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Summary This category includes works examining the relationship between values, in the sense of claims about value, and norms, in the sense of ethical principles concerning what is right, wrong, or there is reason to do. In a famous expression owed to David Ross's homonymous book, the category covers the relation between 'the right and the good'. Consequentialism provides a clear view of such relation: the good determines the right. In other words, what is right and wrong to do is determined on the basis of a ranking of actions on an evaluative scale. Certain forms of virtue ethics provide a different example of how the good determines the right. Here the relevant good is the goodness of the motive that an action would manifest, or the goodness of the agent. The question then is: What would a good (virtuous) agent do? On the other hand, deontological theories are often defined as rejecting this unilateral direction of explanation. One way to be a deontologist is to deny that all the right is determined by the good: W. D. Ross held such a view. E.g. the duty to keep promises is independent from the good that promise-keeping brings about. Another deontological approach claims that, in fact, the right determines the good. A good example here is Kant's claims about happiness: happiness is good, only on condition that is deserved, i.e. as a reward for acting rightly. A connected but in principle distinct debate that falls into this category is whether evaluative concepts should be defined in normative terms, or viceversa. This debate is distinct for two reasons: 1) it is a 'definitional' debate rather than one in normative ethics; 2) the relevant normative terms need not be moral ones, but simply the concept of a reason for acting and having attitudes. See the category on the buck-passing account of value. Yet another area of questions that can fall in this category is how values can justify norms: e.g. Does the value of knowledge (or some other value) justify epistemic norms? Does the value of coherence justify rational requirements?
Key works Chapters 5 and 6 of Moore 1903 contain classic statements of a consequentialist approach, where the good (understood as intrinsic value) not only grounds but even defines the right. Ross 1930 as pointed out provides a clear example of a deontological view on the value-norms relation. The papers contained in A. Prichard 2002 provide much of the background for Ross's view, although arguing for a mixed view whereby the good is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the right. Within contemporary literature, Audi 2004 also proposes a non-consequentialist view, but takes fundamental moral norms to be ultimately grounded on the value of human flourishing. Baron et al 1997 puts consequentialism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics in dialogue, with an emphasis on how they answer the 'right and the good' question--interestingly Marcia Baron claims the centrality of value to Kant's ethics.
Introductions Zimmerman 2007 Wedgwood 2009
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  1. John Rawls: Two Concepts of Rules.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    In his seminal essay, 'Two Concepts of Rules', John Rawls draws a central distinction between justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it. In this review, Leslie Allan walks through Rawls's essay, highlighting his key arguments for a strengthened version of rule utilitarianism and reflecting on the lasting influence of his analysis.
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  2. Pain and Evil.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper I defend the thesis that, considered simply as certain sorts of bodily sensations, pleasure is not the good nor is pain intrinsically evil. In fact, the opposite is largely the case: pursuit of pleasure is generally productive of ontic evil, and pain, when heeded, directs us toward the ontic good.
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  3. Virtual Reality Translation of Nozick's Experience Machine.Erick Ramirez, Carl Maggio, Miles Elliott & Lia Petronio - manuscript
    A virtual reality translation of Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine" thought experiment from his "Anarchy, State, and Utopia" (1974). These modules are free to download and use in the classroom and for research/x-phi purposes. NPCs are randomized for gender during startup of each run. *Requires an Oculus Rift or HTC Vive and VR capable computer. To open the files, uncompress the downloaded .zip folder and run the executable (.exe) file. -/- V1.2 Fixed missing projector video footage during experience machine sales pitch.
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  4. Conversation's Seedy Underbelly. [REVIEW]Sam Berstler - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    I provide an opinionated discussion of two recent volumes on the structure, ethics, and politics of bad conversations. In Just Words (2019), Mary Kate McGowan argues that despite our best intentions, we sometimes inadvertently bring oppressive norms to bear on our interactions. In Grandstanding (2020), Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke argue that the human desire to cut a good moral figure before others systematically distorts moral discourse. Though their authors have different political outlooks, both books converge on a similar theme: (...)
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  5. Review of Social Goodness: On the Ontology of Social Norms, by Charlotte Witt. [REVIEW]Daniel Kelly & Katherine Ritchie - forthcoming - Mind.
