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Virtue in argument

Argumentation 24 (2):165-179 (2010)

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  1. Deep Disagreement and Patience as an Argumentative Virtue.Kathryn Phillips - 2021 - Informal Logic 41 (1):107-130.
    During a year when there is much tumult around the world and in the United States in particular, it might be surprising to encounter a paper about patience and argumentation. In this paper, I explore the notion of deep disagreement, with an eye to moral and political contexts in particular, in order to motivate the idea that patience is an argumentative virtue that we ought to cultivate. This is particularly so because of the extended nature of argumentation and the slow (...)
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  • Editor's Note.Tracy Bowell - 2021 - Informal Logic 41 (1):81-106.
    In this paper, I consider whether there are limits to virtuous argumentation in certain situations. I consider three types of cases: 1) arguing against denier discourses, 2) arguing with people who make bigoted claims, and 3) cases in which marginalised people are expected to exercise virtues of argument from a position of limited agency. For each type of case, I look at where limits to arguing responsibly might be drawn. I argue that there are situations in which we might withdraw (...)
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  • Recognizing Argument Types and Adding Missing Reasons.Christoph Lumer - 2019 - In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell & Jean Wagemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Amsterdam (Netherlands): pp. 769-777.
    The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...)
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  • The Vices of Argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):413-422.
    What should a virtue theory of argumentation say about fallacious reasoning? If good arguments are virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of bad argumentation to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through analysis of several fallacies, with particular emphasis (...)
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  • Virtuous Norms for Visual Arguers.Andrew Aberdein - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (1):1-23.
    This paper proposes that virtue theories of argumentation and theories of visual argumentation can be of mutual assistance. An argument that adoption of a virtue approach provides a basis for rejecting the normative independence of visual argumentation is presented and its premisses analysed. This entails an independently valuable clarification of the contrasting normative presuppositions of the various virtue theories of argumentation. A range of different kinds of visual argument are examined, and it is argued that they may all be successfully (...)
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  • Adversarial Listening in Argumentation.Jeffrey Davis & David Godden - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.
    Adversariality in argumentation is typically theorized as inhering in, and applying to, the interactional roles of proponent and opponent that arguers occupy. This paper considers the kinds of adversariality located in the conversational roles arguers perform while arguing—specifically listening. It begins by contending that the maximally adversarial arguer is an arguer who refuses to listen to reason by refusing to listen to another’s reasons. It proceeds to consider a list of lousy listeners in order to illustrate the variety of ways (...)
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  • The Virtuous Troll: Argumentative Virtues in the Age of (Technologically Enhanced) Argumentative Pluralism.Daniel H. Cohen - 2017 - Philosophy and Technology 30 (2):179-189.
    Technology has made argumentation rampant. We can argue whenever we want. With social media venues for every interest, we can also argue about whatever we want. To some extent, we can select our opponents and audiences to argue with whomever we want. And we can argue however we want, whether in carefully reasoned, article-length expositions, real-time exchanges, or 140-character polemics. The concepts of arguing, arguing well, and even being an arguer have evolved with this new multiplicity and diversity; theory needs (...)
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  • Why Be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher?Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Axiomathes 26 (2):205-218.
    In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in (...)
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  • Other-Regarding Virtues and Their Place in Virtue Argumentation Theory.Felipe Oliveira de Sousa - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (3):317-357.
    In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only enriches the field of research of virtue argumentation theory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully virtuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should be concerned both with (...)
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  • Arguments with Losers.Andrew Aberdein - 2016 - Florida Philosophical Review 16 (1):1-11.
  • Why Simpler Arguments Are Better.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (3):247-261.
    In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, I argue that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over less simple ones. I sketch three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule.
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  • Intellectual Humility, Confidence, and Argumentation.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):395-402.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship of virtue, argumentation, and philosophical conduct by considering the role of the specific virtue of intellectual humility in the practice of philosophical argumentation. I have three aims: first, to sketch an account of this virtue; second, to argue that it can be cultivated by engaging in argumentation with others; and third, to problematize this claim by drawing upon recent data from social psychology. My claim is that philosophical argumentation can be conducive to the (...)
