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The Bounds of Cognition

Wiley-Blackwell (2008)

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  1. Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject.Barbara Trybulec - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 40 (1):111-128.
    The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and (...)
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  • Sketch This: Extended Mind and Consciousness Extension.Victor Loughlin - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):41-50.
    This paper will defend the claim that, under certain circumstances, the material vehicles responsible for an agent’s conscious experience can be partly constituted by processes outside the agent’s body. In other words, the consciousness of the agent can extend. This claim will be supported by the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) example of the artist and their sketchpad (Clark 2001, 2003). It will be argued that if this example is one of EMT, then this example also supports an argument for consciousness (...)
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  • Seeing Mind in Action.Joel Krueger - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
    Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view (...)
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  • A Review of Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, the Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):267-273.
    In The Bounds of Cognition, Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa treat the arguments for extended cognition to withering criticism. I summarize their main arguments and focus special attention on their distinction between the extended cognitive system hypothesis and the extended cognition hypothesis, as well as on their demand for a mark of the mental.
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  • Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body.Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith & Frédérique Vignemont - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
    Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight (...)
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  • In Search of Clarity About Parity. [REVIEW]Michael Wheeler - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):417 - 425.
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  • Scientific Knowledge and Extended Epistemic Virtues.Linton Wang & Wei-Fen Ma - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):273-295.
    This paper investigates the applicability of reliabilism to scientific knowledge, and especially focuses on two doubts about the applicability: one about its difficulty in accounting for the epistemological role of scientific instruments, and the other about scientific theories. To respond to the two doubts, we extend virtue reliabilism, a reliabilist-based virtue epistemology, with a distinction of two types of epistemic virtues and the extended mind thesis from Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58:7–19, 1998 ). We also present a case study on (...)
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  • Mind the Notebook.Gloria Andrada - 2019 - Synthese 1:1-20.
    According to the Extended knowledge dilemma, first formulated by Clark (Synthese 192:3757–3775, 2015) and subsequently reformulated by Carter et al. (in: Carter, Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, Pritchard (eds) Extended epistemology, Oxford Univer- sity Press, Oxford, pp 331–351, 2018a), an agent’s interaction with a device can either give rise to knowledge or extended cognition, but not both at the same time. The dilemma rests on two substantive commitments: first, that knowledge by a subject requires that the subject be aware to some extent (...)
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  • Symbiotic Cognition as an Alternative for Socially Extended Cognition.Marc Slors - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-25.
    ABSTRACTAccording to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and processes in the context of social institutions should be characterized as socially extended cognition. However, this idea invokes...
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  • Extended Cognition, The New Mechanists’ Mutual Manipulability Criterion, and The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness.Beate Krickel - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Many authors have turned their attention to the notion of constitution to determine whether the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) is true. One common strategy is to make sense of constitution in terms of the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability account (MM). In this paper I will show that MM is insufficient. The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive behaviors are extended in a way that should not count as verifying EC. This challenge can (...)
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  • Flesh Matters: The Body in Cognition.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (1):3-20.
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  • Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied, Embedded Mind.Andy Clark - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):37–59.
    Mind, it is increasingly fashionable to assert, is an intrinsically embodied and environmentally embedded phenomenon. But there is a potential tension between two strands of thought prominent in this recent literature. One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine details of a creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the nature of its mind: a kind of new-wave body-centrism. The other depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal-partners dance between brain, body (...)
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  • In Defence of Embodied Cognition: A Reply to Fred Adams.Christopher Letheby - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):403-414.
    Fred Adams : 619–628, 2010) criticizes the theory of embodied cognition which holds that conceptual and linguistic thought is grounded in the brain’s perceptual and sensorimotor systems. Among other things, Adams claims that: EC is potentially committed to an implausible criterion of sentence meaningfulness; EC lacks claimed advantages over rival accounts of conceptual thought; relevant experimental data do not show constitutive, but only causal, involvement of perception in conception; and EC cannot account for the comprehension of abstract concepts. I respond (...)
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  • Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]Robert D. Rupert - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):113-123.
  • Varieties of Cognitive Integration.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2019 - Noûs.
    Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in (...)
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  • Minding One's Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit?Robert Rupert - 2005 - Episteme 1 (3):177-188.
    The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or (...)
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  • Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind.Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological (...)
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  • Friends with Benefits! Distributed Cognition Hooks Up Cognitive and Social Conceptions of Science.P. D. Magnus & Ron McClamrock - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1114-1127.
    One approach to science treats science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals and defines a scientific community as an aggregate of individual inquirers. Another treats science as a fundamentally collective endeavor and defines a scientist as a member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot, (...)
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  • Cognitive Spread: Under What Conditions Does the Mind Extend Beyond the Body?Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):420-438.
    The extended mind hypothesis (EMH) is the claim that the mind can and does extend beyond the human body. Adams and Aizawa (A&A) contend that arguments for EMH commit a ‘coupling constitution fallacy’. We deny that the master argument for EMH commits such a fallacy. But we think that there is an important question lurking behind A&A's allegation: under what conditions is cognition spread across a tightly coupled system? Building on some suggestions from Haugeland, we contend that the system must (...)
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  • Contingent Transcranialism and Deep Functional Cognitive Integration: The Case of Human Emotional Ontogenesis.Jennifer Greenwood - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):420-436.
    Contingent transcranialists claim that the physical mechanisms of mind are not exclusively intracranial and that genuine cognitive systems can extend into cognizers' physical and socio-cultural environments. They further claim that extended cognitive systems must include the deep functional integration of external environmental resources with internal neural resources. They have found it difficult, however, to explicate the precise nature of such deep functional integration and provide compelling examples of it. Contingent intracranialists deny that extracranial resources can be components of genuine extended (...)
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  • The Role of Theory-Constitutive Metaphor in Nursing Science.Jennifer Greenwood & Ann Bonner - 2008 - Nursing Philosophy 9 (3):154-168.
    The current view of theoretical statements in science is that they should be literal and precise; ambiguous and metaphorical statements are useful only as pre-theoretical, exegetical, and heuristic devices and as pedagogical tools. In this paper we argue that this view is mistaken. Literal, precise statements apply to those experiential phenomena which can be defined either conventionally by criterial attribution or by internal atomic constitution. Experiential phenomena which are defined relationally and/or functionally, like nursing, in virtue of their nature, require (...)
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  • Emotions Beyond Brain and Body.Achim Stephan, Sven Walter & Wendy Wilutzky - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-17.
    The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make (...)
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  • “Scaffolding” and “Affordance” as Integrative Concepts in the Cognitive Sciences.Anna Estany & Sergio Martínez - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-14.
    There are (at least) two ways to think of the differences in basic concepts and typologies that one can find in the different scientific practices that constitute a research tradition. One is the fundamentalist view: the fewer the better. The other is a non-fundamentalist view of science whereby the integration of different concepts into the right abstraction grounds an explanation that is not grounded as the sum of the explanations supported by the parts. Integrative concepts are often associated with idealizations (...)
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  • Situating Distributed Cognition.Lisa M. Osbeck & Nancy J. Nersessian - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-16.
    We historically and conceptually situate distributed cognition by drawing attention to important similarities in assumptions and methods with those of American ?functional psychology? as it emerged in contrast and complement to controlled laboratory study of the structural components and primitive ?elements? of consciousness. Functional psychology foregrounded the adaptive features of cognitive processes in environments, and adopted as a unit of analysis the overall situation of organism and environment. A methodological implication of this emphasis was, to the extent possible, the study (...)
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  • Ten Questions Concerning Extended Cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):19-33.
    This paper considers ten questions that those puzzled by or skeptical of extended cognition have posed. Discussion of these questions ranges across substantive, methodological, and dialectical issues in the ongoing debate over extended cognition, such as whether the issue between proponents and opponents of extended cognition is merely semantic or a matter of convention; whether extended cognition should be treated in the same way as extended biology; and whether conscious mental states pose a special problem for the extended mind thesis. (...)
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  • Dimensions of Integration in Embedded and Extended Cognitive Systems.Richard Heersmink - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):577-598.
    The complementary properties and functions of cognitive artifacts and other external resources are integrated into the human cognitive system to varying degrees. The goal of this paper is to develop some of the tools to conceptualize this complementary integration between agents and artifacts. It does so by proposing a multidimensional framework, including the dimensions of information flow, reliability, durability, trust, procedural transparency, informational transparency, individualization, and transformation. The proposed dimensions are all matters of degree and jointly they constitute a multidimensional (...)
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  • Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.
    Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
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  • Lessons and New Directions for Extended Cognition From Social and Personality Psychology.Joshua August Skorburg - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):458-480.
    This paper aims to expand the range of empirical work relevant to the extended cognition debates. First, I trace the historical development of the person-situation debate in social and personality psychology and the extended cognition debate in the philosophy of mind. Next, I highlight some instructive similarities between the two and consider possible objections to my comparison. I then argue that the resolution of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism lends support for an analogously interactionist conception of extended cognition. (...)
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  • Bodily Skill and Internal Representation in Sensorimotor Perception.David Silverman - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):157-173.
    The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience claims that perception is constituted by bodily interaction with the environment, drawing on practical knowledge of the systematic ways that sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement. Despite the theory’s associations with enactivism, it is sometimes claimed that the appeal to ‘knowledge’ means that the theory is committed to giving an essential theoretical role to internal representation, and therefore to a form of orthodox cognitive science. This paper defends the role (...)
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  • What Is Left of the Active Externalism Debate?Victor Loughlin & Karim Zahidi - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1614-1639.
    Since the publication of Clark and Chalmers' Extended Mind paper, the central claims of that paper, viz. the thesis that cognitive processes and cognitive or mental states extend beyond the brain and body, have been vigorously debated within philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Both defenders and detractors of these claims have since marshalled an impressive battery of arguments for and against “active externalism.” However, despite the amount of philosophical energy expended, this debate remains far from settled. We (...)
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  • Collaborative Memory Knowledge: A Distributed Reliabilist Perspective.Kourken Michaelian & Santiago Arango-Munoz - 2018 - In M. Meade, C. B. Harris, P. van Bergen, J. Sutton & A. J. Barnier (eds.), Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications. Oxford University Press. pp. 231-247.
  • Explanatory Power of Extended Cognition.Samuli Pöyhönen - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):735-759.
    I argue that examining the explanatory power of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) offers a fruitful approach to the problem of cognitive system demarcation. Although in the discussions on HEC it has become common to refer to considerations of explanatory power as a means for assessing the plausibility of the extended cognition approach, to date no satisfying account of explanatory power has been presented in the literature. I suggest that the currently most prominent theory of explanation in the special (...)
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  • Mental Muscles and the Extended Will.Tillmann Vierkant - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):1-9.
    In the wake of Clark and Chalmers famous argument for extended cognition some people have argued that willpower equally can extend into the environment (e.g. Heath and Anderson in The thief of time: philosophical essays on procrastination. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 233–252, 2010). In a recent paper Fabio Paglieri (Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 179–206, 2012) provides an interesting argument to the effect that there might (...)
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  • Against Smallism And Localism.Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira & Anthony Chemero - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):9-23.
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  • Embodying the Mind by Extending It.Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):33-51.
    To subscribe to the embodied mind (or embodiment) framework is to reject the view that an individual’s mind is realized by her brain alone. As Clark ( 2008a ) has argued, there are two ways to subscribe to embodiment: bodycentrism (BC) and the extended mind (EM) thesis. According to BC, an embodied mind is a two-place relation between an individual’s brain and her non-neural bodily anatomy. According to EM, an embodied mind is a threeplace relation between an individual’s brain, her (...)