    Charlotte Witt covers a remarkable amount of ground in this concise and elegantly written book. Coming in at under 150 pages, she artfully weaves together Aristotle’s theory of functions with contemporary work on cultural transmission and apprenticeship, ideas about self-creation with theories of aspiration and transformative experience, and reflections on the relationships among social norms and games with thoughts about social roles and the nature of hierarchy. At the heart of it is an elaboration and defense of a thoroughly externalist (...)
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  6. How (Many) Descriptive Claims about Political Polarization Exacerbate Polarization.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - Journal of Social and Political Psychology.
    Recently, researchers and reporters have made a wide range of claims about the distribution, nature, and societal impact of political polarization. Here I offer reasons to believe that, even when they are correct and prima facie merely descriptive, many of these claims have the highly negative side effect of increasing political polarization. This is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been neglected in the work on political polarization, namely that (1) people have a tendency to (...)
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  7. Reasons of Love and Conceptual Good-for-Nothings.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - In Michael Frauchiger & Markus Stepanians (eds.), Themes from Susan Wolf. Berlin: De Gruyter.
    What reasons do we have to use certain concepts and conceptions rather than others? Approaching that question in a methodologically humanistic rather than Platonic spirit, one might seek “reasons for concept use” in how well concepts serve the contingent human concerns of those who live by them. But appealing to the instrumentality of concepts in meeting our concerns invites the worry that this yields the wrong kind of reasons, especially if the relevant concerns are nonmoral ones. Drawing on Susan Wolf’s (...)
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  8. Varieties of Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers pursue a number of different explanatory projects when explaining various sorts of normative phenomena. This chapter takes some steps towards understanding this variety. I lay some general ground about explanation. I describe some key axes of debate about explanations that first-order normative inquiry typically seeks to state and defend. And I briefly discuss how two other sorts of normative explanation that seem more concerned with the foundations of normative domains like ethics and practical reason might be understood and how (...)
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  9. Two Distinctions About Eating Animals.A. G. Holdier - 2024 - Between the Species 27 (1).
    In this paper I describe two distinctions about what “eating animals” entails which are often confused in conversations or arguments aimed against meat-based diets and try to show how both distinctions, on their own lights, ultimately support a concern for all fellow creatures, regardless of species or other biological categories. The distinctions in question are: the distinction between moral and nonmoral actions, presumptions about which serve to define whether or not particular topics (like meat consumption) deserve moral consideration whatsoever, and (...)
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  10. The Basic Obligation to Not Destroy Heritage.Quince Pan - 2024 - Dissertation, King's College London
    Why is destroying heritage pro tanto wrong? Why does heritage destruction require justification, unlike the destruction of rubbish? The property rights view answers: heritage belongs to people, communities and cultures. The reverence view answers: we are obliged to respect things with non-instrumental value. The moral rights view answers: our predecessors, contemporaries and successors have rights to have their cherishings respected and cultural and epistemic goods protected. The moral harm view answers: destroying heritage causes morally significant harm. I argue that these (...)
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  11. Progresso morale ed evoluzione: una nota critica.Francesco Testini - 2024 - Notizie di Politeia 40 (153):61-77.
    Negli ultimi due anni sono stati pubblicati due importanti libri sul progresso morale: 'Moral Progress' di Philp Kitcher e 'A Better Ape' di Victor Kumar e Richmond Campbell. In questa nota critica, recensisco entrambi i libri e problematizzo il modo in cui cercano rispettivamente di legare tra loro il tema del progresso morale con la teoria dell'evoluzione.
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  12. Social Norms and Agent Types: Bridging the Gap Between the Theoretical Models and Their Applications.Vojtěch Zachník - 2024 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 54 (1):3-30.
    The paper presents a novel view of social norms that reflects the importance of different agent types, their specific motivations and roles. How one identifies with a role and behavioral options available to the agent is crucial for the sustainability of the social norms. The analysis of a simple case of social norm is suggested as a default model for analysis, and then the classification of subjects, enforcers, and audience is introduced. This triangular typology of agents is extended by introducing (...)
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  13. Tuomela on Social Norms and Group-Social Normativity.Olle Blomberg - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 219-241.
