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  1. Evolution of Quine’s Thinking on the Thesis of Underdetermination and Scott Soames’s Accusation of Paradoxicality.M. Ashraf Adeel - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):56-69.
    Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.
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  2. Whatever Happened to the Positivist Theory of Meaning.Joseph Agassi - 1987 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1-2):22-29.
    It is getting increasingly difficult to comprehend the history of ideas of the Vienna Circle and only a clear and critical exposition of it will save it from total oblivion; an apologetic presentation will not be understood. Now that the positivist theory of meaning is no longer accepted, only an honest presentation of this fact will enable us to comprehend it and its transformations. An analysis of a paper by Otto Neurath illustrates this: Neurath's inability to present fairly his critics' (...)
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  3. Peirce on Meaning.Robert Almeder - 1979 - Synthese 41 (1):1 - 24.
    More often than not, the attractive features of Peirce's theory of meaning have been overlooked because of the temptation on the part of many philosophers to dismiss Peirce as a beknighted forerunner of a narrow form of verificationism frequently identified with the view of the ...
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  4. Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
  5. Prawitz's Version of Verificationism.Lars Bergström - 1998 - Theoria 64 (2-3):139-156.
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  6. Verification In Metaphysics.Peter M. Burkholder - 1972 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 21:101-113.
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  7. Meaning, Truth, and Pragmatism.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (39):171-176.
  8. Solipsism and the Solitary Language User.Irwin Goldstein - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):35-47.
    A person skeptical about other minds supposes it is possible in principle that there are no minds other than his. A person skeptical about an external world thinks it is possible there is no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes might be realized. In this paper I examine one argument that some people think refutes solipsism. The argument, from Wittgenstein, is (...)
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  9. Quantum Mechanical Unbounded Operators and Constructive Mathematics – a Rejoinder to Bridges.Geoffrey Hellman - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (2):121-127.
    As argued in Hellman (1993), the theorem of Pour-El and Richards (1983) can be seen by the classicist as limiting constructivist efforts to recover the mathematics for quantum mechanics. Although Bridges (1995) may be right that the constructivist would work with a different definition of 'closed operator', this does not affect my point that neither the classical unbounded operators standardly recognized in quantum mechanics nor their restrictions to constructive arguments are recognizable as objects by the constructivist. Constructive substitutes that may (...)
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  10. On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth.Carl G. Hempel - 1934 - Analysis 2 (4):49 - 59.
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  11. The Nature of Truth.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Robert James M. Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela & Victorino Raymundo Lualhati - 2013 - In Leni Garcia (ed.), Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E Publishing. pp. 38–50.
    This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems (...)
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  12. Verification, Meaning, and Truth.Felix Kaufmann - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (2):267-284.
  13. Pluralism and the Logical Basis of Metaphysics.N. Kurbis - 2007 - In Logica Yearbook.
    I argue for a kind of logical pluralism on the basis of a difficulty with defining the meaning of negation in the framework of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic semantics.
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  14. Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back.Nils Kürbis - forthcoming - Logique Et Analyse.
    There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against intuitionism (...)
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  15. What is Wrong with Classical Negation?Nils Kurbis - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92:51-86.
    The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...)
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  16. Negation. A Problem for the Proof-Theoretic Justification of Deduction.Nils Kürbis - 2015
    This is only a very short essay on negation and harmony in philosophical logic. If you buy it anyway, you'll help me pay the bills and I'll be able to write longer things.
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  17. How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption?Nils Kürbis - 2012 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  18. Carnap on Empirical Significance.Sebastian Lutz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):217-252.
    Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to (...)
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  19. Verificationism in the Tractatus?Diego Marconi - unknown
    In the following, I will mean by ‘verificationism’ the doctrine according to which understanding a sentence entails that one knows how to verify it, i.e. how to determine its truth value. It is not the only possible meaning of ‘verificationism’, nor perhaps the most common. However, it is with reference to this sense of ‘verificationism’ that I am going to ask the question whether the Tractatus is committed to verificationism.
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  20. Analytic Philosophy (Alternative Title 'Analytic Atheism?').Charles Pigden - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-319.
    Most analytic philosophers are atheists, but is there a deep connection between analytic philosophy and atheism? The paper argues a) that the founding fathers of analytic philosophy were mostly teenage atheists before they became philosophers; b) that analytic philosophy was invented partly because it was realized that the God-substitute provided by the previously fashionable philosophy - Absolute Idealism – could not cut the spiritual mustard; c) that analytic philosophy developed an unhealthy obsession with meaninglessness which led to a new kind (...)
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  21. Review of P. Frascolla, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics[REVIEW]Victor Rodych - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3).
  22. Cognitive Meaning and Cognitive Use.David Rynin - 1966 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 9 (1-4):109 – 131.
    In the first part of this paper the author restates arguments made earlier against well-known criticisms of a logical nature leveled (by C. Hempel and others) against the so-called verifiability principle, which purport to show that it is at once both too restrictive and too permissive: including as cognitively meaningful, statements intuitively lacking this property, and excluding others that are generally admitted to possess it. The author claims to show that the charge that the verifiability principle is unduly permissive will (...)
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  23. Verificationism and Theories of Space-Time.Richard Swinburne - 1983 - In Space, Time and Causality. Reidel. pp. 63-78.
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  24. Verifiability.F. Waismann - 1951 - In Gilbert Ryle & Antony Flew (eds.), Journal of Symbolic Logic. Blackwell. pp. 117--44.
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