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Carnap and logical truth

Synthese 12 (4):350--74 (1960)

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  1. Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws.Clinton Tolley - 2006 - Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):371-407.
  • Metaphysical Analyticity.Célia Teixeira - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (34):869-888.
  • Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage.Jacob Busch & Andrea Sereni - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):343 - 360.
    Indispensability arguments for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the ‘logical point of view’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA. We then show that the attribution of both minimal arguments to Quine is controversial, and stress (...)
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  • On the Prospects for Ontology: Deflationism, Pluralism, and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.Matthew C. Haug - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):593-616.
    In this paper, I critically discuss recent work on the role that the principle of tolerance plays in Rudolf Carnap's philosophy. Specifically, I consider how two prominent interpretations of Carnap's principle of tolerance can be used to argue for Carnap's anti-metaphysical views. I then argue that there are serious problems with these arguments, and I diagnose those problems as resulting, in part, from a tension between competing goals of Carnap's philosophical project.
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  • Working From Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    During the past few decades, a radical shift has occurred in how philosophers conceive of the relation between science and philosophy. A great number of analytic philosophers have adopted what is commonly called a ‘naturalistic’ approach, arguing that their inquiries ought to be in some sense continuous with science. Where early analytic philosophers often relied on a sharp distinction between science and philosophy—the former an empirical discipline concerned with fact, the latter an a priori discipline concerned with meaning—philosophers today largely (...)
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  • Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge.M. Giaquinto - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):249-268.
  • Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):873-890.
    Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics (...)
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  • Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church’s Intensional Logic.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):277-326.
    This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions within the framework of Church’s intensional logic. A predicative response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this consistency also model other axioms (...)
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  • Signigicance in Quine.Peter Hylton - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1):113-133.
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  • Making Sense of History? Thinking About International Relations.Fabien Schang - 2014 - In Leonid Grinin, Ilya V. Ilyin & Andrey V. Korotayev (eds.), Globalistics and Globalization Studies. Aspects & Dimensions of Global Views. Volgograd, Oblast de Volgograd, Russie: pp. 50-60.
    Can international relations (IR) be a distinctive discipline? In the present paper I argue that such a discipline would be a social science that could be formulated within the perspective of comparative paradigms. The objections to scientific methods are thus overcome by the logic of international oppositions, in other words a model takes several paradigms into account and considers three kinds of foreign relation (enemy, friend, and rival) in the light of three main questions: what is IR about (ontology); what (...)
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  • Inconsistency and Replacement.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):387-402.
    ABSTRACTThe article is an extended critical discussion of Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth. Scharp’s case for the claim that the concept of truth is inconsistent is criticized, and so is his case for the claim that the concept of truth must be replaced because of its inconsistency.
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  • Confirmational Holism and its Mathematical (W)Holes.Anthony Peressini - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):102-111.
    I critically examine confirmational holism as it pertains to the indispensability arguments for mathematical Platonism. I employ a distinction between pure and applied mathematics that grows out of the often overlooked symbiotic relationship between mathematics and science. I argue that this distinction undercuts the notion that mathematical theories fall under the holistic scope of the confirmation of our scientific theories.Keywords: Confirmational holism; Indispensability argument; Mathematics; Application; Science.
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  • Linguistic Convention and Worldly Fact.Brett Topey - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1725-1752.
    Truth by convention, once thought to be the foundation of a uniquely promising approach to explaining our access to the truth in nonempirical domains, is nowadays widely considered an absurdity. Its fall from grace has been due largely to the influence of an argument that can be sketched as follows: our linguistic conventions have the power to make it the case that a sentence expresses a particular proposition, but they can’t by themselves generate truth; whether a given proposition is true—and (...)
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  • Sellars and Quine on Empiricism and Conceptual Truth.Stefan Brandt - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (1):108-132.
    I compare Sellars’s criticism of the ‘myth of the given’ with Quine’s criticism of the ‘two dogmas’ of empiricism, that is, the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism. In Sections I to III, I present Quine’s and Sellars’s views. In IV to X, I discuss similarities and differences in their views. In XI to XII, I show that Sellars’s arguments against the ‘myth of the given’ are incompatible with Quine’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction.
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  • Bolzano on Conceptual and Intuitive Truth: The Point and Purpose of the Distinction.Mark Textor - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):13-36.
