Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Light as an Analogy for Cognition in Buddhist Idealism.Alex Watson - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):401-421.
    In Sect. 1 an argument for Yogācāra Buddhist Idealism, here understood as the view that everything in the universe is of the nature of consciousness / cognition, is laid out. The prior history of the argument is also recounted. In Sect. 2 the role played in this argument by light as an analogy for cognition is analyzed. Four separate aspects of the light analogy are discerned. In Sect. 3, I argue that although light is in some ways a helpful analogy (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence From the Cheng Weishi Lun.Robert H. Sharf - 2016 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (4):777-807.
    There have been several attempts of late to read Yogācāra through the lens of Western phenomenology. I approach the issue through a reading of the Cheng weishi lun, a seventh-century Chinese compilation that preserves the voices of multiple Indian commentators on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā. Specifically, I focus on the “five omnipresent mental factors” and the “four aspects” of cognition. These two topics seem ripe, at least on the surface, for phenomenological analysis, particularly as the latter topic includes a discussion of “self-awareness”. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Second Persons and the Constitution of the First Person.Jay L. Garfield - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (36).
    Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists have become accustomed to distinguishing the first person perspective from the third person perspective on reality or experience. This is sometimes meant to mark the distinction between the “objective” or “intersubjective” attitude towards things and the “subjective” or “personal” attitude. Sometimes, it is meant to mark the distinction between knowledge and mere opinion. Sometimes it is meant to mark the distinction between an essentially private and privileged access to an inner world and a merely inferential or (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness , and How It Differs From Dharmakīrti’s Exposition of the Concept.Alex Watson - 2010 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):297-321.
    The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) when it was appropriated by Śaiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition ( ahampratyaya ). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmakaṇṭha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Self-Awareness in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and -Vṛtti: A Close Reading.Birgit Kellner - 2010 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):203-231.
    The concept of “self-awareness” ( svasaṃvedana ) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and - vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.Birgit Kellner - 2011 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):411-426.
    This paper compares and contrasts two infinite regress arguments against higher-order theories of consciousness that were put forward by the Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). The two arguments differ considerably from each other, and they also differ from the infinite regress argument that scholars usually attribute to Dignāga or his followers. The analysis shows that the two philosophers, in these arguments, work with different assumptions for why an object-cognition must be cognised: for Dignāga it must (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Buddhism, Comparative Neurophilosophy, and Human Flourishing.Christian Coseru - 2014 - Zygon 49 (1):208-219.
    Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain represents an ambitious foray into cross-cultural neurophilosophy, making a compelling, though not entirely unproblematic, case for naturalizing Buddhist philosophy. While the naturalist account of mental causation challenges certain Buddhist views about the mind, the Buddhist analysis of mind and mental phenomena is far more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize the Buddhist claim that there could be mental states that are not reducible to their neural correlates; however, when the mental states (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Enacting the Self: Buddhist and Enactivist Approaches to the Emergence of the Self.Matthew MacKenzie - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):75-99.
    In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings, of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self ( anātman ) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of mind and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Buddhist Idealism.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2017 - In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 178-199.
    This article surveys some of the most influential Buddhist arguments in defense of idealism. It begins by clarifying the central theses under dispute and rationally reconstructs arguments from four major Buddhist figures in defense of some or all of these theses. It engages arguments from Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā and Triṃśikā; Dignāga’s matching-failure argument in the Ālambanaparīkṣā; the sahopalambhaniyama inference developed by Dharmakīrti; and Xuanzang’s weird but clever logical argument that intrigued philosophers in China and Japan. It aims to clarify what is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is Svasaṃvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following Śāntarakṣita.Dan Arnold - 2005 - Asian Philosophy 15 (1):77 – 111.
  • Reconstructing Memories, Deconstructing the Self.Monima Chadha - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (1):121-138.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inner Awareness is Essential to Consciousness: A Buddhist-Abhidharma Perspective.Monima Chadha - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):83-101.
    This paper defends the realist representationalist version of the Buddhist-Abhidharma account of consciousness. The account explains the intentionality and the phenomenality of conscious experiences by appealing to the doctrine of self-awareness. Concerns raised by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophers about the compatibility of reflexive awareness and externality of the objects of perception are addressed. Similarly, the Hindu critiques on the incoherence of the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness with the doctrines of no-self and momentariness are also answered.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations