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Introductions For a broad introduction to issues in the philosophy of well-being, see Fletcher 2015.
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  1. Groundhog Day and the Good Life.Diana Abad - 2012 - Film-Philosophy 16:149-164.
    Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 One of the most important questions of moral philosophy is what makes a life a good life. A good way of approaching this issue is to watch the film Groundhog Day which can teach us a lot about what a good life consists in - and what not. While currently there are subjective and objective theories contending against each other about what a good life is, namely hedonism and desire satisfaction theories on the (...)
  2. Well-Being and Excellence.Robert Adams - unknown
    We have noted some fundamental distinctions between types of goodness or value. There is usefulness, or merely instrumental goodness, the value that something may have as a means to something else that is good or that is valued. Usefulness has an obvious importance, and connects with significant philosophical issues about instrumentality and probability; but more fundamental issues for ethical theory are posed by the goods or ends that the useful is to serve. Within the realm of what is good for (...)
  3. Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis.Matthew D. Adler - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This book addresses a range of relevant theoretical issues, including the possibility of an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being, or “utility” metric; the moral value of equality, and how that bears on the form of the social welfare function; social choice under uncertainty; and the possibility of integrating considerations of individual choice and responsibility into the social-welfare-function framework. This book also deals with issues of implementation, and explores how survey data and other sources of evidence might be used to calibrate (...)
  4. The Science of Well-Being.Anna Alexandrova - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 389-401.
  5. Well-Being as an Object of Science.Anna Alexandrova - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):678-689.
    The burgeoning science of well-being makes no secret of being value laden: improvement of well-being is its explicit goal. But in order to achieve this goal its concepts and claims need to be value adequate; that is, they need, among other things, to adequately capture well-being. In this article I consider two ways of securing this adequacy—first, by relying on philosophical theory of prudential value and, second, by the psychometric approach. I argue that neither is fully adequate and explore an (...)
  6. Mapping Human Values: Enhancing Social Marketing Through Obituary Data-Mining.Mark Alfano, Andrew Higgins & Jacob Levernier - forthcoming - In Eda Gurel-Atay & Lynn Kahle (eds.), Social and Cultural Values in a Global and Digital Age. Routledge.
    Obituaries are an especially rich resource for identifying people’s values. Because obituaries are succinct and explicitly intended to summarize their subjects’ lives, they may be expected to include only the features that the author(s) find most salient, not only for themselves as relatives or friends of the deceased, but also to signal to others in the community the socially-recognized aspects of the deceased’s character. We report three approaches to the scientific study of virtue and value through obituaries. We begin by (...)
  7. A Life Not Worth Living.Jami L. Anderson - 2014 - In David P. Pierson (ed.), Breaking Bad: Critical Essays on the Contexts, Politics, Style, and Reception of the Television Series. Lexington Press. pp. 103-118.
    What is so striking about Breaking Bad is how centrally impairment and disability feature in the lives of the characters of this series. It is unusual for a television series to cast characters with visible or invisible impairments. On the rare occasions that television shows do have characters with impairments, these characters serve no purpose other than to contribute to their ‘Otherness.’ Breaking Bad not only centralizes impairment, but impairment drives and sustains the story lines. I use three interrelated themes (...)
  8. Subjective Well-Being.Erik Angner - unknown
    This paper examines the notion of “subjective well-being” as it is used in literature on subjective measures of well-being. I argue that those who employ the notion differ at least superficially on at least two points: first, about the relationship between subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter, and second, about the constituents of subjective well-being. In an effort to reconcile the differences, I propose an interpretation according to which subjective measures presuppose preference hedonism: an account according to which well-being is a (...)
  9. Are Subjective Measures of Well-Being 'Direct'?Erik Angner - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):115 - 130.
    Subjective measures of well-being?measures based on answers to questions such as ?Taking things all together, how would you say things are these days?would you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days???are often presented as superior to more traditional economic welfare measures, e.g., for public policy purposes. This paper aims to spell out and assess what I will call the argument from directness: the notion that subjective measures of well-being better represent well-being than economic measures do (...)