    In everyday life, as members of larger or smaller groups, we hold each other accountable with respect to social norms. For this practice to be intelligible, we must arguably by and large be justified in demanding that other group members comply with these norms. Other things being equal, it seems that we have a group membership-based pro tanto reason to comply with the social norms of our group. In this chapter, I examine how such demands and reasons for compliance can (...)
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  14. Moral Partiality and Duties of Love.Berit Brogaard - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5):83.
    In this paper, I make a case for the view that we have special relationship duties (also known as “associative duties”) that are not identical to or derived from our non-associative impartial moral obligations. I call this view “moral partialism”. On the version of moral partialism I defend, only loving relationships can normatively ground special relationship duties. I propose that for two capable adults to have a loving relationship, they must have mutual non-trivial desires to promote each other’s interests or (...)
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  15. To Have a Need.Russ Colton - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    Philosophers often identify needing something with requiring it to avoid harm. This view of need is roughly accurate, but no adequate analysis of the relevant sort of requirement has been given, and the relevant notion of harm has not been clarified. Further, the harm-avoidance picture must be broadened, because we also need what is required to reduce danger. I offer two analyses of need (one probabilistic) to address these shortcomings. The analyses are at a high level of generality and accommodate (...)
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  16. Causation, Foreseeability, and Norms.Levin Güver & Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer - 2023 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 45:888–895.
    A growing body of literature has revealed ordinary causal judgement to be sensitive to normative factors, such that a norm-violating agent is regarded more causal than their non-norm-violating counterpart. In this paper, we explore two competing explanations for this phenomenon: the Responsibility View and the Bias View. The Bias View, but not the Responsibility View, predicts features peripheral to the agent’s responsibility to impact causal attributions. In a series of three preregistered experiments (N = 1162), we present new evidence that (...)
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  17. Egalitarian Justice as a Challenge for the Value-Based Theory of Practical Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 239-249.
    In this essay, I argue that the objections that have been raised against the view that equality is intrinsically valuable also provide objections to the view that all practical reasons can be explained in terms of value. Plausible egalitarian principles entail that under certain conditions people have claims to an equal share. These claims entail reasons to distribute goods equally that cannot be explained by value if equality has no intrinsic value.
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  18. Discernment behind Asylum Walls; Or, The Limits of Efficacious Reasoning.Lee McBride - 2023 - In Jacoby Adeshei Carter & Darryl Scriven (eds.), Insurrectionist Ethics. Radical Perspectives on Social Justice. Palgrave. pp. 237-251.
    This chapter offers a discussion of Leonard Harris’ insurrectionist philosophy, paying special attention to those places where Harris attenuates the capability and scope of human reasoning. The chapter critically engages: claims to divine reasoning, conceptual approaches to racism that rely upon totalizing accounts, the prominent conception of modernity, the notion that human apperception is unaffected by the episteme (i.e., intervening background assumptions that pervade the present epoch), and the notion that Harris’ philosophy precludes us from establishing moral imperatives and value (...)
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  19. Value and Idiosyncratic Fitting Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.
    Norm-attitude accounts of value say that for something to be valuable is for there to be norms that support valuing that thing. For example, according to fitting-attitude accounts, something is of value if it is fitting to value, and according to buck-passing accounts, something is of value if the reasons support valuing it. Norm-attitude accounts face the partiality problem: in cases of partiality, what it is fitting to value, and what the reasons support valuing, may not line up with what’s (...)
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  20. Happy Egrets Strike Back?Francesco Orsi - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 297-307.
    In this paper I articulate and respond to Kent Hurtig's objection to the fitting attitude account of value (FA). According to the objection, when a good or bad state of affairs is indexed to the actual world, but is such that the actual world does not contain anyone for whom it is fitting to (dis)favor it, it cannot be fitting for anyone in a non-actual world to (dis)favor it. So there are good or bad states of affairs that it is (...)
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  21. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):541-565.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  22. Fetal Reduction, Moral Permissibility and the All or Nothing Problem.Xueshi Wang - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics (11):772-775.
    There is an ongoing debate about whether multifetal pregnancy reduction from twins to singletons (2-to-1 MFPR) is morally permissible. By applying the all or nothing problem to the cases of reducing twin pregnancies to singletons, Räsänen argues that an implausible conclusion seems to follow from two plausible claims: (1) it is permissible to have an abortion and (2) it is wrong to abort only one fetus in a twin pregnancy. The implausible conclusion is that women considering 2-to-1 MFPR for social (...)
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  23. Unfair Emotions: On their Morality and Blameworthiness.Jonas Blatter - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Bern
  24. Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection.Daniele Bruno - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3211-3231.
    Normative powers like promising allow agents to effect changes to their reasons, permissions and rights by the means of communicative actions whose function is to effect just those changes. An attractive view of the normativity of such powers combines a non-reductive account of their bindingness with a value-based grounding story of why we have them. This value-based view of normative powers however invites a charge of wishful thinking: Is it not bad reasoning to think that we have a given power (...)
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  25. Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derk Pereboom.
    This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a (...)
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  26. Trust and Contingency Plans.Lee-Ann Chae - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):689-699.
    Trusting relationships are both valuable and risky. Where the risks are high and the fears of betrayal are also high, it might seem rational to try to mitigate the risks, while still enjoying the benefits of the trusting relationship, by forming a contingency plan. A contingency plan—in the sense I am interested in—involves contingent punishments for defection, which are primarily meant to encourage the trusted partner to act trustworthily. I argue, however, that such contingency plans suffer from an internal tension (...)
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  27. Values for a Post-Pandemic Future.Matthew J. Dennis, Ishmaev Georgy, Steven Umbrello & Jeroen van den Hoven - 2022 - In Matthew J. Dennis, Georgy Ishmaev, Steven Umbrello & Jeroen van den Hoven (eds.), Values for a Post-Pandemic Future. Cham: Springer. pp. 1-19.
    The costs of the COVID-19 pandemic are yet to be calculated, but they include the loss of millions of lives and the destruction of countless livelihoods. What is certain is that the SARS-CoV-2 virus has changed the way we live for the foreseeable future. It has forced many to live in ways they would have previously thought impossible. As well as challenging scientists and medical professionals to address urgent value conflicts in the short term, COVID-19 has raised slower-burning value questions (...)
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  28. Desiderative Truth: Caprice and the Flaws of Desire.Lauria Federico - 2022 - In Christine Tappolet, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.
    Ronald de Sousa has vindicated the importance of emotions in our lives. This transpires clearly through his emphasis on “emotional truth”. Like true beliefs, emotions can reflect the evaluative landscape and be true to ourselves. This article develops his insights on emotional truth by exploring the analogous phenomenon regarding desire: “desiderative truth”. According to the dominant view championed by de Sousa, goodness is the formal object of desire: a desire is fitting when its content is good. Desiderative truth is evaluative. (...)
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  29. Demystifying Normativity: Morality, Error Theory, and the Authority of Norms.Eline Gerritsen - 2022 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, University of Stirling & University of Groningen
    We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules and the law. While some norms may simply be ignored, we live under the impression that others matter for what we ought to do. How can we make sense of this normative authority some norms have? Does it fit into our naturalist worldview? Many philosophers claim it does not. Normativity is conceived to be distinct from ordinary natural properties, making it mysterious. The (...)
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  30. Are all practical reasons based on value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:27-53.
    According to an attractive and widely held view, all practical reasons are explained in terms of the (instrumental or final) value of the action supported by the reason. I argue that this theory is incompatible with plausible assumptions about the practical reasons that correspond to certain moral rights, including the right to a promised action and the right to an exclusive use of one’s property. The argument is an explanatory rather than extensional one: while the actions supported by the relevant (...)
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  31. Twisted thinking: Technology, values and critical thinking.Lavinia Marin & Steinert Steffen - 2022 - Prometheus. Critical Studies in Innovation 38 (1):124-140.
    Technology should be aligned with our values. We make the case that attempts to align emerging technologies with our values should reflect critically on these values. Critical thinking seems like a natural starting point for the critical assessment of our values. However, extant conceptualizations of critical thinking carve out no space for the critical scrutiny of values. We will argue that we need critical thinking that focuses on values instead of taking them as unexamined starting points. In order to play (...)
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  32. Positive Psychology and Philosophy-as-Usual: An Unhappy Match?Josef Mattes - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (3):52.
    The present article critiques standard attempts to make philosophy appear relevant to the scientific study of well-being, drawing examples in particular from works that argue for fundamental differences between different forms of wellbeing, and claims concerning the supposedly inherent normativity of wellbeing research. Specifically, it is argued that philosophers in at least some relevant cases fail to apply what is often claimed to be among their core competences: conceptual rigor—not only in dealing with the psychological construct of flow, but also (...)
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  33. Pragmatism and Insurrectionist Philosophy.Lee McBride - 2022 - In Scott F. Aikin & Robert B. Talisse (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Pragmatism. Routledge. pp. 358-365.
    This chapter aims to articulate the motivation behind an insurrectionist philosophy. On this account, insurrectionist philosophy is about rejecting a world (and its norms and intervening background assumptions) and creating the possibility for transvaluation or a radical revolution of values. To shed light on this, McBride offers an account of Leonard Harris’s idiosyncratic philosophy born of strife and struggle, clarifying the role of Alain Locke’s critical pragmatism and the insurrectionist spirit needed to disavow the conventional norms and the intervening background (...)
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  34. All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).
    As rational agents, we are governed by reasons. The fact that there’s beer at the pub might be a reason to go there and a reason to believe you’ll enjoy it. As this example illustrates, there are reasons for both action and for belief. There are also many other responses for which there seem to be reasons – for example, desire, regret, admiration, and blame. This diversity raises questions about how reasons for different responses relate to each other. Might certain (...)
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  35. The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1845-1860.
    The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object. In this paper we argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a (...)
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  36. Why Should LGBTQI Marriage Be Legalized.Yang Pachankis - 2022 - Academia Letters 4 (5157).
    Traditional paradigm on marriage equality focused on a humanitarian appeal and was set as a path dependency model on marriage equality for the suppressed regions. However, such gender based focus has largely neglected the multilateral movements underlying the macro- political-economic structures that shaped law as a power political means. Consequentially, LGBTQI existence became marginalized from the public consciousness with structural realist state hierarchies that further undermines the fundamental freedoms of the LGBTQI popula- tion. This makes the question on LGBTQI equal (...)
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  37. Algorithmic Political Bias Can Reduce Political Polarization.Uwe Peters - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-7.
    Does algorithmic political bias contribute to an entrenchment and polarization of political positions? Franke argues that it may do so because the bias involves classifications of people as liberals, conservatives, etc., and individuals often conform to the ways in which they are classified. I provide a novel example of this phenomenon in human–computer interactions and introduce a social psychological mechanism that has been overlooked in this context but should be experimentally explored. Furthermore, while Franke proposes that algorithmic political classifications entrench (...)
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  38. The Roots of Normativity.Joseph Raz & Ulrike Heuer (eds.) - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Joseph Raz addresses one of the most basic philosophical questions: how to explain normativity in its many guises. His value-based account is brought to bear on many aspects of the lives of rational beings and their agency, such as their ability to maintain relationships, and to live their lives as social beings with a sense of their identity.
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  39. Feeling and thinking on social media: emotions, affective scaffolding, and critical thinking.Steffen Steinert, Lavinia Marin & Sabine Roeser - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-28.
    It is often suggested that social media is a hostile environment for critical thinking and that a major source for epistemic problems concerning social media is that it facilitates emotions. We argue that emotions per se are not the source of the epistemic problems concerning social media. We propose that instead of focusing on emotions, we should focus on the affective scaffolding of social media. We will show that some affective scaffolds enable desirable epistemic practices, while others obstruct beneficial epistemic (...)
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  40. From Value to Rightness: Consequentialism, Action-Guidance, and the Perspective-Dependence of Moral Duties.Vuko Andric - 2021 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness. The book develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense moral (...)
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  41. The Descriptive, the Normative, and the Entanglement of Values in Science.Matthew J. Brown - 2021 - In Heather Douglas & Ted Richards (eds.), Science, Values, and Democracy: The 2016 Descartes Lectures. Tempe, AZ, and Washington, DC: Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes, Arizona State University. pp. 51-65.
    Heather Douglas has helped to set the standard for twenty-first century discussions in philosophy of science on the topics of values in science and science in democracy. Douglas’s work has been part of a movement to bring the question of values in science back to center of the field and to focus especially on policy-relevant science. This first chapter, on the pervasive entanglement of science and values, includes an improved and definitive statement of the argument from inductive risk, which she (...)
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  42. There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations.John Dyck - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):592-612.
    Do aesthetic reasons have normative authority over us? Could there be anything like an aesthetic ‘ought’ or an aesthetic obligation? I argue that there are no aesthetic obligations. We have reasons to act certain ways regarding various aesthetic objects – most notably, reasons to attend to and appreciate those objects. But, I argue, these reasons never amount to duties. This is because aesthetic reasons are merely evaluative, not deontic. They can only entice us or invite us – they can never (...)
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  43. Does environmental science crowd out non-epistemic values?Kinley Gillette, Stephen Andrew Inkpen & C. Tyler DesRoches - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 (C):81-92.
  44. Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):106-126.
    Do we love for reasons? It can seem as if we do, since most cases of non‐familial love seem *selective*: coming to love a non‐family‐member often begins with our being drawn to them for what they are like. I argue, however, that we can vindicate love's selectivity, even if we maintain that there are no reasons for love; indeed, that gives us a simpler, and hence better, explanation of love's selectivity. We don't, in short, come to love *for* reasons. That (...)
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  45. Non-ideal prescriptions for the morally uncertain.Amelia Hicks - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1039-1064.
    Morally speaking, what should one do when one is morally uncertain? Call this the Moral Uncertainty Question. In this paper, I argue that a non-ideal moral theory provides the best answer to the Moral Uncertainty Question. I begin by arguing for a strong ought-implies-can principle---morally ought implies agentially can---and use that principle to clarify the structure of a compelling non-ideal moral theory. I then describe the ways in which one's moral uncertainty affects one's moral prescriptions: moral uncertainty constrains the set (...)
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  46. A Problem for Frankfurt Examples.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1):159-167.
    In this paper I intend to raise a problem for so-called Frankfurt examples. I begin by describing the examples and what they are used for. Then I describe the problem.
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  47. Charlie Kurth, The Anxious Mind: An Investigation into the Varieties and Virtues of Anxiety. [REVIEW]Daniel Kelly - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):249-255.
    Kurth wants us to understand and appreciate our anxiety more than we typically do. His concise and crisply written monograph makes a good case that we should. It deepens our understanding of what anxiety is, and of how it animates different facets of our mental and moral lives. The case he builds that, roughly, anxiety is one of the brain’s ways of affectively signaling and responding to uncertainty is clearly argued and meticulously organized. Kurth hits the targets he sets for (...)
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  48. ZusammenDenken: Festschrift Für Ralf Stoecker.Roland Kipke, Nele Röttger, Johanna Wagner & Almut Kristine V. Wedelstaedt (eds.) - 2021 - Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.
    Handeln, Personsein, Menschenwürde und zahlreiche Fragen der Angewandten Ethik – das ist das weite Spektrum dieser Festschrift und auch des Denkens von Ralf Stoecker, dem sie gewidmet ist. Ganz in seinem Geiste laden die Beiträge des Bandes dazu ein, zusammen zu denken und zusammenzudenken, was – möglicherweise – zusammengehört.
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  49. Ethics and Insurrection: A Pragmatism for the Oppressed.I. I. I. Lee A. McBride - 2021 - London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
    Ethics and Insurrection articulates an ethical position that takes critical pragmatism and Harrisian insurrectionist philosophy seriously. It suggests that there are values and norms that create boundaries that confine, reduce and circumscribe the actions we allow ourselves to consider. McBride argues that an insurrectionist ethos is integral in the disavowing of norms and traditions that justify or perpetuate oppression and that we must throw our faith behind something, some set of values, if we want a chance at shaping a future. (...)
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  50. On the Evolution of Moral Conventions: A functionalist alternative to Buchanan and Powell’s biocultural theory of moral progress.Oskar Qvarfort - 2021 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
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