Vedanta

As a Festschrift, this book celebrates and honours the scholarly achievements of Professor Jaysankar Lal Shaw, one of the most eminent and internationally acclaimed comparative philosophers of our times. Original works by leading international philosophers and logicians are presented here, exploring themes such as: meaning, negation, perception and Indian and Buddhist systems of philosophy, especially Nyaya perspectives. -/- Professor Shaw’s untiring effort to solve some of the problems of contemporary philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, metaphysics and morals from the perspectives (...) of classical Indian philosophers or systems of philosophy is deserving of a tribute. Chapters in this volume reflect the diverse aspects of Shaw’s contribution to comparative philosophy and are organised into four sections: Language, Epistemology, Mathematics and Logic, Ethics and Politics. -/- These chapters would appeal to anyone interested in philosophy or East-West thinking, including students and professionals. Graduates and researchers with interests in epistemology, metaphysics, political philosophy, logic and non-western philosophy will find this work highly relevant. (shrink)

The cross-cultural philosopher B.K. Matilal is one of many who have argued that some Indian philosophers are skeptics. Inspired by Matilal, in Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, Ethan Mills argues that Nāgārjuna (150–200 CE), Jayarāśi (770–830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa (1125–1180 CE) are skeptics in a specific sense: as part of a textually inspired tradition of “skepticism about philosophy,” they share overlapping methods. Mills’ arguments about method are more successful than those about tradition, although the book’s engaging exposition (...) of these three thinkers will hopefully spark new interest in their work. (shrink)

In this article, I suggest that moksha (liberation or enlightenment) in Advaita Vedanta is best understood psychologically. A psychological understanding is not only consistent with the Advaita Vedanta articulated by Shankara and Gaudapada, but avoids what will be called the problem of jivan mukti. This article will consist of three main parts. First, I will briefly discuss the metaphysics and ontology of Advaita Vedanta. Next, I will present the problem of jivan mukti, and the Advaitin response to the problem. The (...) problem of jivan mukti will lead to the third portion of the article, which is a presentation of what moksha is. At no point in the article will I be arguing the truth of the Advaitin position. Instead, I will be meeting Advaita on its own terms in order to come to some understanding of moksha. (shrink)

Sankaraachaarya popularized the advaita thought among students of philosophy and seekers of knowledge of the Self or Brahman or Atman. But he is criticized by Indian theistic schools like Visistaadvaita and dvaita philosophies as “prachchnna bouddha – follower of the Buddha in disguise”. This comment of theistic schools makes it worthy of comparing the advaitic and Buddhist schools of thought in relation to consciousness, world, Soonya, and other expressions between the two thought systems. This paper does such a comparison from (...) cognitive science point of view and how the elements of Buddhism and Advaita thought enrich the modern scientific field of cognitive science. Also, a brief analysis is presented how the supplementary and complementary nature of the Upanishads, the Buddhism, the Jainism and the Shaddarsanas of Indian philosophic systems can be used to further the understanding of form, structure and function of human consciousness, mind and their functions. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic. The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking (...) that non-conceptual perception has any necessary causal role in generating concept-laden perceptual awareness. He further raises a number of internal inconsistencies and undesirable consequences for Gaṅgeśa’s claim that non-conceptual states are introspectively invisible. His own causal theory of perception is more parsimonious than the Nyāya account, and is equally compatible with direct realism. I conclude by noting several striking parallels between Vyāsatīrtha’s views and the conceptualism of John McDowell, while also suggesting that Vyāsatīrtha own conceptualism is not unduly constrained by some of McDowell’s limiting assumptions about concepts and perceptual contents. (shrink)

The concept of evolution as envisaged and developed by modern scientists will be reviewed. The concept of consciousness and its evolution in humans as enlightenment and self-realization as experienced and expressed in the Upanishads, Vedanta, Yoga Sutras, Bhakti Sutras and in the experiences and expressions of modern spiritual seers will be critically analyzed. And self-realization in individual leading one to and getting established in jeevanmukta state will be discussed. The possible irreversible physicochemical nature and implications of such consciousness evolution in (...) humans will be discussed. (shrink)

The cross-cultural philosopher B.K. Matilal is one of many who have argued that some Indian philosophers are skeptics. Inspired by Matilal, in Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, Ethan Mills argues that Nāgārjuna (150–200 CE), Jayarāśi (770–830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa (1125–1180 CE) are skeptics in a specific sense: as part of a textually inspired tradition of “skepticism about philosophy,” they share overlapping methods. Mills’ arguments about method are more successful than those about tradition, although the book’s engaging exposition (...) of these three thinkers will hopefully spark new interest in their work. (shrink)

Ghanshamdas Rattanmal Malkani, a Sindhi Kshatriya, was born in 1892 at Hyderabad Sind, and educated at Karachi, where his principal philosophy teacher was T. L. Vaswami. When the Indian Institute of Philosophy was founded in 1916, he was one of the six original fellows chosen to attend it. He soon became its permanent director and, except for two years at Cambridge University, has been there ever since. Since 1926 he has also been editor of the Philosophical Quarterly, which under him (...) has become India's leading philosophical journal. (shrink)

