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  1. Imagining the Purpose of Imagery.Robert P. Abelson - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):548-549.
  2. A Second Report on AA-VVIQ: Role of Vivid and Unvivid Images in Consciousness Research.A. Ahsen - 2005 - Journal of Mental Imagery 29 (3-4).
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  3. Imagery Paradigm: Imaginative Consciousness in the Experimental and Clinical Setting.A. Ahsen - 1993 - Journal of Mental Imagery 17 (1-2).
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  4. A Second Report on AA-VVIQ: Role of Vivid and Unvivid Images in Consciousness Research.A. Ahsen - 1991 - Journal of Mental Imagery 15:1-31.
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  5. Imagery and Consciousness: Putting Together Poetic, Mythic and Social Realities.A. Ahsen - 1991 - Journal of Mental Imagery 15:63-97.
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  6. Seeing-in, Seeing-as, Seeing-With: Looking Through Pictures.Emmanuel Alloa - 2011 - In Elisabeth Nemeth, Richard Heinrich, Wolfram Pichler & Wagner David (eds.), Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts. Volume I. Proceedings of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Ontos: 179-190.
    In the constitution of contemporary image theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy has undoubtedly become a major conceptual reference. Rather than trying to establish what Wittgenstein’s own image theory could possibly look like, this paper would like to critically assess some of the advantages as well as some of the quandaries that arise when using Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’ for addressing the plural realities of images. While putting into evidence the tensions that come into play when applying what was initially a theory (...)
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  7. Consciousness: An Island of Images.Rudolf Arnheim - 1994 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):121-27.
    Discusses consciousness as an island of images, which informs us incompletely and indirectly about the mental and the physical worlds. A dualistic worldview separates the perceptual world from the transcendental physical world. Both universes of discourse are empowered by dynamic forces and are related to each other by reflection, the one reflecting the other. The physical world is understood and operated through the intermediary of perception. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  8. Visual Imagery is Not Always Like Visual Perception.Martha E. Arterberry, Catherine Craver-Lemley & Adam Reeves - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):183-184.
    The “Perky effect” is the interference of visual imagery with vision. Studies of this effect show that visual imagery has more than symbolic properties, but these properties differ both spatially (including “pictorially”) and temporally from those of vision. We therefore reject both the literal picture-in-the-head view and the entirely symbolic view.
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  9. Imagination is Ancient.Stephen Asma - 2017 - Aeon:1.
    Imagination, like other higher cognition, is often thought to arise after the evolution of language. Stephen Asma argues instead that imagination is much older and forms a kind of early cognition --harvesting sensory, motor and affective impressions, and generating novel generate-and-test information.
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  10. Mental Imagery [Special Issue].B. J. Baars - 1996 - Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3).
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  11. When Are Images Conscious? The Curious Disconnection Between Imagery and Consciousness in the Scientific Literature.Bernard J. Baars - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3):261-264.
  12. Music to the Inner Ears: Exploring Individual Differences in Musical Imagery.Roger E. Beaty, Chris J. Burgin, Emily C. Nusbaum, Thomas R. Kwapil, Donald A. Hodges & Paul J. Silvia - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1163-1173.
    In two studies, we explored the frequency and phenomenology of musical imagery. Study 1 used retrospective reports of musical imagery to assess the contribution of individual differences to imagery characteristics. Study 2 used an experience sampling design to assess the phenomenology of musical imagery over the course of one week in a sample of musicians and non-musicians. Both studies found episodes of musical imagery to be common and positive: people rarely wanted such experiences to end and often heard music that (...)
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  13. Electrophysiological Correlates of Flicker-Induced Color Hallucinations.Cordula Becker, Klaus Gramann, Hermann J. Müller & Mark A. Elliott - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):266-276.
    In a recent study, Becker and Elliott [Becker, C., & Elliott, M. A. . Flicker induced color and form: Interdependencies and relation to stimulation frequency and phase. Consciousness & Cognition, 15, 175–196] described the appearance of subjective experiences of color and form induced by stimulation with intermittent light. While there have been electroencephalographic studies of similar hallucinatory forms, brain activity accompanying the appearance of hallucinatory colors was never measured. Using a priming procedure where observers were required to indicate the presence (...)
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  14. The Mechanism of Consciousness: Images.F. R. Bichowsky - 1926 - American Journal of Psychology 37:557-564.
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  15. Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World, by Zenon Pylyshyn. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007. Pp. Xiv + 255. H/B £25.95, $34.00. [REVIEW]John Bishop - unknown
    A new book by Zenon Pylyshyn is always a cause for celebration among philosophers of psychology. While many hard-nosed experimental cognitive scientists are attentive to philosophers’ concerns, Pylyshyn stands alone in the extraordinary efforts he takes to understand, address, and struggle with the philosophical puzzles that the mind, and perception in particular, raises. Pylyshyn’s most recent work, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World, does not disappoint. It is philosophically rich. Indeed, the approach to object perception that (...)
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  16. Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  17. Semantics of Time, Space, and Movement.Miriam Bras, Michel Aurnague, Mario Borillo & Andree Borillo (eds.) - 1994 - IRIT.
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  18. On the Role of Imagery in Event-Based Prospective Memory.Gene A. Brewer, Justin Knight, J. Thadeus Meeks & Richard L. Marsh - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):901-907.
    The role of imagery in encoding event-based prospective memories has yet to be fully clarified. Herein, it is argued that imagery augments a cue-to-context association that supports event-based prospective memory performance. By this account, imagery encoding not only improves prospective memory performance but also reduces interference to intention-related information that occurs outside of context. In the current study, when lure words occurred outside of the appropriate responding context, the use of imagery encoding strategies resulted in less interference when compared with (...)
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  19. Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
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  20. Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive.Robert Briscoe - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
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  21. Varieties of Synesthetic Experience.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    In her response to my "Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery" Ophelia Deroy presents an argument for an interesting new account of synesthesia. On this account, synesthesia can be thought of as "a perceptual state (e.g. of a letter)" that is "changed or enriched by the incorporation of a conscious mental image (e.g. a color)." I reply that while this is a plausible account of some types of synesthesia, some forms cannot be accounted (...)
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  22. Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered a case (...)
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  23. Is Color Experience Cognitively Penetrable?Berit Brogaard & Dimitria E. Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):193-214.
    Is color experience cognitively penetrable? Some philosophers have recently argued that it is. In this paper, we take issue with the claim that color experience is cognitively penetrable. We argue that the notion of cognitive penetration that has recently dominated the literature is flawed since it fails to distinguish between the modulation of perceptual content by non-perceptual principles and genuine cognitive penetration. We use this distinction to show that studies suggesting that color experience can be modulated by factors of the (...)
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  24. Husserl and the Phenomenological Description of Imagery: Some Issues for the Cognitive Sciences?Carmelo Calì - 2005 - ARHE 2 (4):25-37.
    This paper deals with two theories Husserl worked out on imagery in order to see if the properties a phenomenological description ascribes to imagery are fit to give meaningful constraints upon theoretical models that guide empirical research. Husserlian descriptions and Kosslyn and colleagues models are hence compared as to their explanatory strategy and implications.
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  25. Is Imagery Vividness a Determinant Factor in Creativity?Alfredo Campos & Maria Angeles Gonzalez - 1993 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (6):560-562.
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  26. Psychophysical Discrimination of Spatial Structure in Natural Images.P. Carlin & R. Watt - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 43-44.
    We report a series of experiments in which subjects were required to make spatial discriminations about naturally obtained images, as follows. Subjects were shown two natural images on a computer screen, side by side and for a period of 500 ms. Subjects were then shown, on a separate part of the computer screen, a small patch of one of the images selected at random. Subjects were required to decide which of the two full images the patch comes from, and whereabouts (...)
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  27. Imagination: Imagining and the Image.Edward S. Casey - 1971 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):475-490.
  28. Augmenting Cognitive Architectures to Support Diagrammatic Imagination.Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran, Bonny Banerjee, Unmesh Kurup & Omkar Lele - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (4):760-777.
    Diagrams are a form of spatial representation that supports reasoning and problem solving. Even when diagrams are external, not to mention when there are no external representations, problem solving often calls for internal representations, that is, representations in cognition, of diagrammatic elements and internal perceptions on them. General cognitive architectures—Soar and ACT-R, to name the most prominent—do not have representations and operations to support diagrammatic reasoning. In this article, we examine some requirements for such internal representations and processes in cognitive (...)
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  29. Imagination After Neurological Losses of Movement and Sensation: The Experience of Spinal Cord Injury. [REVIEW]Jonathan Cole - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):183-195.
    To what extent is imagination dependent on embodied experience? In attempting to answer such questions I consider the experiences of those who have to come to terms with altered neurological function, namely those with spinal cord injury at the neck. These people have each lost all sensation and movement below the neck. How might these new ways of living affect their imagination?
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  30. Visual Imagery Vs. Semantic Category as Encoding Conditions.Herbert F. Crovitz & Michael T. Harvey - 1979 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 13 (5):291-292.
  31. The Nature of Mental Imagery: How Null is the “Null Hypothesis”?Dalla Barba Gianfranco, Rosenthal Victor & Visetti Yves-Marie - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):187-188.
    Is mental imagery pictorial? In Pylyshyn's view no empirical data provides convincing support to the “pictorial” hypothesis of mental imagery. Phenomenology, Pylyshyn says, is deeply deceiving and offers no explanation of why and how mental imagery occurs. We suggest that Pylyshyn mistakes phenomenology for what it never pretended to be. Phenomenological evidence, if properly considered, shows that mental imagery may indeed be pictorial, though not in the way that mimics visual perception. Moreover, Pylyshyn claims that the “pictorial hypothesis” is flawed (...)
