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  1. Objectivity and Bias.Gordon Belot - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):655-695.
    The twin goals of this essay are: to investigate a family of cases in which the goal of guaranteed convergence to the truth is beyond our reach; and to argue that each of three strands prominent in contemporary epistemological thought has undesirable consequences when confronted with the existence of such problems. Approaches that follow Reichenbach in taking guaranteed convergence to the truth to be the characteristic virtue of good methods face a vicious closure problem. Approaches on which there is a (...)
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  2. Beyond Falsifiability: Normal Science in a Multiverse.Sean M. Carroll - forthcoming - In Richard Dawid, Radin Dardashti & Karim Thebault (eds.), Epistemology of Fundamental Physics: Why Trust a Theory? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Cosmological models that invoke a multiverse - a collection of unobservable regions of space where conditions are very different from the region around us - are controversial, on the grounds that unobservable phenomena shouldn't play a crucial role in legitimate scientific theories. I argue that the way we evaluate multiverse models is precisely the same as the way we evaluate any other models, on the basis of abduction, Bayesian inference, and empirical success. There is no scientifically respectable way to do (...)
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  3. Glymour on Evidential Relevance.David Christensen - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
    Glymour's "bootstrap" account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence, however, the "bootstrap" condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain why neither can give a satisfactory analysis of evidential relevance.
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  4. Ein Erkenntnismodell Des Nikolaus Von Kues Und der Grad der Bewährung Einer Wissenschaftlichen Hypothese.Otto-Joachim Grüsser - 1988 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (2):232-238.
    The degree of corroboration of a scientific hypothesis is an issue that has been repeatedly discussed in modern theory of sciences . In a preceding paper it was shown that the formulae advanced by Popper to calculate the degree of corroboration C are not very satisfactory because the probability values required in the computation of C are not available as a rule. Another equation to measure the degree of corroboration B was proposed ), whereby only the number n of unsuccessful (...)
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  5. First Philosophy and Natural Philosophy in Descartes.Gary Hatfield - 1985 - In A. J. Holland (ed.), Philosophy, its History and Historiography. Reidel. pp. 149-164.
    Descartes was both metaphysician and natural philosopher. He used his metaphysics to ground portions of his physics. However, as should be a commonplace but is not, he did not think he could spin all of his physics out of his metaphysics a priori, and in fact he both emphasized the need for appeals to experience in his methodological remarks on philosophizing about nature and constantly appealed to experience in describing his own philosophy of nature. During the 1630s, he offered empirical (...)
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  6. Milne’s Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure.Franz Huber - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (4):413-420.
    This article shows that a slight variation of the argument in Milne 1996 yields the log‐likelihood ratio l rather than the log‐ratio measure r as “the one true measure of confirmation. ” *Received December 2006; revised December 2007. †To contact the author, please write to: Formal Epistemology Research Group, Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, P.O. Box X906, 78457 Konstanz, Germany; e‐mail: franz.huber@uni‐konstanz.de.
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  7. Common Method Variance & Bias dalam Penelitian Psikologis. Juneman - 2013 - Jurnal Pengukuran Psikologi Dan Pendidikan Indonesia 2 (5):364-381.
    The issue of common method variance and bias in Indonesia still has not gained much attention; even the terminology is less popular, except among psychometric enthusiasts and experts. In fact, the potential for common method variance and bias infiltrating in research results is very high, especially in studies that use a single method, a single source, and concurrent design, which are highly favored by psychological lecturers and researchers in Indonesia. This paper is a critical review, exposing the debate and serious (...)
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  8. Hybrid Models, Climate Models, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Joel Katzav - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):107-129.
    I examine the warrants we have in light of the empirical successes of a kind of model I call ‘ hybrid models ’, a kind that includes climate models among its members. I argue that these warrants ’ strengths depend on inferential virtues that are not just explanatory virtues, contrary to what would be the case if inference to the best explanation provided the warrants. I also argue that the warrants in question, unlike those IBE provides, guide inferences only to (...)
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  9. Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Michael Kruse & Deborah G. Mayo - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):324.
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  10. Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation by the 'Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method'.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):313 - 330.
    Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all three (...)
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  11. Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.
    I propose a distinct type of robustness, which I suggest can support a confirmatory role in scientific reasoning, contrary to the usual philosophical claims. In model robustness, repeated production of the empirically successful model prediction or retrodiction against a background of independentlysupported and varying model constructions, within a group of models containing a shared causal factor, may suggest how confident we can be in the causal factor and predictions/retrodictions, especially once supported by a variety of evidence framework. I present climate (...)
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  12. Science, Politics, and Evolution.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book brings together important essays by one of the leading philosophers of science at work today. Elisabeth A. Lloyd examines several of the central topics in philosophy of biology, including the structure of evolutionary theory, units of selection, and evolutionary psychology, as well as the Science Wars, feminism and science, and sexuality and objectivity. Lloyd challenges the current evolutionary accounts of the female orgasm and analyses them for bias. She also offers an innovative analysis of the concept of objectivity. (...)
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  13. Modus Tollens Probabilized: Deductive and Inductive Methods in Medical Diagnosis.Barbara Osimani - 2009 - MEDIC 17 (1/3):43-59.
    Medical diagnosis has been traditionally recognized as a privileged field of application for so called probabilistic induction. Consequently, the Bayesian theorem, which mathematically formalizes this form of inference, has been seen as the most adequate tool for quantifying the uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis by providing probabilities of different diagnostic hypotheses, given symptomatic or laboratory data. On the other side, it has also been remarked that differential diagnosis rather works by exclusion, e.g. by modus tollens, i.e. deductively. By drawing on a (...)
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  14. Confirmation Measures and Collaborative Belief Updating.Ilho Park - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3955-3975.
    There are some candidates that have been thought to measure the degree to which evidence incrementally confirms a hypothesis. This paper provides an argument for one candidate—the log-likelihood ratio measure. For this purpose, I will suggest a plausible requirement that I call the Requirement of Collaboration. And then, it will be shown that, of various candidates, only the log-likelihood ratio measure \(l\) satisfies this requirement. Using this result, Jeffrey conditionalization will be reformulated so as to disclose explicitly what determines new (...)
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  15. Is There a Place in Bayesian Confirmation Theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1631-1648.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Many of them differ from each other in important respects. It turns out, though, that all the standard confirmation measures in the literature run counter to the so-called “Reverse Matthew Effect” (“RME” for short). Suppose, to illustrate, that H1 and H2 are equally successful in predicting E in that p(E | H1)/p(E) = p(E | H2)/p(E) > 1. Suppose, further, that initially H1 is less probable than H2 in that p(H1) < p(H2). (...)
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  16. Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: A Reply to Glass and McCartney.William Roche - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):491-513.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Zalabardo focuses on the probability difference measure, the probability ratio measure, the likelihood difference measure, and the likelihood ratio measure. He argues that the likelihood ratio measure is adequate, but each of the other three measures is not. He argues for this by setting out three adequacy conditions on confirmation measures and arguing in effect that all of them are met by the likelihood ratio measure but not by any of the other (...)
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