This book draws on Iris Murdoch's philosophy to explore questions related to the importance of attention in ethics. In doing so, it also engages with Murdoch's ideas about the existence of a moral reality, the importance of love, and the necessity but also the difficulty, for most of us, of fighting against our natural self-centred tendencies. Why is attention important to morality? This book argues that many moral failures and moral achievements can be explained by attention. Not only our actions (...) and choices, but the possibilities we choose among, and even the meaning what we perceive, are to a large extent determined by whether we pay attention, and what we attend do. In this way, the book argues that attention is fundamental, though often overlooked, in morality. While the book's discussion of attention revolves primarily around Murdoch's thought, it also engages significantly with Simone Weil, who introduced the concept of attention in a spiritual context. The book also engages with contemporary debates concerning moral perception and motivation, empirical psychology, animal ethics, and Buddhist philosophy. The Ethics of Attention will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on Iris Murdoch, Simone Weil, ethics and moral psychology, and the philosophy of attention. (shrink)

Hume’s Treatise, Enquiries and Essays contain plentiful material for an investigation into the moral nature of other animals and our moral relations to them. In particular, Hume pays considerable attention to animal minds. He also argues that moral judgment is grounded in sympathy. As sympathy is shared by humans and some other animals, this already hints at the possibility that some animals are morally considerable, even if they are not moral agents. Most contributions to the literature on animal ethics assume (...) one of the big three normative theories as their starting point; consequentialism, deontology or neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. However, as several philosophers have argued, Hume’s discussion of animals suggests a distinctive, alternative approach. I defend and develop this sort of view, building from the ground up via a careful study of Hume’s texts. In particular, I pay close attention to the operations of sympathy and the correctness conditions for moral judgments based on our sympathetic responsiveness to animal minds, addressing a number of interpretative puzzles and difficulties along the way. The result is an outline of an approach to animal ethics that is grounded in a general philosophy of nature, a naturalistic methodology and broadly plausible psychological assumptions. (shrink)

Love is a difficult emotion to define. Some suggest that it should not be intellectualized too meticulously lest its nuances be lost (Hamilton, 2006) or that it escapes analytic definitions altoget...

Artikkelissani syvennyn Elisa Aaltolan teoksen Varieties of Empathy avaamiin kysymyksiin empatian luonteesta ja merkityksistä. Analysoin Aaltolan tapaa jakaa empatia erilaisiin muotoihin ja kysyn, tuleeko nämä muodot ymmärtää toisensa poissulkevina vai osittain päällekkäisinä kategorioina. Tämän lisäksi pohdin, missä määrin empatia voidaan jäsentää yhtäältä ”hyväksi ja hyödylliseksi” tai vaihtoehtoisesti ”pahaksi ja haitalliseksi”, ja voidaanko empatiaa ”käyttää” tahdonalaisesti, kuten kirjassa esitetään, vai onko se väistämätön ja jossakin määrin hallitsematon osa ruumiillista olemassaoloa. Kysyn myös, onko eläinten hyväksikäytössä kysymys oikeanlaisen empatian puutteesta vai sen ohella (...) tai sen sijaan kulttuuriin ja elettyyn ruumiiseen monin eri tavoin laskostuneista tottumuksista, arvoista ja hierarkioista. Lopuksi kuvaan husserlilaista erottelua alkuperäisen ja ei-alkuperäisen kokemuksen välillä sekä erittelen laajemminkin fenomenologisia empatiakäsityksiä, joita käsitellään kirjan luvussa “Embodied Empathy”. Argumentoin, että fenomenologinen empatiaperinne on ymmärrettävä viime kädessä heterogeenisenä, vaikka ruumiin ilmaisevuuden korostus yhdistääkin eri ajattelijoita sen piirissä. Tässä yhteydessä esitän myös oman tulkintani Edith Steinin fenomenologisesta empatiakäsityksestä. (shrink)