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Introductions For a broad introduction to issues in the philosophy of well-being, see Fletcher 2015.
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  1. added 2020-05-22
    To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living.Aaron Smuts - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):711-729.
    David Benatar argues that being brought into existence is always a net harm and never a benefit. I disagree. I argue that if you bring someone into existence who lives a life worth living, then you have not all things considered wronged her. Lives are worth living if they are high in various objective goods and low in objective bads. These lives constitute a net benefit. In contrast, lives worth avoiding constitute a net harm. Lives worth avoiding are net high (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-08
    Taking Stock of the Risks of Life Without Death.August Gorman - forthcoming - In Travis Timmerman & Michael Cholbi (eds.), Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge.
    In this chapter I argue that choosing to live forever comes with the threat of an especially pernicious kind of boredom. However, it may be theoretically possible to circumvent it by finding ways to pursue an infinite number of projects consistent with one’s personality, taking on endlessly pursuable endlessly interesting projects, or by rekindling old projects once you’ve forgotten about them. However, each of these possibilities is contingent upon having certain traits that you are likely not currently in a good (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-08
    Mental Health Without Wellbeing.Sam Wren Lewis & Anna Alexandrova - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    What is it to be mentally healthy? In the ongoing movement to promote mental health, to reduce stigma and to establish parity between mental and physical health, there is a clear enthusiasm about this concept and a recognition of its value in human life. However, it is often unclear what mental health means in all these efforts and whether there is a single concept underlying them. Sometimes the initiatives for the sake of mental health are aimed just at reducing mental (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-08
    Supporting Human Autonomy in AI Systems.Rafael Calvo, Dorian Peters, Karina Vold & Richard M. Ryan - forthcoming - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach.
    Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on human autonomy of digital experiences are (...)
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  5. added 2020-05-08
    Life Worth Living (Rev. Edn).Thaddeus Metz - forthcoming - In Filomena Maggino (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research, 2nd edn. Springer.
    Moderately updated version of this encyclopaedia entry.
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  6. added 2020-05-08
    The Ethics of Digital Well-Being: A Multidisciplinary Perspective.Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi - forthcoming - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-Being: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Springer.
    This chapter serves as an introduction to the edited collection of the same name, which includes chapters that explore digital well-being from a range of disciplinary perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, economics, health care, and education. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a short primer on the different disciplinary approaches to the study of well-being. To supplement this primer, we also invited key experts from several disciplines—philosophy, psychology, public policy, and health care—to share their thoughts on what they (...)
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  7. added 2020-05-08
    A Fixed-Population Problem for the Person-Affecting Restriction.Jacob M. Nebel - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population (...)
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  8. added 2020-05-08
    Positive Psychology is Value-Laden—It's Time to Embrace It.Michael Prinzing - 2020 - Journal of Positive Psychology.
    Evaluative claims and assumptions are ubiquitous in positive psychology. Some will deny this. But such disavowals are belied by the literature. Some will consider the presence of evaluative claims a problem and hope to root them out. But this is a mistake. If positive psychology is to live up to its raison d’être – to be the scientific study of the psychological components of human flourishing or well-being – it must make evaluative claims. Well-being consists in those things that are (...)
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  9. added 2020-05-08
    Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry.Andrea Sauchelli (ed.) - 2020 - Routledge.
    Derek Parfit (1942–2017) is widely considered to be one of the most important moral philosophers of the twentieth century. Reasons and Persons is arguably the most influential of the two books published in his lifetime and hailed as a classic work of ethics and personal identity. Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry is an outstanding introduction to and assessment of Parfit’s book, with chapters by leading scholars of ethics, metaphysics and of Parfit’s work. Part I provides (...)
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  10. added 2020-05-08
    Considering Quality of Life While Repudiating Disability Injustice: A Pathways Approach to Setting Priorities.Govind Persad - 2019 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 47 (2):294-303.
    This article proposes a novel strategy, one that draws on insights from antidiscrimination law, for addressing a persistent challenge in medical ethics and the philosophy of disability: whether health systems can consider quality of life without unjustly discriminating against individuals with disabilities. It argues that rather than uniformly considering or ignoring quality of life, health systems should take a more nuanced approach. Under the article's proposal, health systems should treat cases where quality of life suffers because of disability-focused exclusion or (...)
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  11. added 2020-05-08
    Towards a Theory of Schooling for Good Life in Postcolonial Societies.Vikas Maniar - 2019 - Journal of Human Values 25 (3):166-176.
    Schools often aim at creating opportunities for good life and at promoting a good society. Liberal theorization on schooling is premised on a functioning liberal democracy with a capitalist economy. However, postcolonial societies are characterized by poverty and inequality, cultural diversity, and an ongoing project of state and nation building. This challenges some of the foundational assumptions of liberal conceptions of schooling aimed at promoting good life and good society in postcolonial societies. Realization of good life through schools is shaped (...)
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  12. added 2020-05-08
    Taking Utilitarianism Seriously.Christopher Woodard - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Christopher Woodard presents a new and rich version of utilitarianism, the idea that ethics is ultimately about what makes people's lives go better. He launches a state-of-the-art defence of the theory, often seen as excessively simple, and shows that it can account for much of the complexity and nuance of everyday ethical thought.
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  13. added 2020-05-08
    From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism. [REVIEW]Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):246-249.
  14. added 2020-05-08
    Welfare, Health, and the Moral Considerability of Nonsentient Biological Entities.Antoine C. Dussault - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (1):184-209.
    This paper discusses a challenge to the claims made by biocentrists and some ecocentrists that some nonsentient biological entities qualify as candidates for moral considerability. This challenge derives from Wayne Sumner’s critique of “objective theories of welfare” and, in particular, from his critique of biocentrists’ and ecocentrists’ biofunction-based accounts of the “good of their own” of nonsentient biological entities. Sumner’s critique lends support to animal ethicists’ typical skepticism regarding those accounts, by contending that they are more plausibly interpreted as accounts (...)
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  15. added 2020-05-08
    Structured Inclusivism About Human Flourishing: A Mengzian Formulation.Matthew D. Walker - 2013 - In Stephen C. Angle & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics and Confucianism. New York, NY, USA: pp. 94-102.
  16. added 2020-05-08
    Music, Neuroscience, and the Psychology of Well-Being: A Précis.Adam M. Croom - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 2:393.
    In Flourish, the positive psychologist Seligman (2011) identifies five commonly recognized factors that are characteristic of human flourishing or well-being: (1) “positive emotion,” (2) “relationships,” (3) “engagement,” (4) “achievement,” and (5) “meaning” (p. 24). Although there is no settled set of necessary and sufficient conditions neatly circumscribing the bounds of human flourishing (Seligman, 2011), we would mostly likely consider a person that possessed high levels of these five factors as paradigmatic or prototypical of human flourishing. Accordingly, if we wanted to (...)
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  17. added 2020-05-07
    The Narrowed Domain of Disagreement for Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2018 - Public Affairs Quarterly 32 (1):1-19.
    in recent years, policy makers have shown increasing interest in implementing policies aimed at promoting individual well-being. But how should policy makers choose their well-being policies? a seemingly reasonable first step is to settle on an agreed-upon definition of well-being. yet there currently is significant disagreement on how well-being ought to be characterized, and agreement on the correct view of well-being does not appear to be forthcoming. Nevertheless, i argue in this paper that there are several reasons to think that (...)
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  18. added 2020-05-06
    Well-Being Coherentism.Gil Hersch - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually prior to measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize wellbeing and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science.
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  19. added 2020-05-06
    No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):43-64.
    Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which (...)
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  20. added 2020-05-03
    Totalism Without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - forthcoming - In Festschrift for Derek Parfit.
    Totalism is the view that one distribution of well-being is better than another just in case the one contains a greater sum of well-being than the other. Many philosophers, following Parfit, reject totalism on the grounds that it entails the repugnant conclusion that, for any number of excellent lives, there is some number of mediocre lives whose existence would be better. This paper develops a theory of welfare aggregation—the lexical-threshold view—that allows totalism to avoid the repugnant conclusion, as well as (...)
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  21. added 2020-05-03
    The Competition Account of Achievement‐Value.Ian D. Dunkle - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):1018-1046.
    A great achievement makes one’s life go better independently of its results, but what makes an achievement great? A simple answer is—its difficulty. I defend this view against recent, pressing objections by interpreting difficulty in terms of competitiveness. Difficulty is determined not by how hard the agent worked for the end but by how hard others would need to do in order to compete. Successfully reaching a goal is a valuable achievement because it is difficult, and it is difficult because (...)
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  22. added 2020-04-28
    Explanatory Perfectionism: A Fresh Take on an Ancient Theory.Michael Prinzing - forthcoming - Analysis.
