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  1. added 2020-02-11
    Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival.J. Whiting - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):399-410.
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  2. added 2020-01-17
    The Existential Passage Hypothesis. [REVIEW]David Robert - manuscript
    [Excerpt from “Section 1: Summary of the conclusions”] In Chapter 9, Stewart defends the thesis that if non-reductive physicalism is true, then, contrary to a widespread belief, death does not bring about eternal oblivion, a permanent cessation of the stream of consciousness at the moment of death. Stewart argues that the stream of consciousness continues after death—devoid of the body’s former memories and personality traits—and it does so as the stream of consciousness of new, freshly conscious bodies (other humans, animals, (...)
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  3. added 2019-12-21
    Surviving, to Some Degree.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    In this paper we argue that reflection on the patterns of practical concern that agents like us exhibit strongly suggests that the same person relation (SP-relation) comes in continuous degrees rather than being an all or nothing matter. We call this the SP-degree thesis. Though the SP-degree thesis is consistent with a range of views about personal-identity, we argue that combining desire-first approaches to personal-identity with the SP-degree thesis better explains our patterns of practical concern, and hence gives us reason (...)
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  4. added 2019-11-05
    Identity Without Survival: An Account of Transformative Experiences.Danny Marrero - 2019 - Points of Interest. Special Issue on Concerning Personal Identity. Starting From Derek Parfit 3:99-112.
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  5. added 2019-09-12
    Parfits Reduktionismus und die Möglichkeit struktureller Einheit: Vorarbeiten zu einer aristotelischen Theorie personaler Identität.Sascha Settegast - 2018 - In Sebastian Gäb, Dominic Harion & Peter Welsen (eds.), Person und Identität. Regensburg: S. Roderer. pp. 109-170.
    In der Diskussion um personale Identität nehmen die einflussreichen Arbeiten Derek Parfits eine Sonderstellung ein, insofern Parfit nicht bestrebt ist, eines der gängigen Identitätskriterien zu verteidigen, sondern vielmehr behauptet, dass unsere alltäglichen wie philosophischen Vorstellungen von personaler Identität unrettbar inkohärent sind und deshalb aufgegeben werden sollten. In seinem Beitrag beleuchtet Sascha Settegast die verschiedenen Argumente, die Parfit für diese provokante These vorbringt, und unternimmt insbesondere den Versuch einer systematischen Dekonstruktion der wichtigsten Gedankenexperimente Parfits, die zeigen soll, dass sich diese Gedankenexperimente (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-10
    Personal Identity and Trivial Survival.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - Theoria 85 (5):402-411.
    Your replica is created on Mars and you, on Earth, are destroyed. Parfit claims that your replica may still have what prudentially matters for you – provided that you are psychologically connected and continuous with your replica. If someone accidentally destroys the tapes containing your psychological profile used in the production of your replica and this same action fortuitously produces a functionally equivalent tape, Ehring claims that Parfit should maintain that the resulting new individual may still have what matters. Nihilism (...)
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  7. added 2019-08-15
    Esperimenti mentali in filosofia.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - Milano-Udine: Mimesis.
    A popular book about the use of thought experiments in philosophy. I discuss two case studies, both coming from the literature on personal identity/what matters in personal identity: the first one, inspired by Peter Unger, is a case of mechanization (a case in which a human being turns into a mechanical entity); the second one, inspired by Derek Parfit, is a fission case, i.e. a case in which one person splits into two.
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? Edited by Georg Gasser . Pp. Xvi, 277, Farnham, Ashgate, 2010, £55.00/$99.95. [REVIEW]Derek Michaud - 2013 - Heythrop Journal 54 (2):330-331.
    Book review of Georg Gasser, ed. “Personal Identity: How do we Survive Our Death?” (Ashgate, 2010).
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit.Jonny Anomaly - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):331-350.
  10. added 2019-06-06
    Egoismo metaficiso ed egoismo morale. Storia di un termine nella Francia del settecento Silvano Sportelli Pisa, Edizioni ETS , 2007, 190 p. [REVIEW]Sébastien Charles - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):402-404.
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    The Irrelevance/Incoherence of Non-Reductivism About Personal Identity.David W. Shoemaker - 2002 - Philo 5 (2):143-160.
    Before being able to answer key practical questions dependent on a criterion of personal identity, we must first determine which general approach to the issue of personal identity is more plausible, reductionism or non-reductionism. While reductionism has become the more dominant. approach amongst philosophical theorists over the past thirty years, non-reductionism remains an approach that, for all these theorists have shown, could very well still be true. My aim in this paper is to show that non-reductionism is actually either irrelevant---with (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-05
    Fission, Fusion, and the Simple View.Christopher Tollefsen - 2006 - Christian Bioethics 12 (3):255-263.
    In this essay, I defend three Simple Views concerning human beings. First, that the human embryo is, from the one-cell stage onwards, a single unitary organism. Second, that when an embryo twins, it ceases to exist and two new embryos come into existence. And third, that you and I are essentially human organisms. This cluster of views shows that it is not necessary to rely on co-location, or other obscure claims, in understanding human embryogenesis.
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  13. added 2019-06-05
    Book Review. Self‐concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival Raymond Martin. [REVIEW]Marya Schechtman - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):504-507.
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  14. added 2019-06-05
    The Human Soul's Individuation and its Survival After the Body's Death: Avicenna on the Causal Relation Between Body and Soul: Thérèse-Anne Druart.Thérèse-Anne Druart - 2000 - Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10 (2):259-273.
    As for Avicenna the human soul is a complete substance which does not inhere in the body nor is imprinted in it, asserting its survival after the death of the body seems easy. Yet, he needs the body to explain its individuation. The paper analyzes Avicenna's arguments in the De anima sections, V, 3 & 4, of the Shifā ' in order to explore the exact causal relation there is between the human soul and its body and confronts these arguments (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-05
    Parfit on Selves and Their Interests.Eva Bodanszky - 1987 - Analysis 47 (1):47.
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  16. added 2019-04-09
    Metaphysical Daring as a Posthuman Survival Strategy.Pete Mandik - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):144-157.
    I develop an argument that believing in the survivability of a mind uploading procedure conveys value to its believers that is assessable independently of assessing the truth of the belief. Regardless of whether the first-order metaphysical belief is true, believing it conveys a kind of Darwinian fitness to the believer. Of course, a further question remains of whether having that Darwinian property can be a basis—in a rational sense of being a basis—for one’s holding the belief. I’ll also make some (...)
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  17. added 2018-12-03
    What Matters in the Mirror of Time: Why Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument Fails.Lukas J. Meier - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):651-660.
    abstractBy appealing to the similarity between pre-vital and post-mortem nonexistence, Lucretius famously tried to show that our anxiety about death was irrational. His so-called Symmetry Argument has been attacked in various ways, but all of these strategies are themselves problematic. In this paper, I propose a new approach to undermining the argument: when Parfit’s distinction between identity and what matters is applied, not diachronically but across possible worlds, the alleged symmetry can be broken. Although the pre-vital and posthumous time spans (...)
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  18. added 2018-11-02
    Part‐Intrinsicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):431-452.
    In some sense, survival seems to be an intrinsic matter. Whether or not you survive some event seems to depend on what goes on with you yourself —what happens in the environment shouldn’t make a difference. Likewise, being a person at a time seems intrinsic. The principle that survival seems intrinsic is one factor which makes personal fission puzzles so awkward. Fission scenarios present cases where if survival is an intrinsic matter, it appears that an individual could survive twice over. (...)
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  19. added 2018-09-24
    Die Zerlegung des Ichs. Über die Grundlagen personaler Identität.Marc Andree Weber - 2014 - Münster: Mentis.
    Können wir als Personen irreversible Gedächtnisverluste überleben? Wie steht es mit Teletransportationen? Wie mit jahrelangem Einfrieren? Fragen wie diese sind weit davon entfernt, bloße Denksportaufgaben für Science-Fiction-Fans zu sein. Vielmehr verraten uns Antworten darauf, welche unserer Eigenschaften uns wirklich wichtig sind und was unser Wesen ausmacht. -/- Unglücklicherweise beantworten Vertreter unterschiedlicher Theorien personaler Identität diese Fragen auf völlig verschiedene Weise. Manche schöpfen die Plausibilität ihrer Positionen aus phantasievollen Gedankenexperimenten; anderen sind dieselben Gedankenexperimente für eine ernsthafte Einbeziehung in die philosophische Theoriebildung (...)
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  20. added 2018-09-24
    Die Irrelevanz personaler Identität für praktische Belange.Marc Andree Weber - 2013 - In Georg Gasser & Martina Schmidhuber (eds.), Personale Identität, Narrativität und Praktische Rationalität . Münster, Germany: pp. 313–335.
  21. added 2018-09-21
    Baker's First-Person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem.Marc Andree Weber - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 7:158-168.
    Lynne Baker's concept of a first-person perspective is not as clear and straightforward as it might seem at first glance. There is a discrepancy between her argumentation that we have first-person perspectives and some characteristics she takes first-person perspectives to have, namely, that the instances of this capacity necessarily persist through time and are indivisible and unduplicable. Moreover, these characteristics cause serious problems concerning personal identity.