    Bolzano incorporated Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts into the doctrine of propositions by distinguishing between conceptual (Begriffssätze an sich) and intuitive propositions (Anschauungssätze an sich). An intuitive proposition contains at least one objective intuition, that is, a simple idea that represents exactly one object; a conceptual proposition contains no objective intuition. After Bolzano, philosophers dispensed with the distinction between conceptual and intuitive propositions. So why did Bolzano attach philosophical importance to it? I will argue that, ultimately, the value of (...)
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  • Spacetime, Ontology, and Structural Realism.Edward Slowik - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):147 – 166.
    This essay explores the possibility of constructing a structural realist interpretation of spacetime theories that can resolve the ontological debate between substantivalists and relationists. Drawing on various structuralist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as on the theoretical complexities of general relativity, our investigation will reveal that a structuralist approach can be beneficial to the spacetime theorist as a means of deflating some of the ontological disputes regarding similarly structured spacetimes.
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  • Concepts of Law of Nature.Brendan Shea - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Illinois
    Over the past 50 years, there has been a great deal of philosophical interest in laws of nature, perhaps because of the essential role that laws play in the formulation of, and proposed solutions to, a number of perennial philosophical problems. For example, many have thought that a satisfactory account of laws could be used to resolve thorny issues concerning explanation, causation, free-will, probability, and counterfactual truth. Moreover, interest in laws of nature is not constrained to metaphysics or philosophy of (...)
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  • On the Substitutional Characterization of First-Order Logical Truth.Matthew McKeon - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (3):205-224.
    I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth that it expands the class of logical truths beyond what is sanctioned by the model-theoretic account. Briefly, I argue that at best the criticism is shallow and can be answered with slight alterations in Quine's account. At worse the criticism is defective because, in part, it is based on a misrepresentation of Quine. This serves not only to clarify Quine's position, but also to crystallize what is and what (...)
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  • Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
    Given the fundamental role that concepts play in theories of cognition, philosophers and cognitive scientists have a common interest in concepts. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of controversy regarding what kinds of things concepts are, how they are structured, and how they are acquired. This chapter offers a detailed high-level overview and critical evaluation of the main theories of concepts and their motivations. Taking into account the various challenges that each theory faces, the chapter also presents a novel approach (...)
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  • Ontological Relativity and Meaning‐Variance: A Critical‐Constructive Review.Christopher Norris - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):139 – 173.
    This article offers a critical review of various ontological-relativist arguments, mostly deriving from the work of W. V. Quine and Thomas K hn. I maintain that these arguments are (1) internally contradictory, (2) incapable of accounting for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge, and (3) shown up as fallacious from the standpoint of a causal-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and interpretation. Moreover, they have often been viewed as lending support to such programmes as the 'strong' sociology (...)
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  • Wittgenstein and Realism.Hilary Putnam - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (1):3 – 16.
    This paper compares and contrasts three views on the issue of 'solipsism' that were much discussed in the first half of the 20th century, namely those of Wittgenstein, Carnap and Reichenbach. While the paper deals mainly with early Wittgenstein, the so-called 'later Wittgenstein ' is seen as arguing that Carnap's Aufbau, and any similar 'solipsist' reinterpretation of the language must start with a notion of experience utterly different from the one we actually have. And this criticism actually coheres with Wittgenstein (...)
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  • Historicism, Entrenchment, and Conventionalism.Nathaniel Jason Goldberg - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):259-276.
    W. V. Quine famously argues that though all knowledge is empirical, mathematics is entrenched relative to physics and the special sciences. Further, entrenchment accounts for the necessity of mathematics relative to these other disciplines. Michael Friedman challenges Quine’s view by appealing to historicism, the thesis that the nature of science is illuminated by taking into account its historical development. Friedman argues on historicist grounds that mathematical claims serve as principles constitutive of languages within which empirical claims in physics and the (...)
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  • Introduction.[author unknown] - forthcoming - Introduction 4 (32).
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  • Complete Issue in PDF.Nicolas Lindner - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1).
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  • Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2004 - In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 45--56.
    Harman distinguishes between two uses of the term “logic”: as referring either to the theory of implication or to the theory of reasoning, which are quite distinct. His interest here is reasoning: a process that can modify intentions and beliefs. To a first approximation, theoretical reasoning is concerned with what to believe and practical reasoning is concerned with what to intend to do, although it is possible to have practical reasons to believe something. Practical considerations are relevant to whether to (...)
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  • The Future of the A Priori.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (Supplement):23-34.
    Two conceptions of a priori methods and assumptions can be distinguished. First, there are the assumptions and methods accepted prior to a given inquiry. Second, there are innate assumptions and methods. For each of these two types of a priori methods and assumptions, we can also allow cases in which one starts with something that is a priori and is justified in reaching a new belief or procedure without making any appeal to new experiential data. But we should not suppose (...)
