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  1. Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support?Artūrs Logins - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be right (...)
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  2. A Conflict Between Indexical Credal Transparency & Relevance Confirmation.Joel Pust - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E confirms H relative to background knowledge K just in case P(H/K&E) > P(H/K). This requires an inequality between the rational degree of belief in H determined relative to two bodies of total knowledge which are such that one (K&E) includes the other (K) as a proper part. In this paper, I argue that it is quite plausible that there are no two possible bodies of total knowledge for ideally rational agents meeting (...)
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  3. Objectivity as Independence.Alexander Reutlinger - 2021 - Episteme:1-8.
    Building on Nozick's invariantism about objectivity, I propose to define scientific objectivity in terms of counterfactual independence. I will argue that such a counterfactual independence account is (a) able to overcome the decisive shortcomings of Nozick's original invariantism and (b) applicable to three paradigmatic kinds of scientific objectivity (that is, objectivity as replication, objectivity as robustness, and objectivity as Mertonian universalism).
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  4. Jean Perrin and the Philosophers’ Stories: The Role of Multiple Determination in Determining Avogadro’s Number.Klodian Coko - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1):143-193.
    The French physicist Jean Baptiste Perrin is widely credited with providing the conclusive argument for atomism. The most well-known part of Perrin’s argument is his description of thirteen different procedures for determining Avogadro’s number (N)–the number of atoms, ions, and molecules contained in a gram-atom, gram-ion, and gram-mole of a substance, respectively. Because of its success in ending the atomism debates Perrin’s argument has been the focus of much philosophical interest. The various philosophers, however, have reached different conclusions, not only (...)
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  5. Beyond Falsifiability: Normal Science in a Multiverse.Sean M. Carroll - 2019 - In Richard Dawid, Radin Dardashti & Karim Thebault (eds.), Epistemology of Fundamental Physics: Why Trust a Theory? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Cosmological models that invoke a multiverse - a collection of unobservable regions of space where conditions are very different from the region around us - are controversial, on the grounds that unobservable phenomena shouldn't play a crucial role in legitimate scientific theories. I argue that the way we evaluate multiverse models is precisely the same as the way we evaluate any other models, on the basis of abduction, Bayesian inference, and empirical success. There is no scientifically respectable way to do (...)
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  6. Is There a Place in Bayesian Confirmation Theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1631-1648.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Many of them differ from each other in important respects. It turns out, though, that all the standard confirmation measures in the literature run counter to the so-called “Reverse Matthew Effect” (“RME” for short). Suppose, to illustrate, that H1 and H2 are equally successful in predicting E in that p(E | H1)/p(E) = p(E | H2)/p(E) > 1. Suppose, further, that initially H1 is less probable than H2 in that p(H1) < p(H2). (...)
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  7. Objectivity and Bias.Gordon Belot - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):655-695.
    The twin goals of this essay are: to investigate a family of cases in which the goal of guaranteed convergence to the truth is beyond our reach; and to argue that each of three strands prominent in contemporary epistemological thought has undesirable consequences when confronted with the existence of such problems. Approaches that follow Reichenbach in taking guaranteed convergence to the truth to be the characteristic virtue of good methods face a vicious closure problem. Approaches on which there is a (...)
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  8. What Is Bayesian Confirmation For?Darren Bradley - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):229-241.
    Peter Brössel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I will argue that it has both the uses they discussed—it can be used for making claims about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are, and it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experiments. Furthermore, it can be useful in explanations. More generally, I will argue that more coarse-grained concepts can be useful, even when we have more fine-grained concepts available.
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  9. Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation: Likelihood and Antilikelihood Principles.Roberto Festa & Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (1):56-81.
    We explore the grammar of Bayesian confirmation by focusing on some likelihood principles, including the Weak Law of Likelihood. We show that none of the likelihood principles proposed so far is satisfied by all incremental measures of confirmation, and we argue that some of these measures indeed obey new, prima facie strange, antilikelihood principles. To prove this, we introduce a new measure that violates the Weak Law of Likelihood while satisfying a strong antilikelihood condition. We conclude by hinting at some (...)
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  10. Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: A Reply to Glass and McCartney.William Roche - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):491-513.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Zalabardo focuses on the probability difference measure, the probability ratio measure, the likelihood difference measure, and the likelihood ratio measure. He argues that the likelihood ratio measure is adequate, but each of the other three measures is not. He argues for this by setting out three adequacy conditions on confirmation measures and arguing in effect that all of them are met by the likelihood ratio measure but not by any of the other (...)
