary Whiton Calkins examines available conceptions of time and develops her own reconceptualization of it.

In this thesis, I seek to answer the question of what constitutes a tenable form of sexual citizenship for lesbian-, bisexual- and gay citizens by deploying two models of citizenship which have permeated scholarly and public discourse: the “liberal” and the “republican” model. This is done in conjunction with critical engagement with two political philosophers, and their conceptualization of citizenship. They are (1) The capabilities approach by Martha Nussbaum and (2) cosmopolitan federalism as presented by Seyla Benhabib. This thesis uses (...) three primary questions: (1) On what basis are members of the polity chosen? (2) On what basis are the members of the polity able to participate politically? (3) How does the conceptualized model of citizenship account for social- and civil rights pertaining to sexual difference? These questions furthermore establish the basis for the analysis of the models. In order to assess the answers that the different model provide, this thesis utilizes two analytic variables articulated in terms of lack of rights and disenfranchisement which will throughout this thesis act as underpinnings. These variables are predicated on reflecting two mechanisms of exclusions of lesbigay citizens, the claim being that the rejoinders to them are used to assess and constitute to a tenable sexual citizenship. (shrink)

The writings and speeches of the Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024) have been characterized by a constant reference to a teleological history. Using Karl Löwith’s proposals, I analyse the president’s liberal-progressive idea of history and I propose that in this respect he has followed a certain speculative philosophy of history, which I call philosophy of Trans-Historic-History.

The Psychological Society of Ireland’s (PSI) response to the call from the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Rights of the Child: Draft General Comment No. 26 Calls for comment on the draft general comment on children’s rights and the environment with a special focus on climate change III. ‘Specific rights of the Convention as they relate to the environment’, B. The right to the highest attainable standard of health (art. 24), 27. … children’s current and anticipated psychosocial, emotional and (...) mental health problems and suffering caused by environmental harm. The PSI wishes to express sincere thanks to the Society’s Special Interest Group in Human Rights and Psychology, particularly Dr Michelle Cowley-Cunningham, Dr Elaine Rogers, and Ms Alexis Carey, who coordinated the following response on behalf of the Society. 1. Environmental degradation, loss of biodiversity, and climate change impact children’s human rights and present a serious threat to future generations’ enjoyment of human rights. Distressingly, 1.7 million children lose their lives annually as a result of avoidable environmental impacts, while millions more are impacted by disease, displaced from their homes and miss out on receiving education1. The PSI Special Interest Group in Human Rights and Psychology (SIGHRP) is grateful to the Committee on the Rights of the Child for this opportunity to submit a stakeholder comment in advance of the drafting of the Draft General Comment No. 26. SIGHRP is appreciative of the work of the Committee in monitoring the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and welcomes the Committee's stakeholder call for ideas to aid the development of policies, both domestically and internationally, to address critical climate change issues. Specifically, SIGHRP welcomes the opportunity to comment on the connection between child and adolescent mental health and human rights obligations, and advocates for policies and initiatives to address this issue in the context of climate change. (shrink)

This chapter is Grace Andrus de Laguna’s discussion of the relationship between mind and brain.

The possibility of employing human enhancement interventions to aid in future space missions has been gaining attention lately. These possibilities have included one of the more controversial kinds of enhancements: biomedical moral enhancement. However, the discussion has thus far remained on a rather abstract level. In this paper we further this conversation by looking more closely at what type of interventions with what sort of effects we should expect when we are talking about biomedical moral enhancements. We suggest that a (...) more grounded way to picture moral enhancement, at least in the near term, is to envision a form of cognitive enhancement that also provides some moral benefits by heightening the enhanced person's capability for acting according to their own subjective moral code. While this concept of moral adherence enhancement also has relevance for the moral enhancement discussion more widely, in this paper we apply it specifically in the context of space missions. We argue that there are weighty reasons to consider making biomedical enhancements of the proposed kind a mandatory feature of early-phase long-distance space travel because these missions are high-stakes in nature and take place in an environment where the enhancement could be seen as conferring important advantages while negating many of the traditional arguments weighed against it. (shrink)

Визначено специфіку постмодерністського споживача продуктів культури у процесі досвіду споживання та можливостей для бізнесу. Встановлено, що постмодерністського споживача доцільно розглядати як вільну особистість із фрагментованою ідентичністю, яка створює цінність та отримує досвід, а також здатна залучати ресурси та навички для конкретних ситуацій споживання продуктів культури. Обґрунтовано важливість застосування концепції пережитого досвіду, щоб підкреслити ключову роль споживача у спільному із суб’єктом підприємництва формуванні цінності будь-якого досвіду споживання продуктів культури. Обґрунтовано, що досвід споживання має місце не лише до, під час і після (...) споживання продукту культури, але також може розглядатися в контексті великої кількості мікродослідів, що поєднують спільне та/або послідовне використання віртуальних та реальних пристроїв. (shrink)

