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  1. Representation and Extension in Consciousness Studies.Zsuzsanna Kondor - 2017 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 8 (1):209-227.
    Various theories suggest conscious phenomena are based exclusively on brain activity, while others regard them as a result of the interaction between embodied agents and their environment. In this paper, I will consider whether this divergence entails the acceptance of the fact that different theories can be applied in different scales, or if they are reconcilable. I will suggest that investigating how the term representation is used can reveal some hints, building upon which we can bridge the gulf between the (...)
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  • Representing the Impossible.Jennifer Matey - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
    A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the sensory receptors. According to the active-externalist theory of perception, amodal perception depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper focuses on amodal visual perception and presents a counter-example to the idea that active-externalism can account for amodal perception. The counterexample involves the experience of (...)
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  • What is This Cognition That is Supposed to Be Embodied?Ken Aizawa - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):755-775.
    Many cognitive scientists have recently championed the thesis that cognition is embodied. In principle, explicating this thesis should be relatively simple. There are, essentially, only two concepts involved: cognition and embodiment. After articulating what will here be meant by ‘embodiment’, this paper will draw attention to cases in which some advocates of embodied cognition apparently do not mean by ‘cognition’ what has typically been meant by ‘cognition’. Some advocates apparently mean to use ‘cognition’ not as a term for one, among (...)
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