  10. Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Pp. Xv + 286.Erik Angner - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (4):458-461.
  11. The Role of Epistemic Virtue in the Realization of Basic Goods.Baril Anne - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):379-395.
  12. Desire Formation and Human Good.Richard Arneson - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (59):9-.
    In Wuthering Heights a man and a woman fall in love and their passion for each other wreaks havoc on several lives, theirs included.1 Long after his beloved is dead, Heathcliff’s life revolves entirely around his love for her. Frustrated by events, his grand romantic passion expresses itself in destructive spasms of antisocial behavior. Catherine, the object of this passion, marries another man on a whim, but describes her feelings for him as like superficial foliage, whereas “her love for Heathcliff (...)
  13. Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care:Welfare and Rational Care.Richard J. Arneson - 2004 - Ethics 114 (4):815-819.
  14. The End of Welfare As We Know It? Scanlon Versus Welfarist Consequentialism.Richard J. Arneson - 2002 - Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):315-336.
    A notable achievement of T.M. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other is its sustained critique of welfarist consequentialism. Consequentialism is the doctrine that one morally ought always to do an act, of the alternatives, that brings about a state of affairs that is no less good than any other one could bring about. Welfarism is the view that what makes a state of affairs better or worse is some increasing function of the welfare for persons realized in it. I (...)
  15. Morality and the Good Life.N. Athanassoulis & S. Vice (eds.) - 2008 - Palgrave MacMillan.
  16. The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing.John R. Atherton, Elaine L. Graham & Ian Steedman (eds.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    These essays explore the religious dimensions to a number of key features of well-being, including marriage, crime and rehabilitation, work, inequality, mental ...
  17. The Value of This Earthly Life a Reply to "is Life Worth Living?" by W.H. Mallock.Edward Bibbins Aveling - 1879 - Freethought Publishing.
  18. Review of Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being[REVIEW]Neera Badhwar - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (10).
  19. The Nature of Children's Well-Being: Theory and Practice.Alexander Bagattini & Colin Macleod (eds.) - 2014 - Springer.
  20. David Foster Wallace on the Good Life.Nathan Ballantyne & Justin Tosi - 2015 - In Steven M. Cahn & Maureen Eckert (eds.), Freedom and the Self: Essays on the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace. Columbia University Press. pp. 133-168.
    This chapter presents David Foster Wallace's opinion about the three positions regarding the good life—ironism, hedonism, and narrative theories. Ironism involves distancing oneself from everything one says or does, and putting on Wallace's so-called “mask of ennui.” Wallace said that the notion appeals to ironists because it insulates them from criticism. However, he reiterated that ironists can be criticized for failing to value anything. Hedonism states that a good life consists in pleasure. Wallace rejected such a notion, doubting that pleasure (...)
  21. Reasons to Live Versus Reasons Not to Die.Kathy Behrendt - 2011 - Think 10 (28):67-76.
    ‘Any reason for living is an excellent reason for not dying’ (Steven Luper-Foy, 'Annihilation'). Some claims seem so clearly right that we don’t think to question them. Steven Luper-Foy’s remark is like that. It borders on the ‘trivially true’ (i.e. so obviously true as to be uninteresting). If I have a reason to live, surely I likewise have a reason not to die. It may then be surprising to learn that so many philosophers disagree with this claim—either directly or by (...)
  22. CARSON, TL-Value and the Good Life.M. Benjamin - 2002 - Philosophical Books 43 (4):309-309.
  23. Finfish Aquaculture: Animal Welfare, the Environment, and Ethical Implications. [REVIEW]Jenny Bergqvist & Stefan Gunnarsson - 2013 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (1):75-99.
    The aim of this review is to assess the ethical implications of finfish aquaculture, regarding fish welfare and environmental aspects. The finfish aquaculture industry has grown substantially the last decades, both as a result of the over-fishing of wild fish populations, and because of the increasing consumer demand for fish meat. As the industry is growing, a significant amount of research on the subject is being conducted, monitoring the effects of aquaculture on the environment and on animal welfare. The areas (...)