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  • Argumentation and the Challenge of Time: Perelman, Temporality, and the Future of Argument.Blake D. Scott - 2020 - Argumentation 34 (1):25-37.
    Central to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s philosophical revival of rhetoric and dialectic is the importance given to the temporal character of argumentation. Unlike demonstration, situated within the “empty time” of a single instant, the authors of The New Rhetoric understand argumentation as an action that unfolds within the “full time” of meaningful human life. By taking a broader view of his work beyond The New Rhetoric, I first outline Perelman’s understanding of time and temporality and the challenge that it poses for (...)
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  • Inquiry: A New Paradigm for Critical Thinking.Mark Battersby (ed.) - 2018 - Windsor, Canada: Windsor Studies in Argumentation.
    This volume reflects the development and theoretical foundation of a new paradigm for critical thinking based on inquiry. The field of critical thinking, as manifested in the Informal Logic movement, developed primarily as a response to the inadequacies of formalism to represent actual argumentative practice and to provide useful argumentative skills to students. Because of this, the primary focus of the field has been on informal arguments rather than formal reasoning. Yet the formalist history of the field is still evident (...)
     
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  • “That’s Unhelpful, Harmful and Offensive!” Epistemic and Ethical Concerns with Meta-Argument Allegations.Hugh Breakey - forthcoming - Argumentation:1-20.
    “Meta-argument allegations” consist of protestations that an interlocutor’s speech is wrongfully offensive or will trigger undesirable social consequences. Such protestations are meta-argument in the sense that they do not interrogate the soundness of an opponent’s argumentation, but instead focus on external features of that argument. They are allegations because they imply moral wrongdoing. There is a legitimate place for meta-argument allegations, and the moral and epistemic goods that can come from them will be front of mind for those levelling such (...)
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  • Just Following the Rules: Collapse / Incoherence Problems in Ethics, Epistemology, and Argumentation Theory.Patrick Bondy - 2020 - In J. Anthony Blair & Christopher Tindale (eds.), Rigour and Reason: Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen. Windsor, ON, Canada: pp. 172-202.
    This essay addresses the collapse/incoherence problem for normative frameworks that contain both fundamental values and rules for promoting those values. The problem is that in some cases, we would bring about more of the fundamental value by violating the framework’s rules than by following them. In such cases, if the framework requires us to follow the rules anyway, then it appears to be incoherent; but if it allows us to make exceptions to the rules, then the framework “collapses” into one (...)
     
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  • Agente crítico, democracia deliberativa y el acto de dar razones.Cristián Santibáñez - 2020 - Co-herencia 17 (32):37-65.
    El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer un concepto de agente crítico que dialogue con una práctica democrática deliberativa, considerando qué significa el acto de dar razones. Para tal efecto, en este trabajo se discute, primero, qué significaría ser crítico o tender hacia la criticidad tanto autorreferente como hacia terceros. Esta sección está apoyada principalmente con ideas provenientes de la teoría de la argumentación y de la lógica informal. En segundo término, se aborda el concepto de democracia deliberativa a la (...)
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  • The Roles We Make Others Take: Thoughts on the Ethics of Arguing.Katharina Stevens - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):693-709.
    Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of (...)
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  • Teaching Critical Thinking Virtues and Vices.Stuart Hanscomb - 2019 - Teaching Philosophy 42 (3):173-195.
    In the film and play Twelve Angry Men, Juror 8 confronts the prejudices and poor reasoning of his fellow jurors, exhibiting an unwavering capacity not just to formulate and challenge arguments, but to be open-minded, stay calm, tolerate uncertainty, and negotiate in the face of considerable group pressures. In a perceptive and detailed portrayal of a group deliberation a ‘wheel of virtue’ is presented by the characters of Twelve Angry Men that allows for critical thinking virtues and vices to be (...)
