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  1. Slip-Proof Actions.Santiago Amaya - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge. pp. 21-36.
    Most human actions are complex, but some of them are basic. Which are these? In this paper, I address this question by invoking slips, a common kind of mistake. The proposal is this: an action is basic if and only if it is not possible to slip in performing it. The argument discusses some well-established results from the psychology of language production in the context of a philosophical theory of action. In the end, the proposed criterion is applied to discuss (...)
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  2. Cognitive Behavioural Systems.Esposito Anna, Esposito Antonietta M., Hoffmann Rüdiger, Müller Vincent C. & Vinciarelli Alessandro (eds.) - 2012 - Springer.
    This book constitutes refereed proceedings of the COST 2102 International Training School on Cognitive Behavioural Systems held in Dresden, Germany, in February 2011. The 39 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from various submissions. The volume presents new and original research results in the field of human-machine interaction inspired by cognitive behavioural human-human interaction features. The themes covered are on cognitive and computational social information processing, emotional and social believable Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) systems, behavioural and contextual analysis (...)
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  3. Under a Description.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1979 - Noûs 13 (2):219-233.
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  4. A General Theory of Acts, with Application to the Distinction Between Rational and Irrational 'Social Cognition'.A. Y. Aulin-Ahmavaara - 1977 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 8 (2):195-220.
    A general theory of acts leads to a theory of cognition distinguishing between formation of apriorical knowledge about values, norms, and cognitive beliefs, based on conditioning by means of rewards and punishments, and formation of aposteriorical knowledge based on conscious, theoretical analysis of observations. The latter, rational layer of consciousness can be built on the former, irrational layer only, if certain conditions are fulfilled. It is shown that rational cognition of values presupposes a notion of aposteriorical value, which challenges some (...)
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  5. The Search for Basic Actions.Annette Baier - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):161 - 170.
  6. Acting and Producing.Kurt Baier - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (21):645-648.
  7. Why Computers Can't Act.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):157-163.
    To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.
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  8. A Problem in the Phenomenology of Action: Are There Unintentional Actions.A. Zvie Bar-on - 1991 - Analecta Husserliana 35:377.
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  9. The Power of Speech Acts: Reflections on a Performative Concept of Ethical Oaths in Economics and Business.Vincent Blok - 2013 - Review of Social Economy 71 (2):187-208.
    Ethical oaths for bankers, economists and managers are increasingly seen as successful instruments to ensure more responsible behaviour. In this article, we reflect on the nature of ethical oaths. Based on John Austin's speech act theory and the work of Emmanuel Levinas, we introduce a performative concept of ethical oaths that is characterised by (1) the existential self-performative of the one I want to be, which is (2) demanded by the public context. Because ethical oaths are (3) structurally threatened by (...)
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  10. Acting Intentionally and Acting Voluntarily.Jean Beer Blumenfeld - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):228-231.
  11. Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
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  12. Three Forms of Agential Commitment: Reply to Cullity and Gerrans.Michael E. Bratman - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):327–335.
  13. Two Problems About Human Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
    I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain (...)
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  14. Action, Activity, Agent.Sebastián Briceño - 2015 - In Patricia Hanna (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies: Volume 9. Athens Institute for Education and Research. pp. 15–27.
    How is it that someone is an agent, an active being? According to a common and dominant opinion, it is in virtue of performing actions. Within this dominant trend, some claim that actions are acts of will while others claim that actions are identical with certain basic bodily movements. First I make an assessment of these traditional accounts of action and argue that neither of them can make sense of how is it that someone is an agent. Then I offer (...)
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  15. Concepts of Action and Concepts of Approval.Karl Britton - 1972 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:105 - 117.
  16. Joint Action.D. H. M. Brooks - 1981 - Mind 90 (357):113-119.
  17. The Rehabilitation of Spontaneity: A New Approach in Philosophy of Action.Brian J. Bruya - 2010 - Philosophy East and West 60 (2):pp. 207-250.
    Scholars working in philosophy of action still struggle with the freedom/determinism dichotomy that stretches back to Hellenist philosophy and the metaphysics that gave rise to it. Although that metaphysics has been repudiated in current philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the dichotomy still haunts these fields. As such, action is understood as distinct from movement, or motion. In early China, under a very different metaphysical paradigm, no such distinction is made. Instead, a notion of self-caused movement, or spontaneity, is elaborated. (...)
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  18. Aesthetic Spontaneity: A Theory of Action Based on Affective Responsiveness.Brian James Bruya - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    This dissertation is an attempt to analyze an indigenous concept of early Chinese Philosophy in its own context, interpreting it outside of a contemporary Western philosophical framework , then to comb the history of Western philosophy for related concepts, in order to finally enrich the contemporary philosophical landscape by incorporating this concept through a useful and familiar set of conceptual tools. ;The concept in question is ziran, rendered spontaneity, a central notion of early Chinese philosophy but one that has not (...)
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  19. Group Intentions as Equilibria.Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):95 - 109.
    In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
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  20. Intentional Actions and Their Side Effects.Ewing Y. Chinn - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):161-171.
  21. Discontenting Contented Capitalists A B&S Action Plan.Denis Collins - 1994 - Business and Society 33 (1):132-138.
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  22. Acting Intentionally and Minimal Abilities.Michael J. Costa - 1986 - Analysis 46 (3):144 - 147.