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  • Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body.Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith & Frédérique de Vignemont - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
    Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight (...)
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  • Extended Consciousness: An Interim Report.Michael Wheeler - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1):155-175.
  • Is My Memory an Extended Notebook?Paul Loader - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):167-184.
    Clark and Chalmer’s conception of spatially extended memory is underpinned by an objectified conception of biological memory. To the extent that this can be identified with a ‘storage’ approach to memory, criticisms of it are well known and an alternative approach, perhaps more suited to an enactive account of cognition, might be one which focuses on remembering as a type of action. In the Otto story the objectification of memory is apparent not only in C&C’s characterization of the notebook but (...)
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  • Distributed Learning: Educating and Assessing Extended Cognitive Systems.Richard Heersmink & Simon Knight - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):969-990.
    Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plus-artifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualising how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalising cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on how (...)
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  • Complexity and Extended Phenomenological‐Cognitive Systems.Michael Silberstein & Anthony Chemero - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):35-50.
    The complex systems approach to cognitive science invites a new understanding of extended cognitive systems. According to this understanding, extended cognitive systems are heterogenous, composed of brain, body, and niche, non-linearly coupled to one another. This view of cognitive systems, as non-linearly coupled brain–body–niche systems, promises conceptual and methodological advances. In this article we focus on two of these. First, the fundamental interdependence among brain, body, and niche makes it possible to explain extended cognition without invoking representations or computation. Second, (...)
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  • A Property Cluster Theory of Cognition.Cameron Buckner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-30.
    Our prominent definitions of cognition are too vague and lack empirical grounding. They have not kept up with recent developments, and cannot bear the weight placed on them across many different debates. I here articulate and defend a more adequate theory. On this theory, behaviors under the control of cognition tend to display a cluster of characteristic properties, a cluster which tends to be absent from behaviors produced by non-cognitive processes. This cluster is reverse-engineered from the empirical tests that comparative (...)
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  • The Holy Grail of Cognitivism: A Response to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW]Richard Menary - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):605-618.
    Adams and Aizawa (2010b) define cognitivism as the processing of representations with underived content. In this paper, I respond to their use of this stipulative definition of cognition. I look at the plausibility of Adams and Aizawa’s cognitivism, taking into account that they have no criteria for cognitive representation and no naturalistic theory of content determination. This is a glaring hole in their cognitivism—which requires both a theory of representation and underived content to be successful. I also explain why my (...)
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  • Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition, and the Extended Mind.John Sutton - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):281-289.
    I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, Je´roˆme Dokic, Richard Menary, Jenann Ismael, Sue Campbell, Doris McIlwain, and Mark Rowlands. This paper explains the motivation for an alliance between the sciences of memory and the extended mind hypothesis. It examines in turn the role of worldly, social, and internalized forms of scaffolding to memory and cognition, and also highlights themes relating to affect, agency, and individual differences.
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  • Cognitive Spread: Under What Conditions Does the Mind Extend Beyond the Body?Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):420-438.
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  • Radical Predictive Processing.Andy Clark - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1):3-27.
  • Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):753-772.
    Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are _in principle_ incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the _prima facie_ appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition _nor_ the extended mind theses are in principle (...)
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  • Extended Emotion.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
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  • Active Externalism, Virtue Reliabilism and Scientific Knowledge.Spyridon Palermos - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2955-2986.
    Combining active externalism in the form of the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses with virtue reliabilism can provide the long sought after link between mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science. Specifically, by reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition, we can account for scientific knowledge produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts. Additionally, by bringing the distributed cognition hypothesis within the picture, we can introduce the notion of epistemic group agents, (...)
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  • The Mindsized Mashup Mind Isn't Supersized After All.Susan A. J. Stuart - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):174-183.
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  • What’s New About Embodied Cognition?Lawrence Shapiro - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).