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  • Virtudes y vicios argumentativos: A veinte años de Vértigos argumentales, de Carlos Pereda.Mario Gensollen - 2014 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 47:159-196.
    El objetivo de este artículo consiste en analizar la importancia y la relevancia del pensamiento de Carlos Pereda en la teoría de la argumentación, haciendo hincapié en su obra titulada Vértigos Argumentales, que tiene como propósito central la defensa de una razón enfática, no libre de incertidumbre, pero tampoco de objetividad. Teniendo en mente que la teoría de la argumentación de Carlos Pereda colinda con su concepción de racionalidad, el autor recurre al análisis de temas que se entrecruzan, tales como (...)
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  • Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?Gascón José Ángel - unknown
    While, in common usage, objectivity is usually regarded as a virtue, and failures to be objective as vices, this concept tends to be absent in argumentation theory. This paper will explore the possibility of taking objectivity as an argumentative virtue. Several problems immediately arise: could objectivity be understood in positive terms— not only as mere absence of bias? Is it an attainable ideal? Or perhaps objectivity could be explained as a combination of other virtues?
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  • Commentary on Explicating and Negotiating Bias in Interdisciplinary Argumentation Using Abductive Tools.Tracy A. Bowell - unknown
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  • Attacking Character: Ad Hominem Argument and Virtue Epistemology.Heather Battaly - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (4):361-390.
    The recent literature on ad hominem argument contends that the speaker’s character is sometimes relevant to evaluating what she says. This effort to redeem ad hominems requires an analysis of character that explains why and how character is relevant. I argue that virtue epistemology supplies this analysis. Three sorts of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s intellectual character are legitimate. They attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of responsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform intellectually (...)
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  • DAMed If You Do; DAMed If You Don’T: Cohen’s “Missed Opportunities”.Bailin Sharon & Battersby Mark - unknown
    In his paper, “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation,” Daniel Cohen has in his sights a “curious” asymmetry in how we evaluate arguments: while we criticize arguments for failing to point out obvious objections to the proposed line of reasoning, we do not consider it critically culpable to fail to take into account arguments for the position. Cohen views this omission as a missed opportunity, for which he lays the blame largely at the metaphorical feet of the “Dominant Adversarial Model” of (...)
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  • The Virtues of Dissoi Logoi.Victor Ferry - unknown
    My claim is that rhetorical training is required to develop citizenship skills. I illustrate this claim by focussing on dissociation of notions, that is, a rhetorical technique that citizens might have to use in their civic life. After distinguishing a rhetorical and a normative approach to dissociation, I argue that dissoi logoi, as an exercise invented by the Sophists, offer a relevant training to master this technique.
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  • Critical Thinking and the Argumentational and Epistemic Virtues.Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury - unknown
    In this paper we argue that while a full-blown virtue-theoretical account of argumentation is implausible, there is scope for augmenting a conventional account of argument by taking a character-oriented turn. We then discuss the characteristics of the good epistemic citizen, and consider approaches to nurturing these characteristics in critical thinking students, in the hope of addressing the problem of lack of transfer of critical thinking skills to the world outside the classroom.
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  • Willingness to Inquire: The Cardinal Critical Thinking Virtue.Benjamin Hamby - unknown
    Critical thinking skills have associated critical thinking virtues, and the internal motivation to carefully examine an issue in an effort to reach a reasoned judgment, what I call the “willingness to inquire”, is the critical thinking virtue that stands behind all skilled and virtuous thinking that contributes to critical thinking. In this paper, I argue that the willingness to inquire is therefore a more primary critical thinking virtue than charity, open-mindedness, or valuing fallacious-free reasoning.
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  • The Epistemic Approach to Argument Evaluation: Virtues, Beliefs, Commitments.Patrick Bondy - 2013
    This paper discusses virtue argumentation theory, as modeled on virtue epistemology. It argues that virtues of argumentation are interesting but parasitic on a more fundamental account of what makes arguments good. -/- *Note: this is an unpublished manuscript presented at the 2013 conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. An electronic copy is available in the Conference Archive, linked above.
