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  1. Ranking Theory.Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Niels Skovgaard-Olsen & Wolfgang Spohn - forthcoming - MIT Press.
    Ranking theory is one of the salient formal representations of doxastic states. It differs from others in being able to represent belief in a proposition (= taking it to be true), to also represent degrees of belief (i.e. beliefs as more or less firm), and thus to generally account for the dynamics of these beliefs. It does so on the basis of fundamental and compelling rationality postulates and is hence one way of explicating the rational structure of doxastic states. Thereby (...)
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  • A Survey of Ranking Theory.Wolfgang Spohn - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
    "A Survey of Ranking Theory": The paper gives an up-to-date survey of ranking theory. It carefully explains the basics. It elaborates on the ranking theoretic explication of reasons and their balance. It explains the dynamics of belief statable in ranking terms and indicates how the ranks can thereby be measured. It suggests how the theory of Bayesian nets can be carried over to ranking theory. It indicates what it might mean to objectify ranks. It discusses the formal and the philosophical (...)
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  • Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
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  • Hume on Probability.Barry Gower - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (1):1-19.
  • Baconian Probability and Hume’s Theory of Testimony.Dorothy Coleman - 2001 - Hume Studies 27 (2):195-226.
    The foremost advocate of Baconian probability, L. J. Cohen, has credited Hume for being the first to explicitly recognize that there is an important kind of probability which does not fit into the framework afforded by the calculus of chance, a recognition that is evident in Hume's distinction between analogical probability and probabilities arising from chance or cause. This essay defends Hume's account of the credibility of testimony, including his notorious argument against the credibility of testimony to miracles, in light (...)
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  • Francis Bacon as a Precursor to Popper.Peter Urbach - 1982 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):113-132.
  • Human Rationality: Misleading Linguistic Analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.
  • The Persistence of Cognitive Illusions.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):333-334.
  • Similarity and Induction.Matthew Weber & Daniel Osherson - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):245-264.
    We advance a theory of inductive reasoning based on similarity, and test it on arguments involving mammal categories. To measure similarity, we quantified the overlap of neural activation in left Brodmann area 19 and the left ventral temporal cortex in response to pictures of different categories; the choice of of these regions is motivated by previous literature. The theory was tested against probability judgments for 40 arguments generated from 9 mammal categories and a common predicate. The results are interpreted in (...)
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  • Are There Any a Priori Constraints on the Study of Rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.
  • Unphilosophical Probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.
  • Cohen on Contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.
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  • Competence, Performance, and Ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.
  • The Importance of Cognitive Illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.
  • L. J. Cohen, Again: On the Evaluation of Inductive Intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.
  • Inferential Competence: Right You Are, If You Think You Are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.
  • Some Questions Regarding the Rationality of a Demonstration of Human Rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.
  • Rationality is a Necessary Presupposition in Psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.
  • Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.
  • Lay Arbitration of Rules of Inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-350.
  • L. J. Cohen Versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.
  • The Irrational, the Unreasonable, and the Wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346-349.
  • Propensity, Evidence, and Diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345-346.
  • “Is” and “Ought” in Cognitive Science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344-345.
  • Performing Competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.
  • Should Bayesians Sometimes Neglect Base Rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.
  • Intuition, Competence, and Performance.Henry E. Kyburg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):341-342.
  • Improvements in Human Reasoning and an Error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.
  • Who Shall Be the Arbiter of Our Intuitions?Daniel Kahneman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.
  • Another Vote for Rationality.Mary Henle - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-339.
  • Human Reasoning: Can We Judge Before We Understand?Richard A. Griggs - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):338-339.
  • Can Children's Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?Sam Glucksberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):337-338.
  • Can Any Statements About Human Behavior Be Empirically Validated?Baruch Fischoff - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):336-337.
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  • On Defining Rationality Unreasonably.J. St B. T. Evans & P. Pollard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):335-336.
  • Rationality and the Sanctity of Competence.Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):334-335.
  • Status of the Rationality Assumption in Psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.
  • Rational Animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331-332.
  • Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
    The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.
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  • Independent Forebrain and Brainstem Controls for Arousal and Sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.
  • Five Questions : Wolfgang Spohn.Wolfgang Spohn - unknown
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  • From Similarity to Chance.Daniel Osherson - manuscript
    “In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects. ... From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects.”.
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  • Are People Programmed to Commit Fallacies? Further Thoughts About the Interpretation of Experimental Data on Probability Judgment.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 12 (3):251–274.