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  1. added 2019-01-15
    XI—Human Action and the Language of Volitions.John R. Silber - 1964 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64 (1):199-220.
  2. added 2018-02-16
    Why Actions Might Be Willings.Eugene Schlossberger & Ron Talmage - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (2):199 - 203.
  3. added 2017-06-12
    The Conative Mind: Volition and Action.Jing Zhu - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    This work is an attempt to restore volition as a respectable topic for scientific studies. Volition, traditionally conceived as the act of will, has been largely neglected in contemporary science and philosophy. I first develop a volitional theory of action by elaborating a unifying conception of volition, where volitions are construed as special kinds of mental action by which an agent consciously and actively bridge the gaps between deliberation, decision and intentional action. Then I argue that the major skeptical arguments (...)
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  4. added 2017-06-01
    Intentions, Intentional Actions and Practical Knowledge.Benedikt Kahmen - 2013 - In Markus Stepanians & Benedikt Kahmen (eds.), Critical Essays on "Causation and Responsibility". De Gruyter. pp. 253-270.
  5. added 2017-05-29
    Springs of Action.Hugh J. McCann - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):979-982.
  6. added 2017-05-29
    Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet.Richard Malpas - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):134.
  7. added 2017-05-29
    Theory of Action.Charles Marks & Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):634.
  8. added 2017-05-24
    Actions.Carl Ginet & Jennifer Hornsby - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):120.
  9. added 2017-05-18
    Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action.Alan Donagan - 2017 - Routledge.
    This book, first published in 1987, investigates what distinguishes the part of human behaviour that is action from the part that is not. The distinction was clearly drawn by Socrates, and developed by Aristotle and the medievals, but key elements of their work became obscured in modern philosophy, and were not fully recovered when, under Wittgenstein’s influence, the theory of action was revived in analytical philosophy. This study aims to recover those elements, and to analyse them in terms of a (...)
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  10. added 2017-05-15
    Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action.Myles Brand & Alan Donagan - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):115.
  11. added 2016-12-12
    Subjects of Experience.E. J. Lowe - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...)
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  12. added 2016-12-08
    Human Freedom and Agency.Thomas Williams - 2011 - In Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas. Oxford University Press. pp. 199-208.
    This paper considers Aquinas's accounts of the end of human action and the structure of human action, examines the debate between intellectualist and voluntarist interpretations of Aquinas, and corrects mistaken accounts of Aquinas's views on freedom, necessitation, and causation.
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  13. added 2016-08-25
    Carl Ginet, On Action. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Philosophy in Review 12:196-199.
  14. added 2016-08-25
    Action Theory.Leon Pearl - 1977 - International Studies in Philosophy 9:111-112.
  15. added 2016-08-10
    Actions.James S. Morgan - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 29:345-348.
  16. added 2016-08-09
    Carl Ginet, On Action Reviewed By.Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Philosophy in Review 12 (3):196-199.
  17. added 2016-08-09
    Volition and Action.Douglas Odegard - 1988 - American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2):141 - 151.
  18. added 2016-06-20
    Volitions and Actions.Michael Martin - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):187 - 190.
  19. added 2016-05-08
    Actions.Alfred Louch - 1981 - International Studies in Philosophy 13 (2):93-95.
  20. added 2015-09-01
    The Inner Event Conception of Action.Emilio Mahdad Kosrovani - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Washington
    Author considers versions of the theory that actions are inner events, either mental or physical in nature, and finds them ill-motivated, sketchy, incomplete, and inadequate.
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  21. added 2015-06-04
    The Physical Action Theory of Trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2015 - Methode 4 (6).
    Metaphysically speaking, just what is trying? There appear to be two options: to place it on the side of the mind or on the side of the world. Volitionists, who think that to try is to engage in a mental act, perhaps identical to willing and perhaps not, take the mind-side option. The second, or world-side option identifies trying to do something with one of the more basic actions by which one tries to do that thing. The trying is then (...)
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  22. added 2015-05-19
    The Conflicting Aspects of Hugh McCann's Theory of Action.Damir Čičić - 2011 - Filozofia 66 (9):918.
  23. added 2015-04-27
    The Works of Agency.Carl Ginet - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):632-635.
  24. added 2015-04-27
    Contemporary Action Theory.Ghita Holmström-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela - 1997
  25. added 2015-04-27
    Actions.Peter Cataldo - 1985 - New Scholasticism 59 (2):244-245.
  26. added 2015-04-27
    Hornsby, Jennifer Actions. [REVIEW]Jane Heal - 1982 - Philosophy 57:133.
  27. added 2015-04-07
    Agents and Their Actions.Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David & Leopold Stubenberg (eds.) - 2001 - Rodopi.
    IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...)
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  28. added 2015-03-28
    McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency.J. Bishop - 2001 - Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  29. added 2015-03-25
    Action.Winston H. F. Barnes - 1941 - Mind 50 (199):243-257.
  30. added 2014-03-21
    Intention and Volition.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):175 - 193.
  31. added 2014-03-19
    Theory of Action.Lawrence H. Davis - 1979 - Prentice-Hall.
  32. added 2014-03-07
    Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):820-823.
  33. added 2014-02-10
    Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet. [REVIEW]Alfred Mele - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):488-491.
  34. added 2013-06-25
    Quand Vouloir, c'est Faire [How to Do Things with Wants].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In R. Clot-Goudard (Dir.), L'Explication de L'Action. Analyses Contemporaines, Recherches Sur la Philosophie Et le Langage N°30, Paris, Vrin 30.
    This paper defends the action-theory of the Will, according to which willing G is doing F (F≠G) in order to make G happen. In a nutshell, willing something is doing something else in order to bring about what we want. -/- I argue that only the action-theory can reconcile two essential features of the Will. (i) its EFFECTIVITY: willing is closer to acting than desiring. (ii) its FALLIBILITY: one might want something in vain. The action-theory of the will explains EFFECTIVITY (...)
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  35. added 2013-02-25
    Free Will and Probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.
    The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in events posterior to the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in events prior to the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at the act of will if actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This (...)
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  36. added 2013-02-19
    Review of 'New Waves in Philosophy of Action' Edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish. [REVIEW]María G. Navarro - 2012 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 16 (51).
    New Waves in Philosophy, a book collection that stands out for giving a snapshot of research in all areas of philosophy is a successful editorial project addressed by Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard. New Waves in Philosophy of Action is one of its last titles, edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish. -/- The book is aimed at the researchers of all fields and readers in general interested in this sub-discipline of philosophy very difficult to (...)
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  37. added 2012-10-08
    Mental Acts as Natural Kinds.Joëlle Proust - 2013 - In Till Vierkant, Julian Kieverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 262-282.
    This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, mental and bodily actions appear (...)
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  38. added 2012-06-25
    Recent Work on Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):199 - 217.
  39. added 2011-09-13
    A Critique of Carl Ginet's Intrinsic Theory of Volition.Beverly K. Hinton - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:101 - 120.
    This essay presents an analysis in the area of the theory of human action. Philosophers and pschologists are interested in theories of action because action defines those behaviors that are under our control as opposed to behaviors that in some sense just happen. In its wider context, a theory of action has implications for legal reasoning or moral reasoning. Throughout the history of this topic, one of the leading theories of action has been the volitional theory. Volition, in its simplest (...)
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  40. added 2011-06-30
    Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 1980 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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  41. added 2011-06-06
    The Exploration of Moral Life.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, philosopher. Oxford University Press.
    The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to (...)
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  42. added 2011-05-21
    Volition and Basic Action.Hugh McCann - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):451-473.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that the bodily actions of men typicaly involve a mental action of voliton or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least one important sense, the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise an arm, move a finger, or flex a muscle.
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  43. added 2011-05-21
    Trying.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):365-386.
  44. added 2011-05-14
    Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    If a person's head moves, she may or may not have moved her head, and, if she did move it, she may have actively performed the movement of her head or merely, by doing something else, caused a passive movement. And, if she performed the movement, she might have done so intentionally or not. This short array of contrasts (and others like them) has motivated questions about the nature, variety, and identity of action. Beyond the matter of her moving, when (...)
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