    The ‘Big 3’ theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfactionism, and objective list theory—attempt to explain why certain things are good for people by appealing to prudentially good-making properties. But they don’t attempt to explain why the properties they advert to make something good for a person. Perfectionism, the view that well-being consists in nature-fulfilment, is often considered a competitor to these views (or else a version of the objective list theory). However, I argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain (...)
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  23. added 2020-04-28
    Going Green is Good for You: Why We Need to Change the Way We Think About Pro-Environmental Behavior.Michael Prinzing - forthcoming - Ethics, Policy and Environment.
    Awareness and concern about climate change are widespread. But rates of pro-environmental behaviour are low. This is partly due to the way in which pro-environmental behaviour is framed—as a sacrifice or burden that individuals bear for the planet and future generations. This framing elicits well-known cognitive biases, discouraging what we should be encouraging. We should abandon the self-sacrifice framing, and instead frame pro-environmental behaviour as intrinsically desirable. There is a large body of evidence that, around the world, people who are (...)
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  24. added 2020-04-26
    Reason to Be Cheerful.Tom Cochrane - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    This paper identifies a tension between the commitment to forming rationally justified emotions and the happy life. To illustrate this tension I begin with a critical evaluation of the positive psychology technique known as ‘gratitude training’. I argue that gratitude training is at odds with the kind of critical monitoring that several philosophers have claimed is regulative of emotional rationality. More generally, critical monitoring undermines exuberance, an attitude that plays a central role in contemporary models of the happy life. Thus, (...)
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  25. added 2020-04-08
    Propelled: How Boredom, Frustration, and Anticipation Lead Us to the Good Life.Andreas Elpidorou - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Many of our endeavors -- be it personal or communal, technological or artistic -- aim at eradicating all traces of dissatisfaction from our daily lives. They seek to cure us of our discontent in order to deliver us a fuller and flourishing existence. But what if ubiquitous pleasure and instant fulfilment make our lives worse, not better? What if discontent isn't an obstacle to the good life but one of its essential ingredients? In Propelled, Andreas Elpidorou makes a lively case (...)
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  26. added 2020-03-10
    Précis of A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being.Anna Alexandrova - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):509-511.
  27. added 2020-03-10
    Reply to Hawkins, Hassoun, and Arneson.Anna Alexandrova - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):537-544.
  28. added 2020-03-10
    Is Construct Validation Valid?Anna Alexandrova & Daniel M. Haybron - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):1098-1109.
    What makes a measure of well-being valid? The dominant approach today, construct validation, uses psychometrics to ensure that questionnaires behave in accordance with background knowledge. Our first claim is interpretive—construct validation obeys a coherentist logic that seeks to balance diverse sources of evidence about the construct in question. Our second claim is critical—while in theory this logic is defensible, in practice it does not secure valid measures. We argue that the practice of construct validation in well-being research is theory avoidant, (...)
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  29. added 2020-02-26
    Why Should One Reproduce? The Rationality and Morality of Human Reproduction.Lantz Miller - 2014 - Dissertation, City University of New York Graduate Center
    Human reproduction has long been assumed to be an act of the blind force of nature, to which humans were subject, like the weather. However, with recent concerns about the environmental impact of human population, particularly resource depletion, human reproduction has come to be seen as a moral issue. That is, in general, it may be moral or immoral for people to continue propagating their species. The past decade’s philosophical discussions of the question have yielded varying results. This dissertation takes (...)
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  30. added 2020-02-24
    Asymmetries in the Value of Existence.Jacob M. Nebel - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    According to asymmetric comparativism, it is worse for a person to exist with a miserable life than not to exist, but it is not better for a person to exist with a happy life than not to exist. My aim in this paper is to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. My account of asymmetric comparativism begins with a different asymmetry, regarding the (dis)value of early death. I offer an account of this early death asymmetry, appealing to the (...)
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  31. added 2020-02-19
    Death and Prudential Deprivation.Matthew W. G. McClure - forthcoming - Pense (Edinb.) 1.
    Dying is (sometimes) bad for the dier because it prevents her from being the subject of wellbeing she otherwise would (the deprivation account). I argue for this from a (plausible) principle about which futures are bad for a prudential subject (the future-comparison principle). A strengthening of this principle yields that death is not always bad, and that the badness of death does not consist in that it destroys the dier.