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  32. On Interpretative Processes in Imagery.Manuel de Vega - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):551.
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  33. Transformative Navigation: Energizing Imagery for Perceptual Shifts.Margaret Dolinsky - 2009 - Technoetic Arts 7 (1):49-64.
  34. Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - In Marcus Willaschek (ed.), Disjunctivism – Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge. pp. 5-32.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  35. Visualising as Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Kongress-Akten der Deutschen Gesellschaft Für Philosophie 22:1-16.
    In this paper, I would like to put forward the claim that, at least in some central cases, visualising consists literally in imagining seeing. The first section of my paper is concerned with a defence of the specific argument for this claim that M. G. F. Martin presents in his paper 'The Transparency of Experience' (Martin 2002). This argument has been often misunderstood (or ignored), and it is worthwhile to discuss it in detail and to illus­trate what its precise nature (...)
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  36. Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  37. Anxiety, Imagery, and Sensory Interference.Eileen D. Edmunson & Douglas L. Nelson - 1976 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 8 (4):319-322.
  38. Imagination in Non-Representational Painting.Andreas Elpidorou - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
  39. The Neurological Basis of Mental Imagery: A Componential Analysis.Martha J. Farah - 1984 - Cognition 18 (1-3):245-272.
  40. Mental Rotation and Orientation-Invariant Object Recognition: Dissociable Processes.Martha J. Farah & Katherine M. Hammond - 1988 - Cognition 29 (1):29-46.
  41. Imagery, Perception and Creativity.Francesco Ferretti - 2006 - Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1/2):75-94.
    The aim of this paper is to justify the role of mental imagery in creativity. In more specific terms the central idea of this paper is that the justification for the role of mental images in the creative process lies in the analysis of the relationship between vision and imagery. Mental images are present in thought just in those situations in which the ideal way to solve a problem would be the perception of those same things before our own eyes. (...)
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  42. Images, Ontology, and Uncertain Knowledge.James M. Fielding & Dirk Marwede - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):319-321.
    We would first of all like to thank Thor Grünbaum and Andrea Raballo for their thoughtful and lively commentary on our work. We would also like to thank Daniel Rubin for taking this opportunity to describe in detail some of the research carried out in this domain since our paper was first written. Although their commentaries may seem to fall on opposite ends of the critical scale, so to speak, taken together they provide an opportunity to take stock of the (...)
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  43. Imagery, Creativity, and Emergent Structure.Ronald A. Finke - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3):381-393.
    Recent advances in the field of creative cognition have helped to reveal the cognitive structures and processes that are involved in creative thinking and imagination. This article begins by reviewing recent studies of creative imagery that have explored the emergent properties of mental images. The geneplore model of creative cognition, which describes how preinventive structures such as creative mental images are generated and interpreted, is then discussed. In discussing this model and its implications, a distinction is made between aspects of (...)
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  44. Overcoming a Euthyphro Problem in Personal Love: Imagination and Personal Identity.Gary Foster - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):825 - 844.
    In this paper I address a Euthyphro problem associated with personal love. Do we love someone because we have reasons for loving that person or do we have reasons for loving that person because we love her? I argue that a relational view of identity will help us move some distance towards resolving this dilemma. But the relational view itself needs to be further supplemented by examining the role that imagination plays both in personal identity and in our experience of (...)
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  45. A Question of Intention in Motor Imagery.Carl Gabbard, Alberto Cordova & Sunghan Lee - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):300-305.
    We examined the question—is the intention of completing a simulated motor action the same as the intention used in processing overt actions? Participants used motor imagery to estimate distance reachability in two conditions: Imagery-Only and Imagery-Execution . With IO only a verbal estimate using imagery was given. With IE participants knew that they would actually reach after giving a verbal estimate and be judged on accuracy. After measuring actual maximum reach, used for the comparison, imagery targets were randomly presented across (...)
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  46. Mental Images.Ann Garry - 1977 - Personalist 58 (January):28-38.
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  47. Replies to Matthen, Weiskopf and Wikforss.C. Gauker - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):121-131.
    This article consists of replies to three commentaries on the book, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas (Oxford 2011).
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  48. Summary.C. Gauker - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):81-83.
    This is a summary of the book, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas (Oxford 2011). This summary serves as an introduction to a symposium on this book, featuring contributions by Mohan Matthen, Daniel Weiskopf and Åsa Wikforss, and a reply by Gauker.
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  49. Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas.Christopher Gauker - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    At least since Locke, philosophers and psychologists have usually held that concepts arise out of sensory perceptions, thoughts are built from concepts, and language enables speakers to convey their thoughts to hearers. Christopher Gauker holds that this tradition is mistaken about both concepts and language. The mind cannot abstract the building blocks of thoughts from perceptual representations. More generally, we have no account of the origin of concepts that grants them the requisite independence from language. Gauker's alternative is to show (...)
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  50. Imaginative Contagion.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
    The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional (...)
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