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  11. Social Values Influence the Adequacy Conditions of Scientific Theories: Beyond Inductive Risk.Ingo Brigandt - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):326-356.
    The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It (...)
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  12. Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.
    I propose a distinct type of robustness, which I suggest can support a confirmatory role in scientific reasoning, contrary to the usual philosophical claims. In model robustness, repeated production of the empirically successful model prediction or retrodiction against a background of independentlysupported and varying model constructions, within a group of models containing a shared causal factor, may suggest how confident we can be in the causal factor and predictions/retrodictions, especially once supported by a variety of evidence framework. I present climate (...)
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  13. Error and Uncertainty in Scientific Practice.Marcel Boumans, Giora Hon & Arthur Petersen (eds.) - 2014 - Pickering & Chatto.
  14. Confirmation Measures and Collaborative Belief Updating.Ilho Park - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3955-3975.
    There are some candidates that have been thought to measure the degree to which evidence incrementally confirms a hypothesis. This paper provides an argument for one candidate—the log-likelihood ratio measure. For this purpose, I will suggest a plausible requirement that I call the Requirement of Collaboration. And then, it will be shown that, of various candidates, only the log-likelihood ratio measure \(l\) satisfies this requirement. Using this result, Jeffrey conditionalization will be reformulated so as to disclose explicitly what determines new (...)
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  15. What’s Wrong With Our Theories of Evidence?Julian Reiss - 2014 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 29 (2):283-306.
    This paper surveys and critically assesses existing theories of evidence with respect to four desiderata. A good theory of evidence should be both a theory of evidential support, and of warrant, it should apply to the non-ideal cases in which scientists typically find themselves, and it should be ‘descriptively adequate’, i.e., able to adequately represent typical episodes of evidentiary reasoning. The theories surveyed here—Bayesianism, hypotheticodeductivism,satisfaction theories, error statistics as well as Achinstein’s and Cartwright’s theories—are all found wanting in important respects. (...)
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  16. What's Wrong With Our Theories of Evidence?Julian Reiss - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (2):283-306.
    This paper reviews all major theories of evidence such as the Bayesian theory, hypothetico-deductivism, satisfaction theories, error-statistics, Achinstein's explanationist theory and Cartwright's argument theory. All these theories fail to take adequate account of the context in which a hypothesis is established and used. It is argued that the context of an inquiry determines important facts about what evidence is, and how much and what kind has to be collected to establish a hypothesis for a given purpose.
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  17. Radical Uncertainty: Beyond Probabilistic Models of Belief.Jan-Willem Romeijn & Olivier Roy - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1221-1223.
    Over the past decades or so the probabilistic model of rational belief has enjoyed increasing interest from researchers in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Of course, such probabilistic models were used for much longer in economics, in game theory, and in other disciplines concerned with decision making. Moreover, Carnap and co-workers used probability theory to explicate philosophical notions of confirmation and induction, thereby targeting epistemic rather than decision-theoretic aspects of rationality. However, following Carnap’s early applications, philosophy has more recently (...)
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  18. Common Method Variance & Bias dalam Penelitian Psikologis. Juneman - 2013 - Jurnal Pengukuran Psikologi Dan Pendidikan Indonesia 2 (5):364-381.
    The issue of common method variance and bias in Indonesia still has not gained much attention; even the terminology is less popular, except among psychometric enthusiasts and experts. In fact, the potential for common method variance and bias infiltrating in research results is very high, especially in studies that use a single method, a single source, and concurrent design, which are highly favored by psychological lecturers and researchers in Indonesia. This paper is a critical review, exposing the debate and serious (...)
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  19. Hybrid Models, Climate Models, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Joel Katzav - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):107-129.
    I examine the warrants we have in light of the empirical successes of a kind of model I call ‘ hybrid models ’, a kind that includes climate models among its members. I argue that these warrants ’ strengths depend on inferential virtues that are not just explanatory virtues, contrary to what would be the case if inference to the best explanation provided the warrants. I also argue that the warrants in question, unlike those IBE provides, guide inferences only to (...)
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  20. Thinking About Achinstein’s Philosophy of Science: Gregory J. Morgan : Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 300pp, $39.95 HB. [REVIEW]Mark Newman - 2013 - Metascience 22 (3):641-646.
  21. Kuhn Vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science, Part II: How to Strike the Balance.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2):161-168.