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  22. added 2018-09-06
    Prudence and Person-Stages.Kristie Miller - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):460-476.
    Persons care about their future selves. They reason about their future selves’ interests; they plan for their future selves’ happiness and they worry about their future selves’ suffering. This paper is interested in the interplay between diachronic prudential reason and certain accounts of the metaphysics of personal identity that fall under the broad umbrella ‘conventionalist’. Some conventionalists conclude that under certain conditions there are intractable decisions for there is no fact of the matter regarding whether a person-stage ought (prudentially) to (...)
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  23. added 2018-07-06
    Life-Extending Enhancements and the Narrative Approach to Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (4):219-225.
    Various debates on the desirability and rationality of life-extending enhancements have been pursued under the presupposition that a generic psychological theory of personal identity is correct. I here discuss how the narrative approach to personal identity can contribute to these debates. In particular, I argue that two versions of the narrative approach offer good reasons to reject an argument against the rationality of life-extending enhancements.
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  24. added 2018-05-18
    Is Blameworthiness Forever?Andrew C. Khoury & Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):204-224.
    Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that "once blameworthy, always blameworthy." They believe that blameworthiness is like diamonds: it is forever. We argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from (...)
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  25. added 2018-03-21
    Animal Ethics.Jens Johansson - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
  26. added 2018-02-17
    Fission, Fusion and the Parfit Revolution.Douglas Ehring - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 94 (3):329-332.
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  27. added 2018-02-17
    Parfit and the Russians.Simon Beck - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):205.
    The paper takes a close look at Derek Parfit’s example of the Nineteenth Century Russian in 'Reasons and Persons'. Parfit presents it as an example which illustrates the moral consequences of adopting his reductionist view of personal identity in a positive light. I argue that things turn out to be more complex than he envisages, and that it might be far more difficult to live in his world than he allows.
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  28. added 2018-02-16
    On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a major work in moral philosophy, the long-awaited follow-up to Parfit's 1984 classic Reasons and Persons, a landmark of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and a critical examination of the most prominent systematic moral theories, leading to his own ground-breaking conclusion.
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  29. added 2017-09-05
    Personal Identity and Applied Ethics: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction.Andrea Sauchelli - 2018 - London: Routledge.
    ‘Soul’, ‘self’, ‘substance’ and ‘person’ are just four of the terms often used to refer to the human individual. Cutting across metaphysics, ethics, and religion the nature of personal identity is a fundamental and long-standing puzzle in philosophy. Personal Identity and Applied Ethics introduces and examines different conceptions of the self, our nature, and personal identity and considers the implications of these for applied ethics. A key feature of the book is that it considers a range of different approaches to (...)
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  30. added 2017-09-03
    The Just Soul.Jeff Sebo - 2015 - Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):131-143.
    Many philosophers think that, if your “day self” and “night self” are physically, psychologically, and narratively continuous with each other, then they are the same unit of moral concern. But I argue that your day self and night self can share all of these relations and still be different units of moral concern, on the grounds that they can share all of these relations and still be in the circumstances of justice. I then argue that this conception of the scope (...)
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  31. added 2017-03-06
    Bootstrapping the Afterlife.Roman Altshuler - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (2).
    Samuel Scheffler defends “The Afterlife Conjecture”: the view that the continued existence of humanity after our deaths—“the afterlife”—lies in the background of our valuing; were we to lose confidence in it, many of the projects we engage in would lose their meaning. The Afterlife Conjecture, in his view, also brings out the limits of our egoism, showing that we care more about yet unborn strangers than about personal survival. But why does the afterlife itself matter to us? Examination of Scheffler’s (...)
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  32. added 2017-03-01
    Parfitians as Exdurantists.Fabio Patrone - 2017 - Axiomathes (6):1-9.
    Derek Parfit’s thesis that identity doesn’t matter in survival has been extensively discussed except for its metaphysical robustness. How can we justify the abandonment of identity in the way Parfit suggests? My argument is the following. Those who want to endorse the thesis that identity doesn’t matter (and, therefore, abandon identity across time) should adopt exdurantism, i.e. a metaphysics according to which the world is composed by temporal parts each existing at a time and according to which there is nothing (...)
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  33. added 2017-02-27
    The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person.Johan Gustafsson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):745-750.
    Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on this intended reading.
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  34. added 2016-12-12
    Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival.Raymond Martin - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to the philosophical literature on the nature of the self, personal identity and survival. Its distinctive methodology is one that is phenomenologically descriptive rather than metaphysical and normative. On the basis of this approach Raymond Martin shows that the distinction between self and other is not nearly as fundamental a feature of our so-called egoistic values as has been traditionally thought. He explains how the belief in a self as a fixed, continuous point of (...)