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  • Maddy and Mathematics: Naturalism or Not.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):423-450.
    Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's (...)
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  • Realismo/Anti-Realismo.Eduardo Castro - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    State of the art paper on the topic realism/anti-realism. The first part of the paper elucidates the notions of existence and independence of the metaphysical characterization of the realism/anti-realism dispute. The second part of the paper presents a critical taxonomy of the most important positions and doctrines in the contemporary literature on the domains of science and mathematics: scientific realism, scientific anti-realism, constructive empiricism, structural realism, mathematical Platonism, mathematical indispensability, mathematical empiricism, intuitionism, mathematical fictionalism and second philosophy.
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  • Concept Grounding and Knowledge of Set Theory.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):179-193.
    C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in (...)
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  • Epistemology Mathematicized.John Woods - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (2):292-331.
    Epistemology and informal logic have overlapping and broadly similar subject matters. A principle of methodological symmetry is: philosophical theories of sufficiently similar subject matters should engage similar methods. Suppose the best way to do epistemology is in highly formalized ways, with a large role for mathematical methods. The symmetry principle suggests this is also the best way to do the logic of the reasoning and argument, the subject matter of informal logic. A capitulation to mathematics is inimical to informal logicians, (...)
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  • Logic and Aesthetics in Epistemology.Mildred Rose Payne - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    The purpose of this dissertation is to present historical evidence in favor of the thesis that many forms of dichotomy appearing in the history of epistemology are related to the duality represented by the mathematical concepts of continuity and discreteness. Parts 1 and 2 give a descriptive and historical account of epistemological dichotomies appearing during the development of mathematics and logic. In part 3, the implications of these dichotomies for general philosophy are explored by means of a collage of analytic, (...)
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  • Analyticity and Language Engineering in Carnap's Logical Syntax.Sam Hillier - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):25-46.
  • Inertial Motion, Explanation, and the Foundations of Classical Spacetime Theories.James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - In Dennis Lehmkuhl, Gregor Schiemann & Erhard Scholz (eds.), Towards a Theory of Spacetime Theories. Boston, USA: Birkhauser. pp. 13-42.
    I begin by reviewing some recent work on the status of the geodesic principle in general relativity and the geometrized formulation of Newtonian gravitation. I then turn to the question of whether either of these theories might be said to ``explain'' inertial motion. I argue that there is a sense in which both theories may be understood to explain inertial motion, but that the sense of ``explain'' is rather different from what one might have expected. This sense of explanation is (...)
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  • Pragmatic a Priori Knowledge: A Pragmatic Approach to the Nature and Object of What Can Be Known Independently of Experience.Lauri Järvilehto - 2011 - Jyväskylä University Printing House.
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  • Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate.Eric J. Loomis - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
    Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, (...)
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  • Synonymy and the a Priori: A Problem for Boghossian’s Model.Fredrik Nyseth - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):559-565.
    According to Paul Boghossian, some truths are knowable a priori because they are expressed by epistemically analytic sentences. In such cases, understanding the sentence is meant to suffice for justified belief in the proposition it expresses. One alleged route from understanding to justification goes via what Boghossian calls ‘the synonymy model’. This article presents a dilemma for this model and argues that although a strategy for avoiding the dilemma is available, this does not vindicate Boghossian's model.
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  • Functionalism, Superduperfunctionalism, and Physicalism: Lessons From Supervenience.Ronald Endicott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2205-2235.
    Philosophers almost universally believe that concepts of supervenience fail to satisfy the standards for physicalism because they offer mere property correlations that are left unexplained. They are thus compatible with non-physicalist accounts of those relations. Moreover, many philosophers not only prefer some kind of functional-role theory as a physically acceptable account of mind-body and other inter-level relations, but they use it as a form of “superdupervenience” to explain supervenience in a physically acceptable way. But I reject a central part of (...)
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  • Carnap’s Dream: Gödel, Wittgenstein, and Logical, Syntax.S. Awodey & A. W. Carus - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):23-45.
    In Carnap’s autobiography, he tells the story how one night in January 1931, “the whole theory of language structure” in all its ramifications “came to [him] like a vision”. The shorthand manuscript he produced immediately thereafter, he says, “was the first version” of Logical Syntax of Language. This document, which has never been examined since Carnap’s death, turns out not to resemble Logical Syntax at all, at least on the surface. Wherein, then, did the momentous insight of 21 January 1931 (...)