    This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—should be struck, with respect to confirmation (or corroboration) functions and rules of scientific method.
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  22. Scientific Method in Brief.Hugh G. Gauch - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
  23. On Popper’s Strong Inductivism.José A. Díez - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):105-116.
    It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In section (...)
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  24. Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
    Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation builds on the idea that confirming evidence consists of successful predictions that deductively follow from the hypothesis under test. This article reviews scope, history and recent development of the venerable H-D account: First, we motivate the approach and clarify its relationship to Bayesian confirmation theory. Second, we explain and discuss the tacking paradoxes which exploit the fact that H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. Third, we review several recent proposals that aim at a sounder and (...)
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  25. Can Scientific Theories Be Warranted?Alan Chalmers - 2010 - In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 58.
  26. Evaluating Scientific Theories.Russell Berg - 2009 - Philosophy Now 74:14-17.
  27. Some Reflections on Whewell's Scientific Methodology.Azam Golam - 2009 - Journal of Sociology 1 (2):71-89.
  28. Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation by the 'Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method'.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):313 - 330.
    Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all three (...)
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  29. Modus Tollens Probabilized: Deductive and Inductive Methods in Medical Diagnosis.Barbara Osimani - 2009 - MEDIC 17 (1/3):43-59.
    Medical diagnosis has been traditionally recognized as a privileged field of application for so called probabilistic induction. Consequently, the Bayesian theorem, which mathematically formalizes this form of inference, has been seen as the most adequate tool for quantifying the uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis by providing probabilities of different diagnostic hypotheses, given symptomatic or laboratory data. On the other side, it has also been remarked that differential diagnosis rather works by exclusion, e.g. by modus tollens, i.e. deductively. By drawing on a (...)
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  30. The Problem of How to Evaluate Scientific Theories.Germán Guerrero Pino - 2008 - Discusiones Filosóficas 9 (12):37 - 56.
  31. Milne’s Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure.Franz Huber - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (4):413-420.
    This article shows that a slight variation of the argument in Milne 1996 yields the log‐likelihood ratio l rather than the log‐ratio measure r as “the one true measure of confirmation. ” *Received December 2006; revised December 2007. †To contact the author, please write to: Formal Epistemology Research Group, Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, P.O. Box X906, 78457 Konstanz, Germany; e‐mail: franz.huber@uni‐konstanz.de.
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  32. Science, Politics, and Evolution.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book brings together important essays by one of the leading philosophers of science at work today. Elisabeth A. Lloyd examines several of the central topics in philosophy of biology, including the structure of evolutionary theory, units of selection, and evolutionary psychology, as well as the Science Wars, feminism and science, and sexuality and objectivity. Lloyd challenges the current evolutionary accounts of the female orgasm and analyses them for bias. She also offers an innovative analysis of the concept of objectivity. (...)
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  33. Evaluation of Theories.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2007 - In Theo A. F. Kuipers (ed.), General Philosophy of Science. North Holland. pp. 175--217.
  34. Logical Foundations of Evidential Support.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512.
    Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of "logical probability." The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in favor of bridging (...)
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  35. Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference.Deborah G. Mayo & David Cox - 2006 - In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press.
    After some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests. These are defined as the calculation of p-values rather than as formal procedures for ‘acceptance‘ and ‘rejection‘. A number of types of null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing the implications of p- values in the specific circumstances of each application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A number of more complicated situ- ations are discussed (...)
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  36. Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications.Peter Achinstein (ed.) - 2005 - The Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Peter Achinstein has gathered some prominent philosophers and historians of science for critical and lively discussions of both general questions about the ...
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  37. Methodology in Practice: Statistical Misspecification Testing.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1007-1025.
    The growing availability of computer power and statistical software has greatly increased the ease with which practitioners apply statistical methods, but this has not been accompanied by attention to checking the assumptions on which these methods are based. At the same time, disagreements about inferences based on statistical research frequently revolve around whether the assumptions are actually met in the studies available, e.g., in psychology, ecology, biology, risk assessment. Philosophical scrutiny can help disentangle 'practical' problems of model validation, and conversely, (...)
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  38. Methodological and Epistemic Differences Between Historical Science and Experimental Science.Carol E. Cleland - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (3):447-451.