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  35. added 2016-12-08
    Surviving Resurrection.Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123 - 139.
    In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render (...)
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  36. added 2016-12-08
    Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity.Daniel Kolak - 2008 - Synthese 162 (3):341-372.
    Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of (...)
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  37. added 2016-12-08
    The Perfect Murder: A Philosophical Whodunit.Jeremy Allen Byrd - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):47-58.
    In his Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues from the possibility of cases of fission and/or fusion of persons that one must reject identity as what matters for personal survival. Instead Parfit concludes that what matters is “psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause,” or what he calls an R-relation. In this paper, I argue that, if one accepts Parfit’s conclusion, one must accept that R-relations are what matter for moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately, it seems that (...)
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  38. added 2016-12-08
    Personal Identity and Purgatory.David B. Hershenov & Rose Koch-Hershenov - 2006 - Religious Studies 42 (4):439.
    If Purgatory involves just an immaterial soul undergoing a transformation between our death and resurrection, then, as Aquinas recognized, it won't be us in Purgatory. Drawing upon Parfit's ideas about identity not being what matters to us, we explore whether the soul's experience of Purgatory could still be beneficial to it as well as the deceased human who didn't experience the purging yet would possess the purged soul upon resurrection. We also investigate an alternative non-Thomistic hylomorphic account of Purgatory in (...)
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  39. added 2016-12-08
    How to Be a Conventional Person.Kristie Miller - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):457-474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person-directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in part (...)
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  40. added 2016-12-08
    The Survival of the Sentient.Peter Unger - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:325-348.
    In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is (...)
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  41. added 2016-12-08
    Reading Parfit.Jonathan Dancy (ed.) - 1997 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    _ Reading Parfit _ brings together some of the most distinguished scholars in the field to discuss and critique Derek Parfit's outstanding work, _ Reasons and Persons, _.
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  42. added 2016-12-08
    Reasons and Reductionism.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):589.
  43. added 2016-12-08
    A Theory of Disembodied Survival and Re-Embodied Existence.Paul Helm - 1978 - Religious Studies 14 (1):15.
    In his Survival and Disembodied Existences Terence Penelhum presents two arguments against the possibility of disembodied survival. The first is that the memory criterion of personal identity is parasitic upon bodily identity and the second is the more fundamental contention that the notion of a disembodied person is unintelligible. Penelhum's claim is not that it is impossible as such to speak of disembodied intelligence, or perception, or even agency, but that the problem of construing the identity of disembodied individuals is (...)
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  44. added 2016-07-25
    Psychological Reductionism About Persons: A Critical Development.Julian Baggini - unknown
  45. added 2016-04-05
    An Analysis of Prudential Value.Stephen M. Campbell - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):334-54.
    This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of the related concepts of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice, and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of (...)
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  46. added 2016-04-05
    The Multiple Self Objection to the Prudential Lifespan Account.M. Schefczyk - 2009 - Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (1):32-35.
    Multiple self approaches purport that to have equal concern about all stages of one’s life is not a requirement of rationality. This poses a challenge to the prudential lifespan account which Norman Daniels advocates in Just health: meeting health needs fairly. Daniels has criticised the multiple self approach in earlier works, most extensively in Am I my parents keeper? In Just health, he only takes up the issue except in one footnote, presumably because he is convinced that his preceding discussions (...)
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  47. added 2016-04-05
    Personal Identity and Ethics.David Shoemaker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    What justifies our holding a person morally responsible for some past action? Why am I justified in having a special prudential concern for some future persons and not others? Why do many of us think that maximizing the good within a single life is perfectly acceptable, but maximizing the good across lives is wrong? In these and other normative questions, it looks like any answer we come up with will have to make an essential reference to personal identity. So, for (...)
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  48. added 2016-04-05
    Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.
    Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what (...)
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  49. added 2016-04-05
    Indentity, Prudential Concern, and Extended Lives.Walter Glannon - 2002 - Bioethics 16 (3):266–283.
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  50. added 2016-04-05
    Something to Look Forward To: Personal Identity, Prudence, and Ethics.Paul Volkening Torek - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I sketch a theory of personal identity which is Reductionist in Parfit's sense, and inquire into the place of personal identity in our values. I focus on our concern to survive, which is, in large part, a concern for a life which we may anticipate. When we anticipate, we often imagine "from the inside" what a period of life will be like, and look forward to experiencing and doing things. I argue that it need not be irrational to engage in (...)
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1 — 50 / 245