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  • Putting the Bite Back Into 'Two Dogmas'.Paul Gregory - 2003 - Principia 7 (1-2):115-129.
    Recent Carnap scholarship suggests that the received view of the Carnap-Quine analyticity debate is importantly mistaken. It has been suggested that Carnap’s analyticity distinction is immune from Quine’s criticisms. This is either because Quine did not understand Carnap’s use of analytic-ity, or because Quine did not appreciate that, rather than dispelling dog-mas, he was merely offering an alternate framework for philosophy. It has also been suggested that ultimately nothing of substance turns on this dis-pute. I am sympathetic to these reassessments (...)
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  • Carnap’s Defense of Impredicative Definitions.Vera Flocke - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):372-404.
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  • Quine and Logical Truth.T. Parent - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):103 - 112.
    It is a consequence of Quine’s confirmation holism that the logical laws are in principle revisable. Some have worried this is at odds with another dictum in Quine, viz., that any translation which construes speakers as systematically illogical is ipso facto inadequate. In this paper, I try to formulate exactly what the problem is here, and offer a solution to it by (1) disambiguating the term ‘logic,’ and (2) appealing to a Quinean understanding of ‘necessity.’ The result is that the (...)
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  • Analyticity and Holism in Quine’s Thought.Peter Hylton - 2002 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 10 (1):11-26.
  • Logical Constants.John MacFarlane - 2008 - Mind.
    Logic is usually thought to concern itself only with features that sentences and arguments possess in virtue of their logical structures or forms. The logical form of a sentence or argument is determined by its syntactic or semantic structure and by the placement of certain expressions called “logical constants.”[1] Thus, for example, the sentences Every boy loves some girl. and Some boy loves every girl. are thought to differ in logical form, even though they share a common syntactic and semantic (...)
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  • Indeterminacy and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinctions: A Survey.Peter Pagin - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):1-18.
    It is often assumed that there is a close connection between Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in 'Two dogmas of empiricism' and onwards, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, in Word and Object and onwards. Often, the claim that the distinction is unsound (in some way or other) is taken to follow from the indeterminacy thesis, and sometimes the indeterminacy thesis is supported by such a claim. However, a careful scrutiny of the indeterminacy thesis as stated by (...)
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  • Analyticity, Necessity and Belief : Aspects of Two-Dimensional Semantics.Johannesson Eric - 2017 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    A glass couldn't contain water unless it contained H2O-molecules. Likewise, a man couldn't be a bachelor unless he was unmarried. Now, the latter is what we would call a conceptual or analytical truth. It's also what we would call a priori. But it's hardly a conceptual or analytical truth that if a glass contains water, then it contains H2O-molecules. Neither is it a priori. The fact that water is composed of H2O-molecules was an empirical discovery made in the eighteenth century. (...)
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  • Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):33-52.
    With metaphysical philosophy gaining prominence in the aftermath of the Quine-Carnap debate, not only has it become assumed that the Quinean critique leaves ontological pluralism behind as an untenable approach, but also that the same is true of deflationism more generally. Building on Quine’s criticisms against the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion of quantifier variance, contemporary metaphysicians like van Inwagen and Sider continue to argue for the untenability of deflationary approaches to metaontology. In this paper I will argue that Quine’s (...)
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  • How Not to Reject the a Priori.Célia Teixeira - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):365-384.
    According to one influential argument against the existence of a priori knowledge, there is no a priori knowledge because (i) no belief is immune to revision, and (ii) if there were a priori knowledge, at least some beliefs would be unrevisable. The aim of this paper is to examine and reject this argument against the a priori. It is given special attention to premise (ii) of the argument. Philip Kitcher has famously defended a version of this premise. His arguments are (...)
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  • Concepts and Stereotypes.Georges Rey - 1983 - Cognition 15 (1-3):237-62.
  • An Inferential Community: Poincaré’s Mathematicians.Michel Dufour & John Woods - 2011 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18-21, 2011. Windsor, Canada: pp. 156-166.
    Inferential communities are communities using specific substantial argumentative schemes. The religious or scientific communities are examples. I discuss the status of the mathematical community as it appears through the position held by the French mathematician Henri Poincaré during his famous ar-guments with Russell, Hilbert, Peano and Cantor. The paper focuses on the status of complete induction and how logic and psychology shape the community of mathematicians and the teaching of mathematics.
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  • Black, White and Gray: Quine on Convention.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):245-282.
    This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to (...)
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