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  1. Précis of The Unity of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):715-720.
  2. Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Externalism/Internalism Dispute. [REVIEW]Tomas Hribek - 2010 - Filosoficky Casopis 58:443-446.
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  3. Metafyzika antiindividualismu.Tomas Hribek - 2008 - Praha, Česko: Filosofia.
    [The Metaphysics of Anti-Individualism] A detailed exploration of the implications of psychological externalism -- in particular Tyler Burge's variety, or what he calls "anti-individualism" -- for the mind-body problem. Based on his anti-individualism, Burge famously rejected materialism, but the ramifications of this argument were not properly examined. I show how he rejects the identity, supervenience, and realization forms of materialism, but that he leaves out the possibility of constitution. In fact, this is not the only option that he admits -- (...)
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  4. The Mind-Technology Problem - Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artifacts.Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - forthcoming - Springer.
  5. The Extended Mind, the Concept of Belief, and Epistemic Credit.John Miles Preston - unknown
    This chapter poses a challenge to the extended mind thesis that Andy Clark and David Chalmers propose for beliefs, upon which their thesis is largely based. Clark and Chalmers present two related theses in their exposition of the extended mind. First they present “active externalism,” which states that a cognitive system is achieved when humans are appropriately linked with external entities; second, they present “the extended mind thesis,” which states that some, if not all, of a subject’s mental phenomena are (...)
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  6. Learning Disability and the Extended Mind.Caroline King - 2016 - Essays in Philosophy 17 (2):38-68.
    In his critique of the extended mind hypothesis, Robert Rupert suggests that we have no reason to move from the claim that cognition is deeply embedded in the environment to the more radical claim that, in some cases, cognition itself extends into the environment. In this paper, I argue that we have strong normative reasons to prefer the more radical extended mind hypothesis to Rupert’s modest embedded mind hypothesis. I take an agnostic position on the metaphysical debate about the ultimate (...)
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  7. Probabilistic Foundations of Teleology and Content.Marshall David Abrams - 2002 - Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content in terms of functions, where the latter are in turn based in part on facts concerning past natural selection. While I support basing content on functions which are constituted by facts about the past, I argue that it is a mistake to base content on selection. This dissertation works out an alternative concept of function which is a more appropriate basis for a theory of mental content. In (...)
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  8. The Enacted Mind and the Extended Mind.J. Kiverstein & A. Clark - 2009 - Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 28 (1).
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  9. Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind.F. Adams & K. Aizawa - 2009 - In John Symons Paco Calvo (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. pp. 193--213.
  10. The Extended Mind in Focus.R. Menary - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 1--26.
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  11. Het uiterlijk van het innerlijk: Extended Mind, technologie en de binnen-buiten scheiding.Ö Aydin - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74:5-27.
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  12. Anti-Individualism, Materialism, Naturalism.Tomas Hribek - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (3):283-302.
    This paper starts from the familiar premise that psychological anti-individualism is incompatible with materialism. It attempts to state more clearly what this incompatibility consists in, and — rather than arguing in detail for any particular resolution — to inquire whether this incompatibility admits any resolution. However, the paper does offer a conditional argument concerning the possibility that the incompatibility is genuine and cannot be resolved. Provided that anti-individualism and materialism cannot be squared, and anti-individualism is correct, it follows that materialism (...)
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  13. Richard Menary, Ed., The Extended Mind.Benjamin James Lozano - 2011 - Radical Philosophy 165:52.
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  14. An Extended View of Mind and Cognition.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):5-18.
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  15. Review of Robert D. Rupert, Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind[REVIEW]Robert A. Wilson - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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  16. Review of Richard Menary (Ed.), The Extended Mind[REVIEW]William Ramsey - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12).
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  17. How to Do Things Without Words.D. Spurrett & S. J. Cowley - 2004 - Language Sciences 26 (5):443-466.
    Clark and Chalmers (1998) defend the hypothesis of an ‘Extended Mind’, maintaining that beliefs and other paradigmatic mental states can be implemented outside the central nervous system or body. Aspects of the problem of ‘language acquisition’ are considered in the light of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather than ‘language’ as typically understood, the object of study is something called ‘utterance-activity’, a term of art intended to refer to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of (...)
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  18. Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep.Peter Godfrey -Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.
  19. The Antilogism Extended.W. C. Wilcox - 1969 - Mind 78 (310):266-269.
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Twin Earth and Externalism
  1. Language and Scientific Explanation: Where Does Semantics Fit In?Eran Asoulin - forthcoming - Berlin, Germany: Language Science Press.
    This book discusses the two main construals of the explanatory goals of semantic theories. The first, externalist conception, understands semantic theories in terms of a hermeneutic and interpretive explanatory project. The second, internalist conception, understands semantic theories in terms of the psychological mechanisms in virtue of which meanings are generated. It is argued that a fruitful scientific explanation is one that aims to uncover the underlying mechanisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena are made possible, and that a scientific (...)