This article addresses the unusually elaborate dramatic context in Plato’s Protagoras and effect of sophistry on democratic Athens. Because Socrates evokes Odysseus’ κατάβασις in the Odyssey to describe the sophists in Callias’ house (314c-316b), I propose that Socrates depicts the sophists as bodiless shades residing in Hades. Like the shades dwelling in Hades with no connection to embodied humans on Earth, the sophists in the Protagoras are non-Athenians with no consideration for the democratic body of the Athenian πόλις. I conclude (...) that sophistry can be detrimental to Athenian democracy because it can produce education inequality founded on wealth inequality. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly influential in most people’s lives. This raises many philosophical questions. One is what responsibility we have as individuals to guide the development of AI in a desirable direction. More specifically, how should this responsibility be distributed among individuals and between individuals and other actors? We investigate this question from the perspectives of five principles of distribution that dominate the discussion about responsibility in connection with climate change: effectiveness, equality, desert, need, and ability. Since much (...) is already written about these distributions in that context, we believe much can be gained if we can make use of this discussion also in connection with AI. Our most important findings are: (1) Different principles give different answers depending on how they are interpreted but, in many cases, different interpretations and different principles agree and even strengthen each other. If for instance ‘equality-based distribution’ is interpreted in a consequentialist sense, effectiveness, and through it, ability, will play important roles in the actual distributions, but so will an equal distribution as such, since we foresee that an increased responsibility of underrepresented groups will make the risks and benefits of AI more equally distributed. The corresponding reasoning is true for need-based distribution. (2) If we acknowledge that someone has a certain responsibility, we also have to acknowledge a corresponding degree of influence for that someone over the matter in question. (3) Independently of which distribution principle we prefer, ability cannot be dismissed. Ability is not fixed, however and if one of the other distributions is morally required, we are also morally required to increase the ability of those less able to take on the required responsibility. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been an increasing number of attempts by analytic philosophers to engage with key insights of Critical Theory. While this has had some success within feminist philosophy, and in epistemology, with the emergence of political epistemology as a significant and productive subfield, analytic political philosophers have generally not explored what lessons can be learnt from attempting to bridge the disciplinary divide. In this chapter, I provide what I take to be the clearest explanation for this, namely (...) the dominance of Rawlsianism within analytic political philosophy. Moreover, I argue that in its refusal to engage with core tenets of Critical Theory, Rawlsian political philosophy can be exploited as the mouthpiece of dominant ideologies. However, this is not a charge against analytic political philosophy in general, insofar as analytic political philosophers are willing to engage with Critical Theory, at the cost of dismissing Rawlsianism. -/- . (shrink)

This paper examines two ideas of John Rawls that are rarely discussed in conjunction: pure procedural justice (PPJ) and property-owning democracy. Applied to matters of distribu- tion, PPJ orders the establishment of fair procedures under which any private transaction can be considered just. It aims to secure equality without fixating on patterns of distribu- tion. How such an approach is constituted and how it applies to different stages of theori- sation are explored. Three components of PPJ and three guidelines for (...) its institutionalisa- tion are identified. As such, PPJ also provides a backbone to property-owning democracy. The understanding of property-owning democracy as an institution of PPJ helps us assess various interpretations and refinement of property-owning democracy. (shrink)

This book has two main concerns. The first is to isolate the fundamental issues that must be resolved if one is to be able to formulate a defensible position on the question of the moral status of abortion. The second is to determine the most plausible answer to that question. With respect to the first question, the author argues that the following issue–most of which are ignored in public debate on the question of abortion–need to be considered. First, can the (...) abortion question be decided without resolving the issue of the moral status of the fetus? Second, is the fact that the fetus belongs to the biologically defined species Homo Sapiens morally significant in itself? Third, what non-potential properties and necessary and/or sufficient to endow something with a right to life? Fourth, do the corresponding potentialities also make it wrong to destroy something? Fifth, does any property that suffices to give something a right to life admit of degrees, and if so, is it morally significant regardless of the extent to which it is present? Sixth, is it morally permissible to refrain from producing additional people who would lead satisfactory lives? And finally, at what point do developing human beings acquire those properties that give something a right to life – at conception, or at some later point? Alternative answers to these central questions are set out and discussed in a detailed way. Some of the issues are difficult, but it is argued that plausible answers can be advanced, and that they support a liberal position on the morality of abortion. (shrink)