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  32. added 2020-02-19
    Prudence, Sunk Costs, and the Temporally Extended Self.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Many find it reasonable to take our past actions into account when making choices for the future. In this paper, I address two important issues regarding taking past investments into account in prudential deliberation. The first is the charge that doing so commits the fallacy of honoring sunk costs. I argue that while it is indeed irrational to care about sunk costs, past investments are not sunk costs when we can change their teleological significance, roughly their contribution to our excellence (...)
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  33. added 2020-01-26
    Stable Strategies for Personal Development: On the Prudential Value of Radical Enhancement and the Philosophical Value of Speculative Fiction.Ian Stoner - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (1):128-150.
    In her short story “Stable Strategies for Middle Management,” Eileen Gunn imagines a future in which Margaret, an office worker, seeks radical genetic enhancements intended to help her secure the middle-management job she wants. One source of the story’s tension and dark humor is dramatic irony: readers can see that the enhancements Margaret buys stand little chance of making her life go better for her; enhancing is, for Margaret, probably a prudential mistake. This paper argues that our positions in the (...)
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  34. added 2020-01-21
    El problema de la no identidad: Cuatro soluciones posibles.Santiago Truccone Borgogno - 2020 - Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía 69 (172):57-80.
    El artículo defiende una solución al problema de la no identidad, que surge porque la existencia de muchas personas futuras es contingente en relación con nuestras decisiones. Esto hace que, aunque tengan una calidad de vida muy baja, tal situación no sea peor para ellas. Se defiende una solución basada en una noción de umbral de daño: tal noción ayuda a explicar la incorrección que existe en los casos atravesados por el problema de la no identidad. Finalmente, se analizan otras (...)
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  35. added 2020-01-14
    The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments Against Judgment Subjectivism.Anthony Kelley - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    One way to construe subjectivism about well-being is as the view that x is basically good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that x is valued, under the proper conditions, by S. Dale Dorsey argues for an idealized, judgment-based theory of valuing, one according to which a person values a thing if and only if, because, and to the extent that she would believe, under the proper conditions, that it is basically good for herself. Call (...)
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  36. added 2020-01-01
    Emotions and Digital Well-Being. The Rationalistic Bias of Social Media Design in Online Deliberations.Lavinia Marin & Sabine Roeser - forthcoming - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Springer.
    In this chapter we argue that emotions are mediated in an incomplete way in online social media because of the heavy reliance on textual messages which fosters a rationalistic bias and a bias towards less nuanced emotional expressions. This incompleteness can happen either by obscuring emotions, showing less than the original intensity, misinterpreting emotions, or eliciting emotions without feedback and context. Online interactions and deliberations tend to contribute rather than overcome stalemates and informational bubbles, partially due to prevalence of anti-social (...)
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  37. added 2019-11-09
    Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False.Travis Timmerman & Felipe Pereira - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:697-705.
    In a series of recent papers, Ben Bramble defends a version of hedonism which holds that purely repetitious pleasures add no value to one’s life (i.e. Non-Repeatable Hedonism). In this paper, we pose a dilemma for Non-Repeatable Hedonism. We argue that it is either committed both to a deeply implausible asymmetry between how pleasures and pains affect a person’s well-being and to deeply implausible claims about how to maximize well-being, or is committed to the claim that a life of eternal (...)
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  38. added 2019-10-07
    Review of Cheshire Calhoun's Doing Valuable Time. [REVIEW]Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
    This is a book review of Cheshire Calhoun's 2018 book, Doing Valuable Time.
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  39. added 2019-09-13
    Unmoored: Mortal Harm and Mortal Fear.Kathy Behrendt - 2019 - Philosophical Papers 48 (2):179-209.
    There is a fear of death that persistently eludes adequate explanation by contemporary philosophers of death. The reason for this is their focus on mortal harm issues, such as why death is bad for the person who dies. Claims regarding the fear of death are assumed to be contingent on the resolution of questions about the badness of death. In practice, however, consensus on some mortal harm issues has not resulted in comparable clarity on mortal fear. I contend we cannot (...)
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  40. added 2019-08-30
    Identifying Objects of Value at the End of Life.Christopher James Sampson - 2016 - In Jeff Round (ed.), Care at the End of Life: An Economic Perspective. Adis. pp. 103-122.