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  • The Ethics of Argumentation.Vasco Correia - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (2):222-241.
    Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of argumentative discourse. Yet, in everyday debates people use arguments that seem valid in light of such rules but nonetheless biased and tendentious. This article seeks to show that the rationality of argumentation can only be fully promoted if we take into account its ethical dimension. To substantiate this claim, I review some of the empirical evidence indicating that people’s inferential reasoning is systematically (...)
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  • Critical Thinking in Moral Argumentation Contexts: A Virtue Ethical Approach.Michelle Ciurria - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (2):242-258.
    In traditional analytic philosophy, critical thinking is defined along Cartesian lines as rational and linear reasoning preclusive of intuitions, emotions and lived experience. According to Michael Gilbert, this view – which he calls the Natural Light Theory (NLT) – fails because it arbitrarily excludes standard feminist forms of argumentation and neglects the essentially social nature of argumentation. In this paper, I argue that while Gilbert’s criticism is correct for argumentation in general, NLT fails in a distinctive and particularly problematic manner (...)
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  • Commentary on Patrick Bondy, “Bias in Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”.Andrew Aberdein - 2016 - Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016.
  • La virtud abductiva y la regla de introducción de hipótesis en deducción natural.Alejandro Ramírez Figueroa - 2014 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 26 (39):487.
    Desde que Peirce la creara, la naturaleza de la inferencia abductiva ha sido interpretada de muchas maneras. Se analizan tres interpretaciones de ella y algunas de sus derivaciones, para luego examinar la posibilidad de considerar la abducción como una virtud argumentativa, de carácter cognitivo, en consonancia con las teorías actuales de las virtudes epistemológicas surgidas a partir de la obra de E. Sosa y de las virtudes argumentativas según A. Aberdein. Sobre la base de dicha interpretación se propone que la (...)
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  • Biases and Fallacies.Vasco Correia - 2011 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 3 (1):107-126.
    This paper focuses on the effects of motivational biases on the way people reason and debate in everyday life. Unlike heuristics and cognitive biases, motivational biases are typically caused by the influence of a desire or an emotion on the cognitive processes involved in judgmental and inferential reasoning. In line with the ‘motivational’ account of irrationality, I argue that these biases are the cause of a number of fallacies that ordinary arguers commit unintentionally, particularly when the commitment to a given (...)
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  • Visual Arguments and Meta-Arguments.Ian J. Dove - unknown
    Visual arguments—arguments that appeal to visual elements essentially—are legitimate arguments. To show this, I first consider what I call fit arguments—arguments in which the recognition that items fit together suggests that they were once conjoined, perhaps originally. This form of argumentation is a type of abduction or inference to the best explanation. I then consider mathematical visual meta-arguments—arguments in which the validity or soundness of a mathematical argument is confirmed or refuted by appeal to diagrams.
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  • Virtue and Argument: Taking Character Into Account.Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (1):22-32.
    In this paper we consider the prospects for an account of good argument that takes the character of the arguer into consideration. We conclude that although there is much to be gained by identifying the virtues of the good arguer and by considering the ways in which these virtues can be developed in ourselves and in others, virtue argumentation theory does not offer a plausible alternative definition of good argument.
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  • Virtuous Arguers: Responsible and Reliable.José Gascón - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):155-173.
    Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from such traits the quality of arguments does not immediately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad arguments. How could virtue argumentation theory combine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both responsibilist and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller picture of the virtuous arguer.
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  • Reasoning and Arguing, Dialectically and Dialogically, Among Individual and Multiple Participants.Michael Baumtrog - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (1):77-98.
    Within three of the most well-known contemporary approaches to argumentation, the notions of solo argumentation and arguing with one’s self are given little attention and are typically argued to be able to be subsumed within the dialectical aspects of the approach being propounded. Challenging these claims, this paper has two main aims. The first is to argue that while dialogical argumentation may be most common, there exists individual dialectical argumentation, which is not so easily subsumed within these theories. Second, in (...)
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  • Brothers in Arms: Virtue and Pragma-Dialectics.José Gascón - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (4):705-724.
    Virtue argumentation theory focuses on the arguers’ character, whereas pragma-dialectics focuses on argumentation as a procedure. In this paper I attempt to explain that both theories are not opposite approaches to argumentation. I argue that, with the help of some non-fundamental changes in pragma-dialectics and some restrictions in virtue argumentation theory, it is possible to regard these theories as complementary approaches to the argumentative practice.
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  • Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth?Jack Kwong - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-mindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to defend open-mindedness against these challenges. In (...)
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  • Open-Mindedness as a Critical Virtue.Jack Kwong - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):403-411.
    This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen’s recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with special attention given to his explication of how open-mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a contentious claim about open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or who strive to be both). I contend that this tension can be eased or resolved (...)
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  • Virtue and Arguers.José Gascón - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):441-450.
    Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible without committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is affirmative, provided that the object study of our theory is well delimited. My proposal is that a theory of argumentative virtue should not focus on argument appraisal, as has been assumed, but on those traits that make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative practices. An agent-based approach in argumentation should be developed, not in order to find better grounds for argument appraisal, but to gain (...)
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  • Virtue, In Context.Daniel H. Cohen - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (4):471-485.
    Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of an argument that is “fully satisfying” in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an argument’s participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn, requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context.
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  • Commentary On: Katharina von Radziewsky's "The Virtuous Arguer: One Person, Four Characters".Daniel H. Cohen - 2013 - In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewinsky (eds.), Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society forthe Study of Argumentation. OSSA.
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  • Fallacy and Argumentational Vice.Andrew Aberdein - 2013 - In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewinski (eds.), Virtues of argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA.
    If good argument is virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of fallacies to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through case studies of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad hominem.
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  • Courageous Arguments and Deep Disagreements.Andrew Aberdein - forthcoming - Topoi:1-8.
    Deep disagreements are characteristically resistant to rational resolution. This paper explores the contribution a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation can make towards settling the practical matter of what to do when confronted with apparent deep disagreement, with particular attention to the virtue of courage.
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  • Reply to Commentary on “Patrick Bondy, Bias in Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”.Patrick Bondy - unknown
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  • Evaluating Narrative Arguments.Al Tamimi Khameiel - unknown
    This paper addresses the question of how to evaluate narrative arguments. I will be discussing how to evaluate narrative arguments as process as opposed to arguments as product, as with dominant accounts of argument appraisal such as informal logic. The first part of this paper will show that dominant accounts of argument evaluation are not fit for narrative arguments because they focus on the product of argument. The second part of the paper will develop an account of argument evaluation for (...)
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  • Bias in Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments.Bondy Patrick - unknown
    This paper is about bias and ad hominem arguments. It will begin by rehearsing some reasons for thinking that there are both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominems, as well as reasons for thinking that biases can be both justified and unjustified. It will explain that justified biases about people with certain social identities can give rise to both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem attacks, while unjustified biases only give rise to illegitimate ad hominems. The paper will then describe Audrey Yap’s (...)
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  • In Defence of Virtue: The Legitimacy of Agent-Based Argument Appraisal.Andrew Aberdein - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (1):77-93.
    Several authors have recently begun to apply virtue theory to argumentation. Critics of this programme have suggested that no such theory can avoid committing an ad hominem fallacy. This criticism is shown to trade unsuccessfully on an ambiguity in the definition of ad hominem. The ambiguity is resolved and a virtue-theoretic account of ad hominem reasoning is defended.
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  • The Virtuous Arguer: One Person, Four Characters.Katharina von Radziewsky - unknown
    When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument, we soon find ourselves confronted with a puzzling situation: What seems to be a virtue in one argumentative situation could very well be called a vice in another. This talk will present the idea that there are in fact two roles an arguer has to master – and with them four sometimes very different sets of virtues.
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