  24. L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics:Welfare, Happiness and Ethics.Mark Bernstein - 2001 - Ethics 111 (2):441-443.
  25. Personal Integrity, Moraity, and Psychological Well-Being.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2008 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):361-383.
    Most moral theories purport to make claims upon agents, yet often it is not clear why those claims are ones that can be justifiably demanded of agents. In this paper, I develop a justification of moral requirements that explains why it is that morality makes legitimate claims on agents. This justification is grounded in the idea that there is an essential connection between morality and psychological well-being. I go on to suggest how, using this justification as a springboard, we might (...)
  26. Elements of an Evolutionary Theory of Welfare: Assessing Welfare When Preferences Change.Martin Binder - 2010 - Routledge.
    It has always been an important task of economics to assess individual and social welfare. The traditional approach has assumed that the measuring rod for welfare is the satisfaction of the individual’s given and unchanging preferences, but recent work in behavioural economics has called this into question by pointing out the inconsistencies and context-dependencies of human behaviour. When preferences are no longer consistent, we have to ask whether a different measure for individual welfare can, and should, be found. This book (...)
  27. The Good Life: Unifying the Philosophy and Psychology of Well-Being.Michael A. Bishop - 2015 - Oup Usa.
    Science and philosophy study well-being with different but complementary methods. Marry these methods and a new picture emerges: To have well-being is to be "stuck" in a positive cycle of emotions, attitudes, traits and success. This book unites the scientific and philosophical worldviews into a powerful new theory of well-being.
  28. The Evil of Refraining to Save: Liu on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Jacob Blair - 2017 - Diametros 52:127-137.
    In a recent article, Xiaofei Liu seeks to defend, from the standpoint of consequentialism, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: DDA. While there are various conceptions of DDA, Liu understands it as the view that it is more difficult to justify doing harm than allowing harm. Liu argues that a typical harm doing involves the production of one more evil and one less good than a typical harm allowing. Thus, prima facie, it takes a greater amount of good to justify (...)
  29. Morality and Self-Interest.Paul Bloomfield (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    The volume will act as a useful collection of scholarship by top figures, and as a resource and course book on an important topic.
  30. Authentic Happiness.Greg Bognar - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3):272-284.
    This article discusses L. W. Sumner's theory of well-being as authentic happiness. I distinguish between extreme and moderate versions of subjectivism and argue that Sumner's characterization of the conditions of authenticity leads him to an extreme subjective theory. More generally, I also criticize Sumner's argument for the subjectivity of welfare. I conclude by addressing some of the implications of my arguments for theories of well-being in philosophy and welfare measurement in the social sciences.
  31. Well-Being and Health.Greg Bognar - 2008 - Health Care Analysis 16 (2):97-113.
    One way of evaluating health is in terms of its impact on well-being. It has been shown, however, that evaluating health this way runs into difficulties, since health and other aspects of well-being are not separable. At the same time, the practical implications of the inseparability problem remain unclear. This paper assesses these implications by considering the relations between theories, components, and indicators of well-being.
  32. Ethics and Human Well-Being: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy.E. J. Bond - 1996 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This is an ideal introduction to moral philosophy for beginning students and general readers, dealing with the philosophical theories which often lie behind everyday opinions and inviting the reader to examine those theories thoroughly. Using numerous examples and diagrams, Professor Bond guides the reader through the key problems of theoretical ethics seeking to outline a substantial view of morality in universal practical reason, he concludes in an attempt to show that a viable universal morality can only relate to the thriving, (...)
  33. `Good' and `Good For': A Reply to Hurka.E. J. Bond - 1988 - Mind 97 (386):279-280.
  34. Philosophy and Happiness.Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) - 2009 - Palgrave MacMillan.
    Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...)
  35. Constructivist Experimental Philosophy on Well-Being and Virtue.Matthew Braddock - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):295-323.
    What is the nature of human well-being? This paper joins the ancient debate by rejuvenating an ancient claim that is quite unfashionable among moral philosophers today, namely, the Aristotelian claim that moral virtue is (non-instrumentally) necessary for human well-being. Call it the Aristotelian Virtue Condition (AVC). This view can be revived for contemporary debate by a state-of-the-art approach that we might call constructivist experimental philosophy, which takes as its goal the achievement of a reasonable constructivist account of well-being and takes (...)