  23. Causality, Representations, and the Explanation of Actions.Arthur C. Danto - 1979 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 28:1-19.
  24. The Action of God.Brian Davies - 2010 - In John Cottingham & Peter Hacker (eds.), Mind, Method, and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny. Oxford University Press.
  25. BRATMAN, ME-Faces of Intention.R. Dunn - 2000 - Philosophical Books 41 (2):127-128.
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  26. Deciding for Others.Gerald Dworkin, Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):118.
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  27. Learning in Social Settings : Challenges for Sociocultural and Activity Theory.Ed Elbers - 2008 - In B. van Oers (ed.), The Transformation of Learning: Advances in Cultural-Historical Activity Theory. Cambridge University Press.
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  28. Some Noetico-Noematic Analyses of Action and Practical Life.Lester Embree - 1992 - In John Drummond & Lester Embree (eds.), The Phenomenology of the Noema. Springer. pp. 157--210.
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  29. Expansive Learning : Toward an Activity-Theoretical Reconceptualization.Yrjö Engeström - 2009 - In Knud Illeris (ed.), Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning Theorists -- In Their Own Words. Routledge.
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  30. Developmental Work Research: Expanding Activity Theory in Practice.Yrjö Engeström - 2005 - Lehmanns Media.
    FOREWORD Yrjö Engeström is one of the most self-directed but certainly also most interesting representatives of contemporary activity theory. ...
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  31. Speech and Action in Heraclitus. On the Theoretical Foundations of Moral Action.Michel Fattal - 2013 - Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej 58.
    Doesn’t the originality of Heraclitus reside in elaborating, well before Socrates and Plato, a philosophical and theoretical reflection on the foundations of moral and political action? In what ways does Heraclitus envisage the relations between speech and action? The logos and epos of the philosopher, which are behind the doctrine of the harmony of opposites, don’t they offer a pathway, a stable criterion and norm for individual and collective action?Our contemporaries of the 21th century, conscious of the “crisis of values” (...)
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  32. Action.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 137-151.
  33. Deciding to Act.L. Fields - 1989 - Philosophical Inquiry 11 (3-4):1-17.
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  34. They've Lost Control: Reflections on Skill.Ellen Fridland - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2729-2750.
    In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of (...)
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  35. The Intentional and the Intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
    The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the (...)
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  36. Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings.Margaret Gilbert - 2002 - Journal of Ethics 6 (2):115-143.
    Among other things, this paper considers what so-called collective guilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed be guilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do something and to act in light of that intention. An account of collective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting. Finally, a "plural subject" account of collective guilt feelings is (...)
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  37. Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing.Carl Ginet - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):95-110.
  38. Action in a Narrow and in a Broad Sense.Ana Marta González - unknown
    The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the difference between deliberate action and spontaneous action, and see how Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and Kant approach this topic.
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  39. Intentional and Unintentional Actions.Michael Gorr & Terence Horgan - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (2):251 - 262.
  40. The Range of Intentions.Donald Gustafson - 1975 - Inquiry 18 (1):83 – 95.
    Four groups of intentional action sentences can be distinguished. An intentional action sentence belongs in a given group as a consequence of the range of intentions, i.e. it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something in a particular manner, for a particular purpose, to a particular object, or it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something though he intends no particular manner or no manner at all (...)
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  41. At One with Our Actions, but at Two with Our Bodies.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.
    Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as 'doing' the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of 'agent causation'. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are 'tryings' that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so (...)
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  42. What Do You Have In Mind?Morrill Hall - unknown
    Consider the difference between reaching over to the desk to grab your copy of Kant’s first Critique and reaching over to grab some book or other. This is the difference between an action directed on a specific thing and an action directed on something, but no one thing in particular. In the first case, you will be successful only if you grab your copy of Kant—only one book will do; in the second, you will be successful if you grab a (...)
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  43. Distinguishing Joint Actions From Collective Actions.Paul Hammond - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    This paper argues that the intentional actions of collective entities, such as corporations and agencies, are not necessarily joint intentional actions by several members of those collectives. I briefly summarize the social action theories of John Searle, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and Seumas Miller, which I argue are all theories of joint action. I then describe a case based loosely on events from the 2008 financial crisis in which an intentional collective action is performed by a corporation due (...)
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  44. Action.A. H. Hannay - 1941 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 42:141 - 150.
  45. The Intentionality of Animal Action.Cecilia Heyes & Anthony Dickinson - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (1):87–103.
  46. Belief and Agency.David Hunter (ed.) - 2011 - University of Calgary Press.
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  47. Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System.Alicia Juarrero - 1999 - Emergence: Complexity and Organization 2 (2):24-57.
  48. Types of Actions.Christian Kanzian - 2000 - Disputatio Philosophica 2 (1):89-103.
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  49. Agency and Patiency: Back to Nature?Mikael M. Karlsson - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):59 – 81.
    The distinction between acting and suffering underlies any theory of agency. Among contemporary writers, Fred Dretske is one of the few who has attempted to explicate this distinction without restricting the notion of action to intentional action alone. Aristotle also developed a global account of agency, one which is deeper and more detailed than Dretske's, and it is to Aristotle's account (with some modifications) that the bulk of this paper is devoted. Dretske's sketchier theory faces at least two ground-level problems. (...)
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  50. Problem : Object and Intention in the Moral Act.Lottie Kendzierski - 1950 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 24:102.
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