    End-of-life care has a number of characteristics that make economic evaluation particularly challenging. These include proximity to death, the improbability of survival gain, individuals’ changing priorities, declining cognition and effects on close persons. In view of these particularities of end-of-life care, some researchers have determined that current ‘extra-welfarist’ approaches to defining do not adequately reflect well-being. As a result, suggestions are being made that would see the QALY approach either replaced or subject to significant redefinition. The purported goal of adopting (...)
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  41. added 2019-08-26
    Do Fitting Emotions Tell Us Anything About Well-Being?James Fanciullo - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (1):118-125.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Tobias Fuchs has offered a ‘working test’ for well-being. According to this test, if it is fitting to feel compassion for a subject because they have some property, then the subject is badly off because they have that property. Since subjects of deception seem a fitting target for compassion, this test is said to imply that a number of important views, including hedonism, are false. I argue that this line of reasoning is mistaken: (...)
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  42. added 2019-08-01
    On ‘Hybrid’ Theories of Personal Good.Thomas Hurka - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):450-462.
    ‘Hybrid’ theories of personal good, defended by e.g. Parfit, Wolf, and Kagan, equate it, not with a subjective state such as pleasure on its own, nor with an objective state such as knowledge on its own, but with a whole that supposedly combines the two. These theories apply Moore's principle of organic unities, which says the value of a whole needn't equal the sum of the values its parts would have by themselves. This allows them, defenders say, to combine the (...)
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  43. added 2019-07-29
    Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse.Guy Fletcher - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
  44. added 2019-07-01
    A Trilemma for Teleological Individualism.John Basl - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1027-1029.
    This paper addresses the foundations of Teleological Individualism, the view that organisms, even non-sentient organisms, are goal-oriented systems while biological collectives, such as ecosystems or conspecific groups, are mere assemblages of organisms. Typical defenses of Teleological Individualism ground the teleological organization of organisms in the workings of natural selection. This paper shows that grounding teleological organization in natural selection is antithetical to Teleological Individualism because such views assume a view about the units of selection on which it is only individual (...)
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  45. added 2019-06-28
    Virtual Consumption, Sustainability & Human Well-Being.Kenneth R. Pike & C. Tyler DesRoches - forthcoming - Environmental Values.
    There is widespread consensus that present patterns of consumption could lead to the permanent impossibility of maintaining those patterns and, perhaps, the existence of the human race. While many patterns of consumption qualify as ‘sustainable’ there is one in particular that deserves greater attention: virtual consumption. We argue that virtual consumption — the experience of authentic consumptive experiences replicated by alternative means — has the potential to reduce the deleterious consequences of real consumption by redirecting some consumptive behavior from shifting (...)
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  46. added 2019-06-06
    Multi‐Component Theories of Well‐Being and Their Structure.Alexander Sarch - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):439-471.
    The ‘adjustment strategy’ currently seems to be the most common approach to incorporating objective elements into one's theory of well‐being. These theories face a certain problem, however, which can be avoided by a different approach – namely, that employed by ‘partially objective multi‐component theories.’ Several such theories have recently been proposed, but the question of how to understand their mathematical structure has not been adequately addressed. I argue that the most mathematically simple of these multi‐component theories fails, so I proceed (...)
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  47. added 2019-06-06
    Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics: Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson.Daniel M. Hausman - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.
    The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics in general rely on a mistaken theory of (...)
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  48. added 2019-06-06
    Desire Formation and Human Good.Richard Arneson - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:9-32.
    In Wuthering Heights a man and a woman fall in love and their passion for each other wreaks havoc on several lives, theirs included. Long after his beloved is dead, Heathcliff’s life revolves entirely around his love for her. Frustrated by events, his grand romantic passion expresses itself in destructive spasms of antisocial behavior. Catherine, the object of this passion, marries another man on a whim, but describes her feelings for him as like superficial foliage, whereas ‘her love for Heathcliff (...)
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  49. added 2019-06-06
    Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker , Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin , Pp. X + 316. [REVIEW]Tim Mulgan - 2004 - Utilitas 16 (3):326-331.
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  50. added 2019-06-06
    The Attractions and Delights of Goodness.Jyl Gentzler - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):353-367.
    What makes something good for me? Most contemporary philosophers argue that something cannot count as good for me unless I am in some way attracted to it, or take delight in it. However, subjectivist theories of prudential value face difficulties, and there is no consensus about how these difficulties should be resolved. Whether one opts for a hedonist or a desire-satisfaction account of prudential value, certain fundamental assumptions about human well-being must be abandoned. I argue that we should reconsider Plato's (...)
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