  36. Thomas Hurka, The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters. [REVIEW]Gwen Bradford - 2011 - Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (4):487-490.
  37. Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming and Creating.Ben Bradley - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):37-49.
    It is often said that while we have a strong reason not to create someone who will be badly off, we have no strong reason for creating someone who will be well off. In this paper I argue that this asymmetry is incompatible with a plausible principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and that a more general asymmetry between harming and benefiting is difficult to defend. I then argue that, contrary to what many have claimed, it is possible to harm (...)
  38. Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
  39. The Case Against Meat.Ben Bramble - forthcoming - In Ben Bramble Bob Fischer (ed.), The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Oxford University Press.
    There is a simple but powerful argument against the human practice of raising and killing animals for food (RKF for short). It goes like this: 1. RKF is extremely bad for animals. 2. RKF is only trivially good for human beings Therefore, 3. RKF should be stopped. While many consider this argument decisive, not everyone is convinced. There have been four main lines of objection to it. In this paper, I provide new responses to these four objections.
  40. On Susan Wolf’s “Good-for-Nothings".Ben Bramble - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1071-1081.
    According to welfarism about value, something is good simpliciter just in case it is good for some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, “Good-For-Nothings”, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, music, and philosophy. Wolf provides three main arguments against this view, which I call The Superfluity Argument, The Explanation of Benefit Argument, and The Welfarist’s Mistake. In this paper, I reconstruct these arguments and explain where, in (...)
  41. Consequentialism About Meaning in Life.Ben Bramble - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (4):445-459.
    What is it for a life to be meaningful? In this article, I defend what I call Consequentialism about Meaning in Life, the view that one's life is meaningful at time t just in case one's surviving at t would be good in some way, and one's life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was made better in some way for one's having existed.
  42. Whole-Life Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
  43. The Concept of Sustainable Welfare.Eric Brandstedt & Maria Emmelin - 2016 - In Max Koch & Oksana Mont (eds.), Sustainability and the Political Economy of Welfare. Routledge. pp. 15-28.
    The meaning of welfare and the conditions for making it sustainable seemingly are related. This is at least a common idea in current discussions with the implicit assumption that conditions conducive to general welfare improvements also will secure certain sustainability objectives. In this chapter, we challenge this by way of a conceptual analysis of welfare, focused on its descriptive adequacy. Although there are different substantial theories about welfare, they all have to account for its subject-relative nature: individual welfare is whatever (...)
  44. LW Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics Reviewed By.David Braybrooke - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (2):141-144.
  45. L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, And Ethics. [REVIEW]David Braybrooke - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17:141-144.
  46. Looking for the Good Life.Bob Brecher - 1993 - Radical Philosophy 65.
  47. The Psychology of Economic Decisions: Volume One: Rationality and Well-Being.Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Psychologists and economists often ask similar questions about human behaviour. This volume brings together contributions from leaders in both disciplines.The editorial introduction discusses methodological differences between the two which have until now limited the development of mutually beneficial lines of research. Psychologists have objected to what they see as an excessive formalism in economic modelling and an unrealistic degree of sophistication in the behaviour of individuals, while economists criticize the absence of a general psychological framework into which most results can (...)
  48. The Wellbeing of Future Generations. Broome - 2016 - In The Oxford Handbook of Wellbeing and Public Policy. Oxford University Press. pp. 901–28.
    This chapter surveys some of the issues that arise in policy making when the wellbeing of future generations must be taken into account. It analyses the discounting of future wellbeing, and considers whether it is permissible. It argues that the effects of policy on the number of future people should not be ignored, and it considers what is an appropriate basis for setting a value on these effects. It considers the implications of the non-identity effect for intergenerational justice and for (...)
  49. Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.Bruce Brower & L. W. Sumner - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):309.
  50. The Worth of Your Life is in Your Head.Herbert Henry Busher - 1965 - New York: F. Fell.
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