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, a Bengali Brahmin, was born in 1875 at Serampore near Calcutta, one of eight children of an impoverished clerk Educated at Presidency College in Calcutta, he studied under B. N. Seal, who had revived the study of Indian philosophy. He was a brilliant student clearly destined for an academic career, but his unwillingness to appease British administrators prevented his obtaining an appointment commensurate with his ability, and he held a variety of teaching and administrative positions in government (...) colleges. When he reached the retirement age of 55, he was principal of small Hoogly College. After retirement, however, he became professor in the Calcutta post-graduate department, spent two years at the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, and finally became George V Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calcutta. After final retirement in 1938 he lived at Serampore, reading little because of failing sight, but writing a great deal and discussing philosophy with his sons and his many visitors until his death in 1949. (shrink)

Śankara did not comment on the first s ū tra in his Brahmas ū trabh āṣ ya, which was a common practice in such cases; rather, he started by defining two terms: ‘superimposition’ and ‘ignorance’, in a special introductory chapter known to a wider audience as Adhy ā sabh āṣ ya. The question arises as to why he deemed it necessary to precede his commentary to the initial s ū tra with these additional elucidations. Bh ā mat ī, Vācaspati Miśra’s (...) commentary on Mah ā s ū trabh āṣ ya, seems to shed some light on the problem. According to the doctrine of advaita, the phrase ‘desire to know Brahman’ in the first s ū tra seems prima facie to have no meaning. Thus, the introductory commentary is an explanation of an idea of Brahman which is foreign to advaita. (shrink)

The above problem is discussed with the use of the example of selected canonical Upanishads. The analysis starts with a fragment from the Mundaka Upanishad : “When he [ brahman ] that is both high [ para ] and low [ apara ] is seen”. In my opinion, this very conjoining of the absolute and relative reality, which is considerably rare in the canonical texts, requires in-depth analysis. In the discussed texts, the para / apara dimensions of reality are strictly (...) correlated with the states of consciousness in which they are experienced. Thus, in my discussion, I also consider whether all yoga adepts have always been talking about experiencing the four states of consciousness. I discuss the terms which denote the para and apara dimensions as well as the question whether the text indicates their hierarchy and, if this is the case, in what contexts and in what respect. I refer to the canonical Upanishads which belong to the Atharvaveda lineage, i.e. to Prashna, Mundaka, and Mandukya. (shrink)

This was written in 2014 during desultory afternoons in hinterland Bengal. The blog went on to feature in a US Bible Blog carnival. The author tried then to start a dialogue between the Gospel of Glory and Hinduism. But now, in 2018, this seems puerile and infantile to the author.

Some postcolonial theorists argue that the idea of a single system of belief known as "Hinduism" is a creation of nineteenth-century British imperialists. Andrew J. Nicholson introduces another perspective: although a unified Hindu identity is not as ancient as some Hindus claim, it has its roots in innovations within South Asian philosophy from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. During this time, thinkers treated the philosophies of Vedanta, Samkhya, and Yoga, along with the worshippers of Visnu, Siva, and Sakti, as belonging (...) to a single system of belief and practice. Instead of seeing such groups as separate and contradictory, they re-envisioned them as separate rivers leading to the ocean of Brahman, the ultimate reality. Drawing on the writings of philosophers from late medieval and early modern traditions, including Vijnanabhiksu, Madhava, and Madhusudana Sarasvati, Nicholson shows how influential thinkers portrayed Vedanta philosophy as the ultimate unifier of diverse belief systems. This project paved the way for the work of later Hindu reformers, such as Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, and Gandhi, whose teachings promoted the notion that all world religions belong to a single spiritual unity. In his study, Nicholson also critiques the way in which Eurocentric concepts—like monism and dualism, idealism and realism, theism and atheism, and orthodoxy and heterodoxy—have come to dominate modern discourses on Indian philosophy. (shrink)

                  Book review: Yoga: The Indian Tradition. Edited by Ian Whicher and David Carpenter. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, Pp. xii + 206     -/-  .

Much scholarly work has been done on nursery rhymes. How they are coded artifacts warning children about sexual predators etc. But till date no work has been done about Vedanta and nursery rhymes. This draft will be developed into a monograph and in the meanwhile if anyone wants to develop on these ideas, please follow anti-plagiarism rules and cite properly. I thought of putting this up since both philosophers and literature scholars may benefit from some of the insights here. This (...) was given as part of a lecture. Then I discussed theodicy in these rhymes... this last I have not uploaded building up on the theodicy in Vedanta and then using this Vedanta-woven hermeneutic to psychoanalyse and analyse these English rhymes. (shrink)

This is a very rudimentary draft on comparative study of religions. This is being worked for ultimate deposit here and elsewhere as an open access monograph.

Formalized by the tenth century, the expansive Bhāgavata Purāṇa resists easy categorization. While the narrative holds together as a coherent literary work, its language and expression compete with the best of Sanskrit poetry. The text's theological message focuses on devotion to Krishna or Vishnu, and its philosophical outlook is grounded in the classical traditions of Vedānta and Sāmkhya. This translation and detailed analysis of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa includes endnotes that explain unfamiliar concepts and essays that elucidate the rich debates found (...) in the Sanskrit commentaries. The book makes a central Hindu masterpiece more accessible to English-speaking audiences and more meaningful to scholars of Indian literature, philosophy, and religion. (shrink)

The prakaraṇa text called "Pañcīkaraṇa", attributed to Śaṅkara, is investigated here. Through a comparative analysis with Śaṅkara's commentaries on the "Gītā" and some of the principal "Upaniṣads", it is shown that this text is most probably genuine. The background of Yoga in pre-Śaṅkaran Vedānta and in Śaṅkara's thought is completely reevaluated, and the need to develop new criteria to determine the validity of the attribution of these texts to Śaṅkara is highlighted.