    Experimental research is commonly held up as the paradigm of "good" science. Although experiment plays many roles in science, its classical role is testing hypotheses in controlled laboratory settings. Historical science is sometimes held to be inferior on the grounds that its hypothesis cannot be tested by controlled laboratory experiments. Using contemporary examples from diverse scientific disciplines, this paper explores differences in practice between historical and experimental research vis-à-vis the testing of hypotheses. It rejects the claim that historical research is (...)
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  39. How to Test Normative Theories of Science.David Baumslag - 2000 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (2):267-275.
    In this paper I discuss how descriptive studies of science, increasingly emphasised by philosophers of science, can be used to test normative theories of science. I claim that we can use cases of scientific practice as counter examples; if the practice of a given scientist can be shown to be justified and it diverges from the prescriptions of a scientific theory then the theory should be rejected. This approach differs from those offered by previous philosophers of science and at the (...)
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  40. Testability.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2):47-76.
    That some propositions are testable, while others are not, was a fundamental idea in the philosophical program known as logical empiricism. That program is now widely thought to be defunct. Quine’s (1953) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and Hempel’s (1950) “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning” are among its most notable epitaphs. Yet, as we know from Mark Twain’s comment on an obituary that he once had the pleasure of reading about himself, the report of a death can (...)
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  41. Hypothetico-Deductivism: The Current State of Play; The Criterion of Empirical Significance: Endgame.Ken Gemes - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (1):1 - 20.
    : Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selective confirmation: Precise formulations of H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, for any T', S confirms T&T'. It is the perceived failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John Earman to recently conclude that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse". This suggests the following state of play: H-D is an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down (...)
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  42. Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Michael Kruse & Deborah G. Mayo - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):324.
    Once upon a time, logic was the philosopher’s tool for analyzing scientific reasoning. Nowadays, probability and statistics have largely replaced logic, and their most popular application—Bayesianism—has replaced the qualitative deductive relationship between a hypothesis h and evidence e with a quantitative measure of h’s probability in light of e.
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  43. Diverse Tests on an Independent World.J. D. Trout - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):407-429.
  44. The `Corroboration' of Theories.Hilary Putnam - 1991 - Philosophy of Science:121--137.
  45. A Semantic Theory for Partial Entailments and Inductive Inferences.James Allen Hawthorne - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    This investigation is an attempt to spell out a formal semantic theory for inductive logic. The logic is probabilistic. It roughly resembles the logic of confirmation functions developed by Rudolf Carnap. ;Carnap's logic specifies an object language--the language of monadic predicate logic--and defines meta-linguistic probability functions on sentences of the object language. These probability functions express a semantic relationship between sentences, just as logical consequence is a semantic relationship between sentences in deductive logic. The semantic conditional probability functions express the (...)
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  46. Ein Erkenntnismodell Des Nikolaus Von Kues Und der Grad der Bewährung Einer Wissenschaftlichen Hypothese.Otto-Joachim Grüsser - 1988 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (2):232-238.
    The degree of corroboration of a scientific hypothesis is an issue that has been repeatedly discussed in modern theory of sciences . In a preceding paper it was shown that the formulae advanced by Popper to calculate the degree of corroboration C are not very satisfactory because the probability values required in the computation of C are not available as a rule. Another equation to measure the degree of corroboration B was proposed ), whereby only the number n of unsuccessful (...)
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  47. Reconstructing The Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference.Elliott Sober - 1988 - MIT Press.
  48. Normative Systems of Discovery and Logic of Search.Jan M. Zytkow & Herbert A. Simon - 1988 - Synthese 74 (1):65 - 90.
    New computer systems of discovery create a research program for logic and philosophy of science. These systems consist of inference rules and control knowledge that guide the discovery process. Their paths of discovery are influenced by the available data and the discovery steps coincide with the justification of results. The discovery process can be described in terms of fundamental concepts of artificial intelligence such as heuristic search, and can also be interpreted in terms of logic. The traditional distinction that places (...)
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  49. Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and the Social Sciences.Richard W. Miller - 1987 - Princeton University Press.
  50. Dimensions of Theory Acceptance: Methodology and Experiments.Margaret Catherine Morrison - 1987 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    Recent arguments for scientific realism have emphasized the importance of both methodological factors, such as theoretical unification , and experiments , as evidence for a realistic view of certain aspects of theoretical structure . Throughout this dissertation I argue that neither strategy is sufficient as a defense of realism. ;Chapter one consists of a discussion of Friedman's argument for realism as outlined in his Foundations of Space-Time Theories . I argue that his reliance on theoretical unification and conjunction as grounds (...)
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