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  1. Williamson, Closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.
    Closure principles say that if you know some proposition which entails a second and you meet further conditions then you know the second. In this paper I construct an argument against closure principles which turns on the idea that knowing a proposition requires that one’s belief-forming process be reliable. My argument parallels an influential argument offered by Timothy Williamson against KK principles–principles that say that if you know some proposition and you meet further conditions then you know that you know (...)
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  • Externalism, Skepticism and Epistemic Luck.Zivan Lazovic - 2011 - Filozofija I Društvo 22 (1):89-102.
    This paper deals with the concept of epistemic luck and its place within wider philosophical debates on knowledge and skepticism. Philosophers involved in these debates share an intuition that knowledge excludes luck. Starting from Prichard’s modal definition of luck and his distinction between two varieties of epistemic luck, namely veridic and reflective, the paper explores the internalist and externalist prospects for avoiding epistemic luck and skepticism. Externalism seems to be capable of both coping with the Gettier-type cases and eliminating at (...)
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