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  2. Chalmers’ Argument From Relativity.Jan Almäng - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-6.
    David Chalmers has recently argued that Relativity Theory supports the notion that shapes are Twin-Earthable. In this paper this argument is challenged. I reconstruct the argument in five steps where the last step is the conclusion. I proceed to argue that one step in the argument can be interpreted in two different ways. The problem is that on the first interpretation of the step, the conclusion does not follow. And on the second interpretation of the step, it contradicts a previous (...)
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  3. Twin Earth and Perceptual Content.Jan Almäng - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    This paper presents a framework for analysing perceptual Twin Earth thought experiments. Visual content normally has an analogue character, and it is argued in this paper that this sets certain constraints on the extent to which Twin Earth thought experiments can be successful. The argumentation in the paper is developed by using examples from visual spatial content. It is argued that visual spatial content can only be “twin-earthed” in a very limited way. Whereas the metrics of space can be twin-earthed, (...)
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  4. Propositions, Meaning, and Names.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (3):335-362.
    The object of this paper is to sketch an approach to propositions, meaning and names. The key ingredients are a Twin-Earth-inspired distinction between internal and external meaning, and a middle-Wittgenstein-inspired conception of internal meaning as role in language system. I show how the approach offers a promising solution to the problem of the meaning of proper names. This is a plea for a neglected way of thinking about these topics.
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  5. Changing Notions of Linguistic Competence in the History of Formal Semantics.Barbara H. Partee - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning: Essays on the metatheory of natural language semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 172-196.
    In the history of formal semantics, the successful joining of linguistic and philosophical work brought with it some difficult foundational questions concerning the nature of meaning and the nature of knowledge of language in the domain of semantics: questions in part about “what’s in the head” of a competent language-user. This paper, part of a project on the history of formal semantics, revisits the central issues of (Partee, 1979) in a historical context, as a clash between two traditions, Fregean and (...)
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  6. Externalist Thought Experiments and Direction of Fit.Casey Woodling - 2017 - Argumenta 3 (1):139-156.
    The classic thought experiments for Content Externalism have been motivated by consideration of intentional states with a mind-to-world direction of fit. In this paper, I argue that when these experiments are run on intentional states with a world-to-mind direction of fit, the thought experiments actually support Content Internalism. Because of this, I argue that the classic thought experiments alone cannot properly motivate Content Externalism. I do not show that Content Externalism is false in this paper, just that it cannot be (...)
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  7. Semantic Externalism Without Thought Experiments.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2018 - Analysis (1):81-89.
    Externalism is the thesis that the contents of intentional states and speech acts are not determined by the way the subjects of those states or acts are internally. It is a widely accepted but not entirely uncontroversial thesis. Among such theses in philosophy, externalism is notable for owing the assent it commands almost entirely to thought experiments, especially to variants of Hilary Putnam's famous Twin Earth scenario. This paper presents a thought experiment-free argument for externalism. It shows that externalism is (...)
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  8. Content Externalism and Quine’s Criterion Are Incompatible.T. Parent - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):625-639.
    Externalism holds that the content of our utterances and thoughts are determined partly by the environment. Here, I offer an argument which suggests that externalism is incompatible with a natural view about ontological commitment--namely, the Quinean view that such commitments are fixed by the range of the variables in your theory. The idea in brief is that if Oscar mistakenly believes that water = XYZ, the externalist ontologically commits Oscar to two waterish kinds, whereas the Quinean commits him to one (...)
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  9. Object-Dependent and Property Dependent Contents.Manfred Bruns - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3):185.
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  10. Twin Earth Revisited.Robert Stalnaker - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:297.
    Making sense of twin earth intuitions with an information-theoretic account of content: information depends on relations in normal conditions, which are extrinsic. With remarks on the context-sensitivity of content-attribution.
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  11. Where After All Are the Meanings? A Defense of Internalism. Searle Versus Putnam.Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2004 - Experience and Analysis. Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium 12:408-409.
    There has been recent dispute between Putnam and Searle over whether meanings are “in the head”. Putnam makes use of Twin-Earth thought experiments to show that our mental states alone cannot determine what we refer to (and thus “mean”) and that we rely also on external factors, which are not “in the head”. This suggests to me that we in some way mean more than we actually know. Searle on the other hand makes use of what he calls “Intentional contents”, (...)
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  12. Putnam on What Isn’T in the Head.Michael McGlone - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):199-205.
    In "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" Putnam argues, among other things, that "'meanings' just ain't in the head". Putnam's central arguments in favor of this conclusion are unsound. The arguments in question are the famous intra-world Twin Earth arguments, given on pages 223-227 of the article in question. Each of these arguments relies on a premise to the effect that this or that Twin Earth scenario is both logically possible and one in which certain individuals are in the same overall "psychological (...)
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  13. Semantic Externalism.Jesper Kallestrup - 2011 - Routledge.
    Semantic externalism is the view that the meanings of referring terms, and the contents of beliefs that are expressed by those terms, are not fully determined by factors internal to the speaker but are instead bound up with the environment. The debate about semantic externalism is one of the most important but difficult topics in philosophy of mind and language, and has consequences for our understanding of the role of social institutions and the physical environment in constituting language and the (...)
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  14. The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism.Bryan Frances - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138.
    Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
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  15. Self‐Knowledge and Externalism About Empty Concepts.Ted Parent - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):158-168.
    Several authors have argued that, assuming we have apriori knowledge of our own thought-contents, semantic externalism implies that we can know apriori contingent facts about the empirical world. After presenting the argument, I shall respond by resisting the premise that an externalist can know apriori: If s/he has the concept water, then water exists. In particular, Boghossian's Dry Earth example suggests that such thought-experiments do not provide such apriori knowledge. Boghossian himself rejects the Dry Earth experiment, however, since it would (...)
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  16. Propositional Attitudes and Physicalism.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    Many theorists have contended that since the mind depends on the brain, the contents of our thoughts are determined by just the intrinsic physical properties of our bodies. In the first part of my dissertation I examine this theory's negation, anti-individualism, by investigating the "Twin-Earth" thought experiments of Putnam and Burge. Although anti-individualism has recently become widely accepted, I argue that none of the arguments given thus far are sound; nor has the theory been given a proper formulation. I also (...)
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  17. Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):231-244.
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally suited for providing (...)
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  18. Content Externalism and Equivocal Inference.T. Parent - manuscript
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 6 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
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  19. Review of Mikkel Gerken's Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental. [REVIEW]B. J. C. Madison - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:xx-yy.
  20. The Anti-Individualist Revolution in the Philosophy of Language.Gregory Bochner - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (2):91-120.
    The canonical arguments against the description theory of names are usually taken to have established that the reference of a name as used on a given occasion is not semantically determined by the qualitative descriptions that the speaker may have in mind. The deepest moral of these arguments, on the received view, would be that the speaker’s narrow mental states play no semantic role in fixing reference. My central aim in this paper is to challenge this common understanding by highlighting (...)
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  21. Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Palgrave Macmillan (Innovations in Philosophy).
    Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. The book contains introductions to basic concepts in the epistemology of inference and to important aspects of the philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning's epistemic force depends on the external environment in ways that are both surprising and epistemologically important. -/- For example, Gerken argues that purportedly deductive reasoning that exhibits the fallacy of equivocation may nevertheless transmit (...)
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  22. Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language.Basil Smith - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    How are the contents of our beliefs, our intentions, and other attitudes individuated? Just what makes our contents what they are? Content externalism, as Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and others have argued, is the position that our contents depend in a constitutive manner on items in the external world, that they can be individuated by our causal interaction with the items they are about. Content internalism, by contrast, is the position that our contents depend primarily on the properties of our (...)
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  23. Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2004 - MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  24. Searle, Burge and Intentional Content.Maciej Witek - 2004 - In Johann Marek & Maria Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  25. Slow Earth and the Slow-Switching Slowdown Showdown.Pete Mandik - manuscript
    The present paper has three aims. The first and foremost aim is to introduce into philosophy of mind and related areas (philosophy of language, etc) a discussion of Slow Earth, an analogue to the classic Twin Earth scenario that features a difference from aboriginal Earth that hinges on time instead of the distribution of natural kinds. The second aim is to use Slow Earth to call into question the central lessons often alleged to flow from consideration of Twin Earth, lessons (...)
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  26. Externalism About Content: Its Social and Its Physical Roots.Michael Esfeld - 2002 - Filosoficky Casopis 50:387-400.
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  27. Just What Do We Have In Mind?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1986 - In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 25-48.
    M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
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  28. Categories of Being. Koskinen (ed.) - forthcoming
  29. Wilfrid Sellars' Anti-Descriptivism.Kevin Scharp - forthcoming - In Koskinen (ed.), Categories of Being.
    The work of Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and others initiated a tradition in philosophy that has come to be known as anti-descriptivism. I argue that when properly interpreted, Wilfrid Sellars is a staunch anti-descriptivist. Not only does he accept most of the conclusions drawn by the more famous anti-descriptivists, he goes beyond their critiques to reject the fundamental tenant of descriptivism—that understanding a linguistic expression consists in mentally grasping its meaning and associating that meaning with the expression. I show that Sellars’ (...)
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  30. Something Mental is Just in the Head, and What the Mental Out of the Head is Like.Arvan Marcus - manuscript
    In, “Why Nothing Mental is Just in The Head,” Justin Fisher (Noȗs, 2007) uses a novel thought-experiment to argue that every form of mental internalism is false. This paper shows that Fisher fails to refute mental internalism, and that a new variant of his example actually (a) confirms a form of mental internalism, as well as (b) John Locke's “resemblance thesis,” thereby (c) disconfirming all externalist theories of mental content (the type of theory Fisher takes his original example to prove).
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  31. Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus).Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.) - 2005 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume discuss Putnam